# Stewart v. Board of Trustees for the University of Alabama System, The

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · July 25, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631128

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** July 25, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631128

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that to survive the summary judgment stage of litigation, a plaintiff must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact to bring before the jury

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WALTER STEWART, }
}
Plaintiff, }
}
v. } Case No.: 2:22-cv-00203-RDP
}
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES for the }
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA SYSTEM, }
}
Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama (“UAB”). (Doc. # 45).1 The Motion has been fully briefed
and is ripe for review. (Docs. # 45-47; 52-54). For the reasons discussed below, UAB’s Motion is
due to be granted.
I. BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff Walter Stewart, an African American male, filed this cause of action against
Defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. # 20). Plaintiff asserts that,
beginning in 2011, he has consistently received less in pay and lower salary adjustments than white
directors who also serve in the Student Affairs Division. (Id.).

1 Plaintiff sues the Board of Trustees for the University of Alabama system (“Board of Trustees”). However,
the alleged discrimination occurred at the University of Alabama at Birmingham (“UAB”). For purposes of brevity, the
court will refer to Defendant Board of Trustees as “UAB.”

2 The facts set out in this section are gleaned from the parties’ submissions and the court’s own examination of
the evidentiary record. All reasonable doubts about the facts have been resolved in favor of the nonmoving party,
although factual disputes are acknowledged. See Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224
(11th Cir. 2002). These are the “facts” for summary judgment purposes only. They may not be the facts that could be
established through live testimony at trial. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400
(11th Cir. 1994).
A. Compensation at UAB
UAB is a research university and academic medical center located in Birmingham, Alabama.
(Doc. # 46-1 at ¶ 3). The Student Affairs Division is one of many divisions within the UAB system.
(Doc. # 46-2, p. 11:13-22). Student Affairs contains twenty departments and functional areas all
dedicated to student engagement. (Id.; Doc. # 46-1 at ¶ 4).

The UAB Academic and Administrative Compensation Guidelines (“the Compensation
Guidelines”) govern the compensation of employees within the Student Affairs Division. (Docs. #
46-3; 46-4 at ¶¶ 3-5). Specifically, the Student Affairs Division Head oversees the process of setting
up jobs within the Student Affairs Division and determining how much employees are paid within
the applicable pay range. (Doc. # 46-5, pp. 21:1-26:23, 29:7-30:18). Pay ranges for jobs at UAB are
set on a continuum with three salaries denoted: the minimum, which represents the average start rate
within the job market; the midpoint, which represents the rate within the middle of the job market;
and the maximum, which represents the average top rate within the job market. (Doc. # 46-3). The
Executive Director of Compensation, who works in the Human Resources Department (“HR
Compensation Department”), oversees the process of placing a value on available job positions.

(Doc. # 46-5, pp. 21:1-26:23, 29:7-30:18). Then, the HR Compensation Department makes a
recommendation to Division Heads on the salary a particular employee should earn based on the pay
range for the position. (Id.). Division Heads may also request the authority from the Chief Human
Resource Officer to pay employees a higher salary than the assigned valuation. (Id. at pp. 30:19-
33:6).
The Compensation Guidelines establish five mechanisms by which employees may receive
pay raises: merit increases, equity adjustments, market adjustments, promotional increases, and
reclassifications. (Docs. # 46-3; 46-4 at ¶ 6).
• Merit increases are based on job performance, as measured by annual performance
evaluation scores, and each department has discretion to award merit increases so
long as funds are available. (Docs. # 46-3 at 6; 46-4 at ¶¶ 7-8; 46-5, pp. 38:17-39:23).
• Equity adjustments address employees’ pay rates in comparison with other
employees with similar jobs throughout UAB. (Doc. # 46-3 at 8). “Approved equity
adjustments are not centrally funded and must be funded at the department level,”

but the HR Compensation Department will provide recommendations on how to
financially address equity concerns. (Id.).
• Market adjustments address employees’ pay rates in comparison with the external
job market. (Id. at 9). For a market adjustment to occur with jobs shared across
multiple departments, all department leaders must support the adjustment. (Id.).
Market adjustments are also funded at the department level. (Id.).
• Promotional increases occur once an employee applies and is selected for a position
with a greater pay range midpoint. (Id. at 10). Such a promotion may be within an
employee’s current department or when an employee moves to a different

