# Paulette Smith v. City of Los Angeles

> District Court, C.D. California · November 6, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10633993

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** November 6, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

Present: The Honorable CHRISTINAA.SNYDER sss
Catherine Jeang Not Present N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Not Present Not Present
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) - DEFENDANT OFFICER EDWARD
AGDEPPA’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKt.
37, filed on June 30, 2020)

I. INTRODUCTION
On June 16, 2019, plaintiff Paulette Smith, individually and as successor in interest
to decedent Albert Dorsey, filed a complaint against defendants Officer Edward Agdeppa
and the City of Los Angeles (“City”). Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”). In her complaint, Smith alleged
four claims for relief: (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Officer
Agdeppa based on an unreasonable use of deadly force: (2) violations of Section 1983
based on an unconstitutional policy, practice or custom against the City; (3) wrongful death
against Agdeppa and the City based on battery, pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815.2(a),
820(a) and Cal. Civ. Code § 43; and (4) wrongful death against Agdeppa and the City based
on negligence, pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815.2(a), 820(a). See Compl.
The City answered on August 8, 2019, Dkt. 10; and on August 16, 2019, Agdeppa
answered, Dkt. 15. On May 6, 2020, the parties stipulated to dismiss the City from the
case, leaving claims one, three and four as alleged against Agdeppa. See Dkts. 30, 31.
On June 30, 2020, Agdeppa, now the sole defendant, filed the instant motion for
summary judgment, or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment. Dkt. 37 (“MSJ”).
Plaintiff filed an opposition to Agdeppa’s MSJ, Dkt. 45 (“Opp.”), a statement of disputed
facts, Dkt. 51 (“Opp. SDF”), a request for judicial notice, Dkt. 46, and several exhibits,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
Dkts. 47-50, 53. Agdeppa filed a reply, Dkt. 55 (“Reply”), along with evidentiary
objections, Dkt. 55-1 (“Evid. Obj.’””).! The Court held a hearing on October 19, 2020.
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court finds
and concludes as follows.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Officers’ Arrival and Initial Encounter with Dorsey
On the morning of October 29, 2018, the police received multiple calls requesting
police assistance at a 24-Hour Fitness gym in the 6300 block of Sunset Boulevard, in Los
Angeles, California, where it was reported that a visitor to the gym was engaged in
disruptive conduct. Opp. SDF No. 1. Officers Agdeppa and Perla Rodriguez (collectively,
“officers”), arrived at the gym at approximately 9:05 a.m. and activated their body-worn
cameras (“BWC”). Opp. SDF No. 5; see MSJ Exh. B, Agdeppa’s BWC Footage (“Ag.
BWC”); MSJ Exh. C, Rodriguez’s BWC Footage (“Rod. BWC’).
A gym staff member met the officers at the entry door to the gym, and volunteered,
“We have a gentleman who 1s a little bit irate and he’s not listening. He’s already hurting
members [inaudible] and assaulting security as well.” Rod. BWC at 04:01:? see Opp. SDF
No. 6.
The officers immediately proceeded to the men’s locker room because, Agdeppa
contends, they were concerned Dorsey would imminently assault gym patrons or staff.
Opp. SDF No. 6. Plaintiff disputes this, arguing that the officers had no information
regarding—and did nothing to investigate—whether Dorsey had a weapon or had injured
anyone at the gym. Id. at Nos. 1, 6.
It is undisputed, though, that the entrance to the men’s locker room was blocked with
a table and yellow caution tape when the officers arrived, and that the locker room was

The Court resolves only those evidentiary objections relevant to evidence upon
which it relies in this order; any objections to evidence not relied upon in this order are
denied as moot.
? Plaintiff submits its own transcript of the body-worn camera footage in this case.
Opp. Exh. 6. Agdeppa objects to the accuracy and admissibility of the transcript. Evid.
Obj. at 2. The Court need not resolve the accuracy or admissibility of the transcript because
it does not rely on plaintiff's proffered transcript.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
empty except for Dorsey. Id. at No. 7; Rod. BWC at 05:15. The officers found Dorsey,
who was 6’ 1” and 280 pounds, wearing no clothes, with a bath towel over his left shoulder,
listening to music from his phone. Opp. SDF No. 8; Rod. BWC at 05:15. At the time,
Agdeppa was 5’ 1” and 145 pounds, and Rodriguez was 5’ 5” and 145 pounds. Opp. SDF
No. 2.
B. Officers’ Request that Dorsey Leave the Gym
Upon entering the locker room, Agdeppa asked Dorsey what he was doing, and
Rodriguez told him, “We want you out. You gotta get out.” Rod. BWC at 05:15—05:24.
Dorsey looked at the officers, but did not acknowledge them, swaying in time with his
music for several seconds. Id. at 05:25—05:37.
Rodriguez again requested that Dorsey leave, stating, “Turn off your music, put on
your clothes and get out.” Id. at 05:37. Dorsey initially ignored Rodriguez, but then asked
in a low volume, “What’s the problem?” Id. at 05:41. Agdeppa told Dorsey that he was
causing a disturbance. Id. at 05:44. Dorsey replied inaudibly, to which Agdeppa
responded, “I don’t care, you gotta put on your clothes right now. You're not listening to
us.” Id. at 05:48. Dorsey nodded his head once, and appears to have said, “Okay, can I
just grab some things?” while pointing down and to Agdeppa’s right. Id. at 05:51.
Agdeppa responded, “No, I have to watch you.” Id. at 05:53.
