# Roberson v. Doe

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · July 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631133

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** July 30, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

KENNETH EARL ROBERSON,
Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:23-cv-760-CLM-GMB

JOHN DOE, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The magistrate judge has entered a report, recommending the court
dismiss this case without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failing to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 20). Plaintiff Kenneth
Earl Roberson has filed a response to the report and recommendation (doc. 21),
which the court construes as objections, as well as several supplements to his
response (docs. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26). For the reasons stated within, the court will
OVERRULE Roberson’s objections, ADOPT the magistrate judge’s report,
ACCEPT the recommendation, and DISMISS this case WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
Background
Roberson’s amended complaint alleges that on February 10, 2023, he
“was handed a warrant for failure to appear and seized.” (Doc. 17, p. 3). On
February 21, 2023, Roberson receive an order of commitment to jail, which
listed 9 cases in the Municipal Court of Huntsville, Alabama that Roberson
had been sentenced to serve various terms of imprisonment for. (Id., pp. 3, 8).
Roberson was charged with 4th degree theft of property in Case No. 11115467
and sentenced to 365 days with 1 day of jail credit. (Id., p. 8). Six of Roberson’s
other sentences were to run concurrent with the sentence in Case No.
11115467. (Id.). But the order of commitment did not say if Roberson’s 365 day
sentence for 4th degree theft of property in Case No. 11113912 was concurrent
or consecutive with the sentence in Case No. 11115467. (Id.). The order also
did not say when Roberson’s sentence was to begin. (Id.).
Roberson says that he should have been given the ability to turn himself
in. (Id., p. 4). Roberson also says that the order of commitment is void and that
Defendant Officer Fields imposed her own personal will to detain him because
the order (a) left blank the field for date/time sentence begins, and (b) didn’t
explain whether the sentence in Case No. 11113912 was to be served
concurrent or consecutive to the sentence in Case No. 11115467. (Id. pp. 4–6).
He also asserts that Fields improperly detained him because she did not have
a warrant. (Id., p. 4).
The magistrate judge recommends that the court dismiss Roberson’s
claims for failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge noted that state court
records show that Roberson appealed his sentences in both municipal court
cases 11113912 and 11115467 and that the municipal court released Roberson
on bond pending appeal in both cases on June 22, 2021. (Doc. 20, p. 5). After
Roberson failed to appear at trial, the circuit court remanded both cases to the
municipal court on February 22, 2022. (Id.). Because Roberson had been
sentenced to 365 days in jail and was simply out on bond pending appeal when
Fields detained him, the magistrate judge found that Roberson’s claim that
Fields “imposed her own personal will” in detaining him did not state a claim
for relief against Fields in her individual capacity. (Id., p. 9). The magistrate
judge found that the Eleventh Amendment barred Roberson’s official capacity
claims against Fields. (Id., pp. 8–9). And the magistrate judge recommended
that the court dismiss the claims against the other Defendants because
Roberson did not bring any specific claims against them. (Id., pp. 7–8).
Discussion
Roberson raises several objections to the report and recommendation.
The court will address each objection in turn.
1. Roberson first objects to the magistrate judge screening his complaint
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act relying on the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights to support this objection. (Doc. 21, pp. 2–3). The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights creates no judicially
enforceable individual rights and is not binding on federal courts. See United
States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). In contrast, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act requires this court to screen a prisoner’s
complaint “as soon as practicable” and dismiss the complaint if it “fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. So the court
overrules this objection.
2. Roberson next objects to the order of commitment to jail’s failure to
explain whether the sentence in Case No. 11113912 was to be served
concurrently or consecutively with the sentence in Case No. 11115467. (Doc.
21, pp. 4–6). He also objects to the magistrate judge not commenting on
whether the sentence in Case No. 11156070, which the order of commitment
said wasn’t set to be tried until March 2023, was to be concurrent or
consecutive to his other sentences. (Id., p. 4).
Neither Officer Fields nor any of the other Defendants drafted the order
of commitment to jail. (Doc. 17, p. 8). So Roberson hasn’t shown that they can
be held liable for the order’s failure to specify whether the sentence in Case No.
11113912 was to run concurrent with the sentence in Case No. 11115467. And
Roberson’s complaint and the state court record make clear that Roberson
hadn’t completed his sentence for any of the municipal court cases listed in the
order of commitment. So the issue over how to calculate Roberson’s sentence
