# Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

> Court of Appeals of Oregon · June 17, 2020 · 304 Or. App. 794

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10600154

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Oregon
- **Decided:** June 17, 2020
- **Citations:** 304 Or. App. 794
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Linder, S. J.
- **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10600154

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing the process of an appropriateness determination under ORS 243.682
- describing the history of the unified Oregon court system

## Opinion text

794
295
Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County 30417,
June Or2020
App

Argued and submitted March 27, 2019, order set aside June 17, petition for
review denied September 17, 2020 (367 Or 75)

OREGON AFSCME COUNCIL 75,
Respondent,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
OREGON JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT -
YAMHILL COUNTY,
Petitioner.
Employment Relations Board
RC00317; A167661
469 P3d 812

Petitioner, the Oregon Judicial Department (OJD), petitioned for review of an
order of the Employment Relations Board (ERB) that certified Oregon AFSCME
Council 75 as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit consisting of
27 nonsupervisory employees working in the Yamhill County Circuit Court
(27 employees). ERB concluded that the 27 employees were sufficiently separate
and apart from the rest of OJD’s employees to be an appropriate bargaining
unit for representation. On review of that order, OJD argues that ERB erred as
a matter of law in ordering certification of a single-court bargaining unit and,
alternatively, that ERB’s order was not supported by substantial evidence or sub-
stantial reason. Held: Although ERB did not err as a matter of law in ordering
certification of a single-court bargaining unit, ERB’s order was not supported by
substantial evidence or substantial reason.
Order set aside.

Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for petitioner. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Jason M. Weyand argued the cause for respondent. Also
on the brief was Tedesco Law Group.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Linder, Senior Judge.
LINDER, S. J.
Order set aside.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 795

LINDER, S. J.
Under the Public Employees Collective Bargaining
Act (PECBA), ORS 243.650 to 253.782, public employees
have the right to “form, join and participate in the activities
of labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose
of representation and collective bargaining with their pub-
lic employer on matters concerning employment relations.”
ORS 243.662. A public employer, however, is not required
to bargain with any labor organization that a group of its
employees selects to represent them. Rather, the employer’s
obligation to bargain with a chosen labor organization arises
only if the organization is “certified by the Employment
Relations Board or recognized by the public employer,” in
which case it is the “exclusive” bargaining representative for
the group of employees. ORS 243.666(1).
In this case, Oregon AFSCME Council 75 (AFSCME)
petitioned the Employment Relations Board (ERB) to cer-
tify it as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit
consisting of 27 nonsupervisory employees working in the
Yamhill County Circuit Court. With one member dissenting,
ERB ordered the certification, concluding that those employ-
ees were an “appropriate” bargaining unit for representation
separate and apart from the remaining 1,200 or so unrep-
resented employees of the Oregon Judicial Department
(OJD).1 OJD petitions for review of ERB’s order, contending
that ERB erred in its appropriate unit determination. For
the reasons explained below, we agree and set aside ERB’s
order.
I. BACKGROUND
After AFSCME filed its petition seeking certifica-
tion of the proposed bargaining unit, a hearing was held by
an administrative law judge, who issued a proposed order
that drew objections from both parties. After oral argument
on the parties’ cross-objections, ERB issued its final order,
which included extensive factual findings. Some of ERB’s
findings were based on the evidentiary record developed at

1
Although this case involves OJD as a party and raises issues that pertain
to the statewide court system, neither party has questioned the propriety of this
court hearing and resolving AFSCME’s petition for review.
796 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

the hearing and others were based on statutory provisions
and OJD rules.
On review, neither party challenges ERB’s findings
of fact. We therefore base our description of the historical
facts on ERB’s evidence-based findings, supplemented with
facts in the record consistent with ERB’s findings. Meltebeke
v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 322 Or 132, 134, 903 P2d
351 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hickman,
358 Or 1, 24, 358 P3d 987 (2015) (unchallenged agency find-
ings of fact are binding on judicial review); Wallace v. State
ex rel PERS, 249 Or App 214, 215, 275 P3d 997, rev den, 352
Or 342 (2012) (on review, court draws from unchallenged
agency factual findings, supplemented by the record). The
pertinent statutory scheme and rules, and any relevant leg-
islative history, are appropriate for this court to review and
consider independent of ERB’s “factual findings” describing
that scheme.2 Cf. Dept. of Human Services v. J. R. F., 351 Or
570, 579, 273 P3d 87 (2012) (court has independent obliga-
tion to interpret statutes correctly, which includes consider-
ing relevant context).
A. The Unification of Oregon’s Court System
From statehood and into the early 1980s, Oregon’s
state trial court system (circuit and district courts) was
largely funded and administered at the county level; only
the Supreme Court, initially, and later the Court of Appeals
and Tax Court, were fully state-funded and centrally
administered. Although trial court judges were state offi-
cials and paid by the state, all other trial court staff were
county employees. Their salaries, benefits, work responsibil-
ities, and other terms of their employment were the respon-
sibility of the respective counties in which the state’s trial
courts were located. 1980 Report of the Oregon Commission
on the Judicial Branch at 5-6, 26 (February 1981) (1980
Report).3

2
We do not suggest any error or inaccuracy in ERB’s statutory and rule-
based “findings.” But our own review and discussion touches on aspects of the
statutes and their legislative history not mentioned by ERB.
3
Although we cite the 1980 Report for some of the legislative historical con-
text, aspects of the same history were recounted at the hearing by then-Chief
Justice Balmer and then-State Court Administrator Kingsley Click.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 797

That system of locally funded and operated trial
courts changed with the enactment of what at the time was
commonly termed the “Court Reform Act.” 4 Beginning in
1983, the legislature consolidated Oregon’s trial courts, Tax
Court, and appellate courts into a single unified court sys-
tem funded directly by the state and administered centrally
on a statewide basis.5 Trial court employees ceased to be
employees of the individual counties in which they worked
and instead became employees of the state. ORS 8.235.
Each county’s responsibility was primarily limited to main-
taining its respective physical courthouse facility, which
remained county property. ORS 1.185(1).
A host of concerns prompted that legislative change.
Among them was that trial court funding by “36 counties in
36 budgets,” even as supplemented by some state funding,
led to “levels of support [that were] uneven and often unpre-
dictable.” 1980 Report at 5. Also, the trial judges who exer-
cised administrative responsibility at the local level were
often selected by their peers for reasons other than their
“administrative talents.” Id. Regardless of their administra-
tive abilities, those judges had “little control over the county
personnel upon whom they [had to] rely to perform judicial
duties.” Id. And although the Chief Justice had some general
administrative and supervisory authority over the court
system as a whole, in practice that authority was ineffec-
tive. Id. As a result, there was “little administrative cohe-
sion and less administrative accountability in the judicial
branch” than in the other branches of government. Id. The
legislature distilled those and other concerns that led to the
unification of Oregon’s court system into a statutory decla-
ration of purpose:
4
Or Laws 1981, ch 1 and ch 3 (Spec Sess); see Circuit Court v. AFSCME, 295
Or 542, 546 n 2, 669 P2d 314 (1983) (referring to legislation as “Court Reform
Act”); Lent v. ERB, 63 Or App 400, 402 n 1, 664 P2d 1110, rev den, 295 Or 617
(1983) (same).
5
An additional aspect of the proposed court reform was to consolidate the
district and circuit courts into a single circuit court system. Distinguished mem-
bers of the bench and bar had argued for that consolidation since at least the
early 1970s. See generally 1980 Report at 63-64; Kenneth J. O’Connell, We Should
Unify the Trial Courts in Oregon, 51 Or L Rev 641 (1972). The legislature did not
undertake the district court-circuit court consolidation as part of the massive
changes it implemented in 1983 with the Court Reform Act; that further reform
instead came later. Or Laws 1995, ch 658 (effective Jan 1, 1998).
798 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

