# Woods v. Elkin

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · October 24, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632859

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** October 24, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632859

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)
- concluding that policy of using transport vehicles without safety restraints nor its manner of transporting individuals in those vehicles “obviously presented a substantial risk of harm”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

EARL SPENCER WOODS, JR., PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:23-CV-04080-SOH-CDC

SHERIFF JAMES SINGLETON, Hempstead County
Detention Center, individually and in his official capacity;
CAPTAIN JAMES WISE, Hempstead County Jail, individually
and in his official capacity; ELKIN, Hempstead County Jail,
individually and in his official capacity, formally known as Jail Doctor
Elkins; and JAIL GUARD BRYANT, Hempstead County Jail,
individually and in his official capacity, DEFENDANTS.

MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Earl Spencer Woods, Jr., a prisoner, filed the above-captioned civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 15). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States Chief District Judge, referred
this case to the undersigned for the purposes of making a Report and Recommendation.
Plaintiff initiated this action in the Eastern District of Arkansas. (ECF No. 1). Magistrate
Judge Edie R. Ervin of the Eastern District of Arkansas ordered that this matter be transferred here
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) upon finding that venue was proper in this District under 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b). (ECF No. 3). Upon receipt, Magistrate Judge Barry A. Bryant of the Western
District of Arkansas ordered Plaintiff to either pay the filing fee of $402 or submit a complete in
forma pauperis (IFP) application by September 15, 2023, failing which this matter would be
subject to dismissal. (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff opted to submit a complete IFP application, which
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was subsequently granted. (ECF Nos. 7, 10).
Upon initial review of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to the Court’s preservice screening
obligations under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A et seq., this Court ordered Plaintiff to submit an amended
complaint. (ECF No. 12). Having received that Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 15), this matter
is now back before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon that review and

for the reasons outlined below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s complaint be
dismissed, in part, for failure to state a claim as a matter of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
I. BACKGROUND
Although Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint sets forth eight discrete claims for relief, the
Court views Plaintiff’s allegations as constituting the following five claims. (ECF No. 15).
First, Plaintiff alleges that on January 3, 2022, he was wearing handcuffs, leg irons, and a
belly chain when he was placed in a Hempstead County transport vehicle. Id. at p. 4. But before
the transport, Defendant Bryant failed to put on Plaintiff’s seatbelt. Id. When Plaintiff brought
this to Defendant Bryant’s attention, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bryant told him that he would

be “alright” because they were not going far. Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff says that during the transport,
Officer Bryant slammed on his brakes to avoid colliding with another vehicle, causing him to be
thrown out of his seat. Id. Plaintiff explains that his left shoulder hit the partition cage and he
fell onto his right shoulder, causing him significant injuries to his left and right shoulders, right
elbow, and back. Id. According to Plaintiff, when Defendant Bryant stopped the transport
vehicle, he admitted fault. Id. Plaintiff says that he told Defendant Bryant that he was “a little
sore,” but Defendant Bryant told him that he would be “alright.” Id.
When they returned to the Hempstead County Detention Center (HCDC), Plaintiff says

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that Defendant Bryant told Defendant Captain James Wise and Defendant Elkin, the medical
provider, what had happened. Id.at p. 5. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Elkin told him that
he would give him ibuprofen for the pain, but also told him he did not need to go to the hospital
without first conducting a medical or physical exam. Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Wise
did not reprimand Defendant Bryant in any way. Id. Plaintiff says that when he was released

from HCDC, he was examined by hospital staff at Guadalupe Hospital in Seguin, Texas and it was
determined that he had suffered injuries to his rotator cuff, back, and elbow. Id.
Second, Plaintiff claims that on April 27, 2022, he filed a grievance on the kiosk at the
HCDC against HCDC jail staff because he had asked for access to a power of attorney (POA) form
on April 25, 2022, but had not received a response by April 27, 2022. Id. at p. 7. According to
Plaintiff, “R. Langhor” responded to his grievance saying that he “can’t get a power of attorney.”
Id. Plaintiff claims that jail staff also denied him the ability to send legal paperwork associated
with his § 1983 litigation by certified mail, which is why he attempted to obtain POA to provide a
family member or friend with the authority to act on his behalf. Id. at p. 8. With respect to this

