# Scharnhorst v. Cantrell

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · December 12, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632546

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** December 12, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632546

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining the material difference between the two is the allowed duration of such an order
- explaining that Article III of the Constitution prohibits federal courts from issuing advisory opinion advising what the “law would be on a hypothetical set of facts”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JOHN WILLIAM SCHARNHORST, III PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 5:22-CV-05218

CHIEF DEPUTY JAY CANTRELL, Washington County Detention Center (WCDC);
MAJOR RANDALL DENZER, WCDC; CAPTAIN NOLAN AKE, WCDC;
CAPTAIN KEVIN EAST, WCDC; LIEUTENANT MIKE ARNOLD, WCDC;
LIEUTENANT AMANDA ARNOLD, WCDC; LIEUTENANT CARRIER; WCDC;
SERGEANT ALLEN, WCDC; SERGEANT PINEDA, WCDC;
SERGEANT MALONE, WCDC; SERGEANT FOSTER, WCDC;
SERGEANT WORKMAN, WCDC; SERGEANT BZOSKI, WCDC;
SERGEANT BEAVERS, WCDC; SERGEANT BRADSHAW, WCDC;
SERGEANT FULLER, WCDC; SERGEANT BYRD, WCDC;
CORPORAL KRADDUCK, WCDC; CORPORAL RAINES, WCDC;
CORPORAL CORLEY, WCDC; CORPORAL BENJAMIN VELASCO, WCDC;
CORPORAL SMITH, WCDC; CORPORAL VANDENACK, WCDC;
CORPORAL BOWMAN, WCDC; CORPORAL GORDON OCHIENG, WCDC;
CORPORAL TURNER, WCDC; CORPORAL DOMINIC NUMZIATO, WCDC;
CORPORAL TOM MULVANEY, WCDC; DEPUTY EOFF, WCDC;
DEPUTY McLELAND, WCDC; DEPUTY DRUMRIGHT, WCDC;
DEPUTY KRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, WCDC; DEPUTY GRANDADOS, WCDC;
DEPUTY RHODES, WCDC; DEPUTY WHITE, WCDC;
DEPUTY DERSAM, WCDC; DEPUTY HIGDON, WCDC;
DEPUTY TYLER BECK, WCDC; DEPUTY SCHMITT, WCDC;
DEPUTY RAINES, WCDC; DEPUTY BILBREY, WCDC;
DEPUTY PHIPPS, WCDC; DEPUTY EDGE, WCDC;
DEPUTY TATE, WCDC; DEPUTY MONTANO, WCDC;
DEPUTY SELF, WCDC; DEPUTY FRYE, WCDC; and
DEPUTY VASILOPOLOUS, WCDC DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff John William Scharnhorst, III, filed this civil rights matter generally alleging that
the conditions of his confinement at the Washington County Detention Center (“WCDC”) violate
his constitutionally protected rights. (ECF No. 1). This matter is now before the Court on
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 7) and Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (ECF No. 9).
I. BACKGROUND
In addition to this matter, Plaintiff has pending in this District four (4) additional civil rights
actions at various stages. See Scharnhorst v. Cantrell, et al., 5:22-CV-05138-TLB-MEF (W.D.

Ark. July 15, 2022); Scharnhorst v. Helder, et al., 5:22-CV-05167-TLB-CDC (W.D. Ark. Aug.
10, 2022); Scharnhorst v. Cantrell et al., 5:22-CV-05176-TLB-CDC (W.D. Ark. Aug. 30. 2022);
Scharnhorst v. Cantrell et al., 5:22-CV-05232-TLB-MEF (W.D. Ark. Nov. 28, 2022).
Herein, this Court previously granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF No. 5). Upon preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint to address factual and legal deficiencies in his
original complaint. (ECF No. 8). To date, Plaintiff has not submitted the amended complaint for
review and for that reason, this Court has not completed its preservice screening obligation under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) to determine whether Plaintiff has plead any cognizable claims. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b).
Despite lack of review and lack of service, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction. (ECF
No. 7). In his motion, Plaintiff alleges WCDC personnel are “refusing to meet the standards of
cleanliness, sanitation, and hygiene required by law and outlined by their own policies.” (ECF No.
7 at p. 1). According to Plaintiff, the WCDC policy manual provides that “all inmates have a
right to humane treatment which provides for . . . clean living quarters, and a healthy, safe and
secure environment,” but WCDC staff are violating this policy by refusing to clean – or allow
detainees to clean – the facility. Id. Plaintiff claims WCDC personnel spread filth around the