“The Legislative Assembly hereby declares that, as a mat-
ter of statewide concern, it is in the best interests of the
people of this state that the judicial branch of state gov-
ernment, including the appellate, tax and circuit courts,
be funded and operated at the state level. The Legislative
Assembly finds that state funding and operation of the
judicial branch can provide for best statewide allocation of
governmental resources according to the actual needs of
the people and of the judicial branch by establishing an
accountable, equitably funded and uniformly administered
system of justice for all the people of this state.”
ORS 1.001.
B. Administrative Structure of the Unified Court System
Central to achieving an accountable, equitably
funded, and uniformly administered justice system was
“the establishment of clear and direct lines of administra-
tive authority and accountability within the judicial branch,
with a strong executive office of Chief Justice.” 1980 Report
at 5. To that end, the legislature designated the Chief
Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court as the “head of the
judicial department” with “administrative authority and
supervision over the courts of this state[.]” ORS 1.002. The
administrative powers and responsibilities that the legisla-
ture conferred on the Chief Justice are wide-ranging and
extensive. For OJD generally, as well as for the individual
state courts, the Chief Justice is charged with, among other
responsibilities: determining all policies and procedures
for budget and fiscal management; setting staffing levels;
assigning or reassigning all court staff; devising all person-
nel rules and policies, including compensation and benefits;
overseeing the acquisition, use and disposition of all prop-
erty used by the courts; providing for court security, emer-
gency preparedness, and the continuation of court services
in emergencies; designing and implementing technological
and other business processes for court operations; and over-
seeing all court services to the public, including prescribing
uniform rules of procedures for civil and criminal proceed-
ings. See ORS 1.002 (enumerating general powers of Chief
Justice); ORS 1.006 (authority over uniform rules of court
procedure); ORS 1.008 (responsibility over personnel, bud-
get, and property management); ORS 1.177 (responsibility
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 799

for court security, emergency preparedness, and business
continuity planning).
The Chief Justice is aided by the State Court
Administrator, who is appointed by and serves at the plea-
sure of the Chief Justice. ORS 8.110(2). The Chief Justice
may delegate to the State Court Administrator any of the
Chief Justice’s administrative powers. ORS 1.002(9); ORS
8.125(1). The legislature has specified that, subject to the
Chief Justice’s direction, the State Court Administrator’s
responsibilities include, among other aspects of running the
state court system: supervising the personnel plan for non-
judicial officers and employees of the court; budget prepa-
ration and fiscal accounting; property management; con-
tinually surveying administrative methods and business
activities of the state courts; making recommendations to
the Chief Justice based on those surveys; compiling statisti-
cal information and reports on court caseloads, workloads,
performance, management, expenses and revenues; and
establishing and supervising education programs for judges,
other officers, and employees of the state courts pertinent to
the performance of their work. ORS 8.125(2). To provide the
centralized operational and infrastructure services needed
for the state court system, the State Court Administrator
oversees a large staff that is divided into several functional
divisions and programs, such as Budget and Fiscal Services
Division, Enterprise Technology Services Division, Human
Resource Services Division, and an internal Audit Office.
Currently, OJD has over 1,200 employees, the vast
majority of whom work in the circuit courts.6 The staffing
level for each court depends on the volume of work and the
number of judges in that court. Some circuit courts have as
6
Each of Oregon’s 36 counties has a circuit court. Each circuit court, in turn,
is in a judicial district. Most judicial districts have only one circuit court. For
those districts, the circuit court’s jurisdiction, the district’s boundary, and the
county’s boundary are the same. In the most rural areas of Oregon, however,
the judicial districts have more than one circuit court and county in them. As a
result, although there are 36 circuit courts in 36 counties, there are only 27 judi-
cial districts. Each judicial district has one presiding judge and one trial court
administrator. As ERB noted in its opinion, the witnesses at the hearing typi-
cally described trial court administration as though the organizational divisions
are by “circuit court” rather than by judicial district, which is de facto accurate
for 21 of the 27 districts. For ease of reference, ERB, for the most part, followed
the witnesses’ phraseology. We do the same.
800 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

few as five employees; the largest has over 300 (judges and
staff combined). The internal organizational structure for
each circuit court, however, is the same.
By statute, the circuit courts are organized into judi-
cial districts, each of which is authorized to have a presid-
ing judge. ORS 1.003(1)(b). Presiding judges are appointed
by the Chief Justice for two-year terms, after which they
may be reappointed or replaced.7 ORS 1.003(2). The legis-
lature has specified that presiding judges have authority to
“[a]pportion and regulate the disposition of the judicial busi-
ness” of the court (i.e., control the scheduling and assign-
ment of cases to other judges). ORS 1.171(2)(a). Their author-
ity beyond that is delegated by the Chief Justice, who is to
“permit as much variation and flexibility in the adminis-
tration of the courts of this state as are appropriate to the
most efficient manner of administering each court, consid-
ering the particular needs and circumstances of the court,
and consistent with the sound and efficient administration
of the judicial department of government in this state.”
ORS 1.002(5). By Chief Justice rule, presiding judges are
accountable to the Chief Justice in the exercise of their
administrative authority and are responsible within their
respective jurisdictions for “the equitable administra-
tion” of all applicable rules and personnel policies. Judicial
Department Personnel Rule (JDPR) 1.02(6).
Subject to the Chief Justice’s authority to order
otherwise, each circuit court also has a trial court adminis-
trator (TCA). TCAs are appointed by, and can be removed by,
the presiding judges of the respective circuit courts, subject
to the Chief Justice’s personnel policies for those decisions.
ORS 8.195(1)(a). The statutory duties prescribed for TCAs
relate mostly to the official proceedings of the courts. See,
e.g., ORS 8.225(2) (responsibility for, inter alia, keeping and
affixing the seal of the court, recording court proceedings,

