# Walton v. Voss

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · April 11, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632293

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** April 11, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632293

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[p]rocedural guidelines, such as a mandatory hearing, are not enough to create a liberty interest”
- noting that while an arrestee’s denial of medical care is properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the analysis parallels that under the Eighth Amendment

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

MARCUS WALTON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 6:20-cv-06033

DILLION R. VOSS, SERGEANT,
OUACHITA RIVER UNIT, ET AL. DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Plaintiff, Marcus Walton, originally filed his pro se action on March 11, 2020, in the
Eastern District of Arkansas pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). On March 19, 2020, the
matter was transferred to this Court. (ECF No. 3). On March 20, 2020, Plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis was granted. (ECF No. 6).
Before the Court are the parties’ opposing motions for summary judgment: Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 142); and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 147). The Court has considered the motions, and the responses and replies thereto, and
they are ripe for decision. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the
Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the
undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This matter has already been before the Court at the summary judgment stage on the issue
of exhaustion. Following those summary judgment proceedings, Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Ebony Harris, Dillion Jennings, James Gibson, Dale Reed and Tomisha Ivory were
dismissed. (ECF No. 134). The remaining claims in this matter, against Defendants Dillon Voss,
Shakoyia Lewis, Sedrick Franklin, and Flora Washington, are contained in the Third Amended
Complaint, as supplemented by Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement. (ECF No. 58, 61, 79).
Plaintiff’s first claim in his Third Amended Complaint is for “excessive force” and is stated
against remaining Defendants Voss and Lewis, in their personal capacity only. (ECF No. 58 at 5).
Plaintiff lists the date of occurrence as “1-26-2020” and states: “Ebony Harris struck plaintiff 5 or
6 times in face for no reason while incoherent on ground, as well as Dillion Jennings and Shacoya
Lewis struck plaintiff with state issued radio, Dillion R. Voss struck plaintiff with brass knuckle
style cooper.” (ECF No. 58 at 5).

Plaintiff’s second claim is also for “excessive force” with respect to “1-26-2020.” (ECF
No. 58 at 6). The remaining claim is stated against Defendants Voss and Lewis, in their personal
capacity only. Id. Plaintiff states: “[h]ad two teeth knocked out, severe [sic] chronic migraine
[sic] headaches from blows by all defendants to the head, and blunt force trauma to my back blood
in urine and loss of hearing in left ear.” (ECF No. 58 at 6).
Plaintiff’s third claim is for “due process of law denial of medical” with the date of
occurrence of “2-6-2020.” (ECF No. 58 at 7). Plaintiff names remaining Defendants Franklin and
Washington, in their personal capacity only. Id. Plaintiff states he was “[d]enied my right to
medical treatment and due process of law.” Id. Plaintiff’s third claim is supplemented by the
information included in Plaintiff’s pleading docketed as Motion to Supplement. (ECF No. 61).
With respect to Defendant Franklin, Plaintiff states: “procedural due process, denial of medical
care. Defendant put in false reports that denied plaintiff right to a report hearing and denied him
right to medical care which is a violation of amendment 8 also 14 . . . denied the plaintiff liberty
without due process of law.” (ECF No. 61 at 1). With respect to Defendant Washington, Plaintiff

states: “substantial due process, also procedural due process. Defendant placed plaintiff on
involuntary treatment program which caused a . . . liberty denial and also signed papers for the
plaintiff that he was unaware of to admit him for the treatment program. Also denied him the right
to appear before the classification committee.” (ECF No. 61 at 2).
Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages as relief for his claims.
Specifically, Plaintiff seeks “350,000 in compensatory damages . . . 200.00 a day . . . pain and
suffering for my depression mental stability being away from my children.” (ECF No. 58 at 8).
The following is a summation of the facts established for purposes of this summary
judgment proceeding:
Plaintiff Marcus Walton (hereinafter “Walton”) is an inmate with the Arkansas Department
of Corrections1 (“ADC”). Walton was formerly housed at the Ouachita Regional Correctional

