# Anderson v. Turman (INMATE 1)

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · January 10, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10630898

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** January 10, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL DELANO ANDERSON, )
#147822, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:21-cv-154-RAH-CWB
)
BLAKE TURMAN and )
THOMAS HUGGHINS, )
)
Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Procedural Background
Michael Delano Anderson, acting pro se, initiated this action by filing a Complaint that
raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). At the court’s direction, Anderson subsequently
filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 5), which is now the operative pleading. The core allegation
is that Sheriff Blake Turman and Jail Administrator Thomas Hugghins violated Anderson’s
constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at the Covington County Jail. (Id.). For relief,
Anderson requests monetary damages and “[p]roper training for all jail employees.” (Id. at p. 4).
On March 15, 2021, the court issued an Order directing the defendants to file a written
report addressing Anderson’s claims. (Doc. 6). On June 24, 2021, the defendants jointly filed a
Special Report (Doc. 16), along with supporting evidentiary materials (Docs. 16-1 through 16-8),
in which they sought entry of summary judgment. The defendants thereafter filed a supplement
to their Special Report (Doc. 20) and additional evidentiary materials (Docs. 20-1 & 20-2).
On July 8, 2021, the court directed Anderson to file a response to the defendants’ filings and
include affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and/or other evidentiary materials.
(Doc. 21). Anderson filed a response (Doc. 26), and the defendants in turn filed additional
evidentiary material (Doc. 38-1).
In its July 8, 2021 Order, the court notified the parties that “the court may at any time
[after expiration of the time for Anderson to file a response] and without further notice to the

parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment, whichever is proper, and (2) after considering any response …,
rule on the motion in accordance with the law.” (Doc. 21 at p. 4). Pursuant to that disclosure,
and because the defendants’ Special Report presents arguments for dismissal, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge will now treat the Special Report as a motion to dismiss and recommend that the
motion be granted due to Anderson’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing
suit.1
II. The Exhaustion Requirement
The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 … by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).2 Exhaustion of available administrative remedies thus is a mandatory
precondition to suit. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001). The exhaustion requirement
“applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

1 Although the defendants request that the court treat their Special Report as a motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 16 at p. 27), “an exhaustion defense … should be raised in a motion
to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary judgment.” Bryant v. Rich,
530 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2 “42 U.S.C. § 1997e, which is designed to deter the filing of frivolous litigation against prison
officials, applies to both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
576 U.S. 389, 402 (2015).
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). “The requirement is not subject to waiver by a court, or futility
or inadequacy exceptions.” Mathews v. Walters, No. 3:23-cv-10264, 2023 WL 8881170, *2
(N.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2023) (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6).

To properly exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate must “us[e] all steps” in the
administrative process and comply with all “deadlines and other critical procedural rules.”
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). If an inmate has filed “an untimely or otherwise
procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal,” he has not properly exhausted his
administrative remedies. Id. at 83-84. And when an inmate fails to properly exhaust available
administrative remedies before filing suit, the court must dismiss the action. See Chandler v.
Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004).
Deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies involves two
steps:
First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s motion to dismiss
and those in the plaintiff’s response, and if they conflict, takes the plaintiff’s version
of the facts as true. If, in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed.

Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373-74).
“If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step, where the plaintiff’s allegations are
assumed to be true, the court then proceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve the
disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.” Id. (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373-74, 1376).
“Once the court makes findings on the disputed issues of fact, it then decides whether under those
findings the prisoner has exhausted his available administrative remedies.” Id. at 1083. “The
defendants bear the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust.” Id. at 1082 (citing
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)).
III. The Parties’ Filings
a. Allegations in the Amended Complaint
On September 4, 2020, Defendants Turman and Hugghins “had the jail blocks A & B
separated with the two major cities in the County in each block (A-Block—Opp), (B-Block—

Andalusia).” (Doc. 5 at p. 3). “[T]hese two cities are rivalry cities that have never gotten along
and stay fighting with each other.” (Id. at pp. 3 & 5). “The Sheriff and Captain knows this, and
knows not to place one around the other in the same blocks.” (Id. at p. 5). Anderson is from a city
“west of Andalusia,” which is “considered by Opp … to be part of Andalusia.” (Id.). Nevertheless,
when given the choice of which block to go to, Anderson chose A-Block, as he was unaware of
the Opp/Andalusia designations. (Id. at p. 3).
On September 8, 2020, Anderson “was jumped [by two other inmates] and stabbed several
times in the head, shoulder, back, and hand.” (Id. at p. 5). One correctional officer “rolled the
door for [Anderson] to exit,” while another stood at the door. (Id.). One of the inmates who
attacked Anderson “attempt[ed] to continue stabbing [him],” and neither officer intervened.

