# Campbell v. Rodgers (INMATE 2)

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · January 9, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10630661

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** January 9, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10630661

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “because [Plaintiff] alleged no facts indicating that any officer was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to him from [his attacker] and failed to take protective measures, his [failure to protect] claim fails.”
- explaining that complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim because “[n]owhere does the complaint allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that the defendants subjectively foresaw or knew of a substantial risk of injury posed by [inmate-attacker].”
- explaining that “there must be much more than mere awareness of [a] ... generally problematic nature [of another inmate].... [A] generalized awareness of risk ... does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.”
- holding that “within [a prison’s] volatile ‘community,’ prison administrators are . . . under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”
- discussing “[t]he unfortunate reality [ ] that threats between inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

TAYWAN DEWAYNE CAMPBELL, )
AIS 210809, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:20-cv-18-WKW-JTA
)
SGT. T. RODGERS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Taywan Campbell, an indigent state inmate proceeding pro se, files this 42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint seeking relief for certain claimed violations of his
federally protected rights. He brings this action for damages complaining that the existence
of dangerous conditions at the Ventress Correctional Facility caused him to be injured in
an inmate attack on September 8, 2019. Doc. No. 1 at 2–3. The named defendants are
Sergeant Tangela Rodgers and Corrections Officer Khiry Thomas who are or were
employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) at the time of the event
about which Plaintiff complains.1 Doc. No. 7. Plaintiff requests $2.5 million in damages,
but he does not state in which capacity he sues the named defendants.2 Doc. No. 1 at 5.

Defendants filed a Special Report with supplement (Docs. No. 30, 33) which
includes relevant evidentiary materials in support, including affidavits, prison documents,
photographs, and medical records addressing the claims presented by Plaintiff. In their
Special Report Defendants deny they violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
After reviewing the Special Report and supplement, the Court issued an Order on
June 26, 2020, requiring Plaintiff to respond to the reports with affidavits or statements

made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. Doc. No. 37. This Order
specifically cautioned that, unless a party presented sufficient legal cause, the Court would
treat the Special Report as a motion for summary judgment, and rule on the motion after

1 Plaintiff named the Ventress Correctional Facility and the Alabama Department of Corrections
(“ADOC”) as defendants in the original Complaint. Doc. No. 1. The Court therefore directed
Plaintiff to file an amendment identifying the individuals responsible for the alleged violations of
his constitutional rights. Doc. No. 6. Plaintiff filed an amendment naming as defendants Rodgers,
Thomas and Correctional Officer David Dennis. Doc. No. 7. Although the United States Marshals
Service served Officer Dennis with the Complaint, amendment, and the Order of Procedure on
July 28, 2020 (Doc. No. 40) and the Court ordered him to file an Answer and Special Report (Doc.
No. 41), Officer Dennis failed to answer or otherwise respond. Finding that the time for Dennis
to answer the Complaint had expired (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A), that no entry of default has
been entered, and that Plaintiff has not requested entry of default for Officer Dennis’ failure to
answer the Complaint, the Court entered an Order on August 1, 2022, directing Plaintiff to show
cause why entry of default had not been requested for Officer Dennis. Doc. No. 47. The Court
informed Plaintiff his failure to show cause or file a motion for entry of default within the allowed
time period would result in the dismissal of Officer Dennis for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. Id.
Plaintiff filed no response to the August 1, 2022, Order. Accordingly, by Order entered December
22, 2022, the Court terminated Defendant Dennis as a party and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
against him without prejudice. Doc. No. 49.

2 On May 19, 2020, the Court entered an order terminating the Ventress Correctional Facility and
the ADOC as parties. Doc. No. 31.
considering any response. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff filed a response to the Special Report, as
supplemented. Doc. No. 38. Pursuant to the June 26 Order, the Court now treats

Defendants’ Special Report as a motion for summary judgment and concludes it is due to
be granted.
II. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court must
grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute “is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a
reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. . . . [A dispute] is ‘material’ if it
might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion and alerting the court to portions of
the record that support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
However, once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmovant is similarly required
to cite portions of the record showing the existence of a material factual dispute. Id. at 324.