claim, Plaintiff identifies Captain James Wise as a defendant for purportedly allowing the jail staff
to deny him access to court paperwork and denying him access to the U.S. postal service. Id.
Plaintiff also identifies Sheriff James Singleton as a defendant to this claim on the grounds that
Defendant Singleton failed to properly train jail staff. Id.
Third, Plaintiff contends that he requested medical attention for the injuries he sustained in
the January 2022 traffic accident on April 27, 2022, June 6, 2022, June 23 – June 27, 2022, and
July 5, 2022. Id. at pp. 9-12, 15-16. In response, Plaintiff contends that he was told that those
requests had been sent to medical staff, but Plaintiff claims he never received the requested medical

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attention. Id. Plaintiff identifies Defendant Elkin—for failing to provide necessary medication
attention—and Defendant Singleton—for failure to supervise or train jail staff—as defendants to
this claim. Id. Plaintiff also identifies Defendant Wise as a defendant to the April 27, 2022,
incident, for “allowing officers to falsify access to medical through the kiosk,” and as a defendant
to the claim that he was denied medical care from June 23 – June 27, 2022. Id. at pp. 10, 15-16.

Fourth, according to Plaintiff, he filed a grievance on either June 12 or June 13, 2023, to
correct a previous grievance where he had noted the incorrect date of the accident. Id. at pp. 13-
15. In response, Plaintiff claims that R. Langohr simply said, “ok, it’s noted.” Id. Plaintiff
identifies Defendants Elkin and Singleton and defendants to this claim on the grounds that the
medical department was not treating him for his injuries and the jail staff did not convince the
medical department to treat him for his injuries or take him to the hospital to be treated. Id.
Fifth, Plaintiff contends that on June 15, 2022, Defendant Elkin directed him to sign a
medical release form. Id. at p. 19-21. But when Plaintiff did not hear anything back after signing
the form, he submitted a request on July 13, 2022, and received a reply from “M. Evans” saying

“forwarded to Dr. Elkin.” Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Elkin did not respond or see him
for at least three months. Id.
Plaintiff identifies the defendants in their official and individual capacities as to each claim.
He requests punitive and compensatory damages, including the costs associated with filing this
lawsuit. Id. at p. 21.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the PLRA, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

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frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff
has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v.
Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Claim 1: January 2022 Accident
The Court views Plaintiff’s claim regarding the January 2022 traffic accident as three
claims: (1) a claim against Defendant Bryant for both failing to secure him in the vehicle and then
driving “extremely recklessly;” (2) a medical indifference claim against Defendant Elkin; and (3)

a failure to supervise or train claim against Defendant Wise. The Court considers each claim, in
turn, below.
First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bryant failed to properly secure him in the transport
vehicle and then drove “extremely recklessly” and “slammed on his brakes” to avoid collision with
another vehicle, causing him physical injury to his shoulders, elbow, and back. (Amend. Comp. at
p. 4 (ECF No. 15)). The Court construes these allegations as a “failure to protect” claim.
Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time, his “failure to protect” claim arises
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Perry v. Adams, 993 F.3d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 2021).

