# OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

> Oregon Tax Court · October 7, 2016 · 22 Or. Tax 281

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10606730

## Case

- **Court:** Oregon Tax Court
- **Decided:** October 7, 2016
- **Citations:** 22 Or. Tax 281
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Breithaupt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10606730

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding formal organization as a cor- poration is not required under ORS 307.090
- declining the invitation to “revive the scholastic debate between nominalism and realism”

## Opinion text

No. 29 October 7, 2016 281

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
REGULAR DIVISION

OREGON SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
and Marion County Assessor,
Defendants.
(TC 5262)
Plaintiff (taxpayer) appealed from a Magistrate Division decision as to
exemption status of real property it owns in Salem, Oregon. The property at issue
was used as a parking lot for taxpayer’s members that visit Salem for business
and other purposes. Defendant Marion County Assessor (the county) initially
denied taxpayer’s application for exemption on the grounds that taxpayer was
not a school district, a public or municipal corporation, or organized as a corpora-
tion, but during litigation, the county did not continue to maintain that taxpayer
did not qualify as a “corporation” under ORS 307.090, and neither the county
nor Defendant Department of Revenue (the department) disputed that tax-
payer’s property was being used for taxpayer’s corporate purposes. The depart-
ment instead argued that taxpayer did not qualify as a public corporation because
it was not created or authorized by statute and did not possess governmental
powers or responsibilities. The county argued that taxpayer did not qualify as
a public corporation because it only served its members, which are not citizens.
Taxpayer argued that it qualified as a public corporation because it advances
public education in Oregon through assistance to its membership, which is com-
posed entirely of other public corporations. Granting taxpayer’s motion and deny-
ing the department and county’s cross-motions, the court ruled that because it
served a public purpose, was exclusively managed and controlled by public enti-
ties, was impliedly authorized by statute, and was created by public entities with
the limited power and authority necessary to accomplish its purpose, taxpayer
was entitled to an exemption for the subject property.

Oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment
was held March 21, 2016, in the courtroom of the Oregon
Tax Court, Salem.
James E. Mountain, Jr., Harrang Long Gary Rudnick
PC, Portland, filed the motion and argued the cause for
Plaintiff (taxpayer).
Scott A. Norris, Assistant Marion County Counsel, Salem,
filed the cross-motion and argued the cause for Defendant
Marion County Assessor (the county).
Daniel Paul, Assistant Attorney General, Department
of Justice, Salem, filed the cross-motion and argued
282 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

the cause for Defendant Department of Revenue (the
department).
Decision for Plaintiff rendered October 7, 2016.
HENRY C. BREITHAUPT, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before the court on cross-motions
for summary judgment. Plaintiff Oregon School Boards
Association (OSBA or taxpayer) appeals from a Magistrate
Division decision. The magistrate upheld a denial by
Defendant Marion County Assessor (the county) of taxpayer’s
application for property tax exemption for tax year 2014-15
for “corporate property used or intended for corporate pur-
poses of * * * [a] public * * * corporation[ ] in this state.” See
ORS 307.090(1).1 The county and Defendant Department of
Revenue (the department) have argued separate bases for
denying taxpayer an exemption under ORS 307.090(1).
II. FACTS
Taxpayer is a voluntary, unincorporated association
of 196 public K-12 school districts, 17 public community col-
leges, 19 public education service districts, 87 public charter
schools, and the State Board of Education. All public school
boards in Oregon are eligible for automatic membership in
OSBA upon the payment of dues. The purpose of taxpayer is
to advance public education in Oregon through services and
assistance to its public members.2
1
Unless otherwise noted, the court’s references to the Oregon Revised
Statutes (ORS) are to the 2013 edition.
2
Taxpayer’s specific purposes are listed in its constitution, and are: (1) to
work for the general advancement and improvement of the education of all youth
of the State of Oregon; (2) to gather and disseminate information pertinent to
the successful operation of public schools; (3) to work for the most efficient and
effective organization of public schools of this state—public schools include local
school districts, education service districts and community colleges; (4) to work
for adequate and dependable financial support for the public schools of this state;
(5) to study all legislation which affects the public schools of Oregon and to
support and work for that which appears to be desirable and to keep members
informed thereof to propose and work for the enactment of proper education legis-
lation; (6) to cooperate and work with persons and organizations genuinely inter-
ested in public education; (7) to encourage the establishment and maintenance
of high standards in the conduct and operation of the educational endeavor;
(8) to study and interpret educational programs and to relate them to the needs of
Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 283

