# Snyder v. Amsberry

> Court of Appeals of Oregon · September 10, 2020 · 306 Or. App. 439

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10600303

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Oregon
- **Decided:** September 10, 2020
- **Citations:** 306 Or. App. 439; 474 P.3d 417
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** James
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

439

Argued and submitted May 6, 2019, reversed and remanded September 10, 2020

DENNIS JOSHUA SNYDER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Brigitte AMSBERRY,
Superintendent,
Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution,
Defendant-Respondent.
Umatilla County Circuit Court
16CV42398; A166355
474 P3d 417

Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the superintendent on his petition for post-conviction relief in which
he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective and inadequate in failing to inves-
tigate his mental health history before advising him to enter a plea of guilty.
Without holding a hearing, the post-conviction court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the superintendent, noting that expert testimony regarding peti-
tioner’s inability to aid and assist was required to survive summary judgment.
Petitioner advances three arguments on appeal—first, that the post-conviction
court improperly granted summary judgment on the merits; second, that the
court erred when it dismissed petitioner’s claim without holding a hearing;
and third, that any dismissal should have been without prejudice. The superin-
tendent responds that petitioner’s claims are without merit, unpreserved, and
harmless. Held: Although expert testimony may be relevant to ineffective counsel
claims based on failure to alert the trial court of aid and assist concerns, that
expert testimony is not required to survive summary judgment. Further, the
post-conviction court erred in failing to hold a hearing, and the manner in which
the error arose eliminated the need for a contemporaneous objection to preserve
the issue for appellate review.
Reversed and remanded.

Daniel J. Hill, Judge.
Jason Weber argued the cause for appellant. Also on the
brief was O’Connor Weber LLC.
Jordan R. Silk, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and
James, Judge.
440 Snyder v. Amsberry

JAMES, J.
Reversed and remanded.
Cite as 306 Or App 439 (2020) 441

JAMES, J.
Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the superintendent on his
petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that
trial counsel was ineffective and inadequate in failing to
investigate petitioner’s mental health history before advis-
ing petitioner to enter a plea of guilty. Without holding a
hearing, the post-conviction court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the superintendent, on a variety of grounds.
Petitioner advances three arguments on appeal—first, that
the post-conviction court improperly granted summary
judgment on the merits; second, that the court erred when
it dismissed petitioner’s claim without holding a hearing;
and third, that any dismissal should have been without
prejudice. On petitioner’s second point, the superintendent
argues that such an argument is unpreserved, and that this
court should decline to consider it as plain error. We agree
with petitioner on his second point—that the post-conviction
court erred in failing to hold a hearing before entering the
judgment in this matter—and we conclude that the manner
in which the error arose eliminated the need for a contempo-
raneous objection to preserve the issue for appellate review.
We reverse and remand. Our disposition on the second
assignment of error largely obviates the need to address the
remaining arguments. However, we address one aspect of
petitioner’s first assignment of error that is likely to arise on
remand: We conclude that the post-conviction court miscon-
strued the applicable legal standard for assessing prejudice
for the portion of petitioner’s claim that asserts that counsel
was ineffective in failing to alert the trial court of counsel’s
concern that petitioner was unable to aid and assist in his
defense.
“When a party seeks summary judgment, a court
must view the pleadings, as well as any ‘depositions, affida-
vits, declarations and admissions’ that the parties have sub-
mitted in support of or in opposition to the summary judg-
ment motion, in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Eklof v. Steward, 360 Or 717, 729, 385 P3d 1074
(2016) (quoting ORCP 47 C). Whether the post-conviction
court may dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief with
prejudice without holding a hearing where the petitioner is
442 Snyder v. Amsberry