didn’t affect Officer Fields’ ability to detain Roberson under the order of
commitment to jail. As for Case No. 11156070, an exhibit Roberson recently
submitted shows that he was found guilty of obstructing governmental
operations and sentenced to 45 days in jail with his sentence to run concurrent
with the sentence in Case No. 11113912. (Doc. 24, p. 9). Roberson doesn’t
explain how this sentence affects his claims or why the magistrate judge erred
in not mentioning this sentence in the report and recommendation.
Roberson’s objections instead suggest that he wishes for this court to
issue a declaratory judgment that interprets his sentences for all his state
court convictions as running concurrent to the sentence in Case No. 11115467.
This court cannot issue advisory opinions. And a claim that officials are
impermissibly treating a concurrent sentence as a consecutive one must be
raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action. See Rueb v.
Brown, 504 F. App’x 720, 722–23 (10th Cir. 2012). So the court overrules these
objections.
3. Roberson also says that the state court records the magistrate judge
cited show that he was improperly arrested without an arrest warrant before
he was found guilty of his municipal court offenses. (Docs. 22, 23, 24, 25). So
Roberson seeks to amend his complaint to add false arrest claims against Jaron
Medford, the officer who swore out the criminal complaint against Roberson in
Case No. 11113912. (Doc. 20-1, p. 4). According to Roberson, “without the
foundational warrant all other warrants are fruit of a poisoned tree in violation
of all claims asserted by” Roberson. (Doc. 25, p. 7).
The court will not grant Roberson leave to file a second amended
complaint because his proposed amendment of adding Medford as a Defendant
would be futile. “To succeed on a false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must establish
(1) a lack of probable cause, and (2) an arrest.” Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267,
1281 (11th Cir. 2023). “Probable cause exists when a reasonable officer could
conclude that there is a substantial chance of criminal activity,” and “is an
absolute bar to a § 1983 false-arrest claim.” Id. (cleaned up).
Roberson says that Medford falsely arrested and improperly initiated
criminal proceedings against him because he didn’t have an arrest warrant.
But while “an arrest conducted in a public place must be supported by probable
cause, . . . it does not require a warrant.” McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231,
1238 (11th Cir. 2007). And the state court records that Roberson relies on to
say that Medford improperly arrested him without an arrest warrant show
that Medford (a) arrested Roberson in a public place, and (b) had probable
cause to arrest Roberson for 4th degree theft of property. In the criminal
complaint against Roberson, Medford says that Roberson was intoxicated,
belligerent, and harassing the clerk at a Mapco. (Doc. 20-1, p. 4). Roberson then
went outside to speak to officers, was arrested for other charges, and searched.
(Id.). The search revealed a concealed 16 oz can of beer still cold to the touch
and that Roberson had not paid for. (Id.). Roberson hasn’t disputed the
accuracy of Medford’s description of his arrest. Because Medford had probable
cause to arrest Roberson, he didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment by arresting
Roberson in a public place without a warrant. So the court will not grant
Roberson leave to amend his complaint to add claims against Medford and will
overrule any objections related to the initial arrest that led to the charge in
Case No. 11113912.
4. Roberson’s latest filing objects to the magistrate judge taking judicial
notice of his state court records. (Doc. 26). It was appropriate for the magistrate
judge to take judicial notice of Roberson’s state court records, which clarified
why Officer Fields was executing the order of commitment to jail on Roberson.
See Grider v. Cook, 522 F. App’x 544, 546 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) ([T]he district
court was permitted to take judicial notice of Grider’s state court criminal
proceedings.”); Keith v. Dekalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1041 & n.18 (11th Cir.
2014) (taking judicial notice of the Dekalb County Superior Online Judicial
System because it created “a more complete picture” of “Adan’s incarceration
at the Jail.”). So the court overrules this objection.

To sum up, none of Roberson’s filings in response to the report and
recommendation undermine the magistrate judge’s determination that
Roberson’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To the extent that Roberson raises other objections not specifically
addressed in this opinion, they (a) do not show that magistrate judge erred in
recommending that the court dismiss Roberson’s amended complaint, or (b)
establish that Roberson could cure his pleading deficiencies in a second
amended complaint. So the court OVERRULES Roberson’s objections.
Conclusion
After considering the record and the magistrate judge’s report, the court
ADOPTS the report and ACCEPTS the recommendation. Consistent with
that recommendation and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the court DISMISSES this
case WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failing to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
The court will enter a separate final judgment that closes this case.
Done on July 30, 2024.

nt MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631133. Public record. Not legal advice.