# Farmers Direct, Inc. v. Yamhill County Assessor

> Oregon Tax Court · March 20, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10607088

## Case

- **Court:** Oregon Tax Court
- **Decided:** March 20, 2018
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Property Tax

FARMERS DIRECT, INC., )
)
Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 160389R
)
v. )
)
YAMHILL COUNTY ASSESSOR, )
)
Defendant. ) FINAL DECISION1

Plaintiff appealed Defendant’s denial of tax exemption for farm machinery (account

561061), dated January 27, 2016, for the 2016-17 and 2017-18 tax years. The parties and

Magistrate attended a site view of Plaintiff’s property on August 1, 2017. Trial was held on

October 26, 2017, at the Oregon Tax Court, Salem, Oregon. Connor J. Harrington, of the law

firm Kevin L. Mannix, P.C., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Mark Gaibler (Gaibler), Stephanie

Schuld (Schuld), and Erik Lerwick (Lerwick) testified on behalf of Plaintiff. Laurie E.

Craghead, attorney-at-law, appeared on behalf of Defendant. Christopher Lanegan (Lanegan)

and Michael Saladino (Saladino) testified on behalf of Defendant. Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 to 7

were offered and received without objection. Defendant’s Exhibits A to G were offered and

received without objection.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff is an Oregon domestic business corporation, whose principal operations are

located in Yamhill County. Gaibler testified that he is a partner and owner of Plaintiff. He

testified that in the past it was more economical for farmers such as him to burn hay and straw in

1
This Final Decision incorporates without change the court’s Decision, entered February 28, 2018. The
court did not receive a statement of costs and disbursements within 14 days after its Decision was entered. See Tax
Court Rule–Magistrate Division (TCR–MD) 16 C(1).

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 1
the field. State and local policies and environmental regulations changed that, and Gaibler

discovered that there was a profitable market for those products overseas. He testified that

because shipping is charged by volume and not by weight, Plaintiff would have to find a way to

reduce the volume of the product. Gaibler testified that hay and straw could not be effectively

compressed in the field. Plaintiff purchased a Steffen Systems Model 4600SP Big Bale

Compression System (Compression System) to cut and compress large bales of hay and straw

into smaller ones. Defendant determined the Compression System did not meet the requirements

for property tax exempt farm machinery and equipment under ORS 307.394(1). Plaintiff appeals

that decision.

The Compression System takes up approximately 1,372.2 square feet. (Def’s Ex C at 2.)

It includes several main components: an infeed system that can fit up to twelve incoming big

bales; a main press that compresses the bale and ejects it; an outfeed system that packages the

finished bale; a power unit that runs with a hydraulic reservoir and electric motors; and a control

system that monitors and controls all aspects of the machine. (Ptf’s Ex 1 at 9.) On a daily basis,

Plaintiff’s employees put big bales of hay into the Compression System. The infeed system cuts

the incoming big bales in half, and then the main press compresses the bales lengthwise. (Ptf’s

Ex 1 at 9.) The bales then are wrapped and ready for shipment. An incoming bale is 34 to 37

inches tall, 46 to 49 inches wide, and 90 to 108 inches long. (Ptf’s Ex 1 at 10.) A finished bale

is 17 inches tall, 46 inches wide, and 21 inches long. (Ptf’s Ex 1 at 10.) Depending on the

conditions, a finished bale doubles in density of an incoming bale. (Ptf’s Ex 1 at 10.)

Gaibler testified that the Compression System is located in a leased barn in Yamhill

County. The Compression System is bolted to the ground and connected to a power panel

attached to a wall and to a hydraulic system. Gaibler testified that about half of the hay that goes

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 2
through the Compression System is from his or his partner’s farm and the other half is purchased

from other farms. Gaibler testified that the Compression System can be removed from the barn

without professional help and would leave no damage to the barn. A stacking system that was

originally part of the Compression System was slowing the outfeed system down so it was

removed about one year after installation.