department. (Id.).
• Reclassifications include the process of modifying an existing job -- including job
title, job description, and pay grade -- to fit an employee’s actual job responsibilities.
(Id. at 12-13; Doc. # 46-5, p. 68:4-19).
During the relevant time period, Dr. John Jones, Vice President of Student Affairs, ultimately
made the compensation decisions for employees who worked in the Student Affairs Division, subject
to the Compensation Guidelines. (Doc. # 46-2, p. 16:9-14). Dr. Jones is an African American male.
(Doc. # 46-6, p. 103:13-15).
B. Plaintiff’s Background, Employment, and Compensation
Prior to his current position, Plaintiff served in the United States Army for 26 years, retiring
as a Sergeant First Class in August 2007. (Doc. # 52-1 at 2-3). While serving in the Army, Plaintiff
worked as a recruiter for approximately 20 years. (Id. at 3). In 2004, Plaintiff obtained a Bachelor
of Science Degree in Management Communications from Southern Christian University. (Id.). In
2016, Plaintiff obtained a Master’s in Business Administration Degree from Strayer University, with

a concentration in Health Sciences. (Id.).
After retiring from active duty in the military, Plaintiff worked as the Director of Recruitment
for the Bessemer Campus of ITT Technical Institute. (Id.). Plaintiff worked for ITT Technical
Institute from July 2007 until June 2011. (Id.).
On October 17, 2011, Plaintiff began working at UAB as the Veteran Services and
Recruitment Coordinator. (Docs. # 20 at ¶ 1; 46-7; 52-1 at 3). When Plaintiff was hired, the Veteran
Services Department was organized under UAB’s Enrollment Management Division. (Docs. # 46-
2, pp. 25:1-9, 27:22-28:14; 46-6, p. 33:7-9). As the Veteran Services and Recruitment Coordinator,
Plaintiff increased the program’s enrollment and retention of veteran students, expanded program
services, increased the exposure of the veterans’ program in the surrounding community, and

established relationships with over 35 military installations. (Doc. # 52-1 at 4). While operating on
a budget of $241,000, Plaintiff increased the revenue brought in by the Veteran Recruitment and
Student Services Department to a maximum of $10.6 million. (Id.). Plaintiff requested that some of
this money be allocated to his staff and himself, but his request was ignored. (Id.).
Since 2011, Plaintiff has received a rating of 4 out of 5 on all of his yearly performance
evaluations, and he has never received any written disciplinary action during his tenure with UAB.
(Doc. # 52-1 at 8).
Plaintiff began requesting that his position be reclassified to Director of Veteran Services,
including a pay raise, as early as 2015. (Doc. # 46-6, pp. 53:14-54:4, 56:14-21). Around November
30, 2015, Plaintiff emailed the Assistant Vice President of Student Development, Health, and
Wellness (M. Jacob Baggot) along with the former University Registrar (Tina DeNeen) about
reclassifying his position and increasing his salary. (Id. at p. 35:7-11, 68:1-8; Doc. # 52-1 at 3).
In Spring 2017, UAB reorganized and housed the Veteran Services Department in the

Student Affairs Division. (Docs. # 46-2, pp. 12:2-11, 25:20-22; 46-6, pp. 41:15-42:4). Since this
reorganization, Plaintiff has reported to the Assistant Vice President of Student Affairs, who in turn
reports to Dr. Jones. (Id.). When the Veteran Services Department moved to Student Affairs, the
Enrollment Management Division released about half of the funding for Plaintiff’s salary to Student
Affairs. (Doc. # 46-2, pp. 28:3-29:21). As a result, the Student Affairs Division was responsible for
funding the remainder of Plaintiff’s salary and other costs to operate the Veteran Services
Department. (Id.).
After the Veteran Services Department was relocated to the Student Affairs Division, Dr.
Jones and others in the Student Affairs Division reclassified Plaintiff’s position to Director of
Veteran Services, effective November 2017. (Docs. # 46-2, pp. 25:23-27:2; 46-6, p. 95:5-9). As the