7
The other circuit court judges of each judicial district can exercise a limited
“veto” over the Chief Justice’s appointment through a written resolution, signed
by a majority of the judges, disapproving the Chief Judge’s nominee. The Chief
Justice then appoints another judge, and that appointment is final in districts
with fewer than five judges; in the remaining districts, the appointment can be
vetoed a second time, after which it is final. ORS 1.003(5).
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 801

maintaining documents, entering orders, and authenticat-
ing records). Under the Chief Justice’s rules, a TCA also has
supervisory authority over all staff, including judicial staff,
for the TCA’s respective court, unless the presiding judge
in writing specifies otherwise. JDPR 1.02(8). By statute, a
court’s presiding judge also may delegate any of the admin-
istrative powers of that position to that court’s TCA. ORS
1.171(4).
C. Centralization and Uniformity
1. Internal court administration
To establish “an accountable, equitably funded and
uniformly administered system of justice,” ORS 1.001, the
Chief Justice and State Court Administrator, from the out-
set of the unified court system, centralized policy author-
ity and oversight of all aspects of court infrastructure and
administration at their level. To that end, they adopted (and
continually update) rules and orders designed to maximize
uniformity and consistency in the internal administration of
the courts. Much of the desired administrative uniformity is
a product of the Judicial Department Personnel Rules that
apply to all OJD employees except judges (as elected offi-
cials) and the State Court Administrator (who serves at the
Chief Justice’s pleasure). The rules, which span nearly 200
pages, begin with a “Forward” explaining that their pur-
pose “is to ensure [that] all employees enjoy the same rights
and terms of conditions of employment.”8 As ERB accurately
described in its order, the JDPRs are
“a comprehensive set of personnel policies and procedures
[that] address matters including classification, compensa-
tion, hiring, trial service, performance standards, griev-
ances, disciplinary actions and appeals, layoffs, assign-
ment of work, leaves (including the types of leaves and
accrual rates), holidays, and personnel records.”
Under the JDPRs, all OJD officers and employees
are subject to a uniform classification and compensation plan
developed by the Human Resources Division of the State

8
The JDPRs were an exhibit at ERB’s hearing and are also online at
https://www.courts.oregon.gov/rules/Other%20Rules/JDPR-01-01-2018.pdf
(accessed June 1, 2020).
802 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

Court Administrator’s office.9 The uniform position classi-
fications are based on general type and level of job duties,
authorities, and responsibilities. For each position classifica-
tion, the compensation range is the same statewide; it does
not vary based on location or other court-specific consider-
ations. Within a classification, the specific tasks assigned to
a particular position can vary from one court to another, and
those variations are reflected in the “position descriptions”
drafted by each court. The variations usually are a function
of court size, with employees in larger courts typically hav-
ing narrower or more specialized duties and employees in
smaller courts typically having broader or more combined
duties. ERB found, however, that, in general, “employees in
the same type of position perform similar duties in a similar
manner, regardless of which court they are employed in.”
Whether a particular employee is correctly classified, given
the specific tasks and responsibilities that the employee
performs, is determined by the State Court Administrator.10
At the hearing, OJD’s Human Resources Director summed
up OJD’s compensation policy as one to pay employees “who
do similar work, the same amount of money * * * across the
state.”
OJD’s uniform compensation plan ensures not only
equitable pay for the staff, but also “equitable funding” of
the individual courts throughout the state. See ORS 1.001
(statement of legislative purpose). As ERB found, OJD
receives its funding from the legislature as an approved
lump sum based on a comprehensive budget request sub-
mitted by the Chief Justice. In calculating OJD’s budget
request, OJD “accounts for all personnel costs, including
circuit court employees’ compensation.” OJD “can easily cal-
culate the circuit courts’ personnel costs, in part because

90
To ensure the Chief Justice’s broad authority to set compensation and
other terms of employment, the legislature specifically exempts all state court
officers and employees from the State Personnel Relations Law (ORS chapter
240) that applies to state employees generally. ORS 8.170.
10
Employees who believe that they have been misclassified based on the
work assigned to them may pursue a classification review that culminates with
the State Court Administrator. If the State Court Administrator agrees that
an employee is working out of class, the presiding judge and TCA for the court
involved must either promote that employee to the proper classification or remove
the job duties that do not conform to the employee’s classification.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 803

payroll is centralized and classification compensation rates
are [the same] statewide.” Funds are then allocated to the
individual circuit courts on essentially a pro rata basis. The
uniformity of compensation across the state courts ensures
that each court, relative to its size, can afford the same level
of staffing and deliver the same level of court services to the
public.
In addition to compensation, ERB identified other
basic terms and conditions of employment that are set
through the JDPRs and apply uniformly to all OJD officers
and employees. For example, all court officers and employ-
ees receive the same employment benefits (e.g., medical,
dental, and insurance) and participate in the same retire-
ment system. The types of leave that they receive (e.g., vaca-
tion, sick, family, and personal time) and the rates of leave
accrual are uniform. All workers’ compensation claims are
handled directly by the Human Resources Division rather
than through the court for whom an employee works. All
disciplinary action is subject either to the State Court
Administrator’s immediate authority or subsequent over-
sight.11 In addition to those uniform policies noted by ERB,
the JDPRs address a wide range of other terms and con-
ditions of employment as well, such as policies on equal
employment opportunity (JDPR 5); recruitment, selection,
and trial service (JDPR 6); performance standards and
feedback (JDPR 7); layoffs (JDPR 11); resignations and job
abandonment (JDPR 12); work weeks and breaks (JDPR 13);
family and personal workplace relationships (JDPR 18); and
political activity (JDPR 21).
2. Uniformity of judicial procedures
A second means of achieving a uniform justice sys-
tem in Oregon has been to standardize the procedures and
11
As ERB found, the only disciplinary action that a presiding judge or TCA
may take without first consulting the State Court Administrator’s office is a
written reprimand. A written reprimand, however, is subject to a grievance pro-
cess by which the employee may challenge that disciplinary action and have it
reviewed by the Human Resources Director or the State Court Administrator.
All other disciplinary actions—such as pay reductions, suspensions, and
dismissals—must be taken in consultation with the Human Resources Division.
For all disciplinary actions, the employee may pursue a formal appeal process
before an independent board of judges, supervisors, and nonsupervisory employ-
ees appointed by the Chief Justice. JDPR 10.02 (appeals board composition).
804 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