Schuld is Plaintiff’s office manager and has previous experience working with the

Compression System. She testified that generally, straw and hay is first harvested from different

farms, then stored in the Plaintiff’s barns before being moved and put into the Compression

System. Schuld testified that throughout this process, Plaintiff’s employees examine each bale

for dirt. If there is dirt, the finished bale fails to meet export quality standards and is then sold to

local farms. If there is no dirt, the finished bale goes directly into a shipping container.

Lerwick testified that he is Plaintiff’s operations manager. He testified the Compression

System took three to four weeks to install because it was still being manufactured. Otherwise, he

testified, installation could have been completed in a couple of days. The system came in

component parts which had wheels which make is easy to move. The system is bolted together

and to the floor to prevent it from moving during operation. The Compression System is

connected to a power unit that is bolted to the floor and which in turn is connected to a specially

installed transformer located outside the barn. The Compression System uses hydraulic pressure

linked by 20 separate hoses. Lerwick testified that it would take a couple of big forklifts, trucks,

trailers and less than a day’s time to remove the Compression System from the barn.

Lanegan testified he has been Defendant’s chief appraiser since September 2016 and has

10 years of private appraising experience. He testified that the Compression System is real

property for taxation purposes because the component parts are all bolted together, it is bolted to

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 3
the floor, as well as hardwired to a power source and hydraulic system. Lanegan testified that he

contacted the Department of Revenue and surveyed about six counties and found they all agreed

that the Compression System should be taxed as real property.

Saladino testified that he is a manager on the real property valuation team for the

Department of Revenue. He testified that he reviewed Defendant’s video of the Compression

System and determined it should be taxed as real property. Saladino testified that he based his

opinion on the machine’s large size, the fact that the machine is not readily moveable, as it is

bolted to the floor, and hardwired to the electrical and hydraulic system.

II. ANALYSIS

The question before the court is whether the Compression System is entitled to property

tax exemption for the 2016-17 and 2017-18 tax years under ORS 307.394(1).2 Generally, all real

and tangible personal property are subject to taxation. ORS 307.030. The Oregon Legislative

Assembly has provided a number of exceptions to the general policy. One such exception is for

certain machinery and equipment used for farming.

ORS 307.394(1) states in pertinent part:

“(1) The following tangible personal property is exempt from ad valorem property
taxation:

“(a) Farm machinery and equipment used primarily in the preparation of
land, planting, raising, cultivating, irrigating, harvesting or placing in
storage of farm crops;
*****
“(d) Farm machinery and equipment used primarily in any other
agricultural or horticultural use or animal husbandry or any combination
of these activities.”

“In interpreting a statute, the court’s task is to discern the intent of the legislature.” PGE

v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). “First the court

2
Unless otherwise noted, the court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2015.

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 4
examines the text and context of the statute. If the legislature’s intent is obvious from that first

level of analysis, ‘further inquiry is unnecessary’.” State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 164, 206 P3d

1042 (2009). “Words of common usage typically should be given their plain, natural, and

ordinary meaning.” PGE at 611. In this case, the court will not consult legislative history

because as discussed below, the legislature’s intent is obvious from the text and context of the

statutes, and neither party proffered legislative history to the court to prove otherwise. Plaintiff

has the burden of proof and must establish by a preponderance of the evidence. ORS 305.427.

In analyzing whether the Compression System is entitled to tax exemption under ORS

307.394(1), the court will first examine if it meets the definition of tangible personal property.

Then, the court will consider whether it is exempt farm machinery and equipment or non-exempt

processing equipment.

A. Tangible Personal Property

As stated above, ORS 307.394(1) provides a property tax exemption for certain farm

machinery and equipment that is tangible personal property. As used in the property tax law of

Oregon, tangible personal property “includes but is not limited to all chattels and movables, such

as boats and vessels, merchandise and stock in trade, furniture and personal effects, goods,

livestock, vehicles, farming implements, movable machinery, movable tools and movable

equipment.” ORS 307.020(1)(c). “Personal property” is further defined by Oregon

Administrative Rules (OAR) 150-307-0030(4) as “movable machinery, movable tools and

movable equipment include items readily movable as opposed to apparently stationary or fixed

items.”

