# Robert Bailey v. State of Louisiana, Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism

> Louisiana Court of Appeal · November 4, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10623511

## Case

- **Court:** Louisiana Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** November 4, 2021
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2021 CA 0227

ROBERT BAILEY

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE,
RECREATION AND TOURISM

Judgment Rendered: NOV 0 4 2021

On Appeal from the Sixteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Mary
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 129975

Honorable Gregory P. Aucoin, Judge Presiding

Erika L. Richoux Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees
Louisiana Dept. of Justice Louisiana Department of Culture,
Assistant Attorney General Recreation and Tourism
Lafayette, Louisiana

Jay M. Simon Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Robert Bailey

Willie G. Johnson, Jr. Co -Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Robert Bailey

BEFORE: MCCLENDON, WELCH AND THERIOT, JJ.
McCLENDON, 1.

Plaintiff, Robert Bailey, appeals the trial court's judgment granting summary

judgment in favor of the State of Louisiana Department of Culture, Recreation and

Tourism, and dismissing plaintiff's claims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about August 3, 2015, Mr. Bailey and his family had plans to visit

Cypremort Point State Park ( Cypremort Park) for a brief vacation and to go crabbing.

Upon arriving at Cypremort Park, Mr. Bailey and his family began walking from the

parking lot towards the cabin they rented for their visit. Mr. Bailey tripped and fell on

the concrete walkway, sustaining injuries.

Mr. Bailey filed a petition for damages on July 29, 2016, naming as defendant

therein the State of Louisiana Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism ( the

State). Mr. Bailey's petition alleged that " while walking on the entranceway to his cabin,

suddenly and without warning, [ he] was caused to trip and violently fall onto a concrete

walkway due to the defective nature of the entranceway to the cabin." Mr. Bailey

further alleged that the State was the owner and/ or manager of the property, had

custody and control over the entranceway, was responsible for the condition of the

entranceway, and knew or should have known of the dangerous condition which caused

and/ or contributed to cause Mr. Bailey's injuries. Mr. Bailey claimed that the State was

therefore liable for failing to warn him of the defective condition, failing to properly

maintain the entranceway for invitees to Cypremort Park, creating a hidden hazard to

guests of Cypremort Park, and other acts of negligence to be determined at trial.

The State answered Mr. Bailey's petition. The State admitted that it was the

manager/ owner of the property where Mr. Bailey fell at Cypremort Park, but denied

liability. The State also asserted the affirmative defense of immunity pursuant to LSA-

R. S. 9: 2795, which provides immunity to landowners who allow their property to be

used for recreational purposes. Thereafter, discovery commenced.

On November 4, 2019, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing

that it was immune from suit pursuant to LSA- R. S. 9: 2791 and LSA- R. S. 9: 2795, often

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collectively referred to as the " recreational use immunity statutes."' Mr. Bailey opposed

the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Bailey argued that the recreational use

immunity statutes did not apply because he was not engaged in recreation at the time

of the accident, and because the State rented the cabin to Mr. Bailey' s family as part of

a commercial for-profit enterprise.

Following a hearing on January 15, 2020, the trial court took the matter under

advisement. On January 29, 2020, the trial court executed a judgment granting

summary judgment in favor of the State and dismissing Mr. Bailey' s claims, together

with reasons for judgment. From this judgment, Mr. Bailey appeals, raising three

assignments of error: ( 1) the trial court erred in granting the State' s motion for

summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist; ( 2) the trial court

erred in finding that the State' s lease of the cabins was not principally for a commercial

purpose; and, ( 3) the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Bailey did not present any

suitable summary judgment evidence.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts

review evidence de novo under the same criteria that governs the trial court' s

determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Shoemake v. Scott,

2019- 1261 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 3/ 20), 310 So. 3d 191, 194. That is, after an opportunity for

adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as

to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-

C. C. P. art. 966( A)( 3).

On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof rests with the mover.

LSA- R. S. 966( D)( 1). If the mover will bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue

before the court in the motion for summary judgment, the burden of showing there is

1 Although the State' s answer explicitly pled immunity pursuant to LSA- R. S. 9: 2795 only, LSA- R. S. 9: 2791
and LSA- R. S. 9: 2795 relate to the same subject matter, essentially accomplish the same purpose, and are
to be read together. Fournerat v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2011- 1344 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 21/ 12), 104
So. 3d 76, 80, writ denied, 2012- 2148 ( La. 11/ 21/ 12), 102 So. 3d 59. Accordingly, the State's immunity
pursuant to the recreational use immunity statutes was not a new matter when the State raised both
LSA- R. S. 9: 2791 and LSA- R. S. 9: 2795 in its motion for summary judgment. See Aucoin v. Larpenter,
2020- 0792 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 16/ 21), --- So. 3d ---, ---, 2021 WL 1440202, ** 8- 9.