Dorsey proceeded to dry himself with his towel for roughly one minute, before
speaking quietly to Agdeppa, who had moved into the shower area several feet from
Dorsey. Id. at 05:54-06:54. Agdeppa repeated the officers’ request that Dorsey leave,
stating, in a somewhat raised voice, “[S]omeone called on you. So you need to hurry up
‘cause I’m losing my patience right now.” Id. at 06:54. Several seconds later, Rodriguez
repeated that Dorsey needed to leave. Id. at 07:10.
Dorsey then walked toward and past Rodriguez, across the locker room and to a
mirror at the other end of the room. Id. at 07:17. Agdeppa asked Dorsey what he was
doing, to which Dorsey appears to have responded, “I’m about to get my fucking
[inaudible]. What the fuck you think I’m about to do?” Id. at 07:21. Agdeppa replied,
“Alright,” and Rodriguez said, “Go ahead, put on your clothes.” Id. at 07:26, 07:31.
Dorsey did not immediately put on his clothes, though, but instead continued drying
himself. Agdeppa then asked, in a level tone of voice, “You gonna get dressed, or are we
going to have to drag you out of here like this?” Id. at 07:47. Rodriguez again told Dorsey
to “[jJust hurry up and put on your clothes. That’s all you gotta do.” Id. at 07:51.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
During this exchange, Dorsey walked slowly around the locker room, and still made
no gesture toward putting on his clothes. When Dorsey walked back across the room to
the shower stall where the officers initially found him, the officers put on latex gloves. Id.
at 08:00—08:11. Agdeppa raised his voice and said, “Are you going to put on your clothes
or not?” Id. at 08:12. Dorsey, with his voiced raised, responded, “I am. [Inaudible.]” Id.
at 08:14. At this point, both officers raised their voices, saying, among other things, □□□□□□□
walking around,” id. at 08:15, and, “I asked you one simple thing: Take your clothes, put
them onto your body,” id. at 08:19. Dorsey responded in a somewhat raised voice, “Okay,
well let me tell you one simple thing: Stop talking to me.” Id. at 08:24.
Meanwhile, Dorsey continued drying himself with his towel and slowly rearranging
his personal effects on the seat in the shower stall. Id. at 08:37. But Dorsey did not sit,
and instead began dancing intermittently for roughly 41 seconds while occasionally drying
himself. Ag. BWC at 08:51-08:32; Opp. SDF No. 11. About half a minute later,
Rodriguez told Dorsey, in a raised voice, “Hurry up stop dancing, hurry up,” but Dorsey
continued to dance. Rod. BWC at 09:14. Dorsey raised the middle finger on his nght hand
and waived it in time with the music for roughly three seconds, directing it at times toward
the shower wall in front of him, and at times in the direction of the officers, who were
standing to his left. Ag. BWC at 09:24-09:27.
C. Officers’ Physical Engagement with Dorsey
At that point, Agdeppa states that he and Rodriguez decided to go “hands on” in
light of Dorsey’s refusal to dress and leave. Opp. SDF No. 12. The officers quickly
approached Dorsey and grasped his arms; while Agdeppa placed a handcuff on Dorsey’s
right wrist, Rodriguez attempted to restrain Dorsey’s left arm. Id. at No. 13. Dorsey
resisted the officers’ attempts to handcuff him by “tensing up,” and the officers demanded
that he stop resisting.* Id.
Unable to apply the other handcuff to Dorsey’s left arm, the officers applied finger
and wrist locks, “bracing maneuvers,” and a “double-cuff procedure.” Id. at No. 14. The
officers repeatedly demanded that Dorsey stop resisting and calm down. Id. at No. 15.
Despite both officers’ attempts to wrest Dorsey into submission, Dorsey freed his left arm
from Rodriguez’s grip, at which point the officers attempted to pin Dorsey to the wall. Id.
at No. 14. At some point in the struggle, Agdeppa radioed for backup. Id. at No. 18.

3 At this point, although the officers’ body-worn cameras remained in place and
continued to record, the video image is obscured due to the officers’ proximity to Dorsey.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
D. Agdeppa’s Account of the Escalating Struggle and Shooting
The parties dispute certain key facts regarding the physical altercation from this
point on. Because the officers’ body-worn cameras fell to the floor soon after the initial
attempts to handcuff Dorsey, there is no video of the altercation, although the cameras
continued to record audio. Id. at No. 16.
According to Agdeppa, during the struggle with the officers, Dorsey struck
Rodriguez in the face. Id. at No. 17; MSJ at 6. As the struggle continued, Agdeppa
unholstered his Taser, pressed it against Dorsey’s chest and warned that, if Dorsey did not
desist, he would use his Taser. Opp. SDF No. 19; MSJ at 6. The parties agree that, after
issuing the warning, Agdeppa activated his Taser, cycling it two times into Dorsey’s chest.
Opp. SDF No. 20; MSJ at 6. The parties also agree that around this time, Rodriguez fired
the darts from her Taser into Dorsey’s back. Opp. SDF No. 20.
Agdeppa contends that, after he and Rodriguez used their Tasers on Dorsey these
three times, Dorsey became “even more aggressive and combative,” that he “made no move
to flee,” and that “he advanced upon the officers, punching at their heads and faces while
the handcuff, still attached to his wrist, also swung and struck them.” Opp. SDF No. 21;
MSJ at 6. Agdeppa avers that, while striking him in the face repeatedly with his handcuffed
fist, Dorsey struck Agdeppa on the bridge of the nose with such force that the blow knocked
him backward into a wall, caused him to drop his Taser, and disoriented him. Opp. SDF
No. 22: MSJ at 6.