Plaintiff argues that the Compression System is personal property that is movable as

defined by ORS 307.020(1)(c). Plaintiff’s representatives testified that the machine is movable

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 5
because the bolts can be removed, all four components can be disassembled and disconnected,

removal would not cause any damage to the land, and it could be moved in about a day.

Defendant argues that the Compression System in not personal property. Defendant presented

testimonies, pictures and video at trial to show that the machine is not movable because it is

bolted down; it is large in size; and it is connected to a stationary hydraulic and electrical system.

(Ptf’s Ex 5 and 6; Def’s Ex B)

Reading ORS 307.020(1)(c) and OAR 150-307-0030(4) together, given its “plain,

natural, and ordinary meaning,” it is clear to the court that movable machinery, tools, or

equipment should be readily movable as opposed to apparently stationary or fixed to qualify as a

tangible personal property. See PGE, 317 Or at 611. In this case, even though the Compression

System is designed to permit removal in the sense that the bolts can be removed and the

components can be disconnected from each other, it is not designed to be readily movable. As

the plaintiff testified, moving the Compression System would require trucks, trailers and

forklifts, so it is not readily movable for Plaintiff’s day-to-day operation. In addition, Plaintiff

did not provide evidence to show that the Compression System has been used in different

locations or as a unit has ever been moved in the past, other than removing a stacking system

from the outfeed system component. Plaintiff also did not provide a plan to move the

Compression System to another location. Gaibler testified that the Compression System will be

moved to one of Plaintiff’s own properties one day, but there is no indication of when that would

occur.

The definition of real property also provides a clear perspective on the categorization of

the Compression System. ORS 307.010(1)(b)(B) defines real property as “all buildings,

structures, improvements, machinery, equipment or fixtures erected upon, above or affixed to the

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 6
land.” OAR 150-307-0010(2)(b)(B) provides the meaning of “affixed to”: “affixed to means

being annexed or attached to the real property by bolts, screws, nails or by being built into the

structure. Also, items may be constructively affixed to the land or building and considered real

property by virtue of their weight or size.” Examples include pipeline milking equipment, seed

cleaning equipment, rock crushing plants, and plywood machinery and presses. OAR 150-307-

0010(2)(b)(B). The Compression System is a large piece of machinery that is affixed to the land

by being annexed to the barn by bolts, screws or nails, therefore it falls within the definition of

ORS 307.010(1)(b)(B).

Plaintiff’s interpretation of “personal property” renders almost every piece of machinery

movable and not affixed to the land, as oppose to the limitations set by OAR 150-307-

0010(2)(b)(B). However, the examples in the OAR above show that movability is not the sole

criteria.

Case law also clarifies the moveability component. In Saunders v. Dept. of Rev., 300 Or

384, 711 P2d 961 (1985), the court considered whether a “Harvestore,” a storage unit similar to a

silo, was personal property. The unit was constructed of sheet metal panels bolted together,

which was itself bolted to a concrete pad. The court noted “[i]t takes a crew of 5–7 men two

days to erect a Harvestore.” Id. at 386. Taxpayer in that case argued that because the Havestore

could be moved, it is personal property. Id. at 387. However, the court held “that even though

the Harvestores are ‘movable’ in the sense that the bolts can be removed and the structure moved

to another location, they are not ‘movable’ under ORS 307.020(3).” Id. The court reasoned that

the legislature “intended to exempt described personal property that generally is moved or

movable in the ordinary course of business.” Id. (emphasis added.)

The Compression System was not designed and did not function so as to be moved in the

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 7
ordinary course of business. The combination of bolts and especially the 20 hydraulic pipes and

numerous electrical connections, shows that the machine was not readily moveable. Therefore,

the court finds the Compression System is not a tangible personal property as defined in ORS

307.020(1)(c).