present is a question of law. See Howell v. Franke, 258 Or
App 202, 203, 308 P3d 1078 (2013) (applying that standard).
As petitioner alleged in his amended petition for
post-conviction relief, he pled guilty to assault in the sec-
ond degree, despite “[t]rial counsel [being] aware that at the
time of the incident that petitioner was not taking his med-
ications.” Before trial, “[t]rial counsel had concerns about
the petitioner’s ability to aid and assist” and told petitioner
that “he would be evaluated by a mental health professional.
No mental health evaluation was ever performed.” Instead,
trial counsel wrote an email to the prosecutor of the case to
inform him of his concerns about petitioner’s ability to aid
and assist in his own defense. The email, attached in sup-
port of petitioner’s opposition to summary judgment, pro-
vided, in part:
“[Petitioner] is [in] a difficult situation, at times I won-
der if he can aid and assist. I recently got juvenile records
from when [petitioner] was 5-10 years old indicating that
his mother was developmentally disabled and his father
was a sex offender and that he had a whole host of mental
problems which you can imagine. As a result their parental
rights were terminated and he was adopted by a family in
Ohio when [petitioner] was ten years old.
“* * * * *
“I think he has a mental defense but I need, more time
to develop it. He may not want to continue the trial date.
Give me an offer and I will share it with him tomorrow and
we can see if he wants to continue the trial date or accept
the offer.”
(Emphasis added.)
After receiving trial counsel’s email, the state
offered to dismiss Count 2, unlawful use of a weapon, if
petitioner would plead guilty to Count 1. Without having
petitioner examined for his ability to aid and assist, counsel
presented the offer to petitioner. Petitioner accepted the plea
offer, and defense counsel facilitated the entry of the guilty
plea. At petitioner’s plea hearing, trial counsel informed the
court that petitioner had “a long history” of mental illness
but, according to petitioner, did not alert the court to the aid
and assist concerns expressed to the prosecutor.
Cite as 306 Or App 439 (2020) 443

In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner
alleged that trial counsel was inadequate and ineffective in
violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution for failing to investigate his mental
health. That failure to investigate claim, according to the
petition, resulted in two distinct harms. First, petitioner
alleged that the failure to investigate resulted in trial coun-
sel failing to develop a mental health defense. Specifically,
petitioner alleged:
• Trial counsel was aware of petitioner’s mental
health history and other than reviewing some of
petitioner’s past records, never took any steps to
develop a mental health defense.
• Trial counsel did not conduct any investigation
into petitioner’s mental health history and how
that could have mitigated or explained petitioner’s
conduct.
• Trial counsel recognized that petitioner had a men-
tal health defense to the charges, but never dis-
cussed this defense with petitioner.
• Competent counsel exercising reasonable profes-
sional skill and judgment would have investigated
petitioner’s mental health history to determine if
that was a factor in petitioner’s charged conduct.
However, as alleged in the petition, the failure to
investigate petitioner’s mental health also went to the issue
of whether trial counsel was ineffective or inadequate in
failing to inform the trial court of concerns that petitioner
might be unable to aid and assist in his defense. Specifically,
the petition alleged:
• Petitioner told trial counsel that he had a long his-
tory of mental health illness.
• Trial counsel was aware that at the time of the inci-
dent, petitioner had not been taking his medications.
• Petitioner requested trial counsel investigate his
mental health history. Petitioner was told that he
444 Snyder v. Amsberry

would be evaluated by a mental health professional.
No mental health evaluation was ever performed.
• Trial counsel had concerns about petitioner’s abil-
ity to aid and assist. Despite these concerns, trial
counsel never had petitioner evaluated or brought
his concerns to the court’s attention.
• At a minimum, a mental health evaluation should
have been conducted to ensure petitioner could aid
and assist prior to entering a plea.
The superintendent moved for summary judgment,
focusing attention on the portion of petitioner’s claim related
to a mental health defense, arguing that in the absence of
any evidence that petitioner asserted trial counsel should
have obtained, petitioner could raise no genuine issue of fact
as to whether an adequate investigation of petitioner’s men-
tal health would have yielded results changing petitioner’s
decision to plead guilty. The superintendent urged that “[i]f
the non-moving party cannot attach admissible evidence in
the manner prescribed by ORCP 47D, the Court must grant
the motion for summary judgment.” Petitioner responded
that summary judgment should be denied because he will
testify to his mental health history and what trial counsel
was told about his mental health issues.
The post-conviction court agreed with the superin-
tendent that petitioner’s claims required proof of the sub-
stance of a mental health evaluation that petitioner alleges
trial counsel should have conducted. The court’s decision
discussed its reasons for granting the superintendent’s
motion for summary judgment. Those reasons included:
“[There was] no allegation that the plea was not know-
ing, not voluntary and or not intelligent, asserted in the
amended petition or supported in the response to the MSJ.
“A petitioner who claims that their trial lawyers did
not adequately advise them of the consequences of plead-
ing guilty must ‘prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that they would not have pleaded guilty had they received
adequate assistance of counsel.’ This is not even pled by
petitioner nor supported in the asserted testimony by him
or trial counsel. In lieu of an affidavit of an expert, the
Cite as 306 Or App 439 (2020) 445