Director of Veteran Services, Plaintiff is responsible for ensuring that VA benefits for UAB students
are correctly processed and received. (Docs. # 46-1 at ¶ 6; 46-6, pp. 33:10-34:2). Plaintiff is also
responsible for providing support for, aiding in the success of, and offering programs for UAB
students with military affiliation. (Doc. # 46-6, pp. 33:10-38:5). This includes veterans, spouses of
veterans, and dependents of veterans. (Doc. # 47 at ¶ 19). There are approximately 2,362 veterans
and dependents of veterans at UAB. (Doc. # 46-6, pp. 39:23-40:7).
During the relevant timeframe and after coming under the supervision of Dr. Jones, Plaintiff
repeatedly requested to have his compensation reviewed to make it comparable to other directors at
UAB and in the state of Alabama. (Doc. # 52-1 at 5). At the time he was initially hired, Plaintiff
made $51,000 annually. (Docs. # 46-7; 46-8 at ¶ 4). Between October 2011 and November 2017,
Plaintiff received four merit increases: a 3% raise effective October 2013 (to $52,350); a 2% raise
effective October 2015 (to $53,580.60); a 1% raise effective October 2016 (to $54,116.40); and a
1% raise effective October 2017 (to $54,657.60). (Doc. # 46-8 at ¶¶ 5-8).
In 2018, the Student Affairs Division requested an equity review of Plaintiff’s salary. (Doc.

# 46-2, pp. 30:15-32:9). After the HR Compensation Department conducted the review, Plaintiff
received an 11.6% raise effective October 2018 (to $61,000.08), which was slightly above the mid-
point for his pay range. (Docs. # 46-6, pp. 101:8-102:5, 104:8-106:11; 46-8 at ¶ 9). In October 2019,
Plaintiff received a 2% merit increase (to $62,220.12). (Doc. # 46-8 at ¶ 10).
During 2020, UAB did not award merit increases due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. #
46-2, p. 64:4-10). And while UAB was forced to cut some salaries, Plaintiff’s salary was unaffected.
(Id.). In October 2021, Plaintiff received a 3% merit increase (to $64,086.72). (Doc. # 46-8 at ¶ 11).
In June 2022, Student Affairs initiated another compensation review for Plaintiff’s salary.
(Docs. # 46-2, pp. 80:8-12, 98:4-21, 111:11-112:18; 46-4 at ¶¶ 12-17). As a result, Plaintiff did not
receive a market increase. (Id.). Dissatisfied with the result of this review, in late 2022 Plaintiff went

directly to HR about his salary. (Docs. # 46-2, pp. 66:10-67:2, 97:4-99:14; 46-6, pp. 152:22-153:18).
At the time, Plaintiff’s job fell within the following pay range: $52,555 minimum salary, $68,320
midpoint salary, and $85,400 maximum salary. (Doc. # 52-1 at 6). In early 2023, the HR
Compensation Department conducted another review of Plaintiff’s salary. (Doc. # 46-2, pp. 66:10-
67:2). The HR Compensation Department also reviewed the salaries of two other directors in the
Student Affairs Division: the Director of Student Involvement (Jennifer Griffin) and the Director of
Off-Campus Student and Family Engagement (Meredith Kahl). (Docs. # 46-2, pp. 47:13-48:11,
77:1-79:7; 46-4 at ¶¶ 18-20; 46-6, p. 156:17-20). Both Griffin and Kahl are white. (Doc. # 47 at ¶
30). Based on the reviews, all three directors (Plaintiff, Griffin, and Kahl) received an 8.5% salary
increase. (Doc. # 46-2, pp. 47:13-48:11, 77:1-79:7). Plaintiff’s current salary is $71,620.16. (Doc. #
46-6, pp. 159:18-161:8).
While working under Dr. Jones, Plaintiff has never been paid anywhere near the maximum
amount of salary for his position. (Doc. # 52-1 at 6). In fact, Dr. Jones testified that, in 2011, when
Plaintiff was hired, Plaintiff’s salary was the lowest salary in the Student Affairs Division. (Doc. #