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no genuine issue of material fact remains with the mover. When the mover makes

a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, the burden then shifts to the

non- moving party to present factual support, through the use of proper documentary

evidence attached to its opposition, which establishes the existence of a genuine issue

of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-

C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1); June Med. Servs., LLC v. Louisiana Department of Health,

2019- 0191 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 4/ 20), 302 So. 3d 1161, 1164. If the non- moving party fails

to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be

granted. Murphy v. Savannah, 2018- 0991 ( La. 5/ 8/ 19), 282 So. 3d 1034, 1038.

Material facts are those that potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect the

litigant's success, or determine the outcome of a legal dispute. Jenkins v. Hernandez,

2019- 0874 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 3/ 20), 305 So. 3d 365, 371, writ denied, 2020- 00835 ( La.

10/ 20/ 20), 303 So. 3d 315. A genuine issue of material fact is one as to which

reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one

conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is

appropriate. Marks v. Schultz, 2020- 0197 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 10/ 20), 316 So. 3d 534,

538. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a

particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law

applicable to the case. Shoemake, 310 So. 3d at 193- 94.

RECREATIONAL LAND USE IMMUNITY

Tort immunity is an affirmative defense for which the one asserting the defense

has the burden of proof. Barabay Prop. Holding Corp. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co.,

L. L. C., 2007- 2005 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 2/ 08), 991 So. 2d 74, 79, writ granted, 2008- 1185

La. 10/ 10/ 08), 993 So. 2d 1270, and writ denied as improvidently granted sub

nom., Barabay Properties Holding Corp. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co. L. L. C., 2008-

1185 ( La. 3/ 17/ 09), 6 So. 3d 172. An affirmative defense raises a new matter that,

assuming the allegations in the petition to be true, constitutes a defense to the action

and will have the effect of defeating plaintiff's demand on its merits. Succession of

Ciervo v. Robinson, 2019- 0140 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 12/ 19), 291 So. 3d 1063, 1075.

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be construed against the party claiming the
Immunity statutes must strictly

immunity. Barabay, 991 So. 2d at 79.

The recreational use immunity statutes were intended to limit the tortious liability

of landowners and operators of property who allowed their property to be used for

recreational purposes. Fournerat v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2011- 1344 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 9/ 21/ 12), 104 So. 3d 76, 80, writ denied, 2012- 2148 ( La. 11/ 21/ 12), 102 So. 3d 59.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2791 and 9: 2795 were originally enacted as Act 248 of

1964 and Act 615 of 1975, respectively. They relate to the same subject matter and are

to be read together. Doyle v. Lonesome Dev., Ltd. Liab. Co., 2017- 0787 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 7/ 18/ 18), 254 So. 3d 714, 719, writ denied, 2018- 1369 ( La. 11/ 14/ 18), 256 So. 3d

291. Except for some stylistic differences, minor changes in phraseology, and

enactment eleven years apart, both statutes essentially accomplish the same purpose.

Fournerat, 104 So. 3d at 80.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2791 provides immunity to an owner, lessee, or

occupant of " premises," which is defined as " including lands, roads, waters, water

courses, private ways and buildings, structures, machinery or equipment thereon," for

injuries to persons using the premises for " hunting, fishing, camping, hiking,

sightseeing, or boating." Tillman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2020- 0250 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 2/ 22/ 21), 321 So. 3d 1017, 1021, writ denied, 2021- 00429 ( La. 5/ 25/ 21), 316 So. 3d

446. However, the immunity is not absolute. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2791 does

not apply when the premises are used principally for a commercial, recreational

enterprise for profit. Additionally, the statute does not exclude any liability which would

otherwise exist for deliberate and willful or malicious injury to persons or property. LSA-

R. S. 9: 2791.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2795 provides immunity to an owner of land being

used for recreational purposes, with or without charge, against liability for injury to

persons caused by a defect in the land, whether naturally occurring or manmade.

Tillman, 321 So. 3d at 1021. The immunity specifically applies to " any lands, whether

urban or rural, which are owned, leased, or managed as a public park by the state or

any of its political subdivisions and which are used for recreational purposes." LSA -RS.

