# Morris v. Ross

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · August 27, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631176

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** August 27, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631176

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a plaintiff’s burden of showing a defendant officer was subjectively aware of the risk is not satisfied by merely saying “well, they should have known”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
SHANDRA MORRIS, as )
Administrator of the Estate of )
Montarius Brashon Morris, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:24-cv-00142-CLS
)
OFFICER ROSS, OFFICER )
PERRY, CHAD BROOKS, JAY )
JOHNSON, KEVIN TURNER, )
S O U T H E R N H E A L T H )
PARTNERS, and MADISON )
COUNTY, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Shandra Morris, is the mother of Montarius Brashon Morris, who died
while detained in the Madison County, Alabama, Jail. She contends that her son’s
rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution were violated while in the defendants’ custody. Her complaint contains
126 paragraphs, divided among seven counts which allege claims against seven
defendants. Six of those counts are based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and one is a
supplemental state law claim for wrongful death. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against
three of the seven defendants — i.e., the governmental entity known as Madison
County, Alabama; the Sheriff of Madison County, Kevin Turner; and, the
Administrator of the Madison County Jail, Chad Brooks — were dismissed with

prejudice by the Order entered on June 5, 2024 (doc. no. 49).1 The case now is before
the court on the motions to dismiss filed by the remaining defendants: i.e., Southern
Health Partners (doc. no. 10); Madison County Sheriff’s Department Investigator Jay

Johnson (doc. no. 18); Madison County Jail Detention Officer Dakota Ross (doc. no.
50); and, Madison County Deputy Sheriff Jacob Perry (doc. no. 52). Following
consideration of the complaint, motions, and briefs of counsel, the court enters the

following opinion.
I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Quintrell Campbell, a cousin of the plaintiff’s son, was charged on some

unspecified date in 2016 with the murders of two persons in Madison County,
Alabama.2 Campbell “fled the city to avoid arrest.”3 [Note: This is the first of
several confusing contradictions in plaintiff’s complaint. Paragraph 14 alleges that

Quintrell Campbell “was arrested and charged with the murder of two individuals in
1 The claims alleged against the three defendants referenced in text were asserted in Count
One (for “failure to protect” plaintiff’s son from “illegal, addictive, and potentially deadly drugs”
which allegedly were “smuggled” into the Madison County Jail, and which plaintiff’s son “took
whether intentionally, knowingly, or neither”), doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶¶ 82-88; and, Count Seven
(a so-called “Fourteenth Amendment Monell Claim” for the defendants’ deliberate indifference to
adequate supervision of their officers and employees), id. ¶¶ 113-126.
2 Id. ¶ 14.
3 Id. ¶ 16.
2
Madison County” (emphasis supplied), but paragraph 16 alleges that “Campbell fled
the city to avoid arrest” (emphasis supplied).]

The father of Quintrell Campbell, Cedric Coonrod, was a friend of Madison
County Sheriff’s Investigator Jay Johnson.4 Plaintiff alleges that Johnson “allowed
Coonrod to accompany him when he traveled [on some unspecified date] to Georgia

to extradite Campbell after Campbell fled the city to avoid arrest, and . . . allowed
Coonrod back into the questioning [sic] area.”5 The Alabama state court trial of
Campbell’s murder case was scheduled to begin on Monday, January 24, 2022,6 but

did not occur. The trial judge denied a joint motion to continue,7 and “entered an
order setting a sentencing hearing for August 12, 2022.”8 Even so, “[t]here is no
record of whether a plea was entered on or around January 24, 2022.”9

A. Arrest of Plaintiff’s Son
During the early morning hours of Saturday, February 5, 2022, Madison
County Deputy Sheriff Jacob Perry and “other [unnamed] Madison County officers”

stopped a vehicle driven by plaintiff’s son, Montarius Brashon Morris

4 Id. ¶ 15 (“Coonrod, was and is good friends with Defendant Johnson.”).
5 Id. ¶ 16 (alterations supplied).
6 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 17.
7 Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
8 Id. ¶ 20.
9 Id. ¶ 21 (alteration supplied).
3
(“Montarius”).10 Plaintiff alleges that Investigator Jay Johnson agreed with Cedric
Coonrod and Deputy Sheriff Jacob Perry “that they could bring in Montarius to take

the fall for Campbell’s actions.”11 After Montarius’s automobile was searched, Jacob
Perry stated that the officers “were going to bring Montarius in on two secret
indictments for murder.”12 [Note: Even though plaintiff’s complaint does not

explicitly say so, she implies that the murders for which her son was arrested on
February 5, 2022, were the same homicides for which Quintrell Campbell previously
had been charged on some unspecified date in 2016.13 Review of publicly-available

records from the Circuit Court of Madison County, Alabama, establishes that is
correct. Quintrell Marquis Campbell was charged in an indictment returned on June
19, 2018, with two counts of Murder for the deaths of Jaylen Cosby and Khayree

