# Lloyd v. Cousins (INMATE 2)

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · June 17, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10630549

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** June 17, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10630549

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that plaintiff must show more than mere negligence to assert an Eighth Amendment violation
- stating “deliberate indifference” is synonym for intentional or reckless conduct, and that “reckless” conduct describes conduct so dangerous that deliberate nature can be inferred
- concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability
- holding mere fact that inmate desires different mode of diagnosis does not amount to deliberate indifference

## Opinion text

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT S. LLOYD, #250886, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-CV-411-MHT-CSC
)
LT. WAYLON COUSINS & WARDEN )
ANTONIO MCCLAIN, )
)
Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION1
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed on June 13, 2019, by
Robert S. Lloyd, a state inmate, in which he alleges that the Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference in failing to protect him from assault by a fellow prisoner on April 15, 2019, and in
failing to ensure he received adequate medical attention for the resulting injury to his eye. (Doc.
8 at p. 6). He names as Correctional Defendants Lt. Waylon Cousins and Warden Antonio
McClain. He does not name any personnel providing him medical assistance as a Defendant. He
also does not specify whether he sues the Defendants in their individual or official capacities and
he seeks money damages. (Doc. 8 at p. 7).
The Defendants filed special reports and relevant evidentiary materials in support of their
reports, including affidavits, addressing the claims raised in the complaint, as amended. In these

1 All documents and attendant page numbers cited herein are those assigned by the Clerk in the docketing
process.
documents, the Correctional Defendants maintain they did not act with deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s safety or to his medical needs. (Doc. 33).
After reviewing the special reports filed by the Defendants, the court issued an order on
February 20, 2020, directing Defendants to file a response to each of the arguments set forth by

the Defendants in their reports, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury
and other evidentiary materials. (Doc. 38). The order specifically cautioned that “unless within
ten (10) days from the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal cause why such
action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for
the plaintiff filing a response to this order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the
special reports and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and
(2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary
judgment in accordance with the law.” (Doc. 38 at p. 2). Lloyd filed a sworn response to this
order on January 21, 2020. (Doc. 39). Thereafter, Lloyd filed Supplements to his Response (Docs.
41 and 43).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court must grant a
motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A dispute “is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find
for the nonmoving party. . . . [A dispute] is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the case
under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496
(11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion and alerting the court to portions of the record that
support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, once the movant
has satisfied this burden, the nonmovant is similarly required to cite portions of the record showing

the existence of a material factual dispute. Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In determining
whether a genuine dispute for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving
party’s favor. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
III. FACTS
The Plaintiff alleges that on April 15, 2019, while he was housed in Bullock Correctional
Facility, a fellow inmate, Dedric Shepherd, attacked him and robbed him. When Plaintiff

attempted to regain possession of the stolen objects, inmate Shepherd beat him with a mop handle
causing damage and swelling to his left eye. (Doc. 8 at p. 6). He claims that the fight lasted twenty
minutes because there was no officer available to help him. (Doc. 1 at p. 3). He also complains
that Shepherd was never put in lock up. Id. He states that he was taken to “the ER and all they
did was patch me up and sent me back to my dorm.” Id. He further complains that he was not
taken to a free world hospital and no MRI was performed. (Doc. 8 at p. 6). He states that on June
12, 2019, he was seen by free-world doctors at the Dothan Eye Center and the free-world doctors
told him that the attack caused pressure to build up in his eye which damaged tissues and caused
loss of sight in that eye. Id. He claims if Defendants had ensured that he received free-world
treatment sooner, his eye could have been saved. Id.
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that due to the April 15, 2019, 10:50 a.m.
altercation, both Plaintiff and Shepherd were cited for disorderly conduct. (Doc. 33-5 pp. 1-13).

