# Hart v. Brown

> Court of Appeals of Oregon · April 5, 2023 · 325 Or. App. 198

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10610086

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Oregon
- **Decided:** April 5, 2023
- **Citations:** 325 Or. App. 198
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Egan
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10610086

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “a check is a written offer to pay the amount stated” and “by operation of ORS 81.010, a tendered check, if refused, is * * * the tender of lawful money”

## Opinion text

198

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Argued and submitted February 9, affirmed April 5, 2023

Curtis HART,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jaquelynn BROWN,
aka Jackie Brown,
Defendant-Respondent.
Jefferson County Circuit Court
20CV07899; A177371

Daina A. Vitolins, Judge.
Steven E. Benson argued the cause and filed the briefs
for appellant.
Keightley F. Wilkins argued the cause for respondent.
Also on the brief were Jennifer A. Street and Glascock Street
Waxler LLP.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
EGAN, J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 325 Or App 198 (2023) 199

EGAN, J.
Plaintiff appeals an order requiring entry of a sat-
isfaction of general judgment and money award, assigning
error to the trial court’s “granting of defendant’s motion to
satisfy [the] money award.” We affirm.
We reject plaintiff’s argument that a check sent to
plaintiff’s counsel in satisfaction of the judgment was not
tender because under the “common law of tender” tender has
to be made in the form of the “coin of the realm.” See ORS
81.010 (“An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money
or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal prop-
erty is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production
and tender of the money, instrument or property.”); Wiper v.
Fawkes, 198 Or App 331, 335, 109 P3d 798 (2005) (noting “a
check is a written offer to pay the amount stated” and “by
operation of ORS 81.010, a tendered check, if refused, is * * *
the tender of lawful money”); see also Malan v. Tipton, 349
Or 638, 646, 247 P3d 1223 (2011) (“In enacting ORS 81.010,
the legislature intended to modify one significant aspect of
the common law of tender—that is, that the money, the coin
of the realm, actually be produced for acceptance.”).
Nor are we persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that
the trial court erred in entering the judgment because the
check tendered by defendant did not include interest. It is
undisputed that, even if interest had been included, plaintiff
would have refused to accept it as payment, thus necessitat-
ing the filing of the motion, although the plaintiff retained
the check. ORS 18.235(1) (“A judgment debtor * * * may move
the court for an order declaring that a money award has
been satisfied or for a determination of the amount neces-
sary to satisfy the money award, when the person making
the motion cannot otherwise obtain a satisfaction document
from a judgment creditor.”). We conclude that the trial court
did not err.
Affirmed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10610086. Public record. Not legal advice.