Unit (ORU), and is currently housed at Varner SuperMax.
Defendants Voss and Lewis are former correctional officers for the ADC.
On January 27, 2020, Voss was assigned to the ORU. Both the Declaration of Dillon Voss
and the narrative by Voss contained in Walton’s Disciplinary Violation, attached as an exhibit to
Voss’s Declaration, detail Voss’s interactions with Walton on January 27, 2020. (ECF No. 147-1
at 1; 4).
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on January 27, 2020, Walton was inside of Chow Hall 4, Zone
4, monitoring intake chow. (ECF No. 147-1 at 1; 4). Voss further testifies that he gave Walton a
direct order to be quiet, which Walton disobeyed. (ECF No. 147-1 at 4). Voss then ordered Walton
out of the Chow Hall. (ECF No. 147-1 at 1; 4).
Voss testifies that as Walton exited the Chow Hall, he began speaking to Voss in a profane
and aggressive manner. (ECF No. 147-1 at 2; 4). Voss testifies Walton verbally advised Voss he
was refusing to return to the barracks. Id. Voss testifies that Walton was combative and aggressive

in his refusal. Id. Voss testified that he therefore directed Walton to submit to hand restraints. Id.
Voss testifies Walton responded, “I’m not submitting to shit-fuck that . . . .” Id.

1 The Arkansas Department of Correction was reorganized in 2019 to become the Arkansas Department
of Corrections. The new Department is a Cabinet level department within the Arkansas State
Government which includes the Division of Correction and the Division of Community Correction.
Voss testifies that he then attempted to place hand restraints on Walton, but Walton pulled
away in an aggressive manner. (ECF No. 147-1 at 2; 4). An aggressive incident, that was captured
on video, then ensued. (ECF No. 147-2). Voss testifies that he struck Walton with a closed fist to
attempt to gain his compliance and get control of the situation. (ECF No. 147-1 at 2; 4). Voss
testifies that he used only the amount of force necessary to regain control of Walton and to attempt
to restrain him. (ECF No. 147-1 at 2). Voss testifies that he did not strike Walton with hand

restraints. Id. Although he was holding the hand restraints, Voss testifies that he had his fist
completely around them where no portion of the hand restraints struck Walton. (ECF No. 147-1
at 2).
Voss testifies that Walton then struck him back with a closed fist. (ECF No. 147-1 at 3;
4). Voss testifies that this caused him to suffer a fractured eye socket. In addition, since the
incident, Voss has developed a cataract on his eye due to a scratch caused by Walton’s strike.
(ECF No. 147-1 at 3).
Voss testifies that he and Walton went to the ground, and that Walton was on top of him at
that time until additional staff arrived and restrained Walton. (ECF No. 147-1 at 3; 4). Voss
testifies that while on the ground, Walton continued to struggle and refused to stop his aggression.
(ECF No. 147-1 at 3).
Lewis was also involved in the incident with Walton on January 27, 2020. (ECF No. 147-
3). In the Declaration of Shakoyia Lewis, she testifies that she documented her account of what
occurred in an incident report. (ECF No. 147-3 at 1; 3).

Lewis testifies “[a]t no time did I strike Inmate Walton with a radio as he has alleged.”
(ECF No. 147-3 at 1). Lewis further testifies: “[t]hat only the force necessary to regain control of
Inmate Walton and gain his compliance was used in the incident.” (ECF No. 147-3 at 1).
Lewis’s incident report notes aggressive profanity against her, and notes multiple refusals
by Walton to comply with verbal, direct orders. (ECF No. 147-3 at 3). Lewis’s incident report
also states that Voss gave Walton “a loud, verbal, direct order to accept hand restraints.” (ECF
No. 137-3 at 3). Lewis’s incident report notes that Walton refused the order to accept hand
restraints and jerked away in an aggressive manner. Id. Lewis notes that Voss then took Walton
to the ground and that she “then gave Inmate Walton several direct orders to release both of his
arms and accept hand restraints. Inmate Walton refused.” Id. Lewis’s incident report states that