practices for conducting judicial business. In general, all
courts must be open during standard business hours, with
only minor deviation from those hours as approved by the
Chief Justice or State Court Administrator, such as a court’s
exact opening and closing times, whether it remains open
over the lunch hour, or whether it is open for operation of a
night court. Court closures for holidays are uniform. JDPR
17.01-.02 (declaring dates of observed holidays and incorpo-
rating holidays designated in ORS 187.020). The immediate
decision to close a court due to inclement weather is made at
the local circuit court level by the presiding judge, but it must
be made pursuant to and consistently with detailed proto-
cols and criteria set by order of the Chief Justice. The State
Court Administrator, through the Security and Emergency
Preparedness Office (former title; now Marshall’s Office),
provides standardized security training to all OJD judges
and court employees, sets minimum safety requirements
for all of the state’s courts, and sometimes provides fund-
ing or other resources to meet an individual court’s particu-
lar security needs. The Chief Justice can also order special
court closures on a temporary basis for emergencies, which,
as ERB noted, happened when severe budget constraints
resulted in statewide court closures on Fridays for a period
of time.12
State court procedural practices likewise have
become more consistent pursuant to the Chief Justice’s
authority under ORS 1.006 to “prescribe by rule the form of
written process, notices, motions and pleadings” in civil and
criminal proceedings in state courts. The Chief Justice has
exercised that authority by promulgating the Uniform Trial
Court Rules (UTCRs), which, with only a few exceptions,
“apply uniformly to all proceedings and actions in circuit
court[.]” UTCR 1.010. As accurately described by ERB:
“The UTCRs govern the broadest matters in the court
system such as standards for pleadings and documents,

12
More recently, the Chief Justice has had to implement far-reaching mea-
sures statewide in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, postponing all nones-
sential judicial proceedings, limiting public access to courts, reducing staffing
at the courthouses, and taking other steps to reduce the risk of contagion to
the public and court staff. See, e.g., Chief Justice Order No. 20-006 (Amended)
(Mar 27, 2020).
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 805

decorum in proceedings, case management, and calen-
daring. They also address the proper procedures in small
claims court, complex litigation, contempt proceedings,
juvenile court proceedings, domestic relations proceedings,
criminal cases, civil cases, and trials.”
An even greater level of uniformity in statewide
court “business practices” has been achieved with the
implementation of Oregon “eCourt.” The eCourt system
is an integrated technology system for case management;
public access services, such as ePayment, eFiling, and case
searching; centralized financial management; and docu-
ment management, among other features. The system has
“affected nearly every workflow, every business process,
every staff person, trial court administrator, and every
judge in Oregon’s circuit courts[.]” Oregon Judicial Branch,
2016 Annual Report: Focus on Technology 9 (Oregon Judicial
Department 2017) (Ex. R-21). As ERB found:
“Oregon eCourt has made the business processes, forms,
and data entry practices that are used throughout the var-
ious courts more streamlined and uniform. The eCourt
system has also further integrated the courts by, for exam-
ple, enabling employees to access documents or accept pay-
ments for a case in a different circuit court.”
The eCourt system has thus accomplished tighter statewide
integration of the courts’ work, not just in terms of how that
work is done, but also what is done, so that staff in every
court can immediately determine if, for example, a person
before their court is subject to a restraining or child cus-
tody order or is already on a payment schedule elsewhere in
the state. That enhanced functional integration effectively
permits each circuit court to immediately coordinate their
orders with every other circuit court in a way not previously
possible.
The fact that circuit courts throughout the state
perform substantially the same work, using largely stan-
dardized practices and procedures, is important to the judi-
ciary’s ability to provide “business continuity” despite unex-
pected disruptions or emergencies. A central objective of
unifying Oregon’s state courts was to ensure that all judges
and court employees are “statewide resources,” who are able
806 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

to perform the work of any court anywhere in the state,
which in turn ensures the equitable operation of all courts
throughout the state. To that end, as already described, the
Chief Justice has the authority to assign or reassign all staff
and judges.13 That authority was used, for example, when
several Clatsop County Circuit Court employees became ill
during a flu outbreak. Tillamook County Circuit Court staff
were brought into Clatsop County Circuit Court to help,
which they did; first, however, the Tillamook staff had to be
trained on various different case practices and procedures
that the Clatsop staff used under the state court’s older
technology system, which permitted considerable court-by-
court customization. With the statewide implementation of
eCourt, which had been recently accomplished at the time of
ERB’s hearing in this case, OJD has moved much closer to
realizing the goal of having all staff and judges be statewide
resources to the court system. ERB specifically found that,
although some “minor variations” among the circuit court’s
business processes and procedures still exist, eCourt in par-
ticular had significantly advanced OJD’s ongoing efforts “to
limit or reduce the variation among the circuit courts’ rules
and practices” and that OJD expected that uniformity to
continue to increase in the future.
D. Some Flexibility at the Circuit Court Level
In limited areas, administrative policies and proce-
dural practices at the circuit courts may permissibly vary. In
general, the Chief Justice tries to give the presiding judges
and TCAs “reasonable flexibility” in ways that will advance
the goal of efficient delivery of judicial services, while
maintaining the uniformity necessary for an “accountable,

13
Beginning with Chief Justice Peterson in the initial years of the unified
court system, each Chief Justice has maintained a standing order making each
appointed or elected judge a pro tem judge for every circuit court in the state. A
judge therefore can, without procedural delay and as needed, immediately assist
another circuit court outside of the judicial district where the judge is elected or
appointed to serve. As then-Chief Justice Balmer described at the hearing, in
Oregon’s most rural counties, the need for cross-circuit court assistance arises
frequently because, for example, a judge in one rural county may have a multi-
day trial or a conflict. In that event, on a pro tem basis, a judge in a nearby
circuit, by video or otherwise, can preside for a case, a motion ruling, a settle-
ment conference, or a plea, and that judge’s staff can handle all the procedures
involved.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 807

equitably funded and uniformly administered,” ORS 1.001,
single statewide court system.
In terms of court procedural practices, each court
has Supplementary Local Rules (SLRs) that must be consis-
tent with the UTCRs and are approved by the Chief Justice.
SLRs typically address matters such as the scheduling of
cases (e.g., when ex parte or in-custody hearings are held);
whether the court is open or closed over the lunch hour; and
localized differences in the traditional ways some judges
or counties have handled certain kinds of issues (e.g., par-
enting plans). SLRs also sometimes reflect differences in
the availability (or lack) of local resources that are beyond
OJD’s control, such as outside health care providers, drug
rehabilitation services, mediators, and social services. Over
the years, with increases in standardized business practices
in general and with the implementation of eCourt in par-
ticular, the role for SLRs has declined and predictably will
continue to do so into the future.
In terms of personnel policies, the JDPRs also
accord the circuit court presiding judges and TCAs latitude
in some areas. As ERB described, in some instances the pre-
siding judge or TCA is able, under the JDPRs, to select from
specified options; in other areas, they may have discretion to
exercise judgment:
“For example, each circuit court administration may decide
whether to provide their employees with performance eval-
uations; whether to compensate their employees for over-
time by cash payment or compensatory time; whether to
grant or deny their employees annual salary increases;[14]
and whether to adopt a Flexible Employee Recognition
Plan.[15] Additionally, each circuit court administration has