Taxpayer is led by a board of directors. Taxpayer
can buy and sell property, enter into contracts, and sue and
be sued in its own name. Taxpayer is funded by member-
ship dues. These funds can only be used to further the pub-
lic purposes of taxpayer and must, upon dissolution of tax-
payer, be distributed to one or more of its public members.
Taxpayer has been the subject of various administrative
rulings regarding its public character.3
The real property at issue is located in Marion
County. It is used as a parking lot for OSBA members that
visit Salem for educational purposes, meetings, lobbying the
legislature, and other purposes. It is owned solely by tax-
payer, and not by taxpayer’s members. The county denied
taxpayer’s application for exemption because OSBA is not
(1) a school district; (2) a “public or municipal corporation;”
or (3) organized as a corporation.
III. ISSUES
The court first notes what is not at issue. Taxpayer
does not argue that it is a school district. The county no
longer maintains that taxpayer does not qualify as a “cor-
poration” under ORS 307.090(1). See Pacific States Marine
Fisheries v. Dept. of Rev. (Pacific States), 346 Or 117, 122-24,
206 P3d 1037 (2009) (holding formal organization as a cor-
poration is not required under ORS 307.090). Further, nei-
ther the county nor the department dispute that taxpayer’s
property is being used for taxpayer’s corporate purposes.

pupils; (9) to promote public understanding of the role of school boards and school
board members in the improvement of education; (10) to conduct, independently
or in cooperation with others, seminars, conferences, courses, and research proj-
ects in the various aspects of education; (11) to endeavor to implement the pol-
icies, beliefs, and resolutions of the association; (12) to do such other things as
the member boards or board of directors may deem appropriate for the accom-
plishment of these and other purposes which tend to improve education; (13) to
provide such direct services to member districts and their board members as may
be appropriate and authorized by the board of directors of the association; and
(14) to enter into such cooperative agreement with member districts for the pool-
ing of resources as may result in the more efficient utilization of district resources
and accrue to their financial advantage. (See Stip Facts at 2-3.)
3
These rulings, however, do not dictate the outcome in this case. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that “opinions characterizing or declining to char-
acterize various entities as public corporations have to be considered in the spe-
cific legal context in which they arose.” Pacific States Marine Fisheries v. Dept. of
Rev., 346 Or 117, 122, 206 P3d 1037 (2009).
284 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

Accordingly, the only issue remaining is whether
taxpayer qualifies as a “public * * * corporation[ ] in this
state.” 4 ORS 307.090(1). That issue is composed of two parts:
whether taxpayer qualifies as a “public corporation”; and
whether taxpayer is “in this state.”
IV. ANALYSIS
All real property within this state is subject to
assessment and taxation, unless there is an exception pro-
vided for by law. ORS 307.030(1). Taxpayer seeks exemption
for its real property under ORS 307.090(1). That statute
provides:
“Except as provided by law, all property of the state
and all public or corporate property used or intended for
corporate purposes of the several counties, cities, towns,
school districts, irrigation districts, drainage districts,
ports, water districts, housing authorities, public universi-
ties listed in ORS 352.002 and all other public or municipal
corporations in this state, is exempt from taxation.”
The parties primarily differ as to the meaning and charac-
teristics of the term “public * * * corporation[ ]” for purposes
of ORS 307.090(1).5
Taxpayer argues that it qualifies as a public cor-
poration because it advances public education in Oregon
through assistance to its membership, which is composed
entirely of other public corporations. The department
argues that taxpayer does not qualify as a public corpora-
tion because it was not created or authorized by statute and
does not possess governmental powers or responsibilities.
The county argues that taxpayer does not qualify as a pub-
lic corporation because it only serves its members, which are
not citizens.
As a preliminary matter, this court must address
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pacific States. Taxpayer
argues that, because the court determined that Pacific
4
ORS 307.090 also provides for an exemption for the property of municipal
corporations. A municipal corporation can be defined as a body corporate and
politic. Eugene McQuillin, 1 The Law of Municipal Corporations § 2:8 (3d ed 1999,
April 2016 Update). Taxpayer does not argue that it is a municipal corporation.
5
The county also makes an argument that taxpayer is not a public corporation
“in this state,” which is addressed later in this decision. See 22 OTR at 292-93.
Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 285

