# Buchanan v. Pierce

> District Court, E.D. Arkansas · July 29, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631836

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** July 29, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION

JESSIE BUCHANAN PLAINTIFF
ADC #099656

v. No: 4:22-cv-00287-BSM-PSH

ROBERT PIERCE, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge
Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part of this
Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the
factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this
Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you
may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.
DISPOSITION

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Jessie Buchanan, an inmate at the Arkansas Division of Corrections’
Cummins Unit, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 28, 2022,
raising retaliation and equal protection claims (Doc. No. 2). Buchanan sued Deputy
Warden Robert Pierce, Deputy Warden of Treatment Lewis Young, and
Classification Officer Marcie L. Nash. Doc. No. 10, First Amended Complaint. He
alleged that Pierce and Young instructed another prison official to charge him with

a disciplinary on November 12, 2021. Id. at 7-8. As a result of the disciplinary
charges, he lost his job assignment and was moved to a barracks on the East Hall
with “horrific and lawless conditions” and more dangerous Class IV inmates. Id. at

7-9. Buchanan alleged that after he was found not guilty of the disciplinary charges,
he asked Pierce and Nash if he could be reclassified and given back his original job
and housing assignments. Id. He filed a grievance against Pierce and Nash after he
was not reassigned, and they along with Young allegedly retaliated against him by

blocking his efforts to appear before the classification committee. Id. at 8. He states
their efforts resulted in him being kept in dangerous barracks for three and a half
months and prevented him from obtaining another job assignment. Id. Buchanan

further alleges that Young refused another officer’s request to assign him the
position of gym/recreation porter. Id. He also alleges that white inmates are treated
more favorably than black inmates and given better job assignments despite their
poor disciplinary history. Id. at 9-11.

Buchanan’s claims against defendant Nash were dismissed without prejudice
for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Doc. No. 39. His claims
against Pierce and Young (the “Defendants”) remain. Id. Before the Court is a

motion for summary judgment, brief in support, and statement of undisputed
material facts filed by the Defendants (Doc. Nos. 50-52); Buchanan’s response in
opposition to Defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 67); and Buchanan’s response in

opposition to the Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 68).
For the reasons described herein, the undersigned recommends that the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment be granted.

II. Legal Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir.

2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must
demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann
v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations
must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in

his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations
omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must
be supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials . . .”. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact

is disputed or undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is

genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict
for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.
Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes
that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude

summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th
Cir. 2010).
III. Facts1

The Cummins Unit’s East and West Halls
Plaintiff Jessie Buchanan has been housed at the ADC’s Cummins Unit since
February 10, 2020. Doc. No. 50-1, Deposition of Jessie Buchanan (“Buchanan
Deposition”), at 4:19-21.2 There are currently 1,998 inmates at the Cummins Unit.

1 Unless otherwise noted, these material facts are taken from the parties’
statements of facts (Doc. Nos. 52 & 68) and the exhibits provided by the parties,
including Buchanan’s deposition testimony. Disputed facts are noted. Opinions, legal
conclusions, and immaterial facts are omitted.
2 Page numbers refer to the deposition page numbers, not the document’s page
numbers on the Court’s ECF filing system.
Doc. No. 50-3, Declaration of Lewis Young (“Young Declaration”), at ¶ 12. The
Cummins Unit has an East Hall, a West Hall, and a separate building to the south.

Buchanan Deposition at 8:10-18. The West Hall contains 248 “pods” or dorm-style
rooms. Young Declaration at ¶ 13. These are one-man rooms where inmates receive
their own key. Id. Cummins is the only ADC facility with these types of pods, and

they are highly sought after by Cummins inmates. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. According to
Young, due to the scarcity of the pods inmates are often immediately removed from
these housing assignments if they receive a disciplinary. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 15. Buchanan
disputes that inmates are immediately moved once they receive a disciplinary and

cites several examples of inmates who were not immediately moved after receiving
a disciplinary. See Doc. No. 68, Buchanan’s Statement of Disputed Facts, at ¶ 1.
According to Buchanan, the West Hall is primarily for Class I-C inmates

while the East Hall houses inmates in classes II, III, and IV. Buchanan Declaration
at 9:5-9. Buchanan has been a Class I-C inmate for 18 or 19 years. Id. at 30:1-3,
24:8-9. He lived in the West Hall from the time he arrived at the Cummins Unit in
2020 until November 10, 2021. Id. at 30:9-12. According to Young, there are Class