14
As the dissenting member explained, unless an employee is at the top of
the salary range for a particular classification, an annual salary increase may be
denied only after giving the employee written notice of the reason for the denial,
such as the failure to meet the conduct and performance standards set by the
JDPRs. JDPR 4.03(3)(c)(ii).
15
ERB further explained that a Flexible Employee Recognition Plan “per-
mits a circuit court administration to recognize outstanding employee per-
formance with gift cards or sponsored social events. If a court administration
decides to adopt such a plan, they must choose from a set of plan options provided
by the State Court Administrator, and the plan must be approved by the State
Court Administrator.” To implement such a plan, a circuit court must form a
808 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

substantial discretion over their employees’ schedules, e.g.,
they decide whether to allow employees to have part-time
or flexible work schedules. Each circuit court administra-
tion also has discretion over various leave issues, includ-
ing the standards or criteria by which leave requests will
be granted or denied; the order in which their employees
may use various types of leave; whether their employees
may use sick leave to care for certain persons who do not
meet the standard definition for qualified family members;
and whether their employees may receive donations of paid
leave.”

(Original footnotes omitted.) Other examples include author-
ity at the circuit court level to reorganize work assignments
among the respective court staff; whether to fill a vacancy
through open competition or through internal OJD-only
announcement; and whether to deal with a major budget
shortfall by laying off employees, leaving vacancies open, or
reducing some employees to part-time status.
Those and all other areas of administrative flexibil-
ity and discretion at the circuit court level are never com-
pletely unconstrained, however. All circuit court adminis-
trative authority must be exercised consistently with the
JDPRs. For some local court decisions, varying degrees of
central oversight are built in. For example, if a presiding
judge and TCA opt to reduce staff due to a budget short-
fall, they must prepare a layoff plan for approval by the
State Court Administrator and must follow the JDPR layoff
rules, which include, among other provisions, layoff order
and notice requirements, as well as employee displacement
(bumping) rights. As another example, in filling vacancies,
the JDPRs specify criteria and procedures for all recruit-
ment methods; for recruitment from outside of OJD, the
rules require close coordination with the Human Resources
and Fiscal Divisions of the State Court Administrator’s
office. And beyond those and other explicit constraints is
the Chief Justice’s plenary authority as the administrative
head of Oregon’s uniform state court system, complete with

committee of local court staff to recommend what awards should be given under
the plan and then to review and approve those awards. The plan must be posted
and each circuit court has the same maximum percentage of its budget to use to
fund the recognition awards.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 809

the power to issue all rules and orders appropriate to her
role. ORS 1.002(1)(a). Given that authority, the Chief Justice
effectively can reverse, modify, or supplant any exercise of
circuit court administrative discretion at any time, thus
rendering all such exercises subject to the Chief Justice’s
ultimate control.
Finally, OJD has structured training and informa-
tion exchanges among the staff of the various state courts in
ways that both formally and informally facilitate standard-
ization and uniformity in areas where local prerogatives
remain. As ERB found, OJD has standing committees and
workgroups comprised of volunteer judges, administrators,
and other employees from the various courts who meet to
exchange ideas and make recommendations on court policies
and practices. One example was the Court Re-engineering
and Efficiencies Workgroup (CREW), which for several years
generated suggestions on how to improve efficiency and con-
sistency in circuit court operational practices. Other exam-
ples have included Peer Information Exchanges, Process
Improvement Teams, a classification advisory committee,
an advisory policy committee, and a local forms committee.
Also, the Chief Justice meets at least twice a year,
and sometimes a third time, with the presiding judges as a
group. The TCAs also meet as a group at least two to three
times a year. In those meetings, presiding judges and TCAs
exchange ideas and experiences with their peers on “best
practices” so that circuit courts are all “on the same page”
as much as possible. And, through the Communication,
Education and Court Management Division (former title;
now Office of Policy and Education), OJD provides optional
(and sometimes mandatory, as with eCourt) training pro-
grams for supervisors and employees statewide. Those
include, for example, centrally and regularly held employee
orientations for new court employees from across the state,
which are voluntary but are attended by the vast major-
ity of new employees. Another example is the OJD “Clerk
College,” through which, in a university-like setting over a
three-day period, court staff can take classes on a variety
of subjects, such as processing different kinds of cases or
developing “soft skills” like customer service communication
and writing abilities.
810 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

E. Yamhill County Circuit Court
The Yamhill County Circuit Court has one presid-
ing judge, three other judges, and a TCA. Excluding the
judges, the TCA, and a staff person charged with supervi-
sion of court operations, Yamhill County Circuit Court has
27 employees. Judicial assistants and courtroom clerks are
jointly supervised by the judges and the TCA; they work on
the second floor of the courthouse. Other employees, includ-
ing cashiers and clerks, generally work on the first floor of
the courthouse and are supervised by the TCA and a court
operations supervisor. Although it is possible for circuit
court employees to seek positions in and transfer to other
courts, Yamhill County Circuit Court employees have not
commonly done so. In the past 12 years, only two or three
employees have transferred between Yamhill and other
state circuit courts.
ERB found that, although the Yamhill court employ-
ees occasionally interact with employees in other courts,
those interactions are not a regular part of their work. They
occur, for example, when employees participate in central-
ized OJD trainings or Peer Information Exchanges. Also,
because the Yamhill County Circuit Court was the pilot
court for eCourt, some of the Yamhill staff went to other
circuit courts to help their staff train as eCourt was imple-
mented statewide. Similarly, some Yamhill staff went
to Benton County Circuit Court for mentoring when the
Yamhill County Circuit Court decided to adopt a calendar-
ing system similar to Benton County’s. For the most part,
however, the Yamhill court employees work only in their
own courthouse and with each other, and have only limited
interactions with the employees of the other circuit courts.
ERB made several specific findings about partic-
ular administrative policy and procedures decisions made
by the Yamhill County Circuit Court Presiding Judge and
TCA. Because of their significance to the issues in this case,
we quote ERB’s findings in that regard:
“55. Employees in the Yamhill County Circuit Court
have been dissatisfied with certain policies and practices
adopted by the trial court administrator or presiding judge.
In some cases, the trial court administrator has denied
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 811