At this time, the Mental Health Treatment Unit, including the Residential treatment unit where the
alleged assault occurred, was staffed by three (3) DOC personnel. (Docs. 33-2 at p.3; 33-4 at p.2).
The undisputed medical evidence confirms that Plaintiff was seen by prison medical staff
on April 15, 2019, at 11:15 a.m. and they noted the following: “laceration to upper left eyebrow,
upper and lower eye swollen. Large amount of bleeding due to inmate taking aspirin daily.” (Doc.
33-1 at p. 3). Due to the bleeding, pressure dressing on left eye was ordered for 5 days. (Doc. 33-
7 at pp. 22-23). Also, on April 15, 2019, x-rays performed on the Plaintiff’s face confirms no injury
to the bony orbits or facial bones. (Doc. 33-6 at pp.10-13). Wexford Medical records demonstrate
numerous instances of onsite treatment of the Plaintiff’s eye injury by Wexford clinicians
including compression bandaging, medication for pain, and x-rays. (Docs. 33-6, 33-7, 33-8, 33-

9). Furthermore, Wexford referred him free-world eye doctors beginning on April 24, 2019. (Doc.
33-10 at p. 9). Plaintiff was seen by free-world eye doctors on May 17, 2019, (Doc. 33-9 at p. 27),
August 30, 2019, (Doc. 33-9 at p. 9), October 11, 2019, (Doc. 33-8 at p.11) and November 13,
2019 (Doc. 33-8 at p. 7).
As to the medical care provided to the Plaintiff, both Defendants, Lt. Waylon Cousins and
Warden Antonio McClain testified that “[a]t no time was I ever responsible for determining
necessary medical care to be provided to inmate Lloyd. The Alabama Department of Corrections
contracts with Wexford to make sure that all inmates incarcerated with ADOC, including inmate
Lloyd, receive necessary medical treatment and/or care for their necessary medical needs. At no
time have I ever denied or delayed necessary medical care to inmate Lloyd due to the fact that I
am not a trained medical provider and have never been asked to or had anything to do with any
medical care provided to inmate Lloyd.” (Docs. 33-2 at pp. 2-3 and 33-3 at pp. 1-2).
IV. DISCUSSION2

A. Deliberate Indifference Generally
The law is well-settled that establishment of both objective and subjective elements are
necessary to demonstrate a violation of the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment.
Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). With respect to the
requisite objective elements of a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must first show “an
objectively substantial risk of serious harm . . . exist[ed]. Second, once it is established that the
official [was] aware of this substantial risk, the official must [have] react[ed] to this risk in an
objectively unreasonable manner.” Marsh v. Butler Cnty. Ala., 268 F.3d 1014 at 1028–29 (11th
Cir. 2001) abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). As to
the subjective elements, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. . . .
The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and
unusual ‘punishments.’ . . . [A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should
have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994);

2 The court limits its review to the allegations set forth in the complaint. (Doc. 1). Gilmour v. Gates,
McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff may not amend [his] complaint
through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”); Ganstine v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of
Corrections, 502 F. App’x. 905, 909–10 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that plaintiff may not amend complaint
at the summary judgment stage by raising a new claim or presenting a new basis for a pending claim);
Chavis v. Clayton County School District, 300 F.3d 1288, 1291 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2002) (refusing to address a
new theory raised during summary judgment because the plaintiff had not properly amended the complaint).
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838) (“Proof
that the defendant should have perceived the risk, but did not, is insufficient.”); Cottrell v.
Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (same).
The conduct at issue “must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s

interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that
conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical
needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986).
To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been “subjectively aware of
the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have had a ‘“sufficiently culpable
state of mind.”’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38, 114 S.Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324-25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). . . .
Even assuming the existence of a serious risk of harm and legal causation, the
prison official must be aware of specific facts from which an inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists - and the prison official must
also “draw that inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). A defendant’s subjective knowledge
of the risk must be specific to that defendant because “imputed or collective knowledge cannot
serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. . . . Each individual defendant must be
judged separately and on the basis of what that person [knew at the time of the incident].” Burnette
v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, “[t]he known risk of injury must be a
strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility before a [state official’s] failure to act can
constitute deliberate indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[m]erely negligent failure to protect an
inmate from attack does not justify liability under section 1983.” Id.
C. Failure to Protect
To survive the properly supported motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendants,
Lloyd must first demonstrate an objectively substantial risk of serious harm existed to him and