According to Rodriguez, although Dorsey’s body obscured her view, she believed
Dorsey was striking Agdeppa based on Dorsey’s swinging his arms and the sound of
punches. Opp. SDF No. 23. She therefore again activated her Taser. Id.; MSJ at 6. Dorsey
responded by turning and striking Rodriguez in the face four times in quick succession,
knocking her to the ground. Opp. SDF No. 23; MSJ at 7. Rodriguez recounts that Dorsey
attempted to wrest her Taser from her, turning it toward her face, while simultaneously
striking her repeatedly with his handcuffed fist. Opp. SDF No. 23; MSJ at 7. Rodriguez
does not recall Dorsey’s attempting to take control of her gun. Dkt. 48, Opp. Exh. 2
(“Rodriguez Depo.”), at 12:15—13:5. According to Agdeppa, Dorsey straddled Rodriguez
for approximately 30 to 40 seconds, “continually striking her multiple times on both sides
of her face and head, with her head being knocked from side to side.” Opp. SDF No. 24:
MSJ at 7. Rodriguez believed “Dorsey was attempting to kill her,” and that “her life was
at risk.” Opp. SDF No. 24; Dkt. 37-4, Declaration of Officer Rodriguez (“Rodriguez
Decl.”), 4 20-21.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
Agdeppa recounts being dazed throughout these 30 to 40 seconds. Opp. SDF No.
25; MSJ at 7. When he recovered, he saw Dorsey straddling and “viciously and violently”
attacking Rodriguez, “punching her repeatedly in the face with a flurry of punches, hitting
her over and over again in the head and face” while she attempted to protect herself in the
fetal position on the floor. Opp. SDF No. 25; MSJ at 7. Agdeppa reports believing Dorsey
would kill Rodriguez imminently. Opp. SDF No. 25; MSJ at 7.
Although not discernable from the audio portion of the body-worn camera footage,
Agdeppa avers that he verbally warned Dorsey to stop his attack, but that Dorsey continued
nonetheless. Opp. SDF No. 26; MSJ at 7. (Plaintiff disputes that Agdeppa issued such a
warning. Opp. at 3.) At this point, Agdeppa fired five shots in quick succession, four of
which hit Dorsey. Opp. SDF No. 26. Agdeppa reports having been six to eight feet from
Dorsey when he fired. Dkt. 47, Opp. Exh. 1 (“Agdeppa Depo.”), at 73:5-8. Agdeppa
contends he drew his weapon “ijn order to protect both his and his partner’s life,’ MSJ at
7, although he also states that he fired his weapon “[ijn an effort to save Officer
Rodriguez’s life,’ id. at 8: Agdeppa Depo. at 73:14. According to Agdeppa, Dorsey
remained in the same position, “straddling” or “hunched over” Rodriguez, as each shot was
fired. SDF Nos. 25, 26; Agdeppa Depo. at 115:15—20. Immediately after the final shot,
Dorsey fell backward and off Rodriguez and did not move. Opp. SDF No. 26; MSJ at 8.
Dorsey still held Rodriguez’s Taser in his hand, and the officers did not approach him.
Opp. SDF No. 27; MSJ at 8.
Agdeppa reports Rodriguez was treated at the emergency room for swelling on her
left cheek and right jaw, abrasions on her ear and hands, a pulled muscle behind her left
knee, and head pain. Opp. SDF No. 28; MSJ at 8: Rodriguez Decl. § 28.
Agdeppa further reports having abrasions on his arms and head, being treated at the
emergency room for a fractured nose, and receiving sutures on the bridge of his nose. Opp.
SDF No. 29; MSJ at 8; Dkt. 37-3, Declaration of Officer Agdeppa, 30. The following
day, he began experiencing severe headaches, sensitivity to light, and difficulty focusing.
Opp. SDF No. 29; MSJ at 8. Agdeppa says he was diagnosed with and experienced
ongoing symptoms of a concussion, which prevented him from returning to work for six
months. Opp. SDF No. 29; MSJ at 8.
E. Plaintiff's Dispute of Agdeppa’s Account
Plaintiff disputes the officers’ account of the physical altercation between the
officers’ first attempt to handcuff Dorsey and the shooting. The crux of plaintiff's
argument is that the medical records and physical evidence are inconsistent with the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
officers’ account of Dorsey overpowering and viciously beating both officers, one to the
edge of her life. See Opp. at 3—5. Plaintiff first argues that photographs of Rodriguez,
taken shortly after the incident, depict no evidence of being struck in the face—in fact,
according to plaintiff, Rodriguez appears “virtually unscathed.” Opp. SDF Nos. 17, 21,
23, 24, 25; Opp. at 5: see Opp. Exh. 5 (“Rodriguez Post-Incident Photograph”).
Furthermore, Rodriguez suffered no broken bones—in her face or elsewhere—nor a
concussion or other head injury, and she did not miss any work due to injury. Opp. SDF
No. 17; Opp. at 3.
Plaintiff also contends physical evidence and contradictions in Agdeppa’s deposition
testimony undermine the credibility of Agdeppa’s account that Dorsey struck him with
sufficient force to knock him into a wall and daze him for 30 to 40 seconds. Opp. SDF No.
22. Plaintiff cites evidence that, (1) despite Agdeppa’s assertion that he fractured his nose,
he also provided deposition testimony that the X-ray of his nose showed no fracture; (2) a
post-incident photograph shows no evidence of a blow as forceful as that recounted by
Agdeppa, except a laceration on his nose; (3) the post-incident photograph also shows
Agdeppa overstated the length of the laceration on his nose; and (4) the video evidence
shows no sign of “active resistance” to the officers. Opp. SDF No. 22: Opp. at 3—5; see
Agdeppa Depo. at 54:1—61:10: Opp. Exh. 7 (“Agdeppa Post-Incident Photograph’).
