# Brown v. Gammage

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · March 24, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632358

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** March 24, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632358

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

JIMMY L. BROWN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:21-cv-04040

ANGELA GAMMAGE DEFENDANT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Angela Gammage’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint for Insufficient Service of Process and Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 17. Plaintiff,
who is proceeding pro se, has not responded to this Motion, but he has filed a separate motion
(ECF No. 19).
Because the issues raised in Plaintiff’s separate motion are the same issues Defendant
Gammage has raised in her Motion, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s motion as a response to the
current Motion. Defendant Gammage’s Motion has been referred to the undersigned, and it is now
ripe for consideration. Considering this Motion (ECF No. 17); and based upon the foregoing, the
Court finds it should be GRANTED.
1. Background:
On July 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a pro se Amended Complaint against a number of
Defendants, including Defendant Angela Gammage. ECF No. 5. This lawsuit was filed pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Based upon this Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts:
a. On November 23, 2018, Plaintiff, while shopping at Walmart, was asked but refused to
provide a receipt to Walmart employees for goods he had in his possession. Such a failure to
provide a receipt upon request was a purported violation of Walmart’s policy. Plaintiff requested
that Walmart contact the police, and they did so.
b. In response to Plaintiff’s request that the police be contacted, Defendant Gammage
arrived on the scene and asked Plaintiff to show the Walmart employees his receipt. Defendant
Gammage told Plaintiff that if he did not show the Walmart employees his receipt, he could be
arrested for shoplifting. Defendant Gammage asked Plaintiff for his identification to verify his
identity. Defendant Gammage informed Plaintiff that she could arrest him for obstruction of

governmental operations if he continued to refuse to provide his identification.
c. Ultimately, Plaintiff provided his receipt to a Walmart employee and his identification
to Defendant Gammage. Defendant Gammage inquired as to whether Plaintiff had any warrants
for his arrest. Thereafter, the receipt and identification were given back to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff
left Walmart.
The Court interprets the Amended Complaint to allege Defendant Gammage unlawfully
seized Plaintiff, requested his identification, and checked for warrants for his arrest.
After Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was filed, all non-state actors were dismissed from
this lawsuit and only the claims against Defendant Angela Gammage remained. ECF No. 8.

According to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Defendant Gammage was an officer with the Hope
Police Department. See ECF No. 5. As such, she was a state actor and claims against her could
proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On January 31, 2022, the U.S. Marshal’s Office served Defendant Gammage. ECF No.
20. Once served, Defendant Gammage filed the current Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint for Insufficient Service of Process and Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 17. With this
Motion, Defendant Gammage claims she and her employer were not served in accordance with
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and she alleges Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Id. Specifically, Defendant Gammage claims she is entitled to
qualified immunity; she claims no Fourth Amendment violation occurred; and she claims Plaintiff
improperly failed to allege the City of Hope was liable such that his official capacity claim would
be cognizable. Based upon these facts, she claims this case must be dismissed.
2. Applicable Law:
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “the complaint must include

sufficient factual allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests.” Drobnak v.
Andersen Corp., 561 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)). The stated claim for relief must be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
While the Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe
them in favor of the plaintiff, the Court must not “presume the truth of legal conclusions crouch
as factual allegations.” Id.; See also Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he court is free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported allegations, unwarranted
inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”). In short, “the
pleading standard that Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
3. Discussion:
With the present Motion, Defendant Gammage argues Plaintiff’s claims should be
dismissed for several reasons, including her allegation that she is entitled to qualified immunity.
ECF No. 18 at 5-6. In his response (labeled as a “motion”), Plaintiff argues his “Complaint does
state a claim. I am praying that the Court will consider earnestly, with all deliberate speed, the
statements that are in my Complaint.” ECF No. 19 at 1. Plaintiff does not directly address the
issue of Defendant Gammage’s claim to qualified immunity. Upon review of this issue and based
upon the following analysis, the Court finds Defendant Gammage is entitled to qualified immunity.
Notably, police officers are protected from § 1983 suits by the affirmative defense of

qualified immunity. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980) (explaining that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense). Qualified
immunity shields police officers from lawsuits based on official conduct if reasonable officers in
the same position could have believed their conduct was “lawful, in light of clearly established
law and the information the . . . officer possessed” at the time. See Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d
725, 735-736 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).
Importantly, because qualified immunity protects officers from suit, not merely from
liability, courts should “resolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has held that

“[w]hen an official properly and timely files a motion for dismissal or for summary judgment
asserting qualified immunity, the official is entitled to a ruling on the issue of qualified immunity.
As such, the district court must issue a reviewable ruling—either granting or denying qualified
immunity—before requiring the officials to progress further in litigation at the district court.”
Payne v. Britten, 749 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
To overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of his statutory or
constitutional rights, and (2) that “the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of [the]
defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). “Qualified
immunity is appropriate only if no reasonable factfinder could answer yes to both of these
questions.” Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Courts may
analyze either of the qualified immunity prongs first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Here, based on the factual allegations Plaintiff has pled, Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity. The conduct of Defendant Gammage, as alleged, was entirely within the constitutional
range of conduct permissible by a law enforcement officer in the situation described by Plaintiff.

Defendant Gammage responded to a call by a citizen reporting a possible crime. Once on the
scene, she requested Plaintiff’s identification. She informed Plaintiff of the consequences of his
failure to comply with her instructions. Plaintiff was not arrested. After his identity was confirmed
and he produced a receipt for the goods he had in his possession, he was allowed to leave the
premises. None of this conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated a violation of his statutory or constitutional rights; and even
if such a violation had occurred, there has been no allegation at all that this right or these rights
were “clearly established” at the time of Defendant Gammage’s alleged conduct. Indeed, apart
from his bare claim in this matter that his constitutional rights were violated, Plaintiff has supplied

nothing more.
4. Conclusion:
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant Gammage is entitled to qualified
immunity. As such, the Court recommends Defendant Gammage’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint for Insufficient Service of Process and Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 17)
be GRANTED. Because Defendant Gammage is the only remaining Defendant in this action, the
Court also recommends that Plaintiff’s case be DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The Parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).
DATED this 24th day of March 2022.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632358. Public record. Not legal advice.