Austin in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-6-2(a)(3): i.e., while committing or
attempting to commit the crime of burglary in the first or second degree, or in
immediate flight therefrom, Quintrell Marquis Campbell, or another participant

10 Id. ¶¶ 24, 26.
11 Id. at ¶ 23.
12 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 30 (emphasis supplied).
13 E.g., doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 43 (“When asked why Montarius was indicted six years
after allegedly committing the murders, [an unnamed] Huntsville Police [not Madison County]
spokesperson stated that ‘[S]ome new evidence came to light in this case and was provided to the
grand jury.’”) (first two alterations and emphasis supplied). See also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 24-26, 30; doc. no.
19 (Jay Johnson Brief), at 3 (“During the early morning hours of February 5, 2022, [plaintiff’s son]
was arrested by co-defendant ‘Officer Perry’ during a traffic stop based upon two grand jury
indictments for murders allegedly committed six years earlier.”) (alteration and emphasis supplied).
4
(Tyrek Jamar), caused the deaths of Jaylen Cosby and Khayree Austin by shooting
them with a gun.14 In like manner, plaintiff’s son, Montarius Brashon Morris, was

charged in an indictment returned on February 4, 2022, with two counts of Murder
for the deaths of the same persons, in violation of the same state statute.15]
B. Detention of Plaintiff’s Son

Following his arrest, Montarius was booked into the Madison County Jail at
4:31 a.m. on Saturday, February 5, 2022.16 Around 7:00 p.m. that evening — some
thirteen hours after Montarius was booked into the jail — other detainees noticed that

he “was having trouble breathing.”17 The detainees used the jail intercom in an effort
to tell Jail Detention Officer Dakota Ross that Morris needed assistance.18 Ross
rebuked the detainees, however, telling them to “get off the f***ing intercom,” and

to “get the f*** away from the [intercom] button or I will come in there and beat
you’re [sic] a**. If he ain’t dying and no one is dead then get the f*** away from the
14 Madison County, Alabama, Circuit Court Case No. CC-2018-002789, doc. no. 1
(Indictment). The charge of felony murder alleged in Count Two of that indictment was amended
to Burglary in the First Degree on January 24, 2023, and defendant entered a plea of guilty. He was
sentenced on February 16, 2023 to imprisonment for a term of ten years, suspended, and placed on
probation for five years. Id. doc. no. 48. The charge of felony murder alleged in Count One was
nolle prossed on the same date, February 16, 2023. Id. doc. no. 50.
15 Madison County, Alabama, Circuit Court Case No. CC-2022-000703, doc. no. 1
(Indictment). The indictment was dismissed on February 10, 2022, due to the death of the defendant.
Id., doc. no. 7 (Motion to Abate by Reason of Death).
16 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 31.
17 Id. ¶ 33.
18 Id. ¶ 34.
5
button.”19
Unnamed “officers at the jail” made rounds around 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.

on Saturday, February 5, 2022, but ignored attempts by some detainees to obtain
assistance for Montarius.20 Other detainees noticed his breathing slowing around
midnight.21 At some unspecified time during the following morning (Sunday,

February 6, 2022), inmates found Montarius dead.22
An autopsy was conducted, and a “blue pill” was found in the digestive system
of plaintiff’s son.23 The Coroner’s death certificate listed the cause of his death as

“Fentanyl, Fluorofentanyl and Oxycodone Toxicity.”24
C. Allegations Against Southern Health Partners
Madison County, Alabama entered into a contract with defendant Southern

Health Partners, Inc., to provide health care services in the Madison County Jail,
19 Id. ¶ 36 (alteration supplied).
20 Id. ¶ 38.
21 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 39.
22 Id. ¶ 40.
23 Id. ¶ 42.
24 Id. ¶ 41; see also id. ¶ 85 (“Montarius’s ingestion of fentanyl led directly to his death.”).
Elsewhere in the complaint, plaintiff alleges that: during the hours following her son’s incarceration
in the Madison County Jail, he “was subjected to and harassed by someone with fentanyl, which he
took whether intentionally, knowingly, or neither” (id. ¶ 84); the “fentanyl that Montarius ingested
came into the jail through a guard or officer employed there by [the dismissed] Defendant Madison
County” (id. ¶ 86); and that, the defendants dismissed by the Order entered on June 5, 2024 — i.e.,
Chad Brooks (Administrator of the Madison County Jail), Kevin Turner (Sheriff of Madison
County), and Madison County, Alabama — “turned a blind eye to the smuggling in of illegal,
addictive, and potentially deadly drugs into the Madison County Jail” (id. ¶ 83).
6
beginning in 2015.25 The County paid Southern Health Partners $300,000 less than
the previous health care provider.26 Allegedly, “Southern Health Partners deliberately