“that the defendants disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it in an objectively
reasonable manner.” Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App’x 719, 721 (11th Cir. 2014), citing Caldwell,
748 F.3d at 1100. If he establishes these objective elements, Lloyd must then satisfy the subjective
component. This requires Lloyd to show “that [each] defendant subjectively knew that [he] faced
a substantial risk of serious harm. The defendant must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw
the inference.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must submit evidence that
the defendant-official had subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm.
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999). In determining
subjective knowledge, a court is to inquire whether the defendant-official was
aware of a “particular threat or fear felt by [the] [p]laintiff.” Carter v. Galloway,
352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
defendant-official “must be aware of specific facts from which an inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists — and the prison official
must also draw that inference.” Id. at 1349 (quotations omitted).).

Johnston v. Crosby, 135 F. App’x 375, 377 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). The Plaintiff
fails to offer any evidence or to even allege that the named Defendants had any knowledge that
inmate Dedric Shepherd posed a threat of serious harm to him. Accordingly, the court concludes
summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the Defendants on the Plaintiff’s failure to
protect claim.
D. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs.
Lloyd also alleges that Correctional Defendants, as wardens or correctional officers, are
responsible for ensuring that he received appropriate medical treatment as a result of the injuries

he received from the April 15, 2019, alleged assault. These assertions entitle him to no relief.
To prevail on a claim of denial of medical treatment, an inmate must show the defendant
acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976);
Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000). Medical treatment of prisoners violates the
Eighth Amendment only when it is “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock
the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A prison official is not “deliberately
indifferent” unless he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11th Cir.
1995) (finding, under Estelle, a plaintiff must establish “not merely the knowledge of a condition,

but the knowledge of necessary treatment coupled with a refusal to treat properly or a delay in
such treatment”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). “A defendant who unreasonably fails
to respond or refuses to treat an inmate’s need for medical care or one who delays necessary
treatment without explanation or for non-medical reasons may also exhibit deliberate
indifference.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016). Within the Eleventh
Circuit, medical malpractice and negligence do not constitute deliberate indifference:
Instead, something more must be shown. Evidence must support a conclusion that
a prison physician’s harmful acts were intentional or reckless. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-38, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977-79, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994);
Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that deliberate
indifference is equivalent of recklessly disregarding substantial risk of serious harm
to inmate); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1543 (stating that plaintiff must show more than mere
negligence to assert an Eighth Amendment violation); Hill v. Dekalb Regional
Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1191 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that
Supreme Court has defined “deliberate indifference” as requiring more than mere
negligence and has adopted a “subjective recklessness” standard from criminal
law); Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating “deliberate
indifference” is synonym for intentional or reckless conduct, and that “reckless”
conduct describes conduct so dangerous that deliberate nature can be inferred).

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).
Thus, to demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Lloyd must show
(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3)
causation between that indifference and his injury. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–
1307 (11th Cir. 2009). To make this showing, Lloyd must establish “an objectively serious need,
an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts signaling the need,
and an actual inference of required action from those facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott
v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that for liability to attach defendant must
know and disregard excessive risk to prisoner’s health or safety).
Regarding the objective component, a plaintiff must first show an objectively serious
medical need, followed by a response by defendants inadequate enough to constitute an
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, not merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in
diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law. Taylor, 221 F.3d
at 1258. (Citations omitted). For the required subjective intent, a plaintiff must show the public
official acted with an attitude of “deliberate indifference,” which requires two things: an awareness
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and
drawing of the inference. Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; is aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and draws that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
An “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while
no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of
punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. Further, neither a difference of opinion on appropriate