F. Dorsey’s Injuries
The parties do not dispute the injuries suffered by Dorsey, although they do dispute,
for purposes of seeking pre-death pain and suffering damages, how quickly Dorsey
succumbed to them. Dr. Zuhha Ashraf conducted an autopsy on November 2, 2018. See
Dkt. 48, Opp. Exh. 3, Deposition of Dr. Ashraf (“Ashraf Depo.”); Dkt. 49, Opp. Exh. 4
“(Autopsy Rpt”).* She characterized Dorsey’s death as a homicide resulting from the four
4 Plaintiff disputes the credibility of Agdeppa’s testimony that he suffered a
concussion on the ground that Agdeppa admitted he did not review the CAT scan itself.
Opp. at 4. But as pointed out by Agdeppa’s counsel at oral argument, Agdeppa’s testimony
nonetheless supports his claim of having suffered a concussion, including by clarifying that
he received that diagnosis from the doctor who reviewed the CAT scan.
> Agdeppa moves to exclude the autopsy report as inadmissible hearsay pursuant to
Fed. R. Evid. 802. Evid. Obj. at 1. To the extent the Court relies on the report, it may do
so for the purpose of a motion for summary judgment because the report “could [] be
presented in a form admissible at trial” as a public record pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
Koho v. Forest Labs., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1113 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citation omitted)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
gunshot wounds. Autopsy Rpt at 1. Although Agdeppa suggests Dorsey died
“immediately after the final shot was fired,” plaintiff disputes this account and points to
Dr. Ashraf’s deposition testimony that Dorsey likely would have died within “seconds to
minutes.” Opp. SDF Nos. 26, 44.
In addition to the gunshot wounds, Dr. Ashraf observed (1) two areas of blunt force
trauma to Dorsey’s head, which she concluded occurred “within hours of death”; (2)
several abrasions on Dorsey’s neck; (3) abrasions and contusions on his wrists, which
“could be consistent with handcuffing”: and (4) that the Taser dart and wire remained in
Dorsey’s back at the time of the autopsy. Id. at No. 44.
Finally, in the October 19, 2020 hearing, plaintiff advanced for the first time the
argument that the location and direction of Dorsey’s gunshot wounds raise questions as to
whether, in fact, Dorsey was standing over Rodriguez until Agdeppa’s final shot. See Opp.
SDF No. 26; MSJ at 8. Specifically, the autopsy report states that, from their entry point,
three of the four bullets travelled downward relative to Dorsey’s body, but one travelled
upward. Autopsy Rpt at 1-2. Plaintiff argues this evidence suggests Dorsey moved
significantly at some point during the shooting. Because there is no evidence regarding
the sequence of the gunshots, see Ashraf Depo. at 12:7—11, the court cannot draw any
inference as to how Dorsey was positioned relative to each gunshot, such as, for instance,
whether he was standing or hunched over when the first bullet struck him.
G. Board of Police Commissioners Findings
Plaintiff submitted the “Abridged Summary of Categorical Use of Force Incident
and Findings by the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, Officer-Involved
Shooting — 059-18,” which appears to recount the incident at issue here based on, infer
alia, the number in the title (059-18), which appears in the Los Angeles Police Department
video addressing the incident, “Hollywood Division Officer Involved Shooting 10/29/18
(NRF059-18),” see Opp. Exh. 8; the date: and the fact pattern, see Dkt. 46 (“BOPC
Findings” or “Findings”’). The Findings characterizes itself as “a brief summary designed
to enumerate salient points regarding this Categorical Use of Force incident,” and does not
reflect the entirety of the investigation nor BOPC deliberations. BOPC Findings at 1. It

(considering improperly authenticated autopsy report at summary judgment); see U.S. v.
Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc., 248 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Opinions,
conclusions, and evaluations, as well as facts, fall within the Rule 803(8)[(A)(i11)]
exception.” (quotation omitted)).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
consists of three parts: an incident summary apparently based on interviews of the officers,
witness interviews, and footage from the body-worn cameras and available security
cameras in the gym; a findings section; and a section on the basis for those findings. See
id. The Findings includes no indication that disciplinary actions were taken against the
officers, nor does it suggest any such actions.
As a preliminary matter, Agdeppa objects to the admission of the BOPC Findings
as, inter alia, a subsequent remedial measure, inadmissible hearsay and lacking
authentication. Evid. Obj. at 3: see Fed. R. Evid. 407, 802, 901. Plaintiff, for her part,
requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Findings. Dkt. 46; see Fed. R. Evid. 201.
With regard to Agdeppa’s objections on hearsay and foundation grounds, the Court
concludes these objections do not prevent the Court from considering the BOPC Findings
for the limited purposes of this motion because the Findings could be admissible at trial
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(8), as discussed in note four, above. See Koho, 17 F. Supp.
3d at 1113; Midwest Fireworks, 248 F.3d at 566.
Turning to Agdeppa’s argument that the BOPC Findings is inadmissible as a
subsequent remedial measure pursuant to Rule 407, Agdeppa contends Maddox v. City of
Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986), requires its exclusion. In Maddox, the Ninth
Circuit found an internal affairs investigation and disciplinary proceeding conducted by the
City of Los Angeles following a police officer’s fatal use of a prohibited chokehold were
subsequent remedial measures inadmissible at trial. Id. at 1417. But Maddox 1s unavailing
here for at least two reasons. First, the BOPC Findings here includes no disciplinary
measures against the officers, unlike in Maddox. It is therefore not properly characterized
as a “remedial measure.” See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 816 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1989) (“[S]ubsequent remedial measures include only the actual remedial measures
themselves and not the initial steps toward ascertaining whether any remedial measures are
called for.” (quotation omitted)); Willis v. Vasquez, No. LA CV10-07390 JAK (DTBx),
2014 WL 12596313, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2014) (Maddox inapplicable where report
“recommended corrective action” but was not, “in and of itself, a remedial
measure’), aff'd, 648 F. App’x 720 (9th Cir. 2016). Second, even if the BOPC Findings
did include disciplinary measures, Maddox’s holding is limited to the admission of reports
introduced against municipal defendants, not individual officers. Martinez v. Davis, No.