States Marine Fisheries Commission is a public corpora-
tion (with membership composed entirely of public bodies),
taxpayer too must be a public corporation because it is also
composed entirely of public bodies.
However, as Defendants argue, the court in Pacific
States only determined that the commission at issue
there was a public corporation “in the abstract.” 346 Or
at 122. The court reserved whether “shared characteris-
tics inherent in the specific entities” listed in ORS 307.090
would “place further limits on the types of public corpo-
rations that are entitled to a tax exemption.” Id. at 127.
The court did not delineate the characteristics of a pub-
lic corporation for purposes of ORS 307.090. Accordingly,
this court must first ascertain what those characteris-
tics are, and then determine whether taxpayer has those
characteristics.
A. Defining “Public Corporation” for Purposes of ORS
307.090
There is no textual definition for the term “public
corporation” for purposes of ORS 307.090. Accordingly, this
court must look to the context of ORS 307.090, any relevant
legislative history, and, if helpful, the maxims of statutory
construction.6 State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d
1042 (2009). As to context, the court looks to the statutory
history and case law of ORS 307.090, as well as case law
interpreting the term “public corporation.”
ORS 307.090 traces back to the Deady Code, when
only “counties, cities, villages, towns and school districts”
were exempted from property taxation. General Laws of
Oregon, Civ Code, ch LIII, title I, § 4, p 894 (Deady 1845-
1864). This provision has been amended several times, but
its basic character has remained the same: public entities
are exempt from taxation. Indeed, a predecessor of ORS
307.090 has been described as being “merely declaratory of
the common rule” that public property is not taxable absent
a “clear legislative declaration” of the intention to do so.
Portland v. Multnomah County, 135 Or 469, 471, 296 P 48
(1931) (interpreting Oregon Code, title LXIX, ch 1, § 69-104
6
There is no relevant legislative history.
286 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

(1930)). This is because “[i]t would be analogous to tak-
ing money out of one pocket and putting it into another.”
Id. at 472.
The term “public corporation” was not added until
the turn of the twentieth century. The Codes and Statutes
of Oregon, title XXX, ch I, § 3039 (Bellinger & Cotton
1901), amended by Or Laws 1907, ch 268, § 4. At that time,
public corporations were defined as “ ‘those [corporations]
which are exclusively instruments of the public interest.’ ”
Pacific States, 346 Or at 123 (quoting John Bouvier, 1 Law
Dictionary 406 (15th ed 1890)) (alteration in original). The
“original understanding [was] that incorporation of enter-
prises for business purposes [is] something distinct from
incorporation of governmental instrumentalities.” State
ex rel Eckles v. Woolley (Eckles), 302 Or 37, 47, 726 P2d 918
(1986).
Given this historical context, a public corporation is
“a corporation formed for the public’s benefit or for a public
purpose.” Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chemicals
(Shasta View), 329 Or 151, 157, 986 P2d 536 (1999) (citing
Eckles, 302 Or at 48-49). However, this is not the only char-
acteristic of public corporations.7
Public corporations are also subject to public man-
agement or control. Eckles, 302 Or at 49. In Eckles, the court
determined that the State Accident Insurance Fund was a
public corporation in part because it did not have “the ques-
tionable characteristics of mixed private and governmental
investment or management.” Id. While this court has not
found a case holding that any private interest destroys the
public character of a public corporation, it is evident that
having some amount of private interest raises the question
whether an alleged public corporation is an exclusive instru-
ment of the public interest. That question is not similarly
raised in a public corporation with only public investment
and management.

7
Taxpayer argued that this is the only characteristic of public corporations.
However, as the department notes, nonprofit corporations would satisfy this
test. Neither party disputes that private nonprofit corporations have a separate
exemption available to them and that they do not qualify as public corporations
for purposes of ORS 307.090.
Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 287