(Id.). After chasing Anderson, the other inmate was “talked back in his block” and Anderson
“was moved to B-Block for Andalusia inmates.” (Id.). After Anderson was moved to B-Block,
Defendant Hugghins came to talk to him. (Id. at pp. 3 & 6). Anderson stated that he was
“all bruised up” and that one of his assailants “took [his] canteen.” (Id. at p. 6). Anderson “was
never taken to see the nurse, when it was clear that [he] needed to,” and his assailants were never
punished. (Id.).
On September 10, 2020, Anderson met with Officers Tyler Patterson and Ken Harris and
told them about his September 8 assault. (Id. at p. 3). Officer Harris stated, “[I]’m tried [sic] of
these guys, we bought [sic] to start an investigation right f***ing now!” (Id. at p. 6). Anderson
“was then taken across the street to the C.C.S.O.” where Officer Harris told Sergeant Hamm:
“[S]omething has to be done over at the Jail before someone gets killed[.] No one over there has
been properly trained on running that Jail and they kept letting [Anderson’s assailants] do what
they want.” (Id.). Sergeant Hamm took Anderson’s statement, and Investigator McCraw took

pictures and another statement. (Id.). Investigator McCraw stated: “[W]e [are] going to press
charges for theft of property and 3rd degree assault.” (Id. at p. 7).
Defendant Turman then told Anderson to go get a body chart. (Id.). However, Anderson
was “escorted back to the Jail and put back in B-Block with no body chart [and] no medical
attention.” (Id.). Anderson filled out several sick call forms, and he was “finally given a blood
test” on October 6, 2020, at which time it was revealed that he had Hepatitis C. (Id.). Thereafter,
Anderson was sent for a CAT scan. (Id.). The nursing staff said that they would not treat
Anderson’s Hepatitis C and that Anderson’s “headaches were coming from the blows to [his]
head.” (Id.). On December 16, 2020, Anderson was given an eye examination, and “James Barton
O.D. … said most of [Anderson’s] vision problems came from blows to [his] head.” (Id.).

Anderson at that point filed a grievance stating that the defendants “need training,” and
Defendant Hugghins “threaten[ed] to lock [him] up.” (Id.).
b. The Defendants’ Special Report
The defendants assert that the Covington County Jail had an inmate grievance procedure
in place that Anderson had access to but did not follow. (Doc. 16 at p. 10). According to the
defendants, Anderson was required to have filed a grievance on an Inmate Grievance Form
within 48 hours of the September 8, 2020 incident. (Id.). They allege, however, that Anderson
did not submit a grievance until at least late October or early November 2020 (Id. at pp. 11-12)
and that Anderson did not otherwise submit any documentation regarding the incident until he
filled out a sick call slip on October 3, 2020 (Id. at p. 15).
In an affidavit attached to the Special Report3, Defendant Hugghins explained the inmate
grievance procedure as follows:

12. The Covington County Jail Inmate Handbook is made available to all
inmates on the jail kiosk.

13. Chapter 9 of the Covington County Jail Inmate Handbook deals with Inmate
Grievances.

14. If an inmate has an issue, the first action the inmate should take is to try and
resolve the problem through the use of an inmate request form. If such efforts are
unsuccessful, the inmate should submit his or her grievance on an Inmate Grievance
Form within 48 hours of the incident to the pod officer.[]

16. The inmate’s grievance will be investigated and answered, in writing,
within 48 hours of the time the grievance is received, excluding weekends and
holidays.

17. Grievances are first answered by the appropriate staff at the lowest level in
the chain of command.

18. If the inmate is not satisfied with the first answer to the inmate’s grievance,
the inmate may send a grievance to the next higher command level.

19. The inmate may continue to send the grievance through the chain of
command, up to the Sheriff, who will make the final decision.[]

21. The current Covington County Jail Inmate Handbook states that the inmate
should access the Inmate Grievance Form on the kiosk. However, Covington
County Jail had to move away from inmates filing grievances utilizing the kiosk
due to the fact that the inmates were improperly using the kiosk to communicate
with one another.

22. Covington County Jail has an unwritten policy that requires when an inmate
is booked in, the booking officer will verbally inform the inmate that they can file

3 In the event it is necessary to resolve a factual dispute regarding exhaustion, the court may
consider facts outside of the pleadings. See Trias v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 587 F. App’x 531, 535
(11th Cir. 2014) (“The [district] judge properly may consider facts outside of the pleadings to
resolve a factual dispute as to exhaustion where doing so does not decide the merits, and the parties
have a sufficient opportunity to develop the record.”) (citation omitted).
a grievance by hand, using the same procedures laid out above which can be found
in the Inmate Handbook located on the kiosk. The only difference is that inmates
use a handwritten form, not the electronic form.