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9: 2795( E)( 2)( a). " Land" is defined, in pertinent part, as " urban or rural land... private

ways or buildings, structures..." LSA- R. S. 9: 2795( A)( 1). The phrase " Recreational

purposes" is defined in LSA- R. S. 9: 2795( A)( 3) as including, but not limited to:

any of the following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing,
trapping, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, horseback
riding, bicycle riding, motorized, or nonmotorized vehicle operation for
recreation purposes, nature study, water skiing, ice skating, roller skating,
roller blading, skate boarding, sledding, snowmobiling, snow skiing,
summer and winter sports, or viewing or enjoying historical,
archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites.

However, as with LSA- R. S. 9: 2791, the immunity established in LSA- R. S. 9: 2795 is not

absolute. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 2795 retains liability for willful or malicious

failure to warn against a dangerous condition. Souza v. St. Tammany Par., 2011-

2198 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 8/ 12), 93 So. 3d 745, 747; LSA- R. S. 9: 2795( 6)( 1). Louisiana

Revised Statutes 9: 2795 also specifically excepts an " an owner of commercial

recreational developments or facilities" from immunity, except under certain

circumstances. Richard v. Hall, 2003- 1488 ( La. 4/ 23/ 04), 874 So. 2d 131, 147; See

LSA- R. S. 9: 2795( 6)( 2).

The recreational use immunity statutes are in derogation of common or natural

right and, therefore, are to be strictly interpreted, and must not be extended beyond

their obvious meaning. Monteville v. Terrbonne Parish Consol. Government, 567

So. 2d 1097, 1100 ( La. 1990). Nevertheless, the jurisprudence interpreting the

recreational use immunity statutes recognizes that the definition of " recreational

purposes" is a nonexclusive list and that activities not specifically listed are included in

the definition. Doyle, 254 So. 3d at 722. Additionally, this Court has previously found

that the enactment of LSA- R. S. 9: 2795, the second and more expansive immunity

statute, evidences legislative intent to grant a broad immunity from liability. Further,

this Court has stated that the legislature impliedly expressed intent that in the event

there is a conflict between the statutes, LSA- R. S. 9: 2795, as the later enacted statute,

shall be controlling. Fournerat, 104 So. 3d at 81.

ANALYSIS

On this motion for summary judgment, the State bore the burden of proof both

as the moving party seeking summary judgment and as the party asserting

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the affirmative defense of immunity. Barabay, 991 So. 2d at 79; LSA- C. C. P. art.

966( D)( 1). Thus, the initial question before this Court, in reviewing the summary

judgment, is whether the State established that it was entitled to immunity under the

recreational use immunity statutes.

The State filed numerous exhibits in support of its motion, including Mr. Bailey' s

petition; the State' s answer; the affidavit of Stephanie Hyde, Agency Representative for

Louisiana Office of State Parks, Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism; the

deposition transcript of Mr. Bailey, plaintiff; the deposition transcript of Kendall Bailey,

Mr. Bailey' s son; the deposition transcript of Keith Broussard, the Cypremort Park

Manager; and the State's Responses to Requests for Admissions propounded by Mr.

Bailey.

Ms. Hyde' s affidavit provided, in pertinent part:

1) She is employed as the Agency Representative by the Louisiana Office
of State Parks, Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism and
has been employed by the Department since February, 2016.

2) Cypremort Point State Park is a public park owned by the State of
Louisiana, which permits the public to use its land for recreational
purposes, such as sightseeing, picnicking, camping, fishing, crabbing,
boating, water skiing, windsurfing, and sailing.

3) Cypremort Point State Park is not a commercial park and is not
intended to make a profit.

4) The park charges small fees to those who use the park, but these fees
do not cover the cost of keeping the park open. The park's ability to
operate is subsidized by the State.

5) Affiant further states that the facts contained in her aforementioned
statement are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and
belief.

Mr. Bailey's deposition transcript reflected his testimony that the purpose of his

visit to the Park was to enjoy a brief family vacation and to go crabbing. Likewise,

Kendall Bailey's deposition testimony was that the family was visiting Cypremort Park

for " recreation" and " a short [ family] vacation."

The affidavit of Ms. Hyde established that the State owns Cypremort Park and

that the State allows its property to be used for recreational purposes, on a non- profit

basis, and the deposition testimony of Mr. Bailey and his son Kendall Bailey established

that Mr. Bailey was at Cypremort Park for a family vacation and to go crabbing at the

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time he was injured. Although crabbing is not explicitly listed as a recreational activity in

the recreational use immunity statutes, the jurisprudence consistently recognizes that

the lists are nonexclusive, and the Fifth Circuit has applied the immunity when injuries

were sustained while crabbing. See Doyle, 254 So. 3d at 722, and Zulli v. Coregis

Ins. Co., 2005- 155 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 7/ 26/ 05), 910 So. 2d 437, 441, writ denied, 2005-

2226 ( La. 2/ 17/ 06), 924 So. 2d 1017 ( affirming the trial court's judgment finding that St.