46-2, p. 34:1-8).
C. Other Directors within the Student Affairs Division
In this case, Plaintiff claims that he is paid less than seven white Directors and two white
Associate Directors within the Student Affairs Division. (Doc. # 46-9). However, in his response to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has specifically referenced Allison Solomon.
Allison Solomon (white female) is the ADA Compliance Officer for UAB and Executive
Director of Disability Support Services. (Doc. # 46-1 at ¶ 10). Solomon oversees two separate areas:
Disability Support Services and ADA Compliance. (Id.). The Department of Disability Support
Services manages the processes for students with disabilities who seek accommodations (a total of
approximately 2,135 students). (Id. at ¶ 11). In this role, Solomon oversees seven non-student

employees and manages an annual operating budget of $1,040,815. (Id.). As the ADA Compliance
Officer, Solomon ensures that facilities throughout UAB comply with all applicable disability laws.
(Id. at ¶ 12). In this role, Solomon works with UAB’s Campus Planning and Facilities team, the
Office of Compliance & Risk Assurance, and the Office of Counsel. (Id.).
Solomon began working at UAB in 2003. (Id. at ¶ 10). As Student Affairs Specialist II,
Solomon made the following salaries: $30,900 effective October 2003 and $32,735.04 effective
October 2004. (Doc. # 46-10). As Program Administrator II, she made: $35,744.04 effective October
2005; $38,031.60 effective October 2006; and $39,934.08 effective October 2007. (Id.). Prior to
serving as ADA Compliance Officer, Solomon served only as the Director for Disability Support
Services beginning in 2010. (Doc. # 46-1 at ¶ 10). As Director of Disability Support Services, she
made: $45,924.24 effective July 2010; $51,343.32 effective October 2011; $59,044.80 effective
November 2011; $60,816.12 effective October 2013; $80,000.04 effective October 2015;
$82,400.04 effective October 2017; and $84,377.64 effective October 2018. (Doc. # 46-10). She
then added ADA Compliance Officer to her job description in 2019 and made: $91,873.80 effective

July 2017; $93,711.24 effective October 2019; and $96,991.08 effective October 2021. (Id.). She
currently makes a salary of $99,900.84. (Id.).
In total, there are sixteen directors who currently work in the Student Affairs Division. (Doc.
# 46-10). Out of those directors, thirteen are paid more than Plaintiff, with about half being white
directors and half being black. (Docs. # 46-1 at ¶ 10; 46-10). Plaintiff acknowledges that no one has
made any statement to him that indicates that his rate of pay is connected to his race in any way.
(Doc. # 46-6, p. 111:12-23). Plaintiff testified that while he and his white counterparts may have
different jobs, they have about the same amount of responsibility. (Doc. # 46-6, pp. 52:20-53:4,
171:7-15).
II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking
for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for
its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden,
Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -- designate specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts
and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ.
for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,

1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving
party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations.”
Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson teaches, under Rule
56(c), a plaintiff may not simply rest on the allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party
bearing the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with at least some evidence to support
each element essential to his case at trial. 477 U.S. at 248, 252 (“[A] party opposing a properly
supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”)

(citations omitted).
Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment may be granted if
the non-moving party’s “evidence [] is ‘merely colorable’ or [] ‘not significantly probative.’”
Bazemore v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Baloco v.
Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1246 (11th Cir. 2014)).
“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “At summary judgment, the key issue is whether the evidence presents
a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.” Butler v. Gualtieri, 41 F.4th 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); see also LaRoche v. Denny’s, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D.

