# (PC) White v. Decker

> District Court, E.D. California · October 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10637651

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** October 2, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10637651

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and 20 destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate 21 grievances
- discussing the development of cases concerning a prisoner’s right of access to the 5 courts
- emphasizing 24 that a temporary delay or isolated incident of delay of mail does not violate a prisoner's First 25 Amendment rights
- finding that a retaliatory prison 22 transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First 23 Amendment

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 WILSON LEBRANDON WHITE, No. 2:24-cv-01685-CKD
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER AND
14 DECKER, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff is a county inmate proceeding without counsel in this civil rights action filed
18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302
19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a
21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted.
22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§
23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the
24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court.
25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding
26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by
27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account
28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
1 I. Screening Requirement
2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than
15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words,
17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
22 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and
24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
25 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
26 II. Allegations in the Complaint
27 Before the court could screen the complaint, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint as
28 well as a second amended complaint. ECF Nos. 7, 11. An amended complaint supersedes the
1 original. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended
2 complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, the court
3 will proceed to screen plaintiff’s second amended complaint which is the operative pleading in
4 this case. ECF No. 11.
5 While a pretrial detainee at the Shasta County Jail, plaintiff was placed in an over-
6 crowded cell with at least 20 other people by Deputy Decker, a named defendant in this action.
7 Plaintiff was forced to sleep on a floor which contained urine and feces. According to the second
8 amended complaint, plaintiff was held in these conditions for at least two days. Plaintiff also
9 asserts that defendant Dunham interfered and tampered with his legal mail between January and
10 June, 2024. Plaintiff further contends that this violated his right to free speech and to petition the
11 government as provided in the First Amendment and that it also constituted retaliation against
12 him.
13 III. Legal Standards
14 In light of his pro se status, the court provides plaintiff with the legal standards which may
15 apply to the claims in his amended complaint.
16 A. Linkage
17 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
18 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
19 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
20 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a
21 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates
22 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that
23 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
24 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). To state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link
25 each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of
26 plaintiff's federal rights.
27 B. Conditions of Confinement
28 Conditions of confinement claims raised by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the
1 Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v.
2 Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.1998).
3 Nevertheless, comparable standards apply, with Fourteenth Amendment analysis borrowing from
4 Eighth Amendment standards. Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. “Jail officials have a duty to ensure that
5 detainees are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal
6 safety.” Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2018). To prevail on a substantive due
7 process claim, plaintiff must establish that the restrictions imposed by his confinement constituted
8 punishment as opposed to being incident to legitimate governmental purposes. Bell, 441 U.S. at
9 538. If a particular jail condition is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective, it
10 does not amount to punishment absent a showing of an express intent to punish. Id. at 538–39.
11 C. Legal Mail
12 Under the First Amendment, prisoners have a right to send and receive mail. Witherow v.
13 Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). However, a prison may adopt regulations or
14 practices for inmate mail which limit a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the
15 regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482
16 U.S. 78, 89, (1987). “When a prison regulation affects outgoing mail as opposed to incoming
17 mail, there must be a ‘closer fit between the regulation and the purpose it serves.’” Witherow, 52
18 F.3d at 265 (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 412 (1989)). Courts have also
19 afforded greater protection to legal mail than non-legal mail. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413.
20 Isolated incidents of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section 1983
21 for violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir.
22 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940,
23 944 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing
24 that a temporary delay or isolated incident of delay of mail does not violate a prisoner's First
25 Amendment rights). Generally, such isolated incidents must be accompanied by evidence of an
26 improper motive on the part of prison officials or result in interference with an inmate’s right of
27 access to the courts or counsel in order to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Smith,
28 899 F.2d at 944.
1 A prison’s interference with legal mail may also violate an inmate’s right of access to the
2 courts which is protected by the First Amendment’s right to petition the government and the due
3 process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290-291 (7th
4 Cir. 2004) (discussing the development of cases concerning a prisoner’s right of access to the
5 courts). Prison officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Silva v.
6 Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Richey v. Dahne,
7 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2015). In order to state a claim for the denial of access to the
8 courts, a plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect to
9 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-
10 frivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
11 D. Retaliation
12 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five
13 basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)
14 because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's
15 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
16 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
17 Filing an inmate grievance is a protected action under the First Amendment. Bruce v. Ylst, 351
18 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). A prison transfer may also constitute an adverse action. See
19 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and
20 destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate
21 grievances); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a retaliatory prison
22 transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First
23 Amendment).
24 IV. Analysis
25 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon
26 which relief can be granted under federal law. With respect to the conditions of confinement
27 claim, the second amended complaint does not establish that an overcrowded and dirty booking