kept Madison County understaffed so that they [sic] could make more money.”27
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The relevant portion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 permits a party to

move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),
which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis
added). While that pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that
25 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 11.
26 Id. ¶ 61.
27 Id. ¶ 94.
7
is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a
“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads
facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.’” Id. at 557 (brackets omitted).
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,
the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a compliant is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. at 555 (Although for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss. Id. at 556. Determining whether a complaint states
a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. 409 F.3d at 157–58. But where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has
not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
8
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis supplied, second and fourth alterations in

original, other alteration supplied).
III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A. Southern Health Partners

Plaintiff alleges three claims against Southern Health Partners. Two are based
upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983: i.e., a claim for deliberate indifference to Montarius’s serious
medical needs;28 and a claim for failure to protect Montarius in violation of his

constitutional rights.29 Plaintiff’s third claim, for the wrongful death of her son, is
based upon Alabama law.30
Southern Health Partners argues that all claims asserted against it should be

dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Indeed, plaintiff merely alleges that her son
was booked into the jail one morning, that he then took Fentanyl at some
point [during] that day, that he began showing symptoms that he was
having trouble breathing [about] 13 hours after he was booked in, that
jail officers did not assist him, and that he was found dead the next
morning. There is no allegation, at all, regarding any conduct by
28 Id. ¶¶ 89-96 (Count Two) (asserted against both Southern Health Partners and Jail
Detention Officer Dakota Ross).
29 Id. ¶¶ 112-126 (Count Seven) (“Fourteenth Amendment Monell Claim” asserted against
Southern Health Partners and the three dismissed defendants, Madison County, Sheriff Turner, and
Jail Administrator Chad Brooks).
30 Id. ¶¶ 97-99 (Count Three) (asserted against all defendants).
9
Southern Health Partners.
Doc. no. 11 (Southern Health Partners’ Brief), at 7 (alterations and emphasis

supplied).
Plaintiff’s response consists of speculative and conclusory statements that can
be boiled down to an assertion that, because Southern Health Partners was the jail’s

health care provider, and because it allegedly understaffed the jail, it is liable for
Montarius’s death. That is not enough to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rules
8 and 10, or the principles set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Accordingly, all of

plaintiff’s claims against Southern Health Partners are due to be dismissed.
B. Defendants Jay Johnson and Jacob Perry
1. Shotgun pleading

Sheriff’s Investigator Jay Johnson and Deputy Sheriff Jacob Perry contend
that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed as an impermissible “shotgun
pleading.”31

As previously noted, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a pleading to
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 10 requires a plaintiff to “state [her] claims
or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set

31 See doc. no. 19 (Jay Johnson Brief), at 6-10; doc. no. 53 (Jacob Perry Brief), at 6-10.
10
of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (alteration supplied). So-called “shotgun
pleadings” violate those rules because they “fail to one degree or another . . . to give

the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon
which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Sheriff’s Department, 792 F.3d
1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (ellipsis supplied).

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly condemned shotgun pleadings, and
demonstrated “little tolerance” for them. See, e,g., Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878
F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2018); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated,

516 F.3d 955, 979-80 & n.54 (11th Cir. 2008) (listing numerous cases). Shotgun
pleadings “waste scarce judicial resources, ‘inexorably broaden[ ] the scope of
discovery,’ ‘wreak havoc on appellate court dockets,’ and ‘undermine[ ] the public’s

respect for the courts.’” Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Davis, 516 F.3d at
981-83) (alterations in original).
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in the Weiland case, supra, identified four
categories of shotgun pleadings:

[1] The most common type — by a long shot — is a complaint
containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of
all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that
came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire
complaint. [2] The next most common type . . . is a complaint that does
not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is
guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and
11
immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of
action. [3] The third type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the
sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim
of relief. [4] Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of
asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying
which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or
which of the defendants the claim is brought against.
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23 (bracketed alterations and ellipsis supplied, footnotes
omitted).
Plaintiff’s complaint unquestionably is a “shotgun pleading.” In particular,
plaintiff incorporates all eighty factual allegations into each of the seven counts.
However, many of her factual allegations relate to only one or two counts, or none at
all. For example, paragraphs 54 through 75 identify incidents that allegedly occurred
in the Madison County Jail over a nearly twenty-year period, but which have no

apparent connection to the claims asserted in the present suit. Therefore, defendants
are left to speculate as to which factual allegations pertain to which count.
Ordinarily, a plaintiff would be given an opportunity to amend the complaint

to correct the pleading deficiencies. Here, however, as discussed below, there are
other deficiencies in plaintiff’s claims.
2. Abatement of § 1983 claims against Johnson and Perry