Charles Parish was entitled to immunity under the recreational use immunity statutes

for plaintiff's injuries sustained while crabbing on a jetty, which was used and managed

as a public park). Thus, the State made a prima facie showing that it was entitled to

immunity under the recreational use immunity statutes.

Accordingly, the burden shifted to Mr. Bailey to produce factual support, through

the use of proper documentary evidence attached to his opposition, sufficient to

establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the State was not

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA- C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1); June Med. Servs.,

LLC, 302 So. 3d at 1164. If Mr. Bailey failed to do so, LSA- C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1)

mandates the granting of the motion for summary judgment. See Jenkins, 305 So. 3d at

371.

Review of the record herein reflects that Mr. Bailey did not attach documentary

evidence to his opposition. Rather, Mr. Bailey referenced the State's exhibits in support

of his arguments. In opposition to the State's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Bailey

maintained that the recreational use immunity statutes do not apply, because ( 1) the

accident did not occur when Mr. Bailey was engaged in a recreational activity, and ( 2)

the State rented the cabin to Mr. Bailey's family as part of a commercial for- profit

enterprise.

Regarding Mr. Bailey's argument that he was not engaged in a recreational

activity at the time he was injured, Mr. Bailey pointed out that the accident occurred

after he and his family arrived at the cabin, while they were unloading their vehicles

and walking towards the cabin. The State countered this argument by citing this Court's

opinion in Webb v. Par. of St. Tammany, 2006- 0849 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 9/ 07), 959

So. 2d 921, writ denied, 2007- 0521 ( La. 4/ 27/ 07), 955 So. 2d 695. In Webb, the plaintiff
was exiting Pelican Park in Mandeville, Louisiana, following participation in a softball

game, when he lost control of his motorcycle. The plaintiff landed in a storm drain and

sustained severe injuries while still on park property. Webb, 959 So. 2d at 923. The trial

court granted summary judgment finding that the recreational use immunity statutes
applied. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was

engaging in recreational activity at the time of the accident, because the accident

occurred after the softball game had been completed and while he was exiting the park.

This Court wrote:

A plain reading of the statute does not provide support for this argument.
The statute does not require that the injury arise out of the recreational
activity per se, as long as the person injured was on the property for a
recreational purpose. Cooper v. Cooper, 34, 717, p. 6( La. App. 2 Cir.
5/ 9/ 01), 786 So. 2d 240, 244, writ denied, 2001- 1681 ( La. 9/ 21/ 01), 797
So. 2d 675. The record is clear that Mr. Webb went to Pelican Park on the
date of the accident to participate in recreational activities, and he was
still on park property at the time of the accident. Thus, we find no merit in
this assignment of error.

Webb, 959 So. 2d at 925.

In this matter, the State' s evidence, which included Mr. Bailey' s testimony and

the testimony of his son, established that Mr. Bailey was at Cypremort Park for a

recreational purpose when he was injured. Mr. Bailey did not submit any evidence to

dispute that he was at Cypremort Park for a recreational purpose. Therefore, no

genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the purpose of Mr. Bailey' s visit to

Cypremort Park. Under these undisputed facts, and in light of this Court's ruling in

Webb, it is immaterial that Mr. Bailey was not engaged in a recreational activity per se

at the time he was injured, because he went to Cypremort Park to participate in

recreational activities. This argument lacks merit.

With respect to Mr. Bailey's contention that the recreational use immunity

statutes do not apply because Mr. Bailey and his family rented the cabin, Mr. Bailey

asserts that the accident arose from a contractual relationship entered for a commercial

purpose, in a commercial area that was under the State's control at the time of the

accident. Mr. Bailey maintains that summary judgment was not appropriate in the

absence of proof establishing that the relationship between the parties was not part of

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a for-profit transaction. Specifically, Mr. Bailey argues that the State failed to produce

documents reflecting the lease and its terms.

However, Ms. Hyde' s affidavit, submitted by the State, established that

Cypremort Park was not a commercial park and was not intended to make a profit. Ms.

Hyde attested that Cypremort Park charges small fees, but the fees " do not cover the

cost of keeping the park open." Rather, Ms. Hyde explained that Cypremort Park's

ability to operate is subsidized by the State.