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Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit has applied the same standard to “failure to protect” claims
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment as those raised by convicted prisoners under the Eighth
Amendment. Id. Under this standard, to establish a plausible “failure to protect” claim, the
plaintiff must show that “(1) objectively, there was a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff; and
(2) subjectively, Defendants knew of and deliberately disregarded the substantial risk of serious

harm.” Id. Deliberate indifference requires “proof of reckless disregard of the known risk.” Scott
v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013).
It is far from decided that placing an inmate—such as Plaintiff—unsecured in a county
transport vehicle in itself creates a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. Compare Spencer
v. Knapheide Truck Equip. Co., 183 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that policy of using
transport vehicles without safety restraints nor its manner of transporting individuals in those
vehicles “obviously presented a substantial risk of harm”) with Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552,
560 (8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that there was a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff and that the
defendant knew of and disregarded that risk where defendant knew plaintiff was shackled and

restrained so that he could not put on his own seatbelt, yet defendant nevertheless refused to put
plaintiff’s seatbelt on for him and then drove recklessly and ignored requests to slow down).
Here, the Court views Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Bryant knew Plaintiff was not wearing
a seatbelt and that Defendant Bryant knew Plaintiff could not put on his own seatbelt because he
was in handcuffs, but that Defendant Bryant nevertheless refused to put on Plaintiff’s seatbelt for
him as more analogous to Fortner than to Spencer.
Even so, however, Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim fails as a matter of law because
Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Bryant’s subsequent conduct manifested a deliberate

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indifference to Plaintiff’s safety. Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bryant “drove extremely
recklessly.” (ECF No. 15). This is exactly the type of conclusory allegation devoid of factual
enhancement that is not entitled to the presumption of truth. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (requiring
more than conclusory allegations not sufficient to establish a plausible claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)). Setting this allegation aside, Plaintiff offers no facts suggesting

how Defendant Bryant’s driving was “extremely reckless,” or that Plaintiff (or someone else) made
Defendant Bryant aware that his driving conduct was reckless or otherwise unsafe. Cf. Fortner,
518 F.3d at 560 (factual allegations showing that defendant was aware that inmate passengers were
concerned for their safety based on his driving conduct sufficient to conclude that defendant knew
of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to inmates); Brown v. Morgan, 39 F.3d 1184, 1994
WL 610993, at * 1 (8th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994) (table decision) (plaintiff’s allegations that defendant
manifested deliberate indifference by “refusing to let him wear a seatbelt, driving at a high rate of
speed in bad weather, refusing to slow down despite [plaintiff’s] pleas for him to do so” sufficient
to establish a plausible § 1983 claim). Indeed, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Bryant slammed

on his breaks to avoid colliding with another vehicle reflects a regard for Plaintiff’s safety.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Bryant was acting with the necessary
state of mind to sustain a “failure to protect” claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant
Bryant in his individual capacity for “failure to protect” fails as a matter of law and should be
dismissed.
Second, Plaintiff claims that when he and Defendant Bryant returned from the transport,
Defendant Elkin gave him ibuprofen for the pain but did not send him to the hospital or submit

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him to any medical examination. The Court views these allegations as a “medical indifference”
claim.
Courts apply the Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” standard in assessing claims
brought by pretrial detainees challenging the constitutionality of their medical care. Grayson v.
Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 808 (8th Cir. 2006). Under this standard, the plaintiff must show that “(1) he

suffered objectively serious medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but
deliberately disregarded those needs.” Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997).
A “serious medical need” is “on that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Vaughn v. Greene Cty., Arkansas, 438 F.3d 845, 851 (8th
Cir. 2006).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Elkin heard about the car accident and told him that
he did not need to go to the hospital without first conducting a medical or physical examination.
(ECF No. 15). Plaintiff also claims that he complained of having suffered injury from this
accident. Id. Thus, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, for the limited purpose of

preservice screening, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established a plausible “deliberate
indifference” claim against Defendant Elkin in his individual capacity.
This leaves Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Wise for “not reprimanding Officer
Bryant.” (ECF No. 15). The Court construes this claim as a “failure to supervise or train” claim.
Assuming, for the purposes of preservice screening, that Defendant Wise is Bryant’s supervisor,
“a supervisor may be held liable ‘if a failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee
caused the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Perkins v. Hastings, 915 F.3d 512, 524 (8th Cir.
2019) (quoting Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 635 (8th Cir. 2001)). But, for the reasons outlined