I-C inmates housed in the East Hall and it is not exclusive to Class II-IV inmates.
Young Declaration at ¶ 11.
The November 10, 2021 Incident & Disciplinary

On November 10, 2021, Buchanan was working as an office porter in a
treatment office in the West Hall. Buchanan Deposition at 7-11. He and Coach
Thomas Burnett3 were watching the Kyle Rittenhouse trial4 on a television in the

treatment office. Id.; Doc. No. 50-6, Declaration of Thomas Burnett (“Burnett
Declaration”), at ¶ 7. Burnett and Buchanan got into a heated debate about the trial.
Id. at ¶ 6; see also Buchanan Deposition at 7:11-23. Program supervisor Lisa Bailey5

overheard their exchange and wrote Buchanan a disciplinary, stating she overheard
Buchanan say to Burnett, ‘I ought to whip your ass’.”6 Doc. No. 50-5, Witness
Statement of Lisa Bailey; Doc. No. 50-4, Declaration of Lisa Bailey (“Bailey
Declaration”) at ¶ 11.

According to Buchanan, he and Burnett left the treatment office and went to
the gym to work. Buchanan Deposition at 18:4-6. While standing at the gym’s

3 Thomas Burnett is the recreation supervisor at the Cummins Unit; he is often called
“Coach Burnett.” Burnett Declaration at ¶¶ 2-3.
4 Rittenhouse, aged 17, shot three men in Kenosha, Wisconsin in August 2020,
killing two of the men, amid protests following the shooting of a Black man by a white
police officer. He was charged with criminal counts including homicide and was acquitted
in November 2021 on grounds of self defense. “What to Know About the Trial of Kyle
Rittenhouse,” Nov. 19, 2021, NYTimes.com.
5 Lisa Bailey works as a program specialist in the treatment office; she supervises
various programs and teaches a class called “Think Legacy” that helps inmates become
productive members of society. Declaration of Lisa Bailey (Doc. No. 50-4) at ¶¶ 2-4.
6 According to Bailey and Burnett, Bailey was in the treatment office watching the
trial with Burnett and Buchanan. Bailey Declaration at ¶¶ 7, 9-12. Buchanan maintains
she walked in, sat briefly, and then left abruptly. Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 3. He disputes that he
cussed at Burnett or that Bailey scolded him in the treatment room. Id. at ¶ 2. These factual
disputes are not material to this case. Neither Burnett nor Bailey are defendants in this
case, and Buchanan makes no claim concerning what happened on November 10, 2021.
entrance with Burnett and Coach Shelby Bailey, security staff exited and handcuffed
Buchanan. Id. at 37:17-19. He was taken to Captain Lee’s office where he explained

what happened with Burnett while watching the trial, and Lee then telephoned
Burnett. Id. at 24:13-25-25:1-12. Buchanan then wrote a statement and left. Id. at
25:8. At some point, Burnett provided a witness statement stating that he and

Buchanan “talked out” their differences. Doc. No. 50-7. Burnett stated in his
declaration that Buchanan cussed him during their heated discussion, but claims they
“talked it out later” and he had promised Buchanan he would not charge him with a
disciplinary violation. Burnett Declaration at ¶ 7.