Public corporations are also created or authorized by
statute.8 See Mohler et ux. v. Fish Commission, 129 Or 302,
305, 276 P 691 (1929); McClain v. Regents of the University,
124 Or 629, 634, 256 P 412 (1928). In Mohler, the Supreme
Court determined that the fish commission was “a mere
agency of the state in the nature of a quasi-public corpora-
tion created by legislative enactment with certain delegated
powers.” 129 Or at 305 (emphasis in original). In McClain,
the Supreme Court found the Regents of the University to
be “a public corporation, created by legislative enactment for
the special purpose of carrying out the educational policy of
the state.” 124 Or at 634.
Finally, public corporations have some governmen-
tal power or authority.9 Mohler, 129 Or at 305. Public corpo-
rations are, for purposes of ORS 307.090, either quasi-mu-
nicipal or municipal corporations. See White City Water
System v. Dept. of Rev., 285 Or 255, 258, 590 P2d 724 (1979)
(describing all the entities in ORS 307.090 as either munici-
pal or quasi-municipal corporations). Both can be described
as a “corporation for municipal purposes.” See Cook v. The
Port of Portland, 20 Or 580, 583, 27 P 263 (1891) (generally
equating public corporations with municipal corporations).
In Cook, the Supreme Court determined that the test of a
“corporation for municipal purposes” is whether the corpora-
tion has the “right or power to exercise some of the functions
of government.” 20 Or at 586. The difference between a pub-
lic corporation and a municipal corporation is the amount
of governmental authority possessed. A public corporation
requires only the authority necessary to achieve its purpose.
See Eugene McQuillin, 1 The Law of Municipal Corporations
§ 2:17 (3d ed 1999, April 2016 Update).
Accordingly, there are four characteristics that an
entity must have to be considered a “public” corporation.10

80
The department found this characteristic primarily from an application of
ejusdem generis. However, this court considers resort to that canon of statutory
construction unnecessary given the supporting case law.
90
The department here also found this characteristic primarily from an
application of ejusdem generis. However, this court again considers resort to that
canon of statutory construction unnecessary given the supporting case law.
10
As previously stated, there is no dispute that taxpayer is a corporation for
purposes of ORS 307.090.
288 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

First, the entity must be formed for the public’s benefit or
a public purpose. Shasta View, 329 Or at 157. Second, the
entity must be subject to public management or control.
Eckles, 302 Or at 49. Third, the entity must be created or
authorized by statute. Mohler, 129 Or at 305; McClain, 124
Or at 634. Fourth, the entity must possess some govern-
mental power or authority. Mohler, 129 Or at 305; Cook,
20 Or at 586. The question is whether taxpayer has these
characteristics.
B. Applying the Definition of “Public Corporation” to
Taxpayer
1. Taxpayer’s public purpose
Taxpayer has a limited purpose—to advance pub-
lic education through assistance to its public membership.
That purpose, however, is public enough. The Supreme
Court has cautioned against parsing too narrowly the pur-
pose of a public corporation. See Eckles, 302 Or at 49 (“There
is no need to characterize insurance as a more or less ‘pub-
lic’ function than * * * [other areas] that government chooses
to provide * * *.”). Advancing public education is undoubtedly
a public purpose, and taxpayer assists its member public
school boards in fulfilling that public purpose.
The county disputes that this is a valid public pur-
pose because OSBA is directly serving only its membership,
not the public at large. In support of this position, the county
cites Special Districts Association of Oregon v. Washington
County Assessor (SDAO), TC-MD 050661D, WL 167462
(Jan 11, 2006), a Decision from the Magistrate Division of
this court with facts materially indistinguishable from the
present case. There, the SDAO sought tax exemption under
ORS 307.090 because it was a nonprofit mutual benefit corpo-
ration composed of governmental entities. Id. at *2. The court
found that the SDAO did not meet the statutory requirements
because it served its members and not the public. Id. at *7.
Decisions from the Magistrate Division are not
binding on this court. Moreover, the decision in SDAO was
not appealed to this court and has not been considered by
this court until now. Upon review, the decision in SDAO is
not persuasive. The court in SDAO incorrectly interpreted
Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 289