treatment nor the fact that the treatment was ineffective gives rise to a deliberate indifference claim.
Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding mere fact that inmate desires
different mode of diagnosis does not amount to deliberate indifference); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545
(stating that whether additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment should have been used
“is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment” and not a basis for Eighth Amendment
liability) (citation omitted). Indeed, when medical personnel attempt to diagnose and treat an
inmate, the mere fact that the chosen “treatment was ineffectual . . . does not mean that those
responsible for it were deliberately indifferent.” Massey v. Montgomery County Det. Facility, 646
F. App’x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2016).
Finally, in determining whether a delay in medical treatment constitutes deliberate

indifference, courts consider the seriousness of the medical need, whether delay worsened the
medical condition, and the reason for the delay. See Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327
(11th Cir. 2007); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003). Additionally, when an
inmate complains that a delay in medical treatment rises to the level of a constitutional violation,
he “must place verifying medical evidence in the record” establishing the detrimental effect caused
by the delay. Surber v. Dixie Cty. Jail, 206 F. App’x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal citation
omitted). Finally, the subjective knowledge of risk must be specific to that defendant because
“imputed or collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference.
. . . Each individual defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person
[knew at the time of the incident].” Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted).
Lloyd does not name as Defendants any prison personnel who provided medical treatment
to him on April 15, 2019, following the alleged assault. Indeed, the undisputed medical evidence

demonstrates that neither Defendant was “ever responsible for determining necessary medical care
to be provided to inmate Lloyd”. (Docs. 33-2 at pp. 2-3 and 33-3 at pp. 1-2). Rather, “the Alabama
Department of Corrections contracts with Wexford to make sure that all inmates incarcerated with
ADOC, including inmate Lloyd, receive necessary medical treatment and/or car for their necessary
medical needs.” Id. Further, both Defendants state that they never “denied or delayed necessary
medical care to inmate Lloyd,” and they also state they have “never been asked to or had anything
to do with any medical care provided to inmate Lloyd.” Id.
Instead, Lloyd claims that the Correctional Defendants acted in a manner to prevent him
access to treatment from professional medical personnel. However, it is clear from the medical
records that the Correctional Defendants were not in any way involved in decisions regarding the

medical treatment provided to Lloyd, as these decisions are made solely by healthcare
professionals employed by the Jail. Moreover, the undisputed medical records demonstrate that
Plaintiff was repeatedly treated by Wexford healthcare professional for the injury to his eye
received in the April 15, 2019, altercation, (Docs. 33-6, 33-7, 33-8, 33-9), including a first
evaluation within thirty minutes following the alleged assault, which included x-rays of his facial
bones and orbits. (Doc. 33-1 at p. 3; Doc. 33-7 at pp. 22-23; Doc. 33-6 at pp.10-13). Further, the
records confirm that Plaintiff was sent to free world eye doctors on multiple occasions in May,
August, October, and November for treatment to his eye. (Docs. 33-9 at pp. 9, 27 and Doc. 33-8
at pp.7, 11).
Thus, the Court concludes that Lloyd has failed to establish deliberate indifference on the
part of the Correctional Defendants. Specifically, he has not demonstrated that these Defendants
were aware of facts establishing “an objectively serious medical need” nor that these defendants

disregarded any known serious risk to Lloyd’s health. Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182
F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk
of harm to the inmate); Quinones, 145 F.3d at 168 (defendant must have actual knowledge of a
serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to
warrant finding of deliberate indifference); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (failure to alleviate significant
risk that officer “should have perceived but did not” does not constitute deliberate indifference).
Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the Correctional Defendants on
Lloyds claim alleging deliberate indifference arising from the actions of medical personnel in
treating his injuries resulting from the April 15, 2019, assault.
Also, to the extent Lloyd seeks to hold the Correctional Defendants liable for the treatment

provided by medical professionals; however, he is likewise entitled to no relief as
[t]he law does not impose upon correctional officials a duty to directly supervise
health care personnel, to set treatment policy for the medical staff or to intervene in
treatment decisions where they have no actual knowledge that intervention is
necessary to prevent a constitutional wrong. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926
(4th Cir. 1977) (a medical treatment claim cannot be brought against managing
officers of a prison absent allegations that they were personally connected with the
alleged denial of treatment). Moreover, “supervisory [correctional] officials are
entitled to rely on medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible
for prisoner care. See, e.g., Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3rd Cir. 1993);
White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1988).” Williams v. Limestone County,
Ala., 198 Fed.Appx. 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2006).