A few hours later, Buchanan was told to pack his things and was moved out
of 2 barracks to 9B barracks on the East Hall. Id. at 25:21-24-26:2-3. He was moved
because of the major disciplinary written by Bailey, charging him with verbally

threatening Coach Burnett. Doc. No. 50-9, Major Disciplinary Violation, at 1;
Bailey Declaration at ¶ 17. Although he received a disciplinary and was moved, he
remained a Class 1-C inmate. Buchanan Deposition at 24:8-9.
Buchanan claims he stopped by the treatment office to pick up some of his

things on his way to 9B barracks, and while there, Bailey told him that she issued
the disciplinary because Young and Pierce wanted him moved and told her to do so.
Buchanan Deposition at 33:20-25-34:1-5. See also First Amended Complaint at 6-

7. Bailey does not address this allegation in her declaration, but claims that she has
seen Buchanan bully and threaten other inmates, including another inmate who
works in the West Hall; she claims she has heard him tell other inmates he would

“whip their ass.” Bailey Declaration at ¶¶ 14-15. According to Bailey, the
November 10, 2021 incident was the final straw, and she wrote him a disciplinary
because she believed he should be moved and lose his job as an office porter. Id. at

¶ 16-17. Buchanan disputes that he has bullied or threatened other inmates and
submitted an affidavit from another inmate describing Buchanan as a positive
mentor to him and other inmates who “has always exhibited leadership, respect and
concern for staff and inmates.” Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 5; Doc. No. 68 at 13 (Affidavit of

Jeremy Hawkins #129150).
At a disciplinary review hearing one week later, November 17, 2021,
Buchanan was found not guilty and the charges were dismissed. Doc. No. 50-9 at

2; Buchanan Deposition at 19:17-22; Doc. No. 50-2, Declaration of Robert Pierce
(“Pierce Declaration”), at ¶ 10.
Buchanan’s Requests for Reclassification and Job Assignments
Buchanan testified in his deposition that after the disciplinary was dismissed,

he briefly talked to Pierce who said that he would “put [him] up” for a job change
and reclassification. Buchanan Deposition at 54:8-10, 56:19-25. He also sent Pierce
two requests for interviews and sent one to Classification Officer Marcie Nash,
asking why he was not reclassified following the dismissal of the disciplinary. See
First Amended Complaint at 25-27.

Buchanan testified that he also wrote a grievance to cover himself, while
waiting on Pierce to reclassify him. Id. at 13-15. On December 1, 2021, Buchanan
submitted grievance CU-21-01624, stating:

I am being retaliated against by Deputy Warden of Security, Robert
Pierce and classification. Upon my disciplinary being “dismissed on
11/17/2021, I should have either been automatically reinstated or
allowed to appear before the classification committee and reinstated
back to my initial job and room in 2 Bks. Prior to the disciplinary ever
being written; Capt. Lee, a “highly professional commander” had
already investigated the incident with the staff who had “direct
knowledge” (Coach Barnett). He told Capt. Lee and gave a written
statement, it was a heated conversation that was resolved and warrant
no disciplinary action. A few hours later, Deputy Warden Pierce and/or
classification retaliated (first) by moving me from my single-man-room
to open barrack on the (East Hall) “Hoe Squad Bks” where there are
prodominatly Class IV’s and “rule violators of all types.” Facts, I’ve
been incarcerated for (29) twenty-nine years with a good institutional
record. Class I-C for approximately 18 years, no contraband charges,
dirty urines or any assault on staff. One heated conversation in 30 yrs,
I’m retaliated against and punished? To further illustrate the
continuation of retaliation of Mr. Pierce and classification, Coach
Bailey had Mrs. Cook classification to put me for a Recreation Porter
as an alternative, still to no avail. An “animus Retaliation” for a
dismissed disciplinary.

First Amended Complaint at 13.7
On December 13, 2021, Nash emailed Pierce and Young, stating: “What do

7 Grievances are transcribed verbatim without any corrections for misspellings or
mistakes.
you want to do about Inmate Buchanan. He wrote a grievance about not being
returned to his job/room assignment after his disciplinary was dismissed. Coach S.