Supreme Court precedent on the characteristics of public
corporations by relying on its own precedent regarding the
characteristics of charitable or scientific organizations. See
id. at *4, 6-7 (citing Rogue Gem v. Josephine County Assessor
(Rogue Gem), 17 OTR-MD 446 (2003)).
In Rogue Gem, the court determined that a mutual
benefit corporation is not a nonprofit corporation “organized
for a public or charitable purpose” because it only serves its
members, not “the community as a whole.” 17 OTR-MD at
454. This conclusion, however, was demanded by the defi-
nitions of a mutual benefit corporation and a public benefit
corporation.
Under ORS 65.001(24) (2003), a mutual benefit cor-
poration is a corporation that “does not come within the defi-
nition of public benefit or religious corporation.” Id. Under
ORS 65.001(31) (2003), a public benefit corporation is a cor-
poration that is “organized for a public or charitable pur-
pose.” Id. Because a mutual benefit corporation is defined as
something that is not a public benefit corporation, the Rogue
Gem court appropriately determined that a mutual benefit
corporation is not a corporation that is organized for a public
or charitable purpose. Id.
The court in SDAO relied upon Rogue Gem to impute
a requirement that a public corporation cannot be created to
serve only its membership that is composed of other pub-
lic corporations. It concluded its analysis essentially on this
requirement alone: “Because Plaintiff’s activities serve or
benefit its members rather than the public, the court con-
cludes that Plaintiff is not a public corporation.” Id. at *7.
However, there is no such requirement.
What distinguishes Rogue Gem from this case
(and hence SDAO) is that the mutual benefit corporation
in Rogue Gem was composed of individuals—not govern-
mental entities—and the exemption was one for charitable
corporations, not an exemption for governmental entities.11
11
Taxpayer is not organized as a mutual benefit corporation. However, that
would be a distinction without a practical difference. See Eckles, 302 Or at 46
(declining the invitation to “revive the scholastic debate between nominalism and
realism”). Taxpayer serves its membership, and thus is similar to a mutual benefit
corporation—with the important fact that all of its members are public entities.
290 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

17 OTR-MD at 448. There is a significant difference between
private individuals or entities creating mutual benefit corpo-
rations to serve themselves and public corporations creating
mutual benefit corporations to assist in the administration
of their governmental functions. It is for this reason that the
court in SDAO erred by relying upon Rogue Gem to inter-
pret the public purpose requirement as applied to public
corporations.
The court finds that advancing public education
in Oregon is for the public’s benefit or is a public purpose.
Once that is established, it is inappropriate to engage in
too fine an analysis of whether the purpose is more or less
public than another accepted purpose. Eckles, 302 Or at 49.
Taxpayer’s purpose is a public purpose.
2. Taxpayer’s public management or control
Taxpayer is subject to public management or con-
trol. Its members, which are all public corporations, have
the sole power to vote in the board of directors for OSBA.
Taxpayer is also exclusively funded by the public. Its mem-
bers, which are all public corporations, provide taxpayer
funds through the payment of dues. In addition, if taxpayer
is dissolved, its public funds are returned to its members,
which are all public corporations.
The county argues that taxpayer is not subject to
public control because it is not subject to control directly by
the citizenry. The county draws that requirement from the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Cook, 20 Or at 583. There, the
court described a public corporation as “a corporation cre-
ated for public or governmental purposes * * * whose mem-
bers are citizens, not stockholders.” Id.
Whether composition of member-citizens ever
was a requirement, it is no longer a part of Oregon law.
The Supreme Court directly referenced the Cook member-
citizen test in its conclusion in Eckles. See 302 Or at 49. In
Eckles, the court noted that the State Accident Insurance
Fund (SAIF) was not composed of members who are citi-
zens. Id. Yet, because SAIF was exclusively managed and
funded by government—with no private stockholders—the
court determined that SAIF was a public corporation. Id.
Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 291

Much like SAIF, taxpayer does not have members
who are also citizens. But, taxpayer, like SAIF, is exclusively
managed and funded by government. In fact, taxpayer does
not have any private owners or members. Rather, taxpayer
has a membership that is exclusively composed of public cor-
porations, which govern taxpayer’s activities through their
representatives. Taxpayer is subject exclusively to public
management and control.
3. Created or authorized by statute
Although the department argued in its motion for
summary judgment that taxpayer was not created or autho-
rized by statute, it appears that the department conceded
this point in its response to taxpayer’s motion for summary
judgment, and abandoned it in its reply. (See Def’s Cross-Mot
for Summ J at 4 (“Plaintiff was not created by any specific
statute, law, or constitutional provision. Rather, plaintiff
is an association created by an agreement entered into by
the governing bodies of Oregon public schools.”); Def’s Resp
at 3 (“Thus, ORS 332.105(2) permits school districts to form
associations such as plaintiff. However, * * * [i]n order to
be a public corporation, plaintiff must also possess govern-
mental powers * * *.”); Def’s Reply at 1-4 (no mention of tax-
payer’s creation or authorization by law).)
This apparent concession is well taken. Taxpayer
was created pursuant to the implied authority granted by
the legislature under ORS 332.105(2). That statute provides:
“The district school board may participate in the activ-
ities of and may become members of associations of school
boards. When provided for in an approved school district
budget, the board may pay from school districts funds
annual dues to such association.”
The court fails to see how such an association,
which is to be funded by the public school districts, would
be created if not by or for the future membership composed
of public school boards. Indeed, the legislature contem-
plated that there may be many such associations because
it refers to associations in the plural in ORS 332.105(2).
Absent some legislative history to the contrary (and the
court is not aware of any) the court considers the mention
of associations of school boards in ORS 332.105(2), and the
292 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