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facility; throw trash onto the floor of the detainee housing areas; deny detainees garbage
receptacles; and sweep food and trash out of the detainees’ cells and into the common areas,
“leaving piles of food, toilet paper, Kleenex, food packaging, spilled drinks, every sort of trash
imaginable to be walked through and tracked all over the day room, stairs, and hallways.” Id. at p.
2. Plaintiff further alleges the facility’s failure to appropriately “manage” the mentally ill

(detainees) compounds the problem because many of them “soil themselves, urinate all over the
floors, spill food on the floors, etc.” and “all of this is being swept into the day room and left for
all other detainees to contend with.” Id. Plaintiff says that even though the WCDC policy manual
recognizes the public health consequences of failing to maintain a clean facility and requires
cleaning supplies to be delivered to detainees three times a day, WCDC staff “refuse to clean or
allow to be cleaned the showers, toilet or dining area” and refuse to provide cleaning supplies to
Plaintiff despite his requests. Id. at pp. 2-3.
Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court requiring WCDC staff to “(1) stop kicking and
throwing food trays scattering food and juice all over the detainees’ living quarters; (2) stop

throwing trash onto the floor, as this is clearly prohibited on page 10 of the WCDC handbook; (3)
provide cleaning supplies and allow the detainees to clean the common areas including the dining
area, toilet, showers, stairs and catwalk 3 times daily after meals in order to remove food, trash,
and spilled juice or clean it themselves, as currently neither is happening; [and] (4) pursuant to
WCDC page 10, cleanliness ‘detainees shall clean their cells’ and ‘the facility staff, as required,
shall issue cleaning materials,’ allow detainees to clean their cells with clean mops and clean
brooms . . . .” Id. at p. 3.
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF

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No. 9). In this motion, Plaintiff similarly alleges that “he and hundreds of other detainees at the
Washington County Detention Center are being subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement
due to the indifference and neglect of the defendants.” (ECF No. 9 at p. 1). Plaintiff repeats that
the mentally ill detainees “regularly soil themselves, smear feces on themselves, their bed, the
walls, floor and doors, urinate on themselves and the floors, never shower, throw food and drinks

around and spread this filth onto the dining tables, telephones, electronic kiosk, door handles,
handrails, walls and floors” but the WCDC personnel are not qualified to address their needs, so
they are neglected. Id.
Plaintiff claims he is currently housed with a detainee who defecates onto food trays and
into drinking cups, but these items are not being cleaned thoroughly by kitchen staff before being
used at subsequent meals. Id. at p. 2. Plaintiff alleges this detainee’s cell is cleaned first after
meals and Plaintiff is required to use the same mop and broom in his cell, even though neither the
mop nor broom are thoroughly cleaned between uses. According to Plaintiff, he has refused
meals to avoid these mops and brooms being used on his cell. Plaintiff claims that he recently

had a conversation with Captain Ake, who agreed he could use the mop and broom before they are
used by the aforementioned detainee. Plaintiff says, however, that this does not address the
problem entirely because “no sanitation of the common areas is performed regarding [this inmate]
spreading of feces and urine around, and nothing is being done to facilitate his personal hygiene.”
Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff requests a court order requiring the defendants to “address the filth of the
mentally ill.” Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

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Although the Court recognizes that Plaintiff “certified” that he mailed a copy of his Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, (ECF No. 7), to Defendants at 1155 W Clydesdale Drive, Fayetteville,
Arkansas 72701 – which this Court understands to be the address for the WCDC – Defendants
have not yet been served with the Complaint. Accordingly, this Court construes both of Plaintiff’s
motions for injunctive relief as requests for temporary restraining orders (“TRO”) under Rule

65(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to
the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified
complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B)
the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
In addition to the technical requirements of Rule 65(b)(1), when determining whether to
grant a TRO, courts consider the following four factors: (1) the movant’s probability or likelihood
of success on the merits, (2) the threat of irreparable harm or injury to the movant absent the
injunction, (3) the balance between the harm to the movant and the harm that the injunction’s
issuance would inflict on other interested parties, and (4) whether the issuance of an injunction is
in the public interest.1 Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981)
(en banc); see also Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Rauh Rubber, Inc., 130 F.3d 1305, 1307
(8th Cir. 1997); Sanborn Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co., 997 F.2d 484,
485-86 (8th Cir. 1993). Court must be mindful that “in the prison context, a request for injunctive
relief must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for