Bailey has requested him for a gym porter.” Doc. No. 50-10, Marcie Nash Email,
at 1. In response to Nash’s email, Pierce replied: “I would be okay with that.” Id.
at 2. However, Young replied: “He’s not entitled to that job. Due to his remarks,

he should not work with the program staff. As long as we don’t violate his medical
restrictions, we can assign him anywhere we need him.” Id. at 3.8
On January 31, 2022, Buchanan sent Young an Inmate Request for Interview,
asking to be placed as a gym porter if he could not get his prior job back. Buchanan

Deposition at 39:23-40:1-7; First Amended Complaint at 28. Buchanan noted that
he was found not guilty of the November disciplinary, had been Class 1-C for 18 or
19 years, and had been a model inmate. Id. Young says that he replied, “not at this

time,” because his opinion had not changed about Buchanan being ready to work
amongst treatment staff.9 Young Declaration at ¶ 18. Buchanan grieved retaliation

8 In her declaration, Lisa Bailey explained that she has final say over who gets to
work in the treatment office or one of the treatment programs, and she does not want
Buchanan to come back to work in the treatment office due to his past history of explosive
behavior. Bailey Declaration at ¶¶ 23-24. However, there is no indication she told Pierce
or Young this following the reversal of Buchanan’s disciplinary or when he filed requests
and grievances regarding their failure to move him or give him a new job assignment.
Additionally, Buchanan points out that it was Shelvey Bailey, the recreational supervisor,
who requested he be assigned to her as a gym porter, and Lisa Bailey had no say in who
works in the gym. See Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 7.
9 Defendants point out that Covid-19 was an issue in 2021 and 2022 and limited bed
reassignments. Doc. No. 52, Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at ¶¶
and racial discrimination by both Pierce and Young the same day, citing their refusal
to give him a new job assignment after he was cleared of disciplinary charges. First

Amended Complaint at 17 (grievance CU22-00150).
On February 23, 2022, Buchanan was assigned to 7A barracks in the West
Hall and to work in the West Hall kitchen without first appearing before the

classification committee. First Amended Complaint at 10, n.2; Buchanan
Deposition at 27:19 – 28:3; Pierce Declaration at ¶ 12; Young Declaration at ¶ 19.
Young explained that Buchanan was moved then because space opened up in West
Hall on that date. Young Declaration at ¶ 19.

Buchanan came up for a classification committee review on April 15, 2022.10
Young Declaration at ¶ 20. The meeting was held and a vote taken on April 21,
2022. Doc. No. 50-11, Classification Review for April 21, 2022. Buchanan was

deferred for one week to determine a suitable job change for him. Id. On April 28,
2022, Buchanan was approved for a hall porter position. Doc. No. 50-11,
Classification Review for April 28, 2022. On April 24, 2022, a pod room became

42 & 61 (citing Young Declaration at ¶ 10 and Buchanan Deposition at 35:18-20).
However, they do not claim that this is the specific reason Buchanan was not returned to
the West Hall at a sooner date.
10 According to Young, Class I-C inmates are only entitled to classification review
once per year. Young Declaration at ¶ 16. Buchanan agrees that a Class I-C inmate with
a good job would typically only see classification for their annual review. Buchanan
Deposition at 42:8-16. But he also asserts that a Class 1-C inmate might also have a
classification review to receive a new job assignment. Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 8.
available,11 and Buchanan was moved to 4 barracks in the West Hall, where he is
currently housed. Pierce Declaration at ¶ 16.

Buchanan testified that he never spoke with Pierce or Young prior to
November 10, 2021, and never had any fights or altercations with either of them.
Buchanan Deposition at 34:23–35:4-13. Both Pierce and Young claim they had no

personal issues with Buchanan and did not retaliate against him. Pierce Declaration
at ¶¶23-24; Young Declaration at ¶¶ 25-26.
Housing and Job Assignments at Cummins
Buchanan alleges that white inmates are treated more favorably than black

inmates in both job and housing assignments. First Amended Complaint at 10-11.
According to Pierce, Cummins Unit does not use race as a reason to assign inmates
to particular jobs or housing, but states that these assignments are made by balancing

an inmate’s disciplinary record, job skills, medical restrictions, and classification.
Pierce Declaration at ¶ 22.
To evidence racial discrimination, Buchanan identified two white inmates
who were found guilty of major disciplinaries and reduced in class, but were allowed

to remain housed in 8A barracks on the West Hall. See First Amended Complaint
at 29; Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 11. As to the first inmate identified, Pierce states that he

11 It is not clear whether 7A barracks in the West Hall contained a pod room or
not.
required a bed with electrical access for a medical device. As to the second, Pierce
notes that he was housed in 8A barracks due to a medical restriction. Pierce