statutory approval of the public school boards to expend
public funds to be members of such associations, to be an
implied authorization for public school boards to create
such associations.
4. Possessing governmental authority or power
The department argues that taxpayer cannot be a
public corporation because its public members have not del-
egated any of their governmental authority to taxpayer. Yet,
a public corporation requires only the authority necessary to
achieve its purpose. See 1 McQuillin Mun Corp § 2:17.
Taxpayer’s purpose is to provide assistance to its
public members, and advocacy on their behalf. It has been
entrusted with public funds to conduct that purpose. Those
public funds, and the limitations placed upon those funds
by taxpayer’s constitution, represent the scope of taxpayer’s
power and authority. Taxpayer does not need governmental
authority beyond that which is necessary to accomplish its
limited purpose. That is sufficient for it to qualify as a pub-
lic corporation.
5. Taxpayer is a “public corporation” for purposes of
ORS 307.090
The court concludes that taxpayer has the char-
acteristics of a “public corporation” for purposes of ORS
307.090. This interpretation and application of “public cor-
poration” comports with the policy of ORS 307.090 and the
common-law rule that public property is not taxable. If the
exemption requested by taxpayer for the subject property
was denied, the dues of the member public corporations
would bear the economic burden of that tax. The result
would be one of “taking money out of one pocket and putting
it into another.” Portland v. Multnomah County, 135 Or at
472.
C. Taxpayer is “In This State” for Purposes of ORS 307.090
Although the department limits its arguments to
taxpayer’s character as a public corporation, the county also
argues that taxpayer is not a public corporation “in this state”
as that term was defined by the court in Pacific States. See
346 Or at 125-27. The county argues that taxpayer does not
Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 293

serve a geographic area within the state because it serves
its members, not defined geographic areas. This argument
is not persuasive.
First, whatever area taxpayer serves, that area
is certainly within, if not coextensive with the borders of,
Oregon. None of its members are outside the state, as was
the case in Pacific States. Id. at 127 (“[Pacific Fisheries] rep-
resents and serves a multistate area. The interests and geo-
graphic area served by Pacific Fisheries are regional, and
Pacific Fisheries cannot be considered to be confined geo-
graphically within the State of Oregon.”). Taxpayer’s ser-
vices are contained exclusively in Oregon, making it a public
corporation “in this state.”
Second, it does not matter whether taxpayer serves
precisely designated areas in the state.12 The Supreme
Court expressly stated that some public corporations “may
not have distinct geographic boundaries in the same way
that a city, county, school district, or municipal corporation
does.” Id. at 126. It is perfectly acceptable to have a more
vague geographical presence, so long as those areas are
“primarily within the state.” Id.
Because taxpayer is a public corporation created
under Oregon law operating within Oregon, it is the type
of public corporation entitled to an exemption under ORS
307.090.
V. CONCLUSION
Taxpayer qualifies as a public corporation because
it serves a public purpose, is exclusively managed and con-
trolled by public entities, was impliedly authorized by stat-
ute, and was created by public entities with the limited
power and authority necessary to accomplish its purpose.
Taxpayer is within this state because it serves its members,
which all operate within this state. Taxpayer is entitled to
an exemption for the subject property under ORS 307.090.
Now, therefore,

12
Of course, most, if not all, of its members serve precisely designated areas.
Assistance by taxpayer to such members is service to precisely designated areas.
294 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for sum-
mary judgment is granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’
cross-motions for summary judgment are denied.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10606730. Public record. Not legal advice.