she then struck Walton “in his right side and right side of head.” Id. Lewis notes that “Walton
was then placed in hand restraints and escort to day clinic for medical treatment. Company nurse
was contacted.” Id.
The January 27, 2020, incident at issue is captured on a video. (ECF No. 147-2). The
video shows the following events:
a. Time Stamp 10:30:41 – Voss escorts Walton out of Chow Hall;
b. Time Stamp 10:30:55 – Another officer is present and Walton, after exiting Chow Hall
with Voss, begins to argue and flails his arms.
c. Time Stamp 10:31:14 – Multiple officers are present and appear to be attempting to gain
Walton’s compliance and are speaking with Walton. Walton continues to argue;
d. Time Stamp 10:31:31 – Five officers are present. Walton continues to argue;
e. Time Stamp 10:32:11 – Officers attempt to place hand restraints on Walton and he
aggressively pulls away and resists;
f. Time Stamp 10:32:15 – Walton and Officers engage in a physical altercation. Walton

is fighting and refusing to be restrained;
g. Time Stamp 10:32:16 – Voss appears to strike Walton; Walton continues to fight and
struggle;
h. Time Stamp 10:32:41 – At this time it appears a number of officers have gained control
of Walton on the floor;
i. Time Stamp 10:33:55 – Walton is escorted in restraints out of the hallway.
Later on the day of the incident, pictures were taken of various staff involved in the incident
with Walton. Pictures were also taken of Walton. (ECF No. 147-1 at 12-20). The pictures show
injuries to Voss’s head, neck, and right eye. (ECF No. 147-1 at 12). The pictures show injuries
to Harris’s lip, right forearm, and left elbow. (ECF No. 147-1 at 13-14). The pictures show injuries

to Lewis’s right hand. (ECF No. 147-1 at 15). The pictures do not clearly show any injuries to
Walton. (ECF No. 147-1 at 18-20).
According to ADC Use of Force Administrative Directive 17-06, Section IV-
A(3)(“Protecting individuals”), “Employees may use force to protect themselves or any person
from reasonably foreseeable injury by an inmate or others in the performance of their official
duties.”
ADC Use of Force Administrative Directive 17-06, Section IV-A(5)(“Compelling
compliance with orders”) provides, “In ordinary day to day correctional situations, employees may
use non-deadly force to compel an inmate to comply with lawful orders when other methods of
persuasion are not effective and noncompliance jeopardizes safety and security of the institution.”
(ECF No. 147-1 at 6).
Flora Washington was the Classification Officer with the Arkansas Department of
Corrections, assigned to the Varner Unit, in February of 2020. (ECF No. 147-4 at 1).
According to the Declaration of Flora Washington, on February 6, 2020, Walton was found

guilty of the disciplinary violation of Battery – use of force on staff. (ECF No. 147-4 at 1).
Walton appeared before the Classification Committee on February 19, 2020, due to being
found guilty on the disciplinary violation of Battery – use of force on staff. (ECF No. 147-4 at 1).
At that time Walton raised his objections to being placed on an 18-month program at Varner. Id.
After hearing Walton’s objections, the Classification Committee recommended Walton for
an 18-month program at Varner due to being found guilty on the disciplinary violation of Battery
– use of force on staff. (ECF No. 147-4 at 2). The Chief Deputy Director then approved the 18-
month program. Id. at 2.
Sgt. Sedrick Franklin is a Sergeant with the ADC and is assigned to the Varner Unit. (ECF
No. 147-6 at 1). Franklin was assigned to the Varner Unit in February of 2020. Id.

According to the Declaration of Franklin, on February 4, 2020, at 8:22 a.m., Walton was
notified by staff that he had a disciplinary hearing set for February 5, 2020, at 8:30 a.m. (ECF No.
147-6 at 1). Franklin testifies that “[a]s a result, Mr. Walton was given over 24 hours’ notice of
his hearing.” Id. This disciplinary hearing was not concerning the January 27, 2020 altercation;
but, instead, concerned an incident on January 26, 2020. (ECF No. 147-6 at 1, 4-6). Walton
appeared at the February 5 hearing, pled not guilty, and responded to the disciplinary charge. Id.
Walton was found guilty on the charges against him. Id.
Franklin also testifies that Walton was notified later on February 4, 2020, of another
disciplinary hearing scheduled on a separate charge – the charge stemming from the January 27,
2020, altercation – on February 6, 2020. (ECF No. 147-6 at 1, 7-9). Based on Walton’s
notification of the hearing scheduled for February 6, he was given over 24 hours’ notice. Id.
Franklin testifies that on the morning of February 6, 2020, Walton was being seen in the
infirmary when Franklin went to retrieve him for the disciplinary hearing concerning the January
27, 2020, altercation. (ECF No. 147-6 at 2). Franklin testifies that Walton became disruptive and