Cameron v. Allen, et al., 525 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1307 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
Even assuming arguendo that the Correctional Defendants exerted some control over the
manner in which those persons responsible for the provision of medical treatment rendered such
treatment, the law is well settled “that Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates [or co-workers] under the theory of respondeat

superior [or vicarious liability]. . . . A public officer or agent is not responsible for the
misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of
the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed [alongside,] by or under him, in the
discharge of his official duties. Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (internal
quotation marks, citation and parentheses omitted); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding that “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional
acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”); Marsh, 268
F.3d at 1035 (holding that a supervisory official “can have no respondeat superior liability for a

section 1983 claim.”); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding
supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability);
Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not
allow a plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under either
a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.). “Absent vicarious liability, each
Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1949. Thus, liability for actions of the unnamed medical
personnel could attach to the other named Defendants only if these Defendants “personally
participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal connection between
[their] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.
The record is clear that the Correctional Defendants did not personally participate or have
any involvement, direct or otherwise, in the medical treatment provided to Lloyd. (Docs. 33-2 at

pp. 2-3 and 33-3 at pp. 1-2). The evidentiary materials before the court demonstrate that medical
personnel made all decisions relative to the evaluation and treatment of Lloyd based upon their
professional judgment upon assessment of his physical condition. Id.
In light of the foregoing, the Correctional Defendants can be held liable for decisions of
medical personnel only if they undertook actions which bear a causal relationship to the purported
violation of Lloyd’s constitutional rights. To establish the requisite causal connection and
therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of the Correctional Defendants, Lloyd must
present sufficient evidence which would be admissible at trial of either “a history of widespread
abuse [that] put[] [the defendants] on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and
[they] fail[ed] to do so” or “a . . . custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate indifference to

[his medical needs], or . . . facts [that] support an inference that [the correctional defendants]
directed the [facility’s health care staff] to act unlawfully, or knew that [the staff] would act
unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal punctuation
and citations omitted). After extensive review of the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted
in this case, it is clear that Lloyd has failed to meet this burden.
The record before the court contains no probative evidence to support an inference that the
Correctional Defendants directed medical personnel to act unlawfully or knew that they would act
unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In addition, Lloyd has presented no evidence of obvious,
flagrant or rampant abuse of continuing duration regarding his receipt of medical treatment in the
face of which these Defendants failed to take corrective action. Rather, the Warden McClain and
Lt. Cousins testified that employees of Wexford with medical training made all decisions related
to the healthcare of inmates including Lloyd. (Docs. 33-2 at pp. 2-3 and 33-3 at pp. 1-2). The
undisputed records also demonstrate that the challenged course of medical treatment did not occur

pursuant to a policy enacted by the Correctional Defendants. Thus, the requisite causal connection
does not exist in this case and liability under the custom or policy standard is not justified. Cf.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); Turner v.
Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is likewise due to be granted in favor of the
Correctional Defendants with respect to liability based on the theory of respondeat superior.
Furthermore, even had Lloyd presented a proper basis for the claims lodged against the
Correctional Defendants, the evidentiary materials before the court demonstrate that unnamed
health care personnel at Bullock did not act with deliberate indifference to his medical needs
resulting from the April 15, 2019, altercation.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
1. The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33) be GRANTED.
2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the Defendants.
3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.
4. Costs be taxed against the Plaintiff.
On or before July 1, 2022 the parties may file objections to this Recommendation. A party
must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to
which the objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the
Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District
Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions”

except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see
Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v.
Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
DONE this 17th day of June, 2022.

/s/ Charles S. Coody
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10630549. Public record. Not legal advice.