responding attorney may submit an affidavit to the effect
‘that an unnamed qualified expert has been retained who
is available and willing to testify to admissible facts or
opinions creating a question of fact * * *.’ Clearly, petitioner
and petitioner’s counsel have not provided this simple sub-
stitute for actual support from an expert witness.
“* * * * *
“A court could not make a determination of mental illness
that would have affected the plea without an expert wit-
ness now.”
(Internal citations omitted; emphases omitted.)
Post-conviction cases are civil actions of statutory
origin. The Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure apply in post-
conviction cases, unless the post-conviction statutes provide
otherwise. Young v. Hill, 347 Or 165, 171, 218 P3d 125 (2009)
(citing Mueller v. Benning, 314 Or 615, 621 n 6, 841 P2d 640
(1992)). As a general matter, in considering motions for sum-
mary judgment, a court may decide the matter without a
hearing, unless either party requests oral argument in the
caption of their motion:
“There must be oral argument if requested by the moving
party in the caption of the motion or by a responding party
in the caption of a response. The first paragraph of the
motion or response must include an estimate of the time
required for argument and a statement whether official
court reporting services are requested.”
UTCR 5.050(1).
However, in the context of post-conviction matters
ORS 138.620 provides:
“(1) After the response of the defendant to the petition,
the court shall proceed to a hearing on the issues raised. If
the defendant’s response is by demurrer or motion raising
solely issues of law, the circuit court need not order that
petitioner be present at such hearing, as long as petitioner
is represented at the hearing by counsel. At the hearing
upon issues raised by any other response, the circuit court
shall order that petitioner be present. * * *
“(2) If the petition states a ground for relief, the court
shall decide the issues raised and may receive proof by
446 Snyder v. Amsberry

affidavits, depositions, oral testimony or other competent
evidence. * * *”
(Emphasis added.) As the statute makes clear, in the context
of post-conviction, a court is not permitted to resolve issues
that would result in a dismissal with prejudice—even pre-
trial motion issues where neither party has requested oral
argument—without holding a hearing.
On appeal, the superintendent does not dispute
the mandatory nature of ORS 138.620, but rather argues
that petitioner’s failure to request a hearing renders the
issue unpreserved for appellate review. We disagree. As the
Oregon Supreme Court noted in Peeples v. Lampert, “[i]n
some circumstances, the preservation requirement gives
way entirely, as when a party has no practical ability to raise
an issue.” 345 Or 209, 220, 191 P3d 637 (2008). Such is the
case here. As discussed above, the post-conviction court was
not statutorily permitted to resolve the summary judgment
motion without a hearing where, at a minimum, petition-
er’s counsel would be present. Petitioner was not obligated
to request a hearing in the caption of his pleading when that
was the only statutorily permitted procedure. Likewise, by
failing to hold a hearing, petitioner was denied an opportu-
nity to object.
Alternatively, the superintendent argues that any
error in failing to hold a hearing was harmless. Again, we
disagree. A judgment must be affirmed, despite any error
committed at trial, “if, after considering all the matters sub-
mitted, the court is of the opinion that the judgment ‘was
such as should have been rendered in the case.’ ” State v.
Davis, 336 Or 19, 28, 77 P3d 1111 (2003). “Oregon’s consti-
tutional test for affirmance despite error consists of a sin-
gle inquiry: Is there little likelihood that the particular
error affected the verdict?” Id. at 32. Further, to determine
whether an error is harmless, we consider a variety of con-
siderations including the nature of the error and the context
in which the error occurred. See State v. Abbott, 274 Or App
778, 789-90, 362 P3d 1171 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 794 (2016)
(citing Davis, 336 Or at 32-33).
In Ware v. Hall, 342 Or 444, 154 P3d 118 (2007),
the Oregon Supreme Court analyzed the post-conviction
Cite as 306 Or App 439 (2020) 447