Declaration at ¶¶ 20-21. Both inmates have since been transferred to a different
ADC facility. Id. Buchanan disputes that these inmates had medical reasons for
staying in 8A barracks because 8B barracks is the barracks specially equipped to

meet the needs of medically disabled inmates. Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 11 (citing Doc. No.
68 at 14-15, the declarations of Dashgujauhn Danzie and L.M. McGowan, medically
disabled inmates who are assigned to 8B barracks). Buchanan also provided a
declaration by a black inmate who states that he was not given his job back after

receiving a disciplinary while a white inmate who received a disciplinary did get his
job back. Doc. No. 68 at ¶ 12 (citing Doc. No. 68 at 16, the declaration of Brandon
Craig).

IV. Analysis
A. Sovereign Immunity
The Defendants correctly assert that Buchanan’s monetary claims against
them in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity. A suit against a

defendant in his or her official capacity is in essence a suit against the State of
Arkansas, and any official capacity claim for monetary damages against that
defendant is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Will v. Michigan

Department of State Police, et al., 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d
429, 431-432 (8th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that
Defendants be awarded summary judgment with respect to Buchanan’s official

capacity claims for money damages.
B. Qualified Immunity
The Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to

Buchanan’s individual capacity claims. Qualified immunity protects government
officials from liability for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person [in their
positions] would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity is a question of law and is appropriately resolved on summary
judgment. McClendon v. Story County Sheriff’s Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir.
2005); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). To determine whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider two questions:
(1) do the facts alleged by plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional or
statutory right; and (2) if so, was that right clearly established at the time of the
defendant’s alleged misconduct. Wright v. United States, 813 F.3d 689, 695 (8th

Cir. 2015). Courts may exercise “their sound discretion in deciding which of the
two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of
the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009).
1. Retaliation Claims.
To succeed on a § 1983 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he

engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the government official took adverse action
against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing the
activity; and (3) that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise

of the protected activity. Gonzalez v. Bendt, 971 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 2020);
Spencer v. Jackson Cnty., 738 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2013). Speculative and
conclusory, or de minimis allegations cannot support a retaliation claim. See
Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). A plaintiff must

also prove a causal connection between the constitutionally protected activity and
the adverse action. Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004). Temporal
proximity between a protected activity and an adverse action “is relevant but not

dispositive.” Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 592 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Kiel v.
Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999)). To succeed on a
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must provide affirmative evidence of a retaliatory
motive. See Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir. 2009); see also

Wilson, 441 F.3d at 592 (“[Plaintiff’s] belief that [defendant] acted from a retaliatory
motive is insufficient.”).
Buchanan alleges that the Defendants retaliated against him on two separate

occasions. First, he claims they told Bailey to issue him the November 10
disciplinary because they wanted him moved. Buchanan Deposition at 54:7-12;
First Amended Complaint at 7. Second, he claims they refused to give him a new

job assignment and move him back to the West Hall after the November 10
disciplinary was dismissed. First Amended Complaint at 8-10; Buchanan Deposition
at 54:13-25-55:1-17, 56:19-25. He specifically asserts that they blocked him from

having a classification review to obtain a new job and housing assignment. Doc.
No. 68 at ¶ 13.
With respect to the first allegation of retaliation, Buchanan has not identified
any protected activity. He describes no prior interaction with Pierce or Young and

acknowledges that he had never spoken to them before. Buchanan Deposition at
34:23–35:4-13. Accordingly, even if the Court accepts Buchanan’s allegation that
Bailey told him she wrote the disciplinary at their instruction as true, there is simply

no alleged retaliatory motive for the Defendants to instruct Bailey to write him a
disciplinary on November 10, 2021. The Defendants are therefore entitled to
summary judgment as to this first retaliation claim.
Buchanan’s claim that the Defendants retaliated against him after he filed

grievances on December 1, 2021, and January 31, 2022, is a harder question.
Retaliation for the use of a prison grievance procedure is actionable. See Orebaugh
v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (otherwise proper acts

are actionable under § 1983 if done in retaliation for grievances filed under
established prison grievance procedure). Further, denying Buchanan’s requests for
a new job assignment and move back to the West Hall may be considered an adverse

action.12 However, Buchanan has not shown any causal connection between
grievances he wrote and the Defendants’ inaction following his requests for a new
job assignment or to move him back to the West Hall. He also has not provided any

evidence that the Defendants denied him a classification review or job assignment
with a retaliatory motive. See Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d at 1157. For these
reasons, Buchanan cannot show the necessary connection to or motive for their
actions (or inaction). They are therefore entitled to summary judgment on