advised him that he was not going to the disciplinary hearing. Id. Franklin testifies that he told
Walton that he could return to the infirmary after the hearing, but that he refused to go to the
hearing. Id. Franklin testifies that because Walton refused to leave the infirmary and attend
disciplinary court, he left Walton at the infirmary and did not escort Walton to Administrative
Segregation following his presence in the infirmary. Id.
Franklin testifies that as a result of Walton’s refusal to leave the infirmary and go to the
hearing, pursuant ADC policy, Walton waived his ability to appear in disciplinary court on
February 6, 2020. (ECF No. 147-6 at 2, 10-48).
Franklin testifies that he does not provide medical care for inmates; and, that Walton never
made a request to him or through him for medical care at any time. (ECF No. 147-6 at 2).

ADC Inmate Disciplinary Manual Administrative Directive 18-34, Section 18-34
VII(E)(4),
Upon convening to consider cases of inmate violations of rules and regulations, the
Major Disciplinary Court shall cause the inmate to appear before it unless the
inmate waives in writing or through behavior. In the event that an inmate wishes
to waive his/her appearance, a waiver form will be completed and a copy provided
to the charged inmate and must be reviewed by the Warden/Center Supervisor or
designee. If the inmate waives his/her right to appear and is found guilty, he/she
cannot appeal the decision.

(ECF No. 147-6 at 22).
Walton was found guilty of the disciplinary charge stemming from the January 27, 2020,
altercation. (ECF No. 147-6 at 7-9).
According to Walton’s deposition testimony, during the incident in question, Voss asked
him to be quiet in the chow hall and then, when he continued talking, asked him to “exit the chow
hall.” (ECF No. 147-5 at 3). Walton states that after Voss asked him to go back to his barracks,
“I said I’m not your child, you can’t make me do anything.” Id. Walton states that although the
video shows “me moving out of [Voss’s] grasp,” he contends that neither Voss, nor anyone else,
ever attempted to put him in handcuffs. (ECF No. 147-5 at 4).
Walton testifies in his deposition that 24 – 48 hours after the incident he was taken to the
infirmary. He testifies that by the time he was taken to the infirmary “my lumps on my forehead
had went down, and my ear had stopped bleeding.” (ECF No. 147-5 at 5).
Walton testifies in his deposition that he had two teeth “knocked out by Dillon R. Voss
when he punched me in the mouth.” (ECF No. 147-5 at 5). He further testifies that it was “[t]he
teeth that was extracted after only three months, after I had to wait three months for the extraction.”
Id.
Walton testifies that the video shows that Lewis hit him with her radio. (ECF No. 147-5
at 6). Walton further testifies that the video shows that Voss used handcuffs as brass knuckles.

Id. Walton testifies that the video shows both Lewis and Voss “repeatedly hitting me while I lay
on the ground unconscious.” Id.
Walton testifies in his deposition that Franklin “lied about the time I was in the infirmary,
he lied about the time that I was supposed to go to my hearing. He lied about me being disruptive.”
(ECF No. 147-5 at 7). Further, in Walton’s Declaration to Support his motion for summary
judgment, Walton states “Franklin put in false reports of me being disruptive and me waving my
disciplinary hearing, signing my waver at 8:30 when I didn’t come into contact with him until 9:15
a.m.” (ECF No. 142 at 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Once

a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the
non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.
1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion is
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d