CV 05-5684 ABC (JEMx), 2011 WL 13213962, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (admitting
internal affairs investigation and disciplinary actions against police officer defendants
because “the deputies were not responsible for undertaking the investigation or imposing
discipline; the City took these measures”). In any event, courts consider BOPC findings at
summary judgment. See. e.g., Garrett v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 12-1670 FMO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
(SSX), 2014 WL 11397949, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2014). Accordingly, while the Court
reserves judgment on both parties’ requests, it considers the Findings for the limited
purposes of this motion.
Turning to its substance, the course of events presented in the Findings largely
conforms to Agdeppa’s account. Notably, the Findings includes the accounts of several
eyewitnesses to at least portions of the physical altercation between the officers and
Dorsey: Witness A, who was an employee of the gym, and Witnesses E and F, who were
security guards.° BOPC Findings at 2, 3. These witnesses’ accounts, as reported in the
BOPC Findings, substantiate Agdeppa’s version of events at several moments disputed by
plaintiff. For instance, Witness F apparently reported that Dorsey’ struck Officer A—who
likely refers to Agdeppa—in the face numerous times, one of which knocked Officer A
into the wall, causing him to drop his Taser. Id. at 6. Witness F also believed Dorsey
struck Officer B—likely Rodriguez—in the face several times with his “half-opened” hand.
Id. Although ambiguous, the Findings can be read to state that Witness F also saw the
subject knock Officer B to the ground, then attempt to take her Taser and turn it against
her face while hitting her with his right fist; alternatively, the Findings may be simply
restating the officers’ account. Id. at 6—7.
However, the witnesses’ accounts also differ from Agdeppa’s in several ways.
According to the BOPC Findings, Witness F recalled he and Witness E “attempt[ed] to
assist the officers during their struggle with the Subject,” and that “the Subject grabbed
Witness E by his jacket and grabbed him (Witness F) by the neck.” Id. at 7. “The Subject
pushed Witness E away from him and choked Witness F.” Id. But neither officer recounted
any witnesses intervening 1n the altercation. Moreover, the Findings states that Witness F
reported that, “moments prior to the OIS [officer involved shooting], while the Subject was
straddling Officer B, the Subject grabbed Officer A’s [Agdeppa’s]| gun and attempted to
pull it out of its holster,” but that he was “unable to remove the gun because Officer A
pushed the Subject away.” Id. But the BOPC Findings also reports that “Officer A had no
recollection of the subject grabbing his/her service pistol,” id., and neither officer’s account

° The parties’ filings make no reference to these witnesses, nor did either party
mention the witnesses in the October 19, 2020 hearing. The record includes no indication
that these witnesses have been deposed or interviewed by the parties. The witnesses remain
anonymous.
7 The BOPC Findings refers to “the Subject,” but, assuming the Findings recounts
the events at issue here, the Subject is Dorsey.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
of the altercation mentioned Dorsey’s doing so. Third, according to the BOPC Findings,
Witness F reported that, “[a]fter the second round [gunshot], the Subject let go of Officer
A’s wrist. Witness F believed that the Subject looked at Officer A and then began to walk
toward him/her, and that Officer A fired two more rounds.” Id. at 8. But Agdeppa states
that he was not touching Dorsey at the time of the shooting, but rather was six to eight feet
away, and that Dorsey did not move from his position over Rodriguez during the shooting.
Agdeppa Depo. at 73:5—8, 115:15—20.
The Findings concludes, among other things, that the officers’ use of non-lethal and
less-lethal force was reasonable and in policy. BOPC Findings at 14-15. But it also
concludes that the officers “did not effectively utilize tactical de-escalation techniques,”
and that this, along with other tactical failures, amounted to a “substantial deviation,
without justification, from approved Department training.” Id. at 12. Additionally, while
“Officer A’s drawing and exhibiting of a firearm [was] in Policy,” the “lethal use of force
by Officer A was unreasonable.” Id. at 13; 16-17.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party must show that a rational trier of fact would not be able to find
for the nonmoving party, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 □□□□
574, 587 (1986), and thus bears the initial burden of identifying relevant portions of the
record that demonstrate the absence of a fact or facts necessary for one or more essential
elements of each claim upon which the moving party seeks judgment, see Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Ifthe moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing
party must then set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the
motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c), (e). The nonmoving party must not simply rely on the pleadings and must do
more than make “conclusory allegations [in] an affidavit.” Lujan v. Nat’] Wildlife Fed’n,
497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. When deciding a motion for
summary judgment, “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 587 (citation omitted); Valley Nat’] Bank of Ariz. v. ALE. Rouse & Co., 121 F.3d 1332,
1335 (9th Cir. 1997).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
IV. DISCUSSION
Agdeppa moves for summary judgment on each of plaintiffs claims.
A. Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim
Section 1983 provides for a cause of action against a person who, acting under color
of state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. “To prove
a case under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the action occurred ‘under
color of state law’ and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or
federal statutory right.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted). Agdeppa makes two arguments: first, that his use of deadly force was objectively
reasonable; second, that even if his use of force was excessive, he 1s entitled to qualified
immunity. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
1. Objectively Reasonable Use of Force
Agdeppa first argues that plaintiff's excessive force claim cannot withstand
summary judgment because his use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. MSJ at
10-17.