To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In determining whether a genuine dispute for trial
exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant
and draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor.
McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003); see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).
Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant
does not escape the burden of sufficiently establishing a genuine dispute of material fact.
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th
Cir. 1990). Thus, a plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this Court disregard

elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.
III. Background
On September 8, 2019, at approximately 5:00 p.m. an inmate stabbed Plaintiff with
a prison-made knife. Doc. No. 1 at 2–3; Doc. No. 7 at 1–2. Plaintiff maintains Defendants
showed little to no concern in response to the incident and contends the incident occurred

because of understaffing at Ventress. Doc. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff filed an amendment to the
Complaint in which he identified Sergeant Rodgers and Officer Thomas as defendants.
Doc. No. 7. Plaintiff signed his Complaint under penalty of perjury (Doc. No. 1 at 4) and
his affidavit in response to Defendants’ Special Report is verified and sworn to under
penalty of perjury (Doc. No. 38). Therefore, the Court will treat the Complaint and

Plaintiff’s affidavit as evidence when ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s amendment to the Complaint (Doc. No. 7), however, is unsworn. Therefore, the
Court does not treat its factual assertions as evidence on summary judgment. See id.; Roy
v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 n.26
(11th Cir. 2003), as amended, (Sept. 29, 2003) (noting that “[u]nsworn statements may not

be considered by a district court in evaluating a motion for summary judgment.”); see also
Mosley v. MeriStar Mgmt. Co., LLC, 137 F. A’ppx 248, 252 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting
that “the complaint was unverified and therefore could not be considered evidence
supporting [plaintiff’s] claim” on summary judgment).
IV. Discussion

A. Sovereign Immunity and Individual Defendants
Plaintiff seeks money damages on his claims for relief. In response, Defendants
assert Plaintiff’s suit against them, to the extent they are sued in their official capacities, is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all
respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 166 (1985). The Eleventh Circuit has held:

[T]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits
by private parties against States and their agencies [or employees]. There are
two exceptions to this prohibition: where the state has waived its immunity
or where Congress has abrogated that immunity. A State’s consent to suit
must be unequivocally expressed in the text of [a] relevant statute. Waiver
may not be implied. Likewise, Congress’ intent to abrogate the States’
immunity from suit must be obvious from a clear legislative statement.

Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Thus, a state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the
State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the State’s immunity, see
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). “Alabama has not waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abated it.” Holmes v.
Hale, 701 F. App’x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916

F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990)); Ala. Const. Art. I, § 14. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff
sues Defendants in their official capacities, as state actors, they are entitled to sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages. Selensky,
619 F. App’x at 849; Jackson v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir.
1994).

B. Qualified Immunity
Regarding Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, they
argue that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim and that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. Qualified immunity offers complete protection from civil damages for
government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is not merely a defense against liability but
immunity from suit, and the Supreme Court “repeatedly [has] stressed the importance of
resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To receive

qualified immunity, the public official must first prove he was acting within the scope of
his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Lee v. Ferraro, 284
F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). There is no dispute that Defendants here were acting
within the course and scope of their discretionary authority when the challenged incident
occurred. Plaintiff must, therefore, allege facts that, when read in a light most favorable to
him, show that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Cottone v. Jenne, 326

F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003).
To satisfy his burden, Plaintiff must show two things: (1) that a defendant
committed a constitutional violation and (2) that the constitutional right a defendant
violated was “clearly established.” Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2004). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right. . . . In

other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (citations and quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original). “Clearly established law” means (1) “a materially
similar case has already been decided;” (2) “a broader, clearly established principle that
should control the novel facts of the situation;” or (3) “the conduct involved in the case

may so obviously violate the constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Gaines v.
Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The controlling
authority is from “the Supreme Court of the United States, the Eleventh Circuit, or the
highest court in the relevant state.” Id. at 1209. “Qualified immunity gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Messerschmidt v.
Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh
Circuit “has stated many times that if case law, in factual terms, has not staked out a bright
line, qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1210
(citations and quotation marks omitted). “Exact factual identity with the previously
decided case is not required, but the unlawfulness of the conduct must be apparent from

pre-existing law.” Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). If a plaintiff cannot establish both elements to satisfy his burden, the defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity, and the court may analyze the elements “in whatever
order is deemed most appropriate for the case.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 839 (11th
Cir. 2010) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241–42).