Section 1983 authorizes private parties to enforce federal constitutional rights
(and some federal statutory rights) by bringing suit against governmental officials and
12
entities whose conduct under color of state law allegedly deprived the plaintiff of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or federal

statutes. The pertinent portion of the statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis supplied). That statute is the basis for plaintiff’s claim
for false arrest against Deputy Sheriff Jacob Perry in Count Four, and for her claims
against both Perry and Investigator Jay Johnson for malicious prosecution and
conspiracy in Counts Five and Six, respectively. Perry and Johnson contend that
those claims are barred by Alabama’s survivorship statute, which provides that:
In all proceedings not of an equitable nature, all claims upon
which an action has been filed and all claims upon which no action has
been filed on a contract, express or implied, and all personal claims
upon which an action has been filed, except for injuries to the
reputation, survive in favor of and against personal representatives; and
all personal claims upon which no action has been filed survive against
the personal representative of a deceased tortfeasor.
Ala. Code § 6-5-462 (1975). That language is no model of clarity, but it has been
interpreted as providing that “unfiled tort claims do not survive the death of the
putative plaintiff.” Bassie v. Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates of Northwest
13
Alabama, P.C., 828 So. 2d 280, 282 (Ala. 2002).
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Estate of Gilliam ex rel. Waldroup v. City of

Prattville, 639 F.3d 1041 (11th Cir. 2011), addressed the question of whether a §
1983 claim for the use of excessive force that did not cause the victim’s death, but
which was not filed prior to the putative plaintiff’s death, survived or was abated by

the foregoing statute. The Court’s majority opinion explained that:
By its terms, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for the survival
of civil rights actions. Due to this “deficiency” in the statute, the
survivorship of civil rights actions is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588-89, 98 S. Ct. 1991, 1994, 56
L. Ed. 2d 554 (1978). That statute generally directs that, where federal
law is “deficient,” the state law of the forum applies as long as it is “not
inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.”
42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).32
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1988(a) as requiring a
“three-step process” to determine the rules of decision applicable to civil
rights claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267, 105 S. Ct. 1938,
1942, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds);
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2928, 82 L. Ed.
32 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) provides, in pertinent part:
“The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
. . . for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for
their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all
cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the
court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be
extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. . . .”
14
2d 36 (1984); Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1214
(11th Cir. 2001). Courts must first look to federal law “so far as such
laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into
effect.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Second, if federal law is “not adapted to
the object” or is “deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses,” courts must apply the law of the forum
state. Id. Third, if application of state law is “inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States,” courts must not apply state
law. Id.
Estate of Gilliam, 639 F.3d at 1045 (majority opinion) (footnote and alteration in
original). The opinion went on to employ the analytical framework established by the
Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) — a case that
analyzed Louisiana’s survivorship statute — and concluded that Alabama Code § 6-
5-462 is not inconsistent with federal law. Estate of Gilliam, 639 F.3d at 1049.
Accordingly, in cases such as this one, where the defendants’ alleged
constitutional violations did not cause the death of the person upon whom the
violations were inflicted, but the victim dies before the § 1983 claims can be filed, the
claims are abated under Alabama law, and do not survive the death of the putative
plaintiff.33

33 On the other hand, unfiled claims of constitutional violations that allegedly cause the death
of a putative plaintiff still can be asserted through Alabama’s wrongful death statute, Alabama Code
§ 6-5-410. “That proposition finds support in a number of reported cases, where Alabama’s
wrongful death statute . . . has consistently been applied through § 1988 to actions under § 1983.”
Estate of Gilliam ex rel. Waldroup v. City of Prattville, 639 F.3d 1041, 1047 n.9 (11th Cir. 2011)
(majority opinion) (citing, e.g., City of Tarrant, Ala. v. Jefferson, 682 So. 2d 29, 29–31 (Ala. 1996);
Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (S.D. Ala. 1986); Brown v. Morgan County, Ala., 518 F.
Supp. 661, 665 (N.D. Ala. 1981)).
15
In summary, Alabama Code § 6-5-462 applies to and bars plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against defendants Perry and Johnson. While plaintiff appears to allege that

her son’s arrest by Perry and Johnson set in motion a chain of events that ended in
Montarius’s death, she has not plausibly pled that the alleged constitutional violations
caused his death. As noted earlier, the Coroner’s death certificate listed the cause of

death as “Fentanyl, Fluorofentanyl and Oxycodone Toxicity.”34 Accordingly, the
Alabama statute and rationale of the majority opinion in Estate of Gilliam combine
to bar those claims as having been abated.