B. Farm Machinery and Equipment Tax Exemption

ORS 307.394(1)(a) exempts from property taxation: “Farm machinery and equipment

used primarily in the preparation of land, planting, raising, cultivating, irrigating, harvesting or

placing in storage of farm crops.” The Oregon Supreme Court clarified that ORS 307.394’s “list

of uses does not include the processing of farm crops; neither does it include the sale of farm

crops or the sale of processed farm crops.” King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or

414, 419-420, 988 P2d 369 (1999). “Processing” is defined in OAR 150-307-0460(1)(b):

“altering the crop in any way such as: washing, icing, sorting, grading, waxing, boxing, slicing,

or cutting.” Furthermore, OAR 150-307-0460(2) states: “Machinery and equipment used to

place a farm crop in storage are exempt from taxation. However, once processing of the crop is

begun, it is no longer a crop, but a product.” The regulation provides an example:

“Apples are picked and go directly into cold storage. This would be considered
‘placing in storage of farm crops.’ When these same apples are sorted, washed or
boxed it becomes a product and placing back into cold storage until sold is not
considered ‘placing in storage of a farm crops.’ At this point apples change from
a crop to a product.”

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he initial baling of straw and hay in the field is performed so that

the straw and hay can be transported, handled, stored and used. Straw and hay compression is

simply an extension of this initial baling procedure.” (Ptf’s Opening Brief at 5.) Plaintiff also

argues that the Compression System does not process the straw and hay into another product, but

only compresses the straw and hay into smaller bales.

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 8
However, after considering the “plain, natural and ordinary meaning” of the above

statutes, it is clear to the court that the finished bale is a product. In this case, the straw and hay

is first harvested, stored, and then transported to the location of the Compression System. The

Compression System cuts the bale in half and then compresses it lengthwise into a bale smaller

in size with a higher density. Per the example set out by OAR 150-307-0460(2), when a

harvested apple is boxed, it becomes a product, even though the apple itself would not have

changed. Similarly in this case, even though the straw and hay remains the same straw and hay,

it gets sliced, compressed, and wrapped, and so it becomes a product. Furthermore, the

Compression System is not used for harvesting or preparing the bales for storage. Rather, it is

used to process and resize the bales so that they are ready for shipment. Even if the finished

bales are placed back into storage before shipping overseas, it is still a product rather than a crop.

Plaintiff cites Gilmour v. Linn County, 279 Or App 584, 379 P3d 833 (2016), for the

proposition that the Compression System performs farm use. Plaintiff’s emphasis on Gilmour is

misplaced. Gilmour involves an appeal of an order by the Land Use Board of Appeals regarding

whether certain activities are considered “preparation” or “processing.” The Oregon Court of

Appeals concluded that activities such as treatment, sorting, or packaging falls under the

meaning “farm use,” and thus not considered “processing.” While the subject matter is similar—

compressing straw and hay—Gilmour does not define “processing” for the current case. Here,

“processing” is clearly defined for the purpose of taxation, that “processing” is when a crop is

sorted, boxed or in other ways gone through treatment as stated in OAR 150-307-0460(1)(b). In

King Estate Winery, 329 Or at 422, the court stated:

“Land use laws reflect different policies than tax laws. The special assessment statutes
relating to farm land specifically refer to ORS 215.203(2)(a) as the source for the
definition of ‘farm use.’ ORS 307.400, the personal property exemption statute at issue
here, makes no specific reference to a definition of ‘farm machinery and equipment,’

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 9
neither does that statute refer to the definition of ‘farm use’ in ORS 215.203(2)(a). * * *
Oregon land use laws are not relevant to a resolution of the issue presented in this case.”

The King Estate Winery language clearly makes Gilmour inapplicable in this case. For

the above reasons, the court determines that the Compression System is not entitled to farm

machinery and equipment tax exemption under the ORS 307.394(1).

III. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration, the court concludes that the Compression System is not

personal property as defined in ORS 307.020 (1)(c). Furthermore, the Compression System is

not farm machinery and equipment and not entitled to exemption under ORS 307.394(1). Now,

therefore,

IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff’s appeal is denied.

Dated this day of March 2018.

RICHARD DAVIS
MAGISTRATE

If you want to appeal this Final Decision, file a complaint in the Regular
Division of the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR
97301-2563; or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.

Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of the Final
Decision or this Final Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B.

This document was signed by Magistrate Davis and entered on March 20, 2018.

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160389R 10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10607088. Public record. Not legal advice.