C. Failure to Protect Claim
Plaintiff alleges a failure to protect claim based on alleged dangerous conditions at
Ventress. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was stabbed and had his arm broken after
being attacked by another inmate on September 8, 2019. Doc. No. 1 at 2–3; see also Doc.
No. 7. The Court considers Plaintiff’s claim to arise under the Eighth Amendment.
“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions

under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison
officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation marks and citation). “Although prison
officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence by other prisoners, they are not the

guarantors of a prisoner’s safety. Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Co., Ga., 400
F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005). “An Eighth Amendment violation will occur when a
substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the
official does not respond[] reasonably to the risk.” Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346,
1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, to prevail on a
failure to protect claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm;

(2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) a causal connection between
the defendants’ conduct and the Eighth Amendment violation.” Brooks v. Warden, 800
F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015).
Settled law requires the establishment of both objective and subjective elements to
demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748
F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). Regarding the objective elements of a deliberate

indifference claim, an inmate must first show “an objectively substantial risk of serious
harm . . . exist[ed]. . . Second, once it is established that the official is aware of this
substantial risk, the official must react to this risk in an objectively unreasonable manner.”
Marsh v. Butler Cnty, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028-29 (11th Cir. 2001). As to the subjective
elements, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . . The
Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and
unusual ‘punishments’. . . . [A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our
cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38;

Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838)
(explaining that “[p]roof that the defendant should have perceived the risk, but did not, is
insufficient.”); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). The
conduct at issue “must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s
interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good
faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause[.]” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
Prison officials cannot be liable under the Eighth Amendment unless they know of
and disregard an excessive or substantial risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837.
To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been subjectively aware
of the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have had a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1977-80;
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25, 115 L. Ed. 2d
271 (1991). . . . Even assuming the existence of a serious risk of harm and
legal causation, the prison official must be aware of specific facts from which
an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists –
and the prison official must also draw that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837, 14 S.Ct. at 1979.

Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349 (quotation marks omitted). A defendant’s subjective knowledge
of the risk must be specific to that defendant because “imputed or collective knowledge
cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. . . . Each individual
defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person [knew at the time
of the incident].” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover,
“[t]he known risk of injury must be a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before
a [state official’s] failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes,
894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Even where
a prison official perceives a serious risk of harm to an inmate, the official “may still prevail
if he responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”
Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 706 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). In sum, prison officials cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment unless
there is an objectively substantial risk of harm to an inmate, the defendants have knowledge

of this substantial risk of harm, and with this knowledge, consciously disregard the risk.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Plaintiff’s claims stem from the following facts, viewed in the light most favorable
to him. On September 8, 2019, Officer Davis Dennis was assigned as F Dorm Rover. Doc.
No. 30-1 at 2, Doc. No. 30-3 at 11. At approximately 5:13 p.m. he observed inmate Joshua
Willingham running from F1 Dorm covered in blood. Id. Sergeant Rodgers was notified.

Id. The Duty Officer Report indicates:
Inmate Willingham was escort[ed] to the Health Care Unit, via stretcher, for
a medical assessment. Officer Jonathan Pittman observed inmate Taywan
Campbell, B/210809 (El-41A), entering E Dormitory with blood on his
clothing area. Inmate Campbell was escorted to the Health Care Unit for a
medical assessment. It was discovered that inmates Campbell and
Willingham were in a previous homosexual relationship. Sergeant Rodgers
questioned both inmates concerning the incident. Inmate Willingham stated,
“He mad because I don't want to be with him anymore so he want to start
trying to extort me.” Inmate Campbell stated, “I should have been hurt him.
He done ate up all my food then lie on me.” Nurse Amy Matthews, LPN,
advised Sergeant Rodgers that inmate Willingham would need to be
transported to Medical Center Barbour by ambulance for further treatment.
At approximately 5:47 pm, Louisville Fire Rescue arrived at Ventress back
gate. At approximately 6:10 pm, Louisville Fire Rescue departed Ventress
back gate en route to Medical Center Barbour. Officer Patrice Blackmon
provided ambulance security. Officer Shacora Johnson trail in transport
vehicle 1943. Warden II Gwendolyn Babers was notified of the incident.
Inmate Campbell was reassigned to Restricted Housing Unit B3 pending
disciplinary action for fighting with a weapon. Inmate Willingham is pending
disciplinary action for fighting without a weapon.