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above, Plaintiff has not established that Defendant Bryant violated his constitutional rights. Thus,
by extension, Plaintiff has not established a plausible claim against Defendant Wise for failure to
supervise or train. Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant Wise is therefore
dismissed.
B. Claim 2: Access to Power of Attorney Forms

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wise and Defendant Singleton violated his constitutional
rights when they failed to provide him with a power of attorney (POA) form upon his request.
The Court views these allegations in terms of an “access to the courts” claim.
The United States Constitution guarantees prisoners a right to access to the courts. See
White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 2007). Because pretrial detainees are subject to the
same types of restrictions as prisoners, this Court analyzes Plaintiff’s “access-to-the-courts” claim
under the same standard articulated for claims brought by prisoner-plaintiffs.
“To prove a violation of the right of meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner must
establish the state has not provided an opportunity to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner’s

sentence or conditions of confinement in a court of law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the
hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal claim.” Hartsfield v.
Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir.
2007)). “To prove actual injury, moreover, “a prisoner must demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal
claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.” Id. (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353
(1996)).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any injury from allegedly being denied a
power of attorney form. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that he requested the power of attorney form so

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that his family or a friend could send his § 1983 filing to the court by certified mail on his behalf
because he could not mail this paperwork by certified mail himself. (ECF No. 15). But Plaintiff
has not alleged any facts—and this Court finds none—suggesting that the court requires § 1983
paperwork to be mailed by certified mail or that his § 1983 paperwork was rejected because it was
not mailed by certified mail. Thus, because Plaintiff did not—and cannot—allege sufficient facts

establishing that he suffered an injury from being denied a power of attorney form, this Court
recommends that this claim be dismissed for failure to state a claim as a matter of law.
C. Claim 3: Failure to Provide Medical Care
Plaintiff alleges that his requests for medical attention for his pain from the injuries he
sustained in the January 2022 accident were ignored on April 27, 2022, June 6, 2022, June 23 –
June 27, 2022, and July 7, 2022.
As noted above, to establish a claim for medical indifference, Plaintiff must show that
“(1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) defendants knew of the need
yet deliberately disregarded it.” Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 2004).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he experienced ongoing pain from the injuries he sustained in
the January 2022 car accident and that he filed grievances requesting medical attention for that
pain but received none. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Elkin was the medical provider for
the HCDC at the time and that he was made aware of those grievances. For the limited purpose
of preservice screening, therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established a plausible medical
indifference claim against Defendant Elkin in his individual capacity.
Plaintiff also identifies Defendant Wise and Defendant Singleton as defendants to this
claim. Regarding Defendant Wise, Plaintiff claims that he “allow[ed] officers to falsify access to

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medical through the kiosk.” (Amend. Comp. at p. 10 [ECF No. 15]). But this allegation is simply
conclusory: he offers no facts suggesting how officers “falsified” access to medical through the
kiosk, or how he “allowed” this to happen. Thus, this claim against Defendant Wise should fail.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Wise and Defendant Singleton is for “failure
to train or supervise,” this claim should likewise fail because Plaintiff offers no facts establishing

that these defendants supervise—or have any authority over—Defendant Elkin.
Finally, with respect to this claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Singleton “is to blame
for employing [Defendant] Elkin as the medical provider who failed to do his job properly.”
(Amend. Comp. at p. 12 [ECF No. 15]). To establish liability based on hiring decisions, “a plaintiff
must show that the hiring decision and the plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury are closely
connected—an applicant’s background is the causal link.” Morris v. Crawford Cty., 299 F.3d 919,
923 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397
(1997)). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts suggesting that Defendant Singleton hired
Defendant Elkin as HCDC’s medical provider. This pleading deficiency alone is sufficient to

recommend dismissal of this claim. But even if Plaintiff had established that Defendant Singleton
had hired Defendant Elkin, there are no facts—even when liberally construed—to suggest that
Defendant Singleton was aware of any information in Defendant Elkin’s background putting him
on notice that Defendant Elkin had previously failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical
care to pretrial detainees who had been involved in car accidents during their pretrial detention.
Absent such information, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Singleton for hiring Defendant Elkin
should fail as a matter of law. See Morris, 299 F.3d at 924 (To survive summary judgment on
a § 1983 hiring claim, “plaintiff must point to prior complaints in an applicant’s background that