An excessive force claim is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The relevant inquiry is whether officers’ actions are
“objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (quotation and citation omitted).
“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers
are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that 1s necessary 1n a particular
situation.” Id. at 396-97. However, “it is equally true that even where some force is
justified, the amount actually used may be excessive.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853
(9th Cir. 2002).
Courts apply a balancing test to determine whether force used is reasonable.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Courts “must balance [1] the nature and quality of the intrusion
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against [2] the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383
(2007) (quotation omitted). “An officer’s use of deadly force,” specifically, “is reasonable
only if ‘the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat
of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”” Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
914 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985)) (additional citation
omitted). But “[d]eadly force cases pose a particularly difficult problem under this regime
because the officer defendant is often the only surviving eyewitness.” Id. at 915.
Accordingly, “the court may not simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the
police officer. It must also look at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend
to discredit the police officer’s story.” Id. With this admonition in mind, the Court now
applies the Graham balancing test to the evidence here.
Courts begin by evaluating “the type and amount of force inflicted.” Miller v. Clark
Cty., 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, there is no dispute that the use of deadly
force was a severe intrusion on Dorsey’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Second, courts evaluate the countervailing governmental interests by considering a
range of factors, including: (a) whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to
evade arrest by flight: (b) the severity of the crime at issue; and (c) whether the suspect
posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. Lal v. California, 746
F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014). This list is not exhaustive, though, and courts also
consider whether the officer warned the suspect prior to use of force, Bryan v. MacPherson,
630 F.3d 805, 831 (9th Cir. 2010): the parties’ relative culpability, Espinosa v. City & Cty.
of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010); and “whether there were less intrusive
means of force that might have been used,” Glenn v. Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864, 876
(9th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, the “most important” factor is whether the suspect posed an
“immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826.
Here, Agdeppa argues that, because Dorsey had already inflicted serious injuries on
both officers and was striking Rodriguez with his fist while turning her Taser on her,
Dorsey posed an immediate threat to Rodriguez’s safety. He therefore fired at Dorsey “[i]n
an effort to save Officer Rodriguez’s life.” MSJ at 8; Agdeppa Depo. at 73:14.
But plaintiff disputes Agdeppa’s account and whether in fact the circumstances
provided probable cause to believe Dorsey posed an immediate and significant threat of
death or serious injury to Rodriguez. See Opp. SDF Nos. 17, 21, 23, 24, 25. First, plaintiff
argues Rodriguez did not suffer any broken bones in her face or elsewhere, suffered no
concussion or head fracture, did not miss work due to her injuries, and appears unscathed
in her post-incident photograph. Id, at No. 17: Opp. at 5. Second, plaintiff argues
Agdeppa’s claim that he suffered a “broken nose” remains unsupported. Opp. at 4—S.
Third, in the October 19, 2020 hearing, plaintiff advanced an argument that the trajectory
of one of the bullets as it entered Dorsey calls into question Agdeppa’s account that Dorsey
remained standing over Rodriguez until the final shot. See Autopsy Rpt at 1-2. Finally,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
although plaintiff does not raise this argument, according to the BOPC Findings, Witness
F’s account of the moments before the shooting differed in several significant respects from
Agdeppa’s: Witness F said he and Witness E were actively intervening in the altercation,
and Dorsey was fighting for control of Agdeppa’s firearm and holding Agdeppa’s arm
when he was shot. BOPC Findings at 7. Whether this version of events provides additional
support for the reasonableness of Agdeppa’s belief that deadly force was necessary is
irrelevant—if introduced at tral, this evidence would impeach Agdeppa’s credibility
because, according to Agdeppa, he fired from six to eight feet away as Dorsey stood or
hunched over Rodriguez. SDF Nos. 25, 26; Agdeppa Depo. at 73:1—8; 115:15-20.
Agdeppa’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Contrary to Agdeppa’s
characterization of plaintiff's evidence as “mere speculation ... or fantasy,” Reply at 3, the
evidence is specific and exceeds “conclusory allegations,” Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888; see
Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 1992) (“circumstantial evidence can speak
clearly and often unequivocally”), as amended (Mar. 5, 1992), overruled on other grounds
as recognized by Federman v. Cty. of Kern, 61 F. App’x 438, 440 (9th Cir. 2003).
Moreover, Agdeppa’s argument that the post-incident photographs cannot depict all the
officers’ injuries, such as headaches, muscle strains, or even bruises so soon after the
altercation, Reply at 3, is a question of the weight of the evidence, which is not for the
Court to consider on summary judgment, Benas v. Baca, 159 F. App’x 762, 765 (9th Cir.
2005) (summary judgment inappropriate where “thorough inquiry into the facts, including
[decedent’s conduct toward officer], is needed”). In any event, the Court must “resolv[e]
all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff” if it is to grant summary judgment for Agdeppa.
Henrich, 39 F.3d at 915. Finally, although Agdeppa is correct that an officer has no
obligation to wait to suffer serious injury before employing force, he is incorrect in
concluding that, therefore, the extent of either officer’s injuries is irrelevant. Reply at 1.
As mentioned above, the extent of the officers’ injuries goes to Agdeppa’s account of the
events that purportedly gave rise to his belief that Dorsey posed a significant threat.