Doc. No. 30-3 at 4.
Prison records reflect Plaintiff received a medical exam around 6:00 p.m. Doc. No.
30-3 at 2. In the “statement” section of Plaintiff’s September 8, 2019, body chart, Plaintiff

told medical personnel: “I was just standing there talking to my partner.” Doc. No. 30-3
at 5. Medical personnel noted a quarter inch puncture wound to Plaintiff’s left shoulder,
an abrasion to his left shoulder, and a half inch puncture wound to his left forearm. Id.
Defendants’ evidence includes a second incident report prepared on September 13,
2019.

On September 13, 2019, at approximately 11:14pm, a phone call was
received from Shamsuiddin Lalani, at Southeast Medical Center in Dothan,
Alabama. Lalani informed that inmate Joshua Willingham, B/281030, had
been pronounced dead. Inmate Willingham succumbed to his injuries from a
physical altercation that occurred with inmate Taywan Campbell B/210809,
on September 8, 2019, see incident report VCF-19-01612. It was alleged that
inmates Willingham and Campbell were in an unauthorized relationship.
Agent Kelly Smith was notified. Agent Smith advised Lieutenant Victor
Nieves that she would pass the information on to the agent that dealt with the
initial incident. Inmate Willingham’s mother was notified and was allowed
to visit inmate Willingham in the hospital earlier that week. Inmate Campbell
is currently being housed on the Health Care Unit ward due to injuries he
received. The medical staff was advised that inmate Campbell needed to be
placed in restrictive housing. The medical staff informed that the doctor
needed to be contacted to ensure that he could be placed in Restrictive
Housing.

Doc. No. 30-8 at 1.
Defendants submitted affidavits regarding their knowledge of the subject matter of
the Complaint and amendment. Docs. No. 30-1, 30-2. Officer Thomas testifies he was
assigned to F Dorm Cubicle on September 18, 2019. Doc. No. 30-2 at 1. During that time
Officer Thomas observed Officer Dennis roving the F-4 side of the dorm but testifies that
at no time did he see Plaintiff being stabbed or hurt. Id.
Sergeant Rodgers testifies that at approximately 5:13 on September 8, 2019, as she
assisted with the feeding of chow, Officer Dennis notified her that inmate Willingham had

been assaulted and was being taken to the health care unit for medical attention. Doc. No.
30-1 at 3–4. Five minutes later another correctional officer informed Sergeant Rodgers that
Plaintiff, who had blood on his clothes, entered E Dorm and might be a suspect in the
assault. Id. at 4. Sergeant Rodgers testifies that Plaintiff was escorted to the lobby of the
infirmary where he waited for treatment of his wounds considered to be non-life
threatening while medical staff attended to inmate Willingham who had sustained life-

threatening injuries. Id. After inmate Willingham was transported by ambulance for
additional medical care, medical personnel examined and treated Plaintiff in-house for his
injuries. Id.
In response to Defendants’ evidence, Plaintiff submitted a sworn affidavit. Doc. No.
38. He states that on September 8, 2019, between 5:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., he walked from

E Dorm to F Dorm and received permission from Officers Dennis and Thomas—who were
in the lobby—to visit a friend. Id. at 1. While visiting with his friend, Plaintiff saw inmate
Willingham and asked whether he had his (Plaintiff’s) money. Id. at 2. Inmate Willingham
said nothing and walked away. Id. Inmate Willingham subsequently walked up behind
Plaintiff and stabbed him in the neck. Id. The two inmates engaged in a struggle and

Plaintiff states they fought over possession of the knife. Id. During the altercation Inmate
Willingham fell to the floor but jumped up and ran from the dorm. Id. Plaintiff walked to
the bathroom where he saw Officers Dennis and Thomas and they escorted him from the
dorm. Id. at 2–3. Officer Dennis told Plaintiff to go to the infirmary which had been
informed that Plaintiff was on the way. Id. at 4. Plaintiff arrived at the infirmary and sat
down in the lobby. Id. After a few minutes Sergeant Rodgers appeared and observed that

Plaintiff was bleeding. Id. Sergeant Rodgers left and returned with a camera to take
pictures of Plaintiff’s injuries. Id. Plaintiff states he remained in the lobby of the infirmary
for about an hour before he received medical attention after which he was placed in a lock
up cell still bleeding. Id.
It is axiomatic that confrontations among inmates are common in the prison setting
as prisoners engage in an unending struggle for position and power among the incarcerated.