employees’ leave requests based on unwritten standards,
including, for example, her preference that employees accu-
mulate substantial sick and vacation leave balances before
using leave.
“56. The Yamhill County Circuit Court administration
has the discretion to require part-time employees to switch
to full-time or resign, and has exercised that discretion.
“57. The Yamhill administration has adopted a policy
generally eliminating employees’ ability to work ‘adjusted
work hours,’ also known as ‘flex time.’ Previously, when flex
time was permitted, employees could adjust their regular
schedule for a particular workday or workweek (for exam-
ple, an employee could arrive at work 15 minutes early and
leave work 15 minutes early on a certain day).
“58. The Yamhill County Circuit Court administration
has the discretion to deny employees’ requests for flexi-
ble work schedules, and has exercised that discretion. For
example, they denied an employee’s request for a flexible
schedule (with an earlier start and end time) to accommo-
date her childcare issues. In another case, a judicial assis-
tant asked if she could work on a flexible schedule because
her daughter had been seriously injured and would require
a lot of long-term care. Initially, she was told that she could
keep her judicial assistant position and adopt a flexible
schedule when she returned from her leave of absence.
However, upon her return to work, she was told that was no
longer an option. The administration said she could either
continue working as a judicial assistant without a flexible
schedule, or move to a clerk position with more flexibility.
“59. The Yamhill County Circuit Courthouse does not
have its own parking structure. Employees may use a
nearby public parking garage, but due to safety concerns,
many employees prefer to park on the street instead of the
garage. Recently, however, the presiding judge issued an
order prohibiting courthouse employees from parking on
the streets directly adjacent to the courthouse, in an effort
to make those spots available for members of the public.
“60. On one occasion, a Yamhill County Circuit Court
employee anonymously reported to HR Services that the
Yamhill administration was going to close the courthouse
the day after Thanksgiving and require all of the employ-
ees to take leave. The State Court Administrator inter-
vened, and the courthouse remained open.”
812 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

F. History of Collective Bargaining
AFSCME has attempted at least three times—30
years, 14 years, and 6 years before ERB’s hearing in this
case—to organize all OJD’s employees into a single state-
wide bargaining unit (a so-called “wall to wall” bargaining
unit). The Service Employees International Union has also
“more than once” made efforts to organize a wall-to-wall
bargaining unit of OJD employees. AFSCME representa-
tives who were involved in efforts to form a wall-to-wall OJD
bargaining unit believed those efforts had failed because
employee concerns and priorities differed from “court to
court, due to regional differences in culture and economic
conditions (such as the cost of living), as well as differences
in the employees’ court specific working conditions, the sizes
of their courts, and their relationships with their court
administrators and judges.”
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
As we have described, AFSCME petitioned ERB to
certify a bargaining unit comprised of the 27 nonsupervi-
sory OJD employees working in the Yamhill County Circuit
Court. OJD objected to the certification contending that,
under the applicable criteria, the proposed employee group
was too small a segment of OJD’s workforce to be an “appro-
priate” bargaining unit. ERB concluded otherwise and
ordered the certification, which resulted in OJD’s petition
for review. We begin with a general overview of the legal
standards that apply to ERB’s certification decision, which
provides context for ERB’s decision and the parties’ respec-
tive arguments on review.
A. Controlling Legal Principles
The legislature enacted PECBA with the declared
purpose of “providing a uniform basis for recognizing the
right of public employees to join organizations of their own
choice, and to be represented by such organizations in
their employment relations with public employers[.]” ORS
243.656(6). As already noted, under PECBA, Oregon pub-
lic employees may exercise their right to join a labor orga-
nization of their choice without any action by ERB. But a
labor organization can become the exclusive bargaining
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 813

representative for a group of employees—one with which
their public employer must bargain—only through ERB cer-
tification or voluntary recognition by the public employer.
ORS 243.666(1). Because OJD has not recognized AFSCME
as the exclusive bargaining representative for the 27 non-
supervisory employees in the Yamhill County Circuit Court,
this case involves ERB’s certification authority.
1. The appropriate unit determination
For ERB to certify a labor organization as the exclu-
sive representative of a group of public employees, ERB must
determine that the group of employees who desire to be repre-
sented by a particular labor organization would comprise an
“appropriate bargaining unit.”16 See ORS 243.650(1) (defin-
ing “appropriate bargaining unit” to include “the unit des-
ignated by [ERB] to be appropriate for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining”); ORS 243.682 (setting out procedures and
criteria for ERB’s designation of group of employees as an
“appropriate bargaining unit”). By statute, in making that
determination, ERB must “consider such factors as commu-
nity of interest, wages, hours and other working conditions
of the employees involved, the history of collective bargain-
ing, and the desires of the employees.” ORS 243.682(1)(a).
Also by statute, ERB may “determine a unit to be the appro-
priate unit in a particular case even though some other unit
might also be appropriate.” Id. Thus, as ERB has observed,
it is not required to certify “the most appropriate unit, only
an appropriate unit.” E.g., AFSCME v. Douglas County, 26
PECBR 358, 388 (2015) (emphasis in original). That does not
mean, however, that any unit is appropriate. For a unit to be
an appropriate one, ERB must apply the statutory criteria
in a way that “best effectuates the purposes and policies of
PECBA.” Assoc. of Public Employees v. OSSHE and OPEU,
10 PECBR 883, 888 (1988).

16
The desires of the employees to be represented by a petitioning labor
organization are determined either through an election after unit certifica-
tion or by a showing, verified by ERB, that a majority of the employees at the
petition stage have already indicated their support. See generally ORS 243.682
(2) - (4) (procedural requirements to petition for representation election and cer-
tification without election). In this case, AFSCME supported its petition with the
requisite showing of advance majority support and sought certification without
election.
814 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

Oregon is not unique in using the “appropriate bar-
gaining unit” as the organizing principle for public sector
collective bargaining. That unit model concept originated
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for the pri-
vate sector and has been adopted by virtually every state
for public sector collective bargaining.17 Traditionally, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has assessed the
appropriateness of proposed bargaining units under a “com-
munity of interest” doctrine that groups together employees
based on the “mutuality” of their interests in “wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment.”18 For both private and
public sector collective bargaining, unit determination is
generally regarded as being “of fundamental importance,”
because that determination is “both a prerequisite to nego-
tiations and a vital factor in their structure and outcome.”
Lee C. Shaw & R. Theodore Jr. Clark, Determination of
Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector: Legal
and Practical Problems, 51 Or L Rev 151, 152 (1971). Unit
determination has particular importance in the public
sector:
“In the public sector, the scope and nature of the unit found
to be appropriate will * * * affect the range of subjects which
can be negotiated meaningfully, the role played in the pro-
cess by the separate branches of government, the likeli-
hood of peaceful resolution of disputes, order versus chaos
in bargaining, and ultimately, perhaps, the success of the
whole idea of collective bargaining for public employees.”

Eli Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public
Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 67 Mich L Rev 1001,
1001 (1969). ERB likewise has characterized the appropri-
ate unit determination under ORS 243.682 as “integral” to
the collective bargaining rights and policies that PECBA
furthers. Assoc. of Public Employees, 10 PECBR at 888.