Hopkins, 958 F.2d at 885 (summary judgment inappropriate where “medical evidence in
the record undermine[d] [Officer] Andaya’s story” and evinced “milder version of the
threat Andaya faced”); Newmaker v. City of Fortuna, 842 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2016)
(summary judgment inappropriate where credibility of defendant officer in dispute). And
not every threat to an officer warrants deadly force as a matter of law, and a rational fact
finder could view plaintiff's evidence and conclude that the threat here did not warrant
such extreme force. See Santos, 287 F.3d at 853.
Turning to the other factors appropriately considered under Graham, plaintiff argues
that the severity of the crime for which the officers initially seized Dorsey weighs heavily

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
against reasonableness. Opp. at 2; Opp. SDF No. 1. Other courts have reasoned that “the
severity of the crime was relatively low” even “assum|[ing] that [the suspect] had assaulted
individuals.” Berger v. Spokane Cty., No. 2:15-CV-140-RMP, 2017 WL 579897, at *7
(E.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2017) (citation omitted); see Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689,
702—03 (9th Cir. 2005) (where suspect is alleged to have committed domestic violence,
“the circumstances are not such ... to warrant the conclusion that [the suspect] was a
particularly dangerous criminal” and thus “the nature of the crime at issue [provided] little,
if any, basis for the officers’ use of physical force”).
Plaintiff further presents evidence calling into question whether Agdeppa warned
Dorsey of his intent to use deadly force. Opp. at 3, 10. Also, although it is undisputed that
he resisted arrest when the officers initially attempted to handcuff him, at no point was
Dorsey a flight risk. Dorsey was naked and was concealing no weapon. Finally, plaintiff
cites to the BOPC Findings, which concludes that the officers’ initial approach of Dorsey
and failure to use proper de-escalation techniques were a substantial deviation from
Department policy, and that, in light of these failures, “the lethal use of force ... was
unreasonable.”® BOPC Findings at 11-12, 16-17. And plaintiff argues a rational fact
finder could find both officers’ body-worn camera footage consistent with this account,
rather than Agdeppa’s. Opp. at 10.
Agdeppa responds that Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S.Ct. 1539 (2017),
precludes the Court from considering the officers’ pre-shooting tactical decisions. Reply
at 7. But Agdeppa’s reliance on Mendez is misplaced. Mendez stands for the proposition
that once an officer’s use of force is judged reasonable under Graham, it does not become
unreasonable because a prior Fourth Amendment violation “provoked” the confrontation
that ultimately necessitated the use of force. 137 S.Ct. at 1546-47. Here, the question 1s
not whether the officers provoked the confrontation with Dorsey by committing a prior
Fourth Amendment violation; rather, the question 1s whether Agdeppa’s use of deadly force
was reasonable under Graham in the first instance, which appropriately considers pre-
shooting circumstances. Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(“The question ... is whether the force used was reasonable in light of a// the relevant
circumstances.” (emphasis in original)).
Finally, having considered the severity of the intrusion and the importance of the
government’s interests, the Court must balance these two considerations in order to

The BOPC’s use of the term “unreasonable” does not necessarily equate to the term
as used in the context of the Fourth Amendment.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
determine whether the force used was reasonable. Santos, 287 F.3d at 854. Here, a rational
fact finder could conclude the countervailing governmental interests do not justify the
amount of force used. Critically, there is a genuine dispute over whether plaintiff posed an
immediate threat to the officers sufficient to warrant the use of deadly force. Therefore,
the Court cannot conclude that Agdeppa’s use of force was reasonable as a matter of law.
See Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hether a particular use of
force was reasonable is rarely determinable as a matter of law.”); Santos, 287 F.3d at 853
(excessive force cases “nearly always require[] a jury to sift through disputed factual
contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom’).
2. Qualified Immunity
Agdeppa also argues that summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiff's Section
1983 claim because, even if his use of force was excessive, he is entitled to qualified
immunity. MSJ at 17-20.
“Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability,” and therefore must be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (quotation omitted). Qualified
immunity balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly” against “the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. at 231. In excessive force cases,
it protects officers in the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, an officer will be
denied qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action if, “(1) taken in the light most favorable
to the party asserting injury, the facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right, and (2) the right violated was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood his conduct to be unlawful
in that situation.” Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Courts may address either prong first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
|hether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established’ ... must be
answered ‘not as a broad general proposition,’ but with reference to the facts of specific
cases.” Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff's Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).
Agdeppa points to several cases which he argues are factually analogous and
establish that he is entitled to qualified immunity. See MSJ 12-13. Most analogous is
Isayeva. There, construed in favor of the plaintiff, the relevant facts were as follows: After

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
two officers at the scene used escalating measures to subdue the suspect, including physical
restraints and multiple Taser deployments, the suspect hit one officer with enough force
that the officer fell to the ground. Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 950. The suspect then turned on
the second officer, hitting him until he began to lose consciousness. Id. The second officer
fell back onto a bed while the suspect approached with balled fists. Id. After shouting
“Ts|hoot him,” the second officer, from his position on the bed, shot and killed the suspect.
Id. at 950-51. The Isayeva court found the second officer enjoyed qualified immunity
because the suspect did not hold a clearly established right to be free from deadly force in
those circumstances. Id. at 951.
Agdeppa argues that, because his account of the events preceding Dorsey’s shooting
are analogous to those in Jsayeva, Isayeva is dispositive. MSJ at 19. But Agdeppa reads
Isayeva too broadly; it cannot be read to overturn the principle that “the court may not
simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the police officer,” but rather “must
also look at the circumstantial evidence.” Scott, 39 F.3d at 914. To this point, the Isayeva
court explicitly stated that the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity “must be
answered ... with reference to the facts of specific cases.” Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 947.