621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen's "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United
States. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the defendant
acted under color of state law and that he violated a right secured by the Constitution. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999). The

deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not suffice to state a claim for deprivation
of a constitutional right under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
A. Defendants Voss and Lewis -- Excessive Force
As set forth above, Plaintiff’s first two claims are stated against Defendants Voss and Lewis
and are based on allegations of excessive force during an incident which occurred on January 26,
2020.
“When confronted with a claim of excessive force alleging a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Santiago v. Blair,
707 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2013)(quoting Hudson v. McMilliam, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)).
“Because the use of force is sometimes required in prison settings, guards are liable only if they
are completely unjustified in using force, i.e., they are using it maliciously and sadistically.” Irving
v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008). “[E]very malicious push or shove does not amount

to a deprivation of constitutional rights.” Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1993).
“[U]nless it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will
support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain . . . the case should not go to
the jury.” Johnson v. Bi-State J. Ctr./Arkansas Dept. of Corrections, 12 F.3d 133, 136 (8th Cir.
1993).
The Court must consider such factors as the need for the application of force, the
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury
inflicted, the threat to the safety of the staff and inmates, and any attempt to temper the severity of
the response. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). In Wilkins v. Gaddy, 590 U.S. 34

(2010), the Supreme Court held that “the extent of any resulting injury, while material to the
question of damages and informative as to the likely degree of force applied is not in and of itself
a threshold requirement for proving this type of Eighth Amendment claim.” Williams v. Jackson,
600 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010).
The video of the January 27, 2020, incident shows a lengthy verbal disagreement between
the Plaintiff and Voss. The video shows that the Plaintiff appeared agitated and animated and that
the disagreement eventually attracted several other prison staff. The video appears to show that
the officers attempted to restrain Plaintiff with handcuffs and that Plaintiff physically pulled away
from Voss. Following Plaintiff’s active resistance, a physical altercation began and Plaintiff was
hit in the face by Voss. The video further shows that Plaintiff continued to aggressively struggle
with the Defendants and other staff until the officers gained control of him on the floor. Although
Plaintiff contends that he was hit directly with handcuffs and a radio, Defendants dispute this
allegation and the video does not clearly show Plaintiff being hit with these items and certainly
does not show these items being used as weapons. Control of Plaintiff was accomplished fairly

quickly – within less than two minutes – and although Plaintiff did suffer injuries, his injuries were
not extreme. Defendants suffered similar – or even more extensive – injuries.
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that “institutional security is the most
compelling legitimate government interest in a prison setting.” Simpson v. County of Cape
Girardeau, Missouri, 879 F.3d 273, 281 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). The Eighth
Circuit has recognized that “summary applications of force are constitutionally permissible when
prison security and order, or the safety of other inmates or officers, has been placed in
jeopardy.” Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2000). Further, “[t]he infliction of pain
in the course of a prison security measure . . . does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment

simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for
security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.” Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
From the undisputed facts, it does not appear that the force used to restrain Plaintiff was
applied “maliciously and sadistically.” Although Plaintiff suffered injuries in the take-down, the
use of force was necessary and applied in a good faith effort to restore discipline. Accordingly,
there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s allegations of excessive force, and
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
B. Defendants Franklin and Washington
Plaintiff’s third claim is stated against Defendants Franklin and Washington. Plaintiff
states that he was “[d]enied my right to medical treatment and due process of law.” (ECF No. 58).
For his claim against Franklin, Plaintiff states: “procedural due process, denial of medical care.
Defendant put in false reports that denied plaintiff right to a report hearing and denied him right to
medical care which is a violation of amendment 8 also 14 . . . denied the plaintiff liberty without

due process of law.” (ECF No. 61 at 1). With respect to Washington, Plaintiff states: “substantial
due process, also procedural due process. Defendant placed plaintiff on involuntary treatment
program which caused a . . . liberty denial and also signed papers for the plaintiff that he was
unaware of to admit him for the treatment program. Also denied him the right to appear before
the classification committee.” (ECF No. 61 at 2). Plaintiff’s claims will be discussed in two
sections: due process with respect to his disciplinary hearing/treatment program placement; and,
denial of medical care.
1. Due Process
Plaintiff asserts that his due process rights were violated during his disciplinary conviction
which ultimately resulted in his placement in an eighteen month treatment program at Varner
Supermax. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his rights were violated when Franklin “put in a false
report that denied” Plaintiff the right to attend the disciplinary hearing. (ECF No. 61). Plaintiff