17
Andria S. Knapp, Anatomy of a Public Sector Bargaining Unit, 35 Case
W Res L Rev 395, 404 (1985). See generally Marcus R. Widenor, Public Sector
Bargaining in Oregon: The Enactment of the PECBA, 8 LERC Monograph Ser 1,
17 (1989) (PECBA modeled on NLRA and was intended, among other goals, to
“rationalize the determination of bargaining units” among public employees).
18
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 US 157, 172, 92 S Ct 383, 30 L Ed 2d 341 (1971)
(discussing NLRB test (citing 15 NLRB Annual Report 39 (1950))).
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 815

2. Factors in determining whether a unit is “appropriate”
Although ORS 243.682(1)(a) lists “community of
interest” as a “factor” to be considered, ERB in practice has
treated it, consistently with the traditional NLRB “commu-
nity of interest” doctrine identified above, as a “comprehen-
sive term that encompasses other factors listed” in the stat-
ute (i.e., wages, hours, other working conditions). E.g., Dept.
of Administrative Services v. AFSCME, 15 PECBR 786, 795
(1995). By the statute’s terms, the list of factors for ERB to
consider are not exclusive. Through the directive for ERB to
consider factors “such as” those listed in the statute, ERB
has interpretative authority through rulemaking—both for-
mally promulgated rules and policies adopted through case
adjudication—to consider other factors of like character
and to refine the listed criteria consistently with the stat-
ute’s generally expressed legislative policy. See Springfield
Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 225-30, 232-33,
621 P2d 547 (1980) (discussing general principles of agency
interpretative authority and analyzing ERB’s author-
ity under PECBA in particular); U of O Chapter, AFT v.
U of O, 92 Or App 614, 619, 759 P2d 1112 (1988) (acknowledg-
ing ERB’s interpretative authority under ORS 243.682(1)).
ERB traditionally has interpreted “community of
interest” to encompass, in addition to wages, hours, and
working conditions, “similarity of duties, skills, benefits,
interchange or transfer of employees, promotional ladders,
common supervision, etc.” Douglas County, 26 PECBR at
388 (citing former ERB rule).19 And, by rule, ERB has pro-
vided that a bargaining unit, if otherwise an appropriate
one under the relevant criteria, “may consist of all of the

19
ERB’s interpretative expansion of the term “community of interest” is con-
sistent with the federal law-derived community of interest factor that PECBA
adopted. See AFSCME Council 75 v. City of Lebanon, 360 Or 809, 817, 825, 388
P3d 1028 (2017) (PECBA is patterned after the NLRA in many respects; fed-
eral cases interpreting NLRA can provide guidance in interpreting parallel
provisions of PECBA). Under federal law, in addition to wages, “community of
interest” typically encompasses considerations such as “similarity of duties,
skills, working conditions, and benefits; the employer’s organizational structure
including supervision; the distinctiveness of the functions performed; and the
extent to which work processes are integrated.” Shaw & Clark, Determination of
Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector: Legal and Practical Problems,
51 Or L Rev at 164 (citing representative cases; footnote omitted).
816 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

employees of the employer, or any department, division,
section or area, or any part or combination thereof[.]” OAR
115-025-0050(1).
Through case adjudication, ERB has identified other
relevant policy-based factors as well. Particularly “promi-
nent” among them is ERB’s well-established policy of non-
fragmentation of public workplaces. Oregon Workers Union
v. Dept. of Transportation and SEIU, 21 PECBR 873, 883
(2007) (internal quotes and citations omitted). As ERB has
explained, fragmentation is “inimical to stable labor rela-
tions under PECBA” and harms both the public employees’
and employers’ interests alike. Assoc. of Public Employees,
10 PECBR at 889. In terms of the employees’ interests:
“The creation of multiple splinter units of a public work force
waters down the bargaining power of affected employees to
the point where bargaining becomes an exercise in futil-
ity. The multiple small groups can be played one against
the other in a whip-saw fashion to make a charade of the
bargaining process. In the case of multiple small bargain-
ing units of strike-permitted employees, little incentive
exists to resolve differences under the bargaining proce-
dures established by the PECBA, as the threat of strike by
such small groups would be of little consequence to public
employers. Thus, fragmentation into multiple units serves
to destroy rather than preserve parity of bargaining power
which [the PECBA] seeks to establish.”
Id. In terms of employers’ interests, avoiding fragmenta-
tion “promotes workplace stability and prevents the undue
burden [that] would fall on public employers if they had to
engage in bargaining sessions for the many splinter groups
on a round-robin basis.” Oregon Workers Union, 21 PECBR
at 883 (internal quotes and citation omitted).20 For the pub-
lic generally, because more bargaining units increase the
potential for labor disputes that can result in work stop-
pages, avoiding fragmentation serves the PECBA goal of
20
“Undue burden” on the public employer includes not only the time and
resources needed to bargain with (and later administer the multiple contracts
with) a number of different bargaining units, but also the potential for the
employer to be “whipsawed” as a result of different labor organizations competing
for higher and better contract settlement packages. See, e.g., Div. of State Lands
Employees Assoc. v. Div. of State Lands, 7 PECBR 6118, 6129 (1983) (discussing
nonfragmentation policy).
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 817

minimizing impairment or interruption of necessary public
services. Id.
As a well-established corollary to its nonfragmenta-
tion policy, ERB also has a policy-based preference for certi-
fying the “largest possible appropriate unit,” which a “wall-
to-wall” bargaining unit carries out to the “fullest extent.”
Welches Education Assn. v. Welches School Dist., 12 PECBR
304, 311, 311 n 7 (1990), aff’d, 116 Or App 564 , 842 P2d 437
(1992). That preference rests on the pragmatic recognition
that “[l]arger units tend to better equalize bargaining power”
and most fully advance PECBA’s objectives of efficient bar-
gaining, stable labor relations, and uninterrupted public
services. Oregon Workers Union, 21 PECBR at 883 (empha-
sis added). ERB’s nonfragmentation and largest-possible-
appropriate-unit policies are thus grounded in the same
statutory goals and purposes. U of O, 92 Or App at 618.21
3. ERB’s adjudicative role and appellate court review
For many bargaining unit determinations, the deci-
sion whether to certify a particular proposed unit requires
ERB, after considering the relevant criteria, to “balance
competing policies of the PECBA: e.g., the promotion of
labor relations stability and the equalization of bargaining
power versus the right of employees to choose an exclusive