Because “a risk of harm to some degree always exists by the nature of it[ ] being a [prison],”
not every condition rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Purcell ex rel.
Estate of Morgan, 400 F.3d at 1323; Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that “the constitutional rights of inmates are [not] violated every time a prisoner
is injured. It would not be reasonable to impose such an absolute and clearly unworkable

responsibility on prison officials.”); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27
(1984) (holding that “within [a prison’s] volatile ‘community,’ prison administrators are .
. . under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”).
Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that Ventress was inadequately staffed at
the time of the challenged incident. However, he makes no allegation that Sergeant Rodgers

or Officer Thomas had involvement in staffing decisions on September 8, 2019, and does
not refute Defendants’ evidentiary materials which demonstrate that Sergeant Rodgers was
in another area of the institution at the time of the assault and that Officer Thomas was
assigned as the cubicle operator of F Dorm and not a rover within the dorm. Doc. No. 30-
3 at 2–4, 11, 12. Plaintiff also has not shown that the conditions under which he was
incarcerated presented a “substantial risk of harm” to him, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, to

which Defendants responded in an objectively unreasonable manner, Marsh, 268 F.3d at
1028–1029. His general assertion of inadequate staffing does not, by itself, show a culpable
state of mind by Defendants to disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Liability cannot be imposed upon prison officials “solely because
of the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions.” Id. at 838. Rather, to be liable
under the Eighth Amendment, a defendant must know of and disregard an excessive or

substantial risk. Id.
Here, Plaintiff does not present any evidence showing inmate Willingham posed
“an objectively substantial serious risk of harm” to him prior to the assault about which he
complains. Plaintiff makes no allegation that prior to the challenged incident he complained
to any prison official, or made any prison official aware, that he was in danger of being

attacked by a fellow inmate. And Plaintiff does not indicate he knew he was in any danger
prior to the attack. Docs. No. 1, 38. There is also no indication or allegation that Defendants
had information of any threat to Plaintiff from another inmate from which they could infer
that a substantial risk of harm existed to Plaintiff prior to the attack at issue. Carter, 352
F.3d at 1349, 1350 (explaining that “there must be much more than mere awareness of [a]

... generally problematic nature [of another inmate].... [A] generalized awareness of risk ...
does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.”); see also Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d
538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996) (observing that “threats between inmates are common and do not,
under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.”).
Instead, the record reflects that the altercation occurred without notice or provocation.

Even had Plaintiff satisfied the objective component of his deliberate indifference
claim, he fails to establish the subjective component because he has not shown that any
Defendant subjectively knew of a risk of harm to him posed by inmate Willingham.
Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099-1100 (explaining a defendant “must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.”). Plaintiff’s assertion of inadequate staffing and the

implication that such condition made Ventress unsafe is not evidence that any Defendant
was subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff posed by inmate
Willingham at the time of the challenged assault. Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App’x 719, 722
(11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a
claim because “[n]owhere does the complaint allege, nor can it be plausibly inferred, that

the defendants subjectively foresaw or knew of a substantial risk of injury posed by
[inmate-attacker].”); Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that “because [Plaintiff] alleged no facts indicating that any officer was aware of a
substantial risk of serious harm to him from [his attacker] and failed to take protective
measures, his [failure to protect] claim fails.”); Harrison v Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1300

(11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that although increasing the number of officers in an area of
the facility “may have improved security, [the warden’s] decision not to do so did not create
a substantial risk of harm).
Further, without disputing that inmate-on-inmate assaults occur in the correctional
system and assuming the institutional facility was experiencing understaffing at the time

of the challenged incident, Plaintiff presents no direct facts, as opposed to conclusions, to
support his general allegation that Ventress was not adequately staffed when he was
assaulted nor does he show that this condition constituted a contributing factor to the
September 8, 2019, assault. Moreover, no evidence has been presented of rampant violence
at Ventress. Settled law holds that an occasional and isolated attack by one prisoner on
another does not demonstrate the existence of unconstitutional conditions inside the

prison. Purcell ex rel Estate of Morgan, 400 F.3d at 1320. A prison is an inherently
dangerous place which is why the law requires a plaintiff asserting an Eighth Amendment
violation to show the defendants had knowledge of a “strong likelihood, rather than a mere
possibility” of injury. Brown, 894 F.2d 1537 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