Fla. 1999) (“The law is clear ... that suspicion, perception, opinion, and belief cannot be used to
defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint -- the operative pleading in this case -- asserts two counts
against UAB. (Doc. # 20). The parties have already stipulated to the dismissal of the claim in Count
II. (Docs. # 43-44). Thus, the only claim remaining against UAB is Plaintiff’s race discrimination
claim under Title VII. (Doc. # 20).
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer…to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation…because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42. U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). “In order to survive summary judgment,
a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination must present sufficient facts to permit a jury to rule in
h[is] favor.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Lewis I”).
One way he can do this is by satisfying the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell
Douglas. Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of race discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If plaintiff satisfies this initial
burden, then the employer has the burden to show that the employer’s conduct was for a legitimate,
non-discriminatory purpose. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002).
And, finally, if the employer can rebut plaintiff’s presumption, then the burden falls on plaintiff once
again to show that the employer’s proffered reason is pretext for discriminatory intent. Smith v.
Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, the court starts its analysis
with Plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination.
A. Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination based
on his race.

To state a prima facie case for wage discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff may show
that: “(1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he received low wages; (3) similarly situated
comparators outside the protected class received higher compensation; and (4) he was qualified to
receive a higher wage.” Walker v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 624 F. App’x 683, 686 (11th Cir. 2015).
While Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish the second, third, and fourth elements,
Defendant cites no case law in support of its arguments as to the second and fourth elements. Nor
has it sufficiently developed those arguments. Instead, Defendant focuses on the third requirement
– the “similarly situated comparator” element. The court will do the same.
To satisfy his initial burden, Plaintiff may show that the white directors in the Student Affairs
Division are “similarly situated [to him] in all material respects.” Lewis I, 918 F.3d at 1218.
However, the Eleventh Circuit has clarified that the “all material respects” standard does not equate
to a “nearly identical” standard. Id. When analyzing this element, “a plaintiff and h[is] comparators
must be sufficiently similar, in an objective sense, that they ‘cannot reasonably be distinguished.’”
Lewis I, 918 F.3d at 1228 (quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 576 U.S. 206, 231 (2015)).
The Lewis I decision also makes clear “that a meaningful comparator analysis must remain part of

the prima facie case.” Id. at 1221-24. “If a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly situated
employee, summary judgment is appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is present.”
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis I,
918 F.3d at 1224-25.
As noted above, Plaintiff has expressly identified only one white director as a comparator –
Allison Solomon. In determining whether an individual is a proper comparator, courts have
considered factors such as the length of time a person has worked for an employer, the individual’s
expertise, and the similarity of tasks and responsibilities they perform. E.g., Smith v. IVM Sols., LLC,

No. 1:21-cv-00162-RAH, 2022 WL 16701100, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2022) (citing Crawford v.
Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 975 (11th Cir. 2008) and Davis v. Dunn Constr. Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1291,
1310 (N.D. Ala. 2012)).
Here, Plaintiff has not satisfied his prima facie burden. Plaintiff and Solomon both serve as
directors in the Student Affairs Division at UAB, report to Dr. Jones, and serve over 2,000 students.
However, that is where any similarities between the two end. Solomon has worked for UAB since
2003, served as a director since 2010, and served as the ADA Compliance Officer since 2019. (Doc.
# 46-10). As part of her responsibilities, Solomon primarily manages the processes for disability
accommodations and ensures that facilities at UAB comply with applicable laws addressing
disabilities. (Doc. # 46-1). She also regularly engages with three additional departments on campus

in addition to the Student Affairs Division. (Id.). And, as Director of Disability Support Services,
she manages an annual operating budget of $1,040,815. (Id.)
In contrast, Plaintiff has worked for Defendant since 2011 and has served as a director since
2017 (Doc. # 20 at ¶ 11), although Plaintiff also has over 20 years of experience in military
recruitment (Doc. # 53 at 7). As Director of Veteran Services, Plaintiff is responsible for managing
VA benefits as well as executing programming and other forms of support for veterans, spouses of
veterans, and dependents of veterans. (Docs. # 46-1 at ¶ 6; 46-6, pp. 33:10-38:5; 47). The record is
unclear on the amount of the current annual operating budget for Veteran Services, but as the Veteran
Services and Recruitment Coordinator, Plaintiff managed an operating budget of $241,000. (Doc #
52-1 at 4).
The Rule 56 record simply does not support a finding that Plaintiff and Solomon have
“sufficiently similar” roles that “cannot reasonably be distinguished.” Lewis I, 918 F.3d at 1228
(quoting Young, 576 U.S. at 231). While Solomon has been employed by UAB for twenty-one years,
Plaintiff has been employed for thirteen years. The responsibilities of Solomon and Plaintiff are not