Buchanan’s retaliation claims.
2. Equal Protection Claims.
Buchanan alleges that white inmates receive more favorable job assignments

than black inmates, and that white inmates were allowed to stay housed in the West
Hall at Cummins despite receiving a disciplinary and reduction in class, whereas he
was immediately moved to the East Hall and not returned for three and a half months,
even after his disciplinary was reversed. Defendants argue that they are entitled to

12 There is no evidence in this record that Pierce made a decision not to allow
Buchanan a new job assignment; rather, the evidence is that Young denied his requests
because he believed Buchanan should not be working with certain staff members.
However, Buchanan wrote both Defendants asking to be reclassified and did not receive a
classification hearing or new job assignment until his routine annual classification review.
summary judgment because Buchanan cannot prove they acted with a racially
discriminatory motive.

Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o
state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. The Equal Protection Clause has been

interpreted to require that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
To state a claim of racial discrimination, a prisoner must allege (1) he was treated
differently from similarly situated inmates; and (2) the different treatment was the

result of intentional and purposeful racial discrimination. See In re: Kemp, 894 F.3d
900, 909-10 (8th Cir. 2018); Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 815 (8th
Cir. 2008); Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007).

An isolated incident of unequal treatment is insufficient to show that an
individual was “systematically and intentionally treated differently.” See e.g.,
Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998) (“A few individual examples
of unequal treatment are insufficient to provide more than minimal support to an

inference of classwide purposeful discrimination.”); Inmates of Neb. Penal and
Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 1368, 1381 (8th Cir. 1977) (two or
three individual cases of discrimination insufficient to provide more than minimal
support to an inference of classwide purposeful discrimination).13

Buchanan has offered no evidence to prove that the Defendants intentionally
or purposefully discriminated against him based on his race. Rather, he provided a
roster indicating that two white inmates were allowed to stay on the West Hall

despite being Class II and Class IV and an affidavit by another black inmate,
claiming that he was not given a job back after being reclassified as Class I-C, while
a white inmate was given his job back after being reclassified as Class I-C. With
respect to the white inmates remaining on West Hall, Defendants maintain these two

inmates had medical reasons for staying on the West Hall, which Buchanan disputes.
But even if Buchanan is correct, there is no evidence providing that these inmates
were similarly situated to Buchanan (i.e., that they received disciplinaries for similar

behavior occurring in the West Hall) or that either Defendant allowed them to stay
on the West Hall based on their race. Likewise, the affidavit by Brandon Craig
provides no details showing that he and the white inmate were similarly situated.

13 See also Thrash v. White, No. 5:09-CV-00095, 2010 WL 6749181, at *3 (E.D.
Ark. Dec. 23, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:09-CV-00095, 2011 WL
2110372 (E.D. Ark. May 27, 2011) (“An isolated example of unequal treatment is
insufficient to establish that the difference in treatment was motivated by Plaintiffs’
membership in a protected class, or that it burdened a fundamental right.”); Hughes v.
Banks, No. 1:07-CV-00027, 2011 WL 3861368, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 19, 2011) (equal
protection claim failed where plaintiff only identified one inmate who was allegedly treated
differently than him).
And finally, just three examples of white inmates being treated differently is
insufficient to show that Buchanan was “systematically and intentionally treated
differently” because of his race. See Weiler v. Purkett, supra.
Because Buchanan cannot prove that he was systematically and intentionally
treated differently than similarly situated inmates, his equal protection claim fails
and defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 50) be granted and Buchanan’s claims be
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 29" day of July, 2024.

OATES TRON RATEIOOGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631836. Public record. Not legal advice.