Turning to the Isayeva court’s reasoning, that court was not forced to “simply
accept” the officers’ account because they were not “the only surviving eyewitness|es].”
Scott, 39 F.3d at 915. The plaintiff in Isayeva—the decedent’s wife—saw portions of the
altercation preceding the shooting: and, although “[f|rom her position outside the
room| she] did not see [the decedent] punch either of the deputies,” she could hear the final
moments and the shooting itself. 872 F.3d at 943-44. Nevertheless, despite being highly
motivated to dispute the officer’s account, her testimony largely mirrored that of the
officer’s, and she did not raise a dispute of fact regarding the officer’s claim that he was
losing consciousness and that his life was in danger.’ See id. at 950. Here, by contrast,
there 1s no comparable witness. (Although the BOPC Findings reports that Witness F saw
the altercation immediately preceding the shooting, his testimony diverges significantly
from Agdeppa’s account, as discussed above. See supra Part II.G. In any event, Witness
F remains anonymous, provided no declaration, gave no deposition, and was not mentioned

° The only two disputed facts relevant to the use of deadly force were “whether ...
[the decedent] had purposely thrown [the second officer] against a wall or merely had
inadvertently ‘bucked’ him into a wall”: and “whether [he] subsequently punched, pushed,
or threw” the first officer, although it was undisputed that the decedent used force against
the officer. Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff's Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2017).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
in either party’s filings.) Furthermore, plaintiff cites circumstantial evidence that
undermines Agdeppa’s account. By contrast, in Isayeva, the court was able to substantiate
the officer’s account with circumstantial evidence that he “had visible injuries including
bruises and swelling around his eyes, bruising and redness to his left ear, and bruising at
the base of his neck,” and that he “developed nausea and went to the emergency room,
where he was diagnosed with a non-serious head injury.” 872 F.3d at 944. Finally, there
is a meaningful factual distinction between this case and Isayeva. That court’s reasoning
relied heavily on the fact that the officer had “beg[un] to pass out when he was being
beaten,” which would have rendered him completely vulnerable and left his firearm
available to the suspect. Id. at 952. Here, although Agdeppa contends he thought Dorsey’s
next punch would kill Rodriguez, Opp. SDF No. 25: MSJ at 7, plaintiff raises a genuine
dispute as to whether that belief was reasonable. The Court must consider “the facts of
[this] specific case[],” Isayeva at 947, which, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
do not match those in Isayeva such that that case is dispositive.
Having concluded Isayeva is not dispositive, the Court must determine whether
Agdeppa violated a clearly established right held by Dorsey. At the time of the incident, it
was “clearly established” that “|w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer
and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify
the use of deadly force to do so.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d
1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A desire to resolve quickly a potentially dangerous situation
is not the type of government interest that, standing alone, justifies the use of force that
may cause serious injury.”). As discussed above, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, a jury could find that a reasonable officer in Agdeppa’s position
would not have believed that Rodriguez or anyone else was in imminent danger and, thus,
would have understood that his use of deadly force violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
rights. See supra PartIV.A.1. Therefore, Agdeppa is not entitled to qualified immunity as
a matter of law. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[i]f
a genuine issue of fact exists” as to “what the officer and claimant did or failed to do,”
qualified immunity at summary judgment is inappropriate). Accordingly, the Court
DENIES Agdeppa’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's excessive force claim.
B. State Law Wrongful Death Claims Based on Battery and Negligence
Plaintiff's third and fourth claims allege wrongful death based on battery and
negligence, respectively. Compl. §[ 41-56. “Claims of excessive force under California
law are analyzed under the same standard of objective reasonableness used in Fourth
Amendment claims.” Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2013)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. 2:19-CV-05370-CAS-JCx Date November 6, 2020
Title PAULETTE SMITH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
(applying Graham to negligent wrongful death claim); Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal.
App. 4th 1269, 1272-74 (1998) (noting that Section 1983 is “the federal counterpart of
state battery or wrongful death actions”). Agdeppa argues that the battery and negligence
claims fail as a matter of law because his use of force was reasonable. MSJ at 23. However,
the Court has already concluded that there is an issue of disputed fact regarding his use of
deadly force and denied summary judgment on plaintiffs excessive force claim. See supra
Part IV.A.1. Therefore, the Court also DENIES Agdeppa’s motion for summary judgment
on plaintiffs battery and negligence claims.
C. Chaudhry Damages
The Ninth Circuit recognizes a decedent’s nght to recover damages for pre-death
pain and suffering through a survival action brought by his heirs, Chaudhry v. City of Los
Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1103-105 (9th Cir. 2014), including “for every second a decedent
survives following a Constitutional violation,” Willis v. City of Fresno, No. 1:09-CV-
01766-BAM, 2017 WL 5713374, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (emphasis in original);
Nunez v. Santos, 427 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (upholding Chaudhry
damages where “jury could have concluded” decedent suffered “for at least [a] few
seconds”), appeal dismissed sub nom. Nunez v. City of San Jose, No. 20-15057, 2020 WL
1862133 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020).
Here, Agdeppa argues no jury could award Chaudhry damages because Dorsey’s
death was “instantaneous.” MSJ at 24. But plaintiff has raised a genuine dispute as to
whether Dorsey’s death was indeed instantaneous, as supported by Dr. Ashraf’s deposition
testimony that he could have died “seconds to minutes” after being shot. Opp. SDF No.
44: Opp. at 17. Accordingly, the Court also DENIES Agdeppa’s motion for summary
judgment on plaintiffs request for Chaudhry damages.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Agdeppa’s motion for summary
judgment with respect to all plaintiffs claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00 : 00
Initials of Preparer

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10633993. Public record. Not legal advice.