comparable. Solomon is responsible for determining the accommodations needed by students while
also meeting with the appropriate departments at UAB to ensure those facilities comply with the
relevant law. Plaintiff engages almost exclusively with veterans and those affiliated with veterans to
ensure their success at UAB. Plaintiff does not point to any evidence to show how these two roles
are sufficiently similar to make Solomon a viable comparator.
Further, Plaintiff admits that his responsibilities and Solomon’s responsibilities are “quite
different.” (Doc. # 46-6, p. 182:21-23). As Plaintiff testified, “when I see my white counterparts and
I see their salaries and I see what I make and I see what I bring to the table, and I see these are new
directors, some of them, and I said in our job descriptions, yeah we got different jobs, but my
responsibility is just as important as theirs.” (Doc. # 46-6, pp. 52:20-53:4). Plaintiff’s admission that

he has different job responsibilities than Solomon weighs against finding that Solomon is a
“similarly situated comparator” in this case. See Sumerlin v. AmSouth Bank, 242 F. App’x 687, 690
(11th Cir. 2007) (considering Plaintiff’s admission that “all of the payroll representative ‘had
different duties’” against find a similarly situated comparator). While Plaintiff argues that his role is
“just as important” as Solomon’s role, the subjective worth that Plaintiff attributes to his role as
Director of Veteran Services does not indicate that his job is “similarly situated in all material
respects” to that of the Director of Disability Support Services and ADA Compliance Officer. Lewis
I, 918 F.3d at 1218. Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden under the
McDonnell Douglas framework because he has not identified a proper comparator.
B. Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant’s proffered reason for Plaintiff’s salary
is pretext for race discrimination.

Although Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case, for a complete analysis, the court
proceeds to evaluate whether UAB’s explanation about his pay is a pretext. In doing so, the court
concludes that even if Plaintiff had satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case (and, to be
clear, he has not done so), the Rule 56 record before the court shows that UAB is entitled to summary
judgment.
Assuming only for purposes of this analysis that Plaintiff has made the initial showing of a
prima facie case, and thereby raised a presumption that his race motivated his employer to treat him
unfavorably, Smith, 644 F.3d at 1325-26, “the burden then shifts to [UAB] to rebut this presumption
by producing evidence that [its] action was taken for some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.”
Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d at 1272. “If the employer meets its burden of production, the
presumption of discrimination raised by the plaintiff’s prima facie case is rebutted and thus
disappears.” Smith, 644 F.3d at 1325-26. Finally, if the presumption is rebutted, “the inquiry
proceeds to a new level of specificity, whereby the plaintiff must show the employer’s proffered
reason to be a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. (quotations omitted).
The court finds that Defendant has met its exceedingly light burden, Furcron v. Mail Ctrs.
Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1312 (11th Cir. 2016), and produced evidence showing a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s salary. Defendant explains that any disparity between Plaintiff’s

salary and that of the other directors within the Student Affairs Division is on account of the
difference in the market rate for each position. (See Docs. # 46-1 at ¶ 29; 46-3 at 9-10; 46-4 at ¶ 24;
46-5, pp. 24:19-27:21, 62:8-13, 63:11-65:13). The record shows, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that
other department heads had different responsibilities and that Plaintiff’s salary was consistent with
the market rate for his position. (Doc. # 46-4 at ¶¶ 12-17; 46-2, pp. 80:8-12, 98:4-21, 111:11-112:18).
And, in the past, in those instances where the HR Compensation Department determined that his
salary was below the market rate and his pay range, Plaintiff received a raise. (See Docs. # 46-2, pp.
30:15-32:9; 46-6, pp. 101:8-102:5, 104:8-106:11; 46-8 at ¶ 9). Thus, Defendant has articulated a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s lower salary.