On this record, there is no probative evidence of “an objectively substantial serious
risk of harm” posed by any inmate to Plaintiff prior to the challenged assault as is necessary
to establish deliberate indifference. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1028-1029. And the evidentiary
materials submitted by Defendants refute Plaintiff’s allegations they acted with deliberate
indifference to his safety. Absent is any evidence Defendants actually knew of a risk to

Plaintiff from another inmate regarding the incident about which he complains. Thus,
Plaintiff has not presented facts sufficient to create a genuine dispute regarding “actual
knowledge” of a substantial risk of harm. See Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1236
(11th Cir. 2019) (discussing “[t]he unfortunate reality [ ] that threats between inmates are
common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a
substantial risk of harm.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Even if Defendants

were negligent in carrying out some of their duties, mere negligence cannot support a
finding of deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Since the record fails to
demonstrate that the incident between Plaintiff and inmate Willingham occurred due to any
deliberate indifference or reckless disregard by Defendants, they are entitled to qualified
immunity and summary judgment is due to be granted in their favor on Plaintiff’s failure
to protect claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Hope, 536 U.S. at 736.

D. Medical Claim
Plaintiff challenges as constitutionally inadequate the response by Sergeant Rodgers
and Officer Thomas to the injuries he sustained in the altercation with inmate Willingham.
He maintains Officers Dennis and Thomas escorted him from the dorm following the
incident, Officer Dennis told him to go to the infirmary where medical staff were expecting

him, and that despite his obvious wounds, Sergeant Rodgers only took pictures of his
injuries. Doc. No. 38 at 2–3. Plaintiff states he then remained in the lobby of the infirmary
for approximately one hour before receiving medical treatment. Id. at 3. The Court
considers Plaintiff’s allegations against Sergeant Rodgers and Officer Thomas as asserting
a claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.
To prevail in a suit based on an Eighth Amendment claim regarding a denial of
constitutionally adequate medical attention, a prisoner must show at a minimum that prison
or medical officials have acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000).
Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care,

deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only
if those needs are “serious.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). To demonstrate
a denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must prove both
an objective and subjective component. The objective element requires Plaintiff to
demonstrate the existence of an “objectively serious medical need.” Farrow v. West, 320
F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed

by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “In either of these situations, the medical need must be one that, if left
unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

The subjective component of Plaintiff’s medical claim requires that he demonstrate
“deliberate indifference” to a serious medical need. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. Deliberate
indifference is shown by establishing that a defendant had actual knowledge or awareness
of an obvious risk to a plaintiff's serious medical need and failed to take steps to abate that
risk. It may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834. Reckless disregard occurs when a defendant “knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and he
must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th
Cir. 1998) (holding a defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not
just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding

of deliberate indifference). “[A]an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our
cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
“Deliberate indifference” also entails more than mere negligence. Estelle, 429 U.S.
at 106; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Delay in access to medical attention can violate the
Eighth Amendment . . . when it is tantamount to unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). “Cases stating a constitutional claim for immediate or
emergency medical attention have concerned medical needs that are obvious even to a
layperson because they involve life-threatening conditions or situations where it is apparent
that delay would detrimentally exacerbate the medical problem.” Id.

The unrefuted evidence of record reflects that Sergeant Rodgers reported to the
infirmary after being notified of the incident between Plaintiff and inmate Willingham
which had occurred shortly after 5:00 p.m. on September 8, 2019. Doc. No. 30-1; Doc. No.
30-3 at 2–4. When Sergeant Rodgers arrived at the infirmary medical staff were
administering treatment to inmate Willingham due to the severity of his injuries. Doc. No.

30-1 at 2, 4. Plaintiff remained in the infirmary lobby until 5:55 p.m. at which time medical
staff prepared a body chart for Plaintiff which notated and described his injuries. No. 30-3
at 5. Plaintiff’s medical records show that medical personnel treated him for his stab
wounds, placed his left arm in a sling, prescribed him pain medication, and directed him to
report to the infirmary for daily bandage changes. Doc. No. 33-1 at 6, 17, 29.

Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish deliberate indifference on the part of the
correctional defendants. First, Plaintiff does not name as a defendant any prison personnel
who provided medical treatment to him on September 8, 2019, following the altercation
with inmate Willingham. Next, there is no evidence the defendant correctional officers
were responsible for determining the level of necessary medical care for Plaintiff. Doc. No.
33-1. Finally, while the record shows Plaintiff had an objectively serious medical need

requiring medical treatment, he presents no evidence that Defendants disregarded any
known serious risk to his health by denying, delaying, or interfering with his ability to
obtain necessary medical care. Taylor, 221 F.3 at 1258; McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248,
1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that for liability to attach, the official must know of and then
disregard an excessive risk of harm to the inmate); Johnson, 145 F.3d at 168; Farmer, 511

U.S. at 838.
In sum, the record in this matter is devoid of evidence that Defendants had
knowledge of specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of harm existed to Plaintiff, and that Defendants actually drew this inference and thereafter
ignored the risk. Plaintiff has therefore failed to establish the requisite element of subjective

awareness on the part of Defendants. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350. Accordingly, Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment is due to be granted in their favor
on Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Hope,
536 U.S. at 736.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for the treatment provided by
medical professionals, he is likewise entitled to no relief as

“[t]he law does not impose upon [correctional officials] a duty to directly
supervise health care personnel, to set treatment policy for the medical staff
or to intervene in treatment decisions where they have no actual knowledge
that intervention is necessary to prevent a constitutional wrong. See
Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977) (a medical treatment claim
cannot be brought against managing officers of a prison absent allegations
that they were personally connected with the alleged denial of treatment).
Moreover, “supervisory [jail] officials are entitled to rely on medical
judgments made by medical professionals responsible for prisoner care. See,
e.g., Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993); White v. Farrier,
849 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1988).” Williams v. Limestone County, Ala., 198
Fed.Appx. 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2006).

Cameron v. Allen, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
Finally, if Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable under a theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability, the law is settled that liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
may not be based on either of these theories. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)
(finding that “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior.”); Cottone, 326 F.3d
at 1360 (holding that “officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of
their subordinates [or co-workers] on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious
liability.”). “[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for
his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677.
Even if supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot be established by the supervisor’s
personal participation in the complained acts, liability may be shown by “the existence of
a causal connection linking the supervisor’s actions with the violation.” Lewis v. Smith,
855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). Although § 1983 requires a connection between the
official’s acts or omissions and the plaintiff’s injury, an official also may be liable where a

policy or custom that he established or utilized resulted in deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s constitutional rights. [Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1059 ].” Salas v. Tillman, 162 F. App’x.
918, 922 (11th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff has presented no evidence to create a genuine issue of disputed fact with
respect to a claim that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
Nothing before the Court indicates that Defendants personally participated in or had any

direct involvement with the medical treatment provided to Plaintiff. Additionally, the
undisputed evidentiary materials demonstrate that medical personnel made all decisions
relative to the course of treatment provided to Plaintiff and do not establish that such
treatment resulted from a policy instituted by Defendants. As explained, the law does not
impose upon correctional officials a duty to directly supervise health care personnel, to set

treatment policy for the medical staff, or to intervene in treatment decisions where they
have no actual knowledge that intervention is necessary to prevent a constitutional wrong.
Vinnedge, 550 F.2d 926. Accordingly, Defendants are likewise entitled to qualified
immunity and summary judgment is due to be granted in their favor with respect to liability
based on a theory of respondeat superior. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Hope, 536

U.S. at 736.
V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 30) be GRANTED.
2. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Defendants
3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is ORDERED that by January 24, 2023, the parties may file objections to this
Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual findings and legal
conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive or
general objections will not be considered by the Court. This Recommendation is not a final
order and, therefore, it is not appealable.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo determination by
the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waive
the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon
grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (Sth Cir.
1982); 11TH Cir. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982);
see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
DONE this 9th day of January, 2023.

USHA T. ADAMS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10630661. Public record. Not legal advice.