statutory scheme, focusing on ORS 138.550(3). The court
held that the post-conviction statutes required the post-
conviction court to hold a hearing to “provide [petitioner]
an opportunity to be heard” before it determined whether
his claim in his petition for post-conviction relief had any
merit. Id. at 448. The Supreme Court reasoned that ORS
138.620 requires both a hearing and counsel before a
court may dismiss a petition with prejudice. Id. at 453.
Thus, the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed
the petition with prejudice without providing petitioner or
his counsel any “opportunity to be heard.” Id. The court
reasoned:
“As noted, ORS chapter 138 contemplates two different
courses for resolving post-conviction petitions. On the one
hand, a court may appoint counsel, hold a hearing, and, if
appropriate, permit amendments to the petition. See ORS
138.590 (authorizing appointment of counsel); ORS 138.610
(permitting amendments); ORS 138.620 (providing for
hearings on petitions). Having followed that course, a court
may dismiss the petition with prejudice. See ORS 138.640
(describing form of judgment). On the other hand, a trial
court may dismiss a meritless petition before appointing
counsel and without a hearing but only if it dismisses with-
out prejudice—a course that could leave a petitioner free to
file another post-conviction petition. ORS 138.525.
“* * * * *
“ORS chapter 138 leaves it to the trial court, in the first
instance, to decide which course to follow. Here, the trial
court followed neither course. Rather, it departed from the
statutory scheme and, in so doing, deprived petitioner of
the opportunity either to make a record at a hearing or to
file a later petition if the court dismissed without prejudice.
In these circumstances, we do not think it is appropriate to
uphold a judgment dismissing the petition with prejudice.
* * *”
Id.
Here, as in Ware, the post-conviction court departed
from the statutory scheme when it dismissed petitioner’s
petition with prejudice, without allowing him an opportu-
nity to be heard at a hearing. And, as in Ware, the harm
to petitioner was that he was deprived of the “opportunity
448 Snyder v. Amsberry

either to make a record at a hearing or to file a later petition
if the court dismissed without prejudice.” Id.
Our remand for a hearing largely obviates the need
to address petitioner’s other assignments of error, which
address the merits of the court’s summary judgment ruling
on issues that could arise in a different posture depending
on what record is made below. However, we will consider
one question of law that will still be at issue after the case
is remanded, which is the court’s formulation of the legal
standard for prejudice resulting from the failure to alert
the court of aid and assist concerns. See, e.g., Westwood
Construction Co. v. Hallmark Inns, 182 Or App 624, 50 P3d
238, rev den, 335 Or 42 (2002) (addressing ruling concerning
the availability of certain type of attorney fees under ORS
87.060 as likely to arise on remand); State v. McFeron, 166
Or App 110, 999 P2d 470 (2000) (addressing propriety of jury
instruction concerning ways in which state may prove intox-
ication because it was likely to arise on remand); OR-OSHA
v. Roseburg Lumber Co., 151 Or App 236, 949 P2d 307 (1997)
(addressing agency’s construction of legal standard set forth
in administrative rule because it was likely to arise on
remand).
In assessing petitioner’s claims that concerned a
mental health defense, the post-conviction court concluded
that summary judgment was appropriate because petitioner
had not presented affidavit testimony from a medical expert,
holding that “[a] court could not make a determination of
mental illness that would have affected the plea without an
expert witness now. The nature of petitioner’s claim makes
the need material.”
It is true that generally a petitioner cannot obtain
relief based on the unamplified assertion that trial coun-
sel should have investigated more; instead, the petitioner
must “adduce evidence” of what trial counsel “would have
discovered * * * had trial counsel undertaken the proposed
investigation.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729, 99 P3d
311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). And where a peti-
tioner pleaded guilty in the underlying criminal proceed-
ing, the results of that investigation must be such that they
would have changed the petitioner’s decision to plead guilty.
Cite as 306 Or App 439 (2020) 449