(Doc. 16-2; see also Docs. 16-5 & 16-8).
Anderson’s jail and medical records attached to the Special Report reflect that on
September 6, 2020, two days prior to his alleged assault, Anderson filled out a sick call slip stating:
“I have arthritis & [illegible] in my knee and ankles which made me fall because of these slides[.]
I fell and I have … big bruises in my hand and side.” (Doc. 16-3 at p. 44). On September 7, 2020,
Anderson filled out a Patient’s Consent for Treatment form to allow him to receive treatment, and
he received a medical screening the same day. (Id. at pp. 42-43). On October 3, 2020, Anderson
filled out another sick call slip, stating in part: “On Sept 8, 2020[,] I was stabbed multiple times in
A-Block as a C/O stood and watched[.] These wounds are hurting it seems from the inside.”
(Id. at p. 40). Anderson was seen on October 5, 2020. (Id.)
On October 10, 2020, Anderson filled out a third sick call slip, stating: “I can’t see do
[sic] to being stabbed in the head. I keep writing these sick calls and the nurse will not
see me[.] I’m loosing [sic] weight they still don’t see me[.] I was stabbed[.]” (Id. at p. 35).
On October 11, 2020, Anderson filled out a fourth sick call slip, stating in part: “I was stabbed in
the head and now the nurse say I got Hept C! I didn’t have none of these problems before I got
stabbed and not giving any medical attention for over 30 days.” (Id. at p. 36). Anderson was seen
on October 14, 2020. (Id. at pp. 33 & 35). On November 25, 2020, Anderson filled out a fifth
sick call slip, stating: “On Sept 8, I was stabbed in the head and back. I have migraine headaches,
and Hept C from the stabbing, and also high blood pressure. I need medical attention.” (Id. at
p. 29). On November 27, 2020, Anderson filled out a sixth sick call slip, stating: “On Sept 8, 2020,
I was stabbed in the head and it has impaired my vision. I can[’]t see and I need to see the eye
doctor about my vision.” (Id. at p. 26). Anderson was seen that same day. (Id. at p. 28).
On December 2, 2020, Anderson filled out a seventh sick call slip, stating in part: “I’m
having severe chronic migrain[e]s 4 to 5 times a week … every [sic] since I got stabbed in the head

on Sept 8, 2020.” (Id. at p. 24). He was seen on December 3, 2020. (Id. at pp. 22-23). Finally,
on December 7, 2020, Anderson submitted his first inmate request form pertaining to the
September 8 incident. (Doc. 16-1 at p. 20). Additionally, Correctional Officer Natalie Brown—
who was present during the September 8 incident—avers that she does not remember Anderson
filing any grievances regarding the incident in September 2020; the only grievance she recalls
receiving was submitted “months after the incident took place.” (Doc. 16-4 at p. 4).
c. Anderson’s Response
The court directed Anderson to file a response specifically addressing the defendants’
exhaustion argument as raised in the Special Report. (Doc. 21). In his response, Anderson did not
address the exhaustion argument other than to state: “I turned in many sick call slips[.]”

(Doc. 26 at p. 2).
IV. Discussion
The defendants have alleged that Anderson failed to follow the inmate grievance procedure
in place at the Covington County Jail, i.e., that Anderson did not file an Inmate Grievance Form
within 48 hours of the underlying incident. (See Doc. 16-4 at p. 4). In response, Anderson does
not dispute the existence of the inmate grievance procedure, that the procedure was available to
him,4 or that he failed to follow the procedure. He simply states that he “turned in many sick call

4 The Supreme Court has recognized three circumstances in which an administrative remedy is
considered unavailable to an inmate. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016). First, a remedy
is unavailable when “it operates as a simple dead end” because prison officials are “unable or
slips.” (Doc. 26 at p. 2). This case thus is due to be dismissed for a failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83-84, 90-91; Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082;
Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1286.
V. Conclusion

Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge hereby RECOMMENDS as follows:
1. that the defendants’ Special Report (Doc. 16), which is construed as a motion to
dismiss, be granted; and
2. that this case be dismissed due to Anderson’s failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies.
It is ORDERED that any objections to this Recommendation must be filed by
January 24, 2024. An objecting party must identify the specific portion of any factual findings
or legal conclusions to which objection is made and must describe in detail the basis for the
objection(s). Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered.
After receiving all objections, the District Judge will conduct a de novo review of the

findings or recommendations to which objection is made. The District Judge may accept,
reject, or modify the Recommendation or may refer the matter back to the Magistrate Judge with
instructions for further proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party shall be deemed to
have waived the right to challenge on appeal a District Judge’s order to the extent it is based upon
unobjected-to findings or recommendations. The court on appeal may review unobjected-to

consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id. Second, a remedy is
unavailable if the grievance process is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable
of use.” Id. This occurs when “some mechanism exists to provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner
can discern or navigate it.” Id. at 644. Finally, a remedy is unavailable if “prison administrators
thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. Anderson has made no allegations sufficient to invoke
any of those circumstances.
factual and legal conclusions only for plain error if necessary in the interests of Justice.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1. No party may appeal this Recommendation directly to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. A party may appeal only from a final judgment
ultimately entered by the District Judge.
DONE this the 10th day of January 2024.
(hr
CHAD W. BRYAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10630898. Public record. Not legal advice.