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are nearly identical to the type of misconduct that causes the constitutional deprivation allegedly
sufferance by the plaintiff.”).
D. Claim 4: Grievance and Claim 5: Release of Information Form
Plaintiff claims that he submitted a grievance on or about June 12 or June 13, 2023, to
correct the date of the accident that he had noted in an earlier grievance.1 Plaintiff asserts that

“the medical staff is at fault as they weren’t treating [him] for [his] injuries sustained in the
accident. The Sheriff, Jail Administrator, etc. are at fault as they seen that the medical department
was not treatment me and then done nothing to convence medical to help nor would they take me
to the hospital.” (Amend. Comp. at p. 14 [ECF No. 15]). Also, Plaintiff claims that on June 15,
2022, he signed a release of information (ROI) form at Defendant Elkin’s direction. (Amend.
Comp. at p. 20 [ECF No. 15]). According to Plaintiff, he filed a request on July 13, 2022,
explaining that he had signed the form but had not heard anything back. Id. Plaintiff contends
that he did not receive any medical attention for three months.
To the extent that these claims are against the grievance procedure itself, such claims fail

as a matter of law because Plaintiff has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure. Buckley
v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (because a prison grievance procedure does not confer
any substantive right upon the inmates, failure to comply with grievance procedure does not
amount to a constitutional violation). To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims concern the defendants’
failure to provide adequate medical care, Plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient facts alleging

1 Plaintiff says that in the earlier grievance he had noted that the date of the “accident” was “11-3-
22 when in all actually it was on or about 11-3-21.” (Amend. Comp. at p. 14 [ECF No. 15]). It is
entirely unclear whether this is a typo and Plaintiff is referring to the car accident he alleges took
place on or about January 3, 2022, or if he is referring to an entirely different accident. In any
event, this question is immaterial to the Court’s analysis.
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when, for example, he was denied that care (and whether these dates are the same as or in addition
to those noted above). Accordingly, these claims do not allege a plausible “failure to provide
medical care” claim. This Court, therefore, recommends that these claims be dismissed.
E. Official Capacity Claims
This leaves Plaintiff’s official capacity claims. “Official-capacity liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 occurs only when a constitutional injury is caused by a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy.” Gladden v. Richbourg, 759 F.3d 960, 968 (8th Cir.2014) (quoting Grayson v.
Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 810–11 (8th Cir.2006)).
Here, of all Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims, this Court recommends that only the
following proceed past screening: (1) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Elkin for failure to
provide constitutionally adequate medical care immediately following the January 3, 2022, traffic
accident; and (2) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Elkin for failing to provide constitutionally
adequate follow-up medical care on April 27, 2022, June 6, 2022, June 23 – June 27, 2022, and

July 7, 2022. To sustain these claims against Defendant Elkin in his official capacity, Plaintiff
must establish that “a policy or custom of the governmental entity was the moving force behind
the violation of federal law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). But Plaintiff fails
to plead any facts suggesting that Defendant Elkin’s purported failure to provide constitutionally
adequate medical care was the result of the policy or custom of Hempstead County. This Court
therefore recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Elkin in his official capacity be
dismissed.

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IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, having reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court
recommends that the following claims proceed: (1) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Elkin in
his individual capacity for failing to provide constitutionally adequate medical care immediately
following the January 3, 2022, traffic accident; and (2) Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Elkin

for failing to provide constitutionally adequate care on April 27, 2022, June 6, 2022, June 23 –
June 27, 2022, and July 7, 2022.
All other claims should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.

DATED this 24th day of October 2023.

/s/ Christy Comstock
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632859. Public record. Not legal advice.