28 cell amounts to punishment because plaintiff was held in it for only two days. Bell, 441 U.S. at
1 538-39. Furthermore, it is not clear to the court from the vague and conclusory allegations in the
2 amended complaint that the interference with plaintiff’s mail by defendant Dunham rises to the
3 level of a constitutional violation. In order to do so, the mail interference must involve more than
4 isolated incidents or, if so isolated, be based on an improper motive. See Smith, 899 F.2d at 944.
5 There are no allegations that defendant Danis participated in any of the asserted constitutional
6 violations. For all these reasons, plaintiff’s second amended complaint must be dismissed. The
7 court will, however, grant leave to file a third amended complaint.
8 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions
9 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.
10 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in
11 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.
12 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the
13 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory
14 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of
15 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
16 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
17 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
18 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a
19 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375
20 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no
21 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original
22 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
23 V. Other Pending Motions
24 Plaintiff has also filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel. ECF No. 10.
25 District courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 1983
26 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional
27 circumstances, the court may request an attorney to voluntarily represent such a plaintiff. See 28
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v.
1 Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). When determining whether “exceptional
2 circumstances” exist, the court must consider plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits as
3 well as the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the
4 legal issues involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court did not
5 abuse discretion in declining to appoint counsel). The burden of demonstrating exceptional
6 circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id. Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of
7 legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that
8 warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel.
9 Having considered the factors under Palmer, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to
10 meet his burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of
11 counsel at this time. The motion for counsel is therefore denied without prejudice.
12 Also pending before the court are plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and motion for a
13 pretrial conference. ECF No. 13. Plaintiff attaches his first set of interrogatories and request for
14 production of documents to defendants in this case. ECF No. 13 at 3-8. Since the court has
15 concluded that plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not state any colorable claim for relief
16 against defendants, these motions are denied as premature.
17 VI. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
18 In a separately filed motion for a preliminary and permanent injunction, plaintiff seeks a
19 court order preventing further unlawful searches and seizures of his property while incarcerated at
20 the Shasta County Jail. As support for this request, plaintiff recapitulates his amended complaint
21 almost verbatim. ECF No. 12.
22 The legal principles applicable to a request for preliminary injunctive relief are well
23 established. “The traditional equitable criteria for granting preliminary injunctive relief are (1) a
24 strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if the
25 preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4)
26 advancement of the public interest (in certain cases).” Dollar Rent A Car v. Travelers Indem.
27 Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985). The criteria are traditionally treated as alternative tests.
28 “Alternatively, a court may issue a preliminary injunction if the moving party demonstrates
1 ‘either a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or
2 that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.’” Martin v.
3 International Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting William Inglis & Sons
4 Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1975)). The Ninth Circuit
5 has reiterated that under either formulation of the principles, if the probability of success on the
6 merits is low, preliminary injunctive relief should be denied:
7 Martin explicitly teaches that “[u]nder this last part of the alternative
test, even if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the
8 moving party, it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there
is a fair chance of success on the merits.”
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10 Johnson v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting
11 Martin, 740 F.2d at 675).
12 Having concluded that the second amended complaint does not state a claim for relief, the
13 undersigned finds that plaintiff does not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits to
14 warrant a preliminary injunction. As a result, it is recommended that the motion for a preliminary
15 injunction be denied.
16 VII. Plain Language Summary for Party Proceeding Without Counsel
17 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not
18 intended as legal advice.
19 The court has reviewed the allegations in your second amended complaint and determined
20 that they do not state any claim against defendants. Your second amended complaint is being
21 dismissed, but you are being given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening
22 order. Although you are not required to do so, you may file a third amended complaint within 30
23 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular
24 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims.
25 It is also recommended that your motion for a preliminary injunction be denied because
26 you did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits in your second amended complaint.
27 /////
28 /////
1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
3 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees
4 shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California
5 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
6 3. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No. 11) is dismissed for failing to state a
7 claim upon which relief may be granted.
8 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a third
9 amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules
10 of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the
11 docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an
12 amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action
13 be dismissed.
14 5. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 10) is denied without
15 prejudice.
16 6. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 13) and motion for a pretrial conference (ECF
17 No. 14) are denied as premature.
18 7. The Clerk of the Court is directed to assign a district judge to this action.
19 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction
20 (ECF No. 12) be denied.
21 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
22 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days
23 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
24 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
25 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the
26 /////
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1 | objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The
2 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
3 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
4 || Dated: October 2, 2024 Card ke yy a
5 CAROLYN K DELANEY?
6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10637651. Public record. Not legal advice.