1 Notably, “the standard for analyzing a temporary restraining order is the same as a motion for a preliminary
injunction.” Tumey v. Mycroft Al, Inc. 27 F.4th 657, 665 (8th Cir. 2022) (explaining the material difference between
the two is the allowed duration of such an order).
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in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Goff v. Harper,
60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he burden of establishing the
propriety of an injunction is on the movant.” Watkins, Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir.
2003).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief are unsound for at least two reasons.
First, “a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296,
300 (1998). Here, citing legal and factual deficiencies with his original complaint, this Court
directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint which has not yet been filed. At this stage,
Plaintiff has not yet established a cognizable cause of action. “The dramatic and drastic power of
injunctive force may be unleashed only against conditions generating a presently existing actual
threat; it may not be used simply eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury, or a future
invasion of rights . . . .” Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations

omitted). It exceeds the power of this Court to speculate on whether Plaintiff will, in his amended
complaint, establish a viable cause of action sufficient to trigger consideration of temporary relief.
See KCCP Trust v. City of North Kansas City, 432 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
Article III of the Constitution prohibits federal courts from issuing advisory opinion advising what
the “law would be on a hypothetical set of facts”). Given the procedural posture of this case,
Plaintiff’s motions are subject to dismissal as unripe.
Second, even if the Court considered Plaintiff’s motions on the merits, the motions would
fail at this stage. While no single Dataphase factor is dispositive, “the two most critical factors for

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a district court to consider in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction are (1) the
probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer
irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted.” Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204,
206 (8th Cir. 1976). While Plaintiff expresses confidence that his action will succeed on the
merits, the undersigned cannot agree since it remains to be seen whether Plaintiff (a) will establish

a cognizable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging a violation of his constitutionally protected rights,
and (b) illustrate sufficient facts to suggest a likelihood of success on the merits of his
constitutional claim(s). The first Dataphase factor weighs heavily against issuance of a TRO.2
Similarly, Plaintiff has not illustrated irreparable harm. To establish irreparable harm, “a
party must show that the harm is certain and of great and of such imminence that there is a clear
and present need for equitable relief.” Iowa Utils. Bd. v. F.C.C., 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (citations omitted). “Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy
at law, typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.”
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). “Speculative harm

does not support a preliminary injunction.” S.J.W. ex rel Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist.,
696 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 2012). While Plaintiff’s motions suggest that WCDC personnel have
not only violated their cleanliness policies but contributed to the problem, (ECF No. 7), and are
ill-equipped to meet the needs of the WCDC’s population of mentally ill detainees, (ECF No. 9),

2 With respect to Plaintiff’s second TRO motion, (ECF No. 9), a further note is warranted: First, “a party motiving
for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury complaint in the party’s
motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s
second motion for injunctive relief requests an order concerning the defendants’ care of the mentally ill detainees.
Such a request is wholly unrelated to factual predicate of the original complaint, which concerns the conditions of
confinement at the WCDC. (ECF No. 1). Second, to the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a claim against the WCDC
on behalf of the population of mentally ill detainees, such a claim would fail. See Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of
Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1016 (8th Cir. 1983) (“A litigant may not claim standing . . . to vindicate the
constitutional rights of some third party.”) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)).
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Plaintiff does not allege he has suffered any concrete harm because of WCDC’s failures or that he
will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. The mere possibility of harm is not enough to
satisfy this requirement. Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. Soo Line R.R., 792 F.3d 903, 915 (8th Cir. 2015).
Failing to illustrate that he will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction is fatal to Plaintiffs
TRO requests.> “Once a court determines that the movant has failed to show irreparable harm
absent an injunction, the inquiry is finished, and the denial of the injunctive request is warranted.”
Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 420 (8th Cir. 1987).
I. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is therefore recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction (ECF No. 7) and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 9) be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 12™ day of December 2022.
( Ansty Comatack
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3 Plaintiff’s second request for injunctive relief, moreover, is moot to the extent that it complains of being required
to use the same broom and mop that are first used to clean the cell of a mentally ill detainee. See Martin v. Sargent,
780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[A] prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief to improve prison conditions is moot
if he or she is no longer subject to those conditions.”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632546. Public record. Not legal advice.