In an attempt to show Defendant’s reason is pretext for discrimination, Plaintiff highlights
the authority Dr. Jones has to set the salary for his employees anywhere in the applicable pay range.
(Doc. # 46-5, pp. 24:19-26:23, 29:7-31:18, 33:16-34:8). Plaintiff also points to the ability Dr. Jones
has to petition to pay his subordinates at higher salaries than the maximum salary calculated by the
HR Compensation Department. (Id.). However, Plaintiff undercuts his own argument. As Plaintiff
testified, “the problem that I’ve always had is that my supervisor…never knew and still don’t know
what we do in veteran services.” (Doc. # 46-6, p. 171:11-15). Plaintiff has acknowledged that this
lack of understanding from his supervisors is not a problem that is tied to his race. (Id. at p. 171:17-
19). In fact, Dr. Jones is himself black and there are multiple (six) other directors in Student Affairs
who are black. (Docs. # 46-1 at ⁋ 28; 46-10). Therefore, because Plaintiff cannot show that

Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his salary is pretext for race discrimination,
Plaintiff cannot satisfy his burden under McDonnell Douglas.
C. Plaintiff has not pointed to circumstantial evidence in the record that creates a
triable issue concerning Defendant’s alleged discriminatory intent.

As explained above, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden under
the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, the court does not end its analysis there. As the
Eleventh Circuit has noted (and as Plaintiff argues here):
‘[E]stablishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and never
was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment
motion in an employment discrimination case.’ Even without similarly situated
comparators, ‘the plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he … presents
circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s
discriminatory intent.’

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Lewis II”) (quoting
Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328).
Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether
his salary was affected by race discrimination by Defendant. To support his argument, Plaintiff relies
heavily on the fact that he was the lowest paid director in the Student Affairs Division at the time he
was hired. (Doc. # 46-2, p. 34:1-8). Because he was hired at such a low rate, Plaintiff contends that
“he cannot crack the upper echelon of the pay scale like the white directors” and remains “locked
into a discriminatory pay grade.” (Doc. # 53 at 15). Plaintiff points to Solomon once again in an
effort to bolster this theory. He argues that, in November 2023, Solomon received a 29% pay
increase while he received a 9% pay increase. (Id.) However, what Plaintiff fails to note is any
evidence in the record showing that this discrepancy is due to race. In fact, he merely recants this
assertion: “[Plaintiff] has for years consistently received less in pay or salary adjustments than his
white counterparts. It has been this way from the beginning. Thus, a jury should decide whether
these salary discrepancies are benign or evidence discriminatory intent.” (Id. at 15-16). Such an
argument ignores an essential part of a summary judgment motion: that a non-moving party must
put forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (holding that
to survive the summary judgment stage of litigation, a plaintiff must show that there is a genuine
issue of material fact to bring before the jury). “A party cannot defeat summary judgment by relying
upon conclusory allegations.” Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. YP, LLC, 856 F. App’x 846, 854 (11th
Cir. 2021) (citing Hill v. Oil Dri. Corp. of Ga., 198 F. App’x 852, 858 (11th Cir. 2006)).
The majority of Plaintiffs arguments hinge on his belief that he has been treated unfairly by
Defendant. However, “Title VII does not ‘replace employers’ notions about fair dealing in the
workplace with that of judges.’” Herron-Williams vy. Ala. State Uni., 805 F. App’x 622, 631 (11th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Flowers vy. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015)).
It is neither the role of the court nor the jury to address Plaintiff's concerns about being undervalued
by his employer. Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff has not presented “circumstantial evidence
that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Lewis IT, 934 F.3d at
1185 (Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328).
IV. CONCLUSION
Although this authority has perhaps been cited too often by district courts in assessing
summary judgment motions, it is directly applicable here: this court does not sit as a super-personnel
board charged with the responsibility of determining what is a fair or equitable pay rate. Elrod v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991). The only question before the court is
whether Plaintiff's pay rate was affected by race discrimination. There is no evidence in the Rule 56
record that it was.
For the reasons discussed above, UAB’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 45) is due
to be granted.
An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.
DONE and ORDERED this July 25, 2024.

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10631128. Public record. Not legal advice.