Id.; Cox v. Howton, 268 Or App 840, 842-43, 343 P3d 677
(2015) (post-conviction petitioner who pleaded guilty must
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] would
not have pleaded guilty had [he] received adequate assis-
tance of counsel” (citing Moen v. Peterson, 312 Or 503, 513,
824 P2d 404 (1991))).
Whether those principles require the use of expert
testimony to establish prejudice in a claim for ineffective
counsel arising from a failure to investigate a mental health
defense is an open question, and one we need not decide here.
But, even if such expert testimony were required, a claim of
ineffective counsel for a failure to alert the court of aid and
assist concerns presents a fundamentally different claim.
The procedures for a determination of a criminal
defendant’s fitness to proceed, also known as the ability to
“aid and assist” in one’s defense, is defined by statute. ORS
161.360(1) provides that “[i]f, before or during the trial in
any criminal case, the court has reason to doubt the defen-
dant’s fitness to proceed by reason of incapacity, the court
may order an examination in the manner provided in ORS
161.365.” (Emphasis added.) ORS 161.370(1)(a) further states
that “[w]hen the defendant’s fitness to proceed is drawn in
question, the issue shall be determined by the court.”
While the fitness to proceed statutes permit a court
to order a psychological examination, such an examination
is not mandated. See ORS 161.365; ORS 161.370. What is
mandated, however, is an inquiry by the court anytime it
becomes aware of fitness to proceed concerns. If after such
an inquiry, “the court determines that the defendant lacks
fitness to proceed, the criminal proceeding against the
defendant shall be suspended.” ORS 161.370(2) (emphasis
added).
In assessing prejudice, a petitioner must prove “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been dif-
ferent,” that is, a “probability sufficient to undermine con-
fidence in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 US
668, 694, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). Performance
is evaluated according to the context of the legal proceeding
450 Snyder v. Amsberry

at issue. In Richardson v. Belleque, for example, the court
noted that prejudice in that case was adjudged in the con-
text of a dangerous offender hearing:
“Based on the record, we reject the state’s argument, and
we credit arguments by petitioner and amicus that it was
more than a mere possibility that competent defense coun-
sel could have used the information from Cooley’s report in
ways that ‘could have tended to affect’ the outcome of the
dangerous-offender hearing.”
362 Or 236, 266, 406 P3d 1074 (2017) (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
Given the context of the fitness to proceed stat-
utes, expert testimony may be relevant to ineffective coun-
sel claims based on a failure to alert the trial court of aid
and assist concerns, but expert testimony is not required
to prove that claim or to survive summary judgment.1 In
the context of fitness to proceed, the inquiry for prejudice
is whether, had reasonable counsel alerted the trial court
of aid and assist concerns, there is “more than a mere pos-
sibility” that the trial court would have determined that, at
that time, petitioner lacked the fitness to proceed and would
have accordingly been required to “suspend” the criminal
proceeding. ORS 161.370(2).
Reversed and remanded.

1
The argument of the superintendent’s motion for summary judgment was
that “to overcome summary judgment, petitioner must attach the sworn testi-
mony of at least one mental health expert.” That narrow issue is what petitioner
was obligated to respond to. See Eklof v. Steward, 360 Or 717, 730, 385 P3d 1074
(2016) (“Parties opposing summary judgment have the burden of producing evi-
dence that creates a material issue of fact as to those issues, but only as to those
issues.” (Internal citations omitted; emphasis omitted.)). Accordingly, our opinion
is confined solely to the issue of whether expert testimony was required.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10600303. Public record. Not legal advice.