It is settled that " intention to derive a profit is an essential ingredient in a

commercial activity." Doyle, 254 So. 3d at 723. This Court has consistently held:

T] he fact that an activity generates income does not prevent the owner
from enjoying the benefit of LSA- R.S. 9: 2795, which clearly provides that
an owner may charge a fee for the right to use his land and still not incur
liability.

Doyle, 254 So. 3d at 723. We also note the Louisiana Supreme Court's statement in

Eastwood v. Niblett' s Bluff Park Auth., 2013- 2408 ( La. 4/ 17/ 14), 137 So. 3d 1200:

The mere fact that a public entity charges a minimal fee for use of its
facilities does not mean the premises were " used principally for a
commercial, recreational enterprise for profit" for purposes of the
exception to immunity set forth in LSA- R. S. 9: 2791( B). The undisputed
evidence in the record establishes the majority of the park's funding came
from local property taxes. Therefore, the district court erred in denying
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground there were
questions of fact as to whether the park was operated as a commercial
enterprise.

Eastwood, 137 So. 3d at 1200.

On this point, the State offered evidence sufficient to establish that Cypremort

Park did not make a profit by charging rental fees. As noted above, Mr. Bailey did not

offer any exhibits that controverted the State' s evidence. Moreover, the plain language

of the statute and the jurisprudence make clear that a landowner may charge a fee

without incurring liability. Thus, the undisputed facts establish that Cypremort Park was

not " used principally for a commercial, recreational enterprise for profit." This argument

lacks merit.

Mr. Bailey does not argue on appeal that the State is not entitled to immunity

because there was a willful or malicious failure to warn against a dangerous condition,

such as would except the State from immunity under LSA- R. S. 9: 2795( B). Nevertheless,

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for the sake of completeness, we note that there is no evidence in the summary

judgment record that there was any " deliberate and willful or malicious injury to

persons or property." Once a defendant establishes that it was entitled to immunity

under LSA- R. S. 9: 2795, the burden of establishing a malicious or willful failure to warn

of a dangerous condition shifts to the plaintiff. Doyle, 254 So. 3d at 725. Mr. Bailey did

a malicious or willful
not submit any evidence that established, or even suggested,

failure to warn of a dangerous condition. 2

Having completed a thorough de novo review of the record before us, we find
that the State submitted evidence sufficient to establish that the State is entitled to

immunity pursuant to LSA- R. S. 9: 2791 and LSA- R. S. 9: 2795. As set forth above, Mr.

Bailey did not submit evidence to controvert the State' s evidence and establish the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact, nor did he demonstrate that the State is

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, Mr. Bailey's assignments of error lack

merit, and summary judgment was appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, the January 29, 2020 judgment of the trial

court granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the State of Louisiana,

Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism, and dismissing the claims asserted by

Mr. Robert Bailey, is affirmed. Costs are assessed to Mr. Bailey.

AFFIRMED.

z During his deposition, Mr. Bailey described the concrete slab where he fell as " uneven," " broke[ n]," and

crack[ ed]";in response to Mr. Bailey' s Requests for Admission, the State admitted that there was an
approximately 3/a inch height differential between two sections of the walkway where Mr. Bailey fell. The
deposition testimony of Keith Broussard, the Cypremort Park Manager since December of 2013, was
consistent with the State's admission regarding the condition of the area where Mr. Bailey fell.

Mr. Broussard also testified extensively regarding Cypremort Park' s maintenance and safety
practices. Mr. Broussard stated that he and other Cypremort Park employees are trained to recognize slip
or trip hazards throughout the property, including dirt, mud, uneven surfaces, and gaps or cracks in
concrete walkways. Mr. Broussard further stated that employees often perform repairs on the property,
and that while general repairs such as tending to a leaky faucet were not always documented in the
maintenance log because Cypremort Park was short staffed and the employees were usually very busy,
he expected to be notified about unsafe conditions and repairs made to same. Specifically regarding
repairs to the concrete walkways under cabins, like the area where Mr. Bailey fell, Mr. Broussard recalled
repairs being made throughout his tenure at Cypremort Park, both before and after Mr. Bailey's fall.
Additionally, quarterly inspections were conducted to identify safety hazards throughout Cypremort Park.
Mr. Broussard recalled meeting with Mr. Bailey after his fall and preparing an incident report. Because the
undisputed evidence demonstrates reasonable efforts to maintain the safety of Cypremort Park, the State
was clearly not grossly negligent, nor did the State act with intent to cause injury or with indifference to
the consequences of its actions. See Eastwood, 137 So. 3d at 1200, FN1.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10623511. Public record. Not legal advice.