Even if plaintiff’s claims had not been abated by her son’s death prior to suit
being filed, she still has not pled a plausible claim for false arrest or malicious
prosecution, because her son was arrested pursuant to an indictment of a grand jury.

Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that Montarius was “framed” by defendants Perry and
Johnson is not supported by her factual allegations. For that same reason, plaintiff
has failed to state a claim for conspiracy, as she cannot show that the alleged
agreement between Perry and Johnson to “frame” Montarius resulted in an actual

deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s
Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1327 (11th Cir. 2015).
C. Defendant Dakota Ross

34 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 41.
16
Plaintiff alleges a § 1983 claim against Madison County Sheriff’s Department
Officer Dakota Ross for deliberate indifference to her son’s medical needs in

violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Ross argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.35
Whenever a state, county, or municipal officer is sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

in a personal, or “individual” capacity, as opposed to being sued as a representative
of his state governmental employer, the official is entitled to invoke the so-called
“doctrine of qualified immunity” as a defense. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991).
That doctrine protects state governmental officials whose conduct violated “no clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also, e.g., Thomas ex
rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2001) (same); Lassiter v.
Alabama A. & M. University, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (same).
Stated differently, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields state, county, and

municipal officials from suit for money damages if a reasonable officer could have
believed that his action was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the
information possessed by the officer. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641

35 Ross did not argue that this claim had abated under Alabama’s survivorship statute.
17
(1987). “Even law enforcement officials who ‘reasonably but mistakenly conclude
that [their challenged actions were lawful]’ are entitled to immunity.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641) (alteration
supplied).
It has been said that the doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to strike a

balance between “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009).
The doctrine initially requires a defendant to “prove that ‘he was acting within
the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’”

Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson v. McMillian,
939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff does not contest that element.
Even so, there are two additional requirements. The first requires a court to ask
whether the facts, viewed “in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury,” show that “the [defendant]’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (alteration supplied). If that question is
answered affirmatively, the court then must proceed to analyze the second aspect of

the two-part inquiry: i.e., “whether the right was clearly established.” Id.
18
The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, recently clarified the applicable standard
to establish a claim of deliberate indifference in the context of the Eighth Amendment

in Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251 (11th Cir. 2024).36 That is, a plaintiff must first
show that he suffered a deprivation that was objectively serious; and, second, he must
demonstrate that “the defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the

criminal law,’” and “ must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware
that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Id.
at 1262 (citation omitted). In the course of stating that standard, the Eleventh Circuit

acknowledged that it “took this case en banc solely to clarify our inconsistent
precedent and to answer a discrete question of law.” Id. at 1254 (emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, this court cannot conclude that plaintiff has alleged that Ross’s conduct

violated clearly established law.
Moreover, as Ross observes, plaintiff has completely failed to allege that Ross
was aware of facts indicating a serious risk to Montarious’s health, or that he drew
that inference. All that plaintiff has alleged is that other detainees told Ross that

Montarius was having trouble breathing. That allegation, without more, is

36 The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies to convicted
prisoners, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to pre-trial detainees,
such as Montarius. Even so, “the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison
inmates applies equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d
1559, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1994).
19
insufficient to establish the subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding no

constitutional violation where plaintiff did not show that the defendant fire medics
“actually drew the inference that [the decedent] was having a seizure,” because “the
drawing of such an inference from the observations of a layperson bystander is by no

means automatic”); see also Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir.
2013) (holding that a plaintiff’s burden of showing a defendant officer was
subjectively aware of the risk is not satisfied by merely saying “well, they should

have known”).
D. State Law Wrongful Death Claim
As all of plaintiff’s federal claims have been determined to be deficient and,

therefore, due to be dismissed, all that remains is her wrongful death claim under
Alabama law.37 In cases where the federal district court has original jurisdiction over
some of the claims, the court also has discretion to entertain state claims that are

supplemental to the federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even so, the district
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
37 See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 23-24.
20
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) inexceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (emphasis supplied). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-
law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under
the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7
(1988) (alteration supplied).
Here, all of plaintiff's federal claims have been eliminated. Accordingly, the

court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law wrongful death
claim, and exercises its discretion to dismiss that claim without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
A separate order, consistent with this memorandum opinion, will be entered
contemporaneously herewith.
DONE this 27th day of August, 2024.

21

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631176. Public record. Not legal advice.