continues that as a result of the disciplinary conviction Washington placed him in the treatment
program “which caused a . . . liberty denial,” “signed papers for the plaintiff that he was unaware
of to admit him for the treatment program,” and “denied him the right to appear before the
classification committee.” (ECF No. 61).
Defendants argue that summary judgment with respect to this claim is appropriate because
Plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction and assignment to Varner SuperMax does not amount to an
“atypical and significant hardship” such that he has any due process liberty interest implicated;
and, because any challenge to the validity of his disciplinary conviction is barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
“In order to prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, [the plaintiff] must
first demonstrate that he was deprived of life, liberty, or property by government action.”  Phillips

v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2003).  When deciding whether an individual was afforded
procedural due process a court employs a two-step analysis.  See Kentucky Dept. of Corrections
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989).  First the court must determine whether the individual holds a
protected liberty or property interest.  Id.  If the court finds a protected interest, the question
becomes whether the state provided sufficient due process prior to depriving that individual of the
protected interest.  Id.
A prisoner can only bring a due process challenge to a disciplinary conviction or
proceeding if he is found to have a liberty interest at stake. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995); Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2003). Further,  “[t]o prevail on such a

claim based on prison housing, an inmate must show that the segregation created an ‘atypical and
significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’ to demonstrate that
his liberty interest was curtailed.”  Rahman X v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2002)
(alteration omitted) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,484 (1995).  An inmate’s liberty
interests are limited to the nature of confinement and do not extend to procedural rules imposed
by the state.  See Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (“If [the plaintiff] has
a liberty interest, it is an interest in the nature of his confinement, not an interest in the procedures
by the which the state believes it can best determine how he should be confined.”); see
also Swenson v. Trickey, 995 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that “[p]rocedural guidelines,
such as a mandatory hearing, are not enough to create a liberty interest”).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his due process rights with respect to his right to
appear at a disciplinary hearing which ultimately resulted in his placement on an 18 month
involuntary treatment program. The Court finds, however, that neither Plaintiff’s disciplinary

conviction or his placement in the treatment program is an atypical and significant hardship which
warrants protection by the Due Process Clause. See Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995).
See Jenner v. Nikolas, 828 F.3d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 2016).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff, through his claim, seeks to challenge the validity of his
disciplinary conviction or resulting placement, his claim is barred by Heck.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages for "allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid" is not cognizable until "the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87.
The Heck doctrine applies to inmate disciplinary proceedings and prevents such a challenge
in this case. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir.
2002). Thus, Heck requires favorable termination of the disciplinary charge “in an authorized state
tribunal or a federal habeas court, even if the claim is for damages rather than earlier release.”
Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F3d. 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996); Cincoski v. Richard, 418 Fed App’x 571,
571-72 (8th Cir. 2011) (Plaintiff’s claims regarding his disciplinary convictions, including
restoration of good- time credits, declaratory relief, and damages based on those convictions were
Heck-barred.)
Plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction has not been favorably challenged through the appeal
process. Summary judgment is appropriate on this claim.
2. Denial of Medical Care

Plaintiff also appears to state a denial of medical care claim against Defendants Franklin
and Washington.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners. Luckert v. Dodge Cnty, 684 F.3d
808, 817 (8th Cir. 2012). The Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard applies to all
denial of medical care claims including those by arrestees and pretrial detainees. Carpenter v.
Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 650 (8th Cir. 2012)(noting that while an arrestee’s denial of medical care is
properly analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the analysis
parallels that under the Eighth Amendment). The deliberate indifference standard includes “both

an objective and a subjective component: ‘The [Plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered
[from] objectively serious medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but
deliberately disregarded those needs.’” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiff makes bare allegations concerning his denial of medical care claim – arguing that
he “put in numerous sick calls” and “was seen untimely.” (ECF No. 142 at 3). There is no proof
that Plaintiff requested medical treatment from the Defendants or that Defendants were responsible
in any way for Plaintiff’s medical care. (ECF No. 147-6 at 2). Viewing these conclusory
allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that there has been no
summary judgment proof established that supports a denial of medical care claim and that the
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in this regard.
C. Qualified Immunity
Finally, in addition to arguing that the undisputed facts show that Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for other reasons, Defendants alternatively

argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court, having found that the facts do not
make out a constitutional violation, finds that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
See, e.g., Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (unless the facts make out a
violation of a constitutional right the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 142) be denied.
I also recommend that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 147) be
granted.

The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 11th day of April 2022.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10632293. Public record. Not legal advice.