21
The two policies, although complementary, are not the same. See Oregon
Workers Union, 21 PECBR at 883 n 5, 883-84 (declining to consider “wall-to-wall”
preference while still considering nonfragmentation policy). ERB’s policy favor-
ing a wall-to-wall (or other largest appropriate) unit is a preference to certify the
“most” appropriate unit possible. See, e.g., Oregon Nurses Assn. v. Or. State Bd.
Of Higher Educ., 8 PECBR 6716, 6716 (1984) (order on reconsideration) (describ-
ing ERB’s goal on case-by-case basis to move state’s historically highly frag-
mented workforce into “most” appropriate—i.e., largest possible—bargaining
unit or units). It reflects ERB’s permissible choice to require more than the leg-
islative minimum for the appropriate unit determination and thus to maximize
the purposes that PECBA serves. See ORS 243.682(1)(a) (ERB may determine
unit to be appropriate “even though some other unit might also be appropriate”).
Fragmentation, on the other hand, compromises, and at some point defeats, the
PECBA policies that unit determination serves. See Assoc. of Public Employees,
10 PECBR at 888-89 (discussing various ways that undue fragmentation frus-
trates PECBA’s goals). Fragmentation is a factor that weighs against finding a
proposed unit to be “an appropriate” one, not just a factor that makes the pro-
posed unit less appropriate than some other. See, e.g., IBEW v. Eugene Water &
Electric Board, 23 PECBR 739, 765 (2010) (separate bargaining unit of only nine
of about 350 unrepresented employees would fragment workforce, which disfa-
vors certification).
818 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

representative.” OPEU v. Corrections Dept. and Exec. Dept.
and AFSCME, 12 PECBR 876, 889-90 n 17 (1991). Like
other administrative bodies, ERB “possesses the collective
expertise of its members” along with the expertise devel-
oped “by virtue of its administrative function”; it is expected
to use its expertise in evaluating and understanding the
evidence in the cases that come before it. Rolfe v. Psychiatric
Security Review Board, 53 Or App 941, 948, 951, 633 P2d
846, rev den, 292 Or 334 (1981) (discussing the Psychiatric
Security Review Board’s expertise and adjudicative role);
see ORS 240.060(1) (identifying background, experience,
and interest required for governor’s selection of ERB mem-
bers). Thus, ERB’s adjudicative role is typical of administra-
tive decision-making in general: It blends factfinding with
subject-matter expertise.
But, as is also true of other agencies, ERB’s orders
are subject to judicial review. City of Hermiston v. ERB, 280
Or 291, 294, 570 P2d 663 (1977). The standard of our review
is the same as for other administrative bodies. This court
does not weigh the evidence anew or otherwise judicially
interfere with how ERB evaluates, weighs, and balances
competing criteria to reach a decision. U of O, 92 Or App
at 620 (ERB weighs factors bearing on unit determination
“free of judicial intervention”); OSEA v. Deschutes County,
40 Or App 371, 376, 595 P2d 501 (1979) (weight to be given
various criteria in a given case is for ERB, not reviewing
court); see ORS 183.482(7) (reviewing court shall not substi-
tute its judgment for that of agency on any issue of fact). We
do, however, review ERB’s decisions for substantial evidence
and substantial reasoning. Deschutes County, 40 Or App at
376. And the nature of that review is the same as for other
administrative bodies:
“Substantial evidence to support a finding of fact is evi-
dence that, viewing the record as a whole, would permit a
reasonable person to make that finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c);
Armstrong v. Asten-Hill Co., 90 Or App 200, 206, 752 P2d
312 (1988). In reviewing for substantial reason, however,
we go one step further: We examine not only the evidence
that supports ERB’s findings but also the reasoning that
leads ERB from the facts that it has found to the conclu-
sions that it draws from those facts. See Drew v. PSRB, 322
Or 491, 500, 909 P2d 1211 (1996). Specifically, we review
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 819

ERB’s reasoning for whether ERB correctly interpreted
and applied legal principles in the individual case before it,
and whether it did so consistently with other similar cases
rather than arbitrarily or ad hoc. Id.”
Portland Assn. of Teachers v. Mult. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 171 Or
App 616, 627, 16 P3d 1189 (2000).
III. ERB’S DECISION
As earlier noted, ERB issued a split decision in this
case, with two members joining in the order certifying the
proposed unit and one member authoring a dissent. In its
order, the majority (ERB) first set out its factual findings on
which our description of historical facts is based and then
analyzed whether the proposed unit is appropriate under the
basic legal principles that we have outlined. ERB began with
the “community of interest” factor under ORS 243.682(1)(a),
which encompasses the statutory factors of wages, hours,
and other terms of employment, as well as similarity of
duties, skills, benefits, interchange or transfer of employ-
ees, promotional ladders, and common supervision. As ERB
explained, when, as here, the proposed unit excludes other
employees of the same employer, the community of interest
factor subsumes two questions: (1) whether the employees
in the proposed unit have a “shared” community of interest
with each other; and (2) whether their shared community
of interest is sufficiently “distinct” from the interests of the
excluded employees to warrant the proposed separate bar-
gaining unit. E.g., IBEW v. Eugene Water & Electric Board,
23 PECBR 739, 765 (2010) (assessing whether shared inter-
ests of employees in proposed unit were “substantially differ-
ent” from, and therefore distinct from, interests of employ-
ees excluded from unit); AFSCME v. Washington County, 20
PECBR 745, 755-56 (2004) (similar).
In this case, there was no dispute that the 27
employees in the proposed unit share a community of inter-
est. ERB therefore focused on the extent to which their
shared interests are “sufficiently distinct so that those
employees alone constitute an appropriate bargaining unit.”
ERB acknowledged that all OJD employees are supervised
at the highest levels by the Chief Justice and the State Court
Administrator and are subject to the same personnel rules
820 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

and the same classification, compensation, and benefits
plans. ERB likewise acknowledged that all OJD employees
working in courthouses throughout the state have similar
job duties, work hours, and workplaces. More important in
ERB’s view, however, was that the Yamhill court employ-
ees work in relative physical and social isolation from other
state court employees and are subject to “day-to-day work-
ing conditions” that their presiding judge and TCA have
discretion to set, such as policies for use of accrued leave
time, adjustments to work hours, and limitations on flex and
part-time schedules. Comparatively, ERB concluded, “the
Yamhill employees’ community of interest is significantly
stronger than, and distinct from, their community of inter-
est with other Department employees.”
ERB then turned to the two other pertinent statu-
tory factors. AFSCME’s petition included a showing that a
majority of the Yamhill employees supported the proposed
bargaining unit, which satisfied the “desires of employees”
factor. Next, ERB considered the “history of collective bar-
gaining” for the OJD workforce. ERB inferred from that his-
tory that the past unsuccessful organizing efforts (30 years,
14 years, and 6 years before this petition) reflected the exis-
tence of current impediments to organizing a wall-to-wall
bargaining unit for all representable OJD employees.
As a final prong of its analysis, ERB considered in
tandem its preference for the largest possible bargaining
unit and its corollary policy of avoiding undue fragmenta-
tion. ERB agreed that a wall-to-wall unit would be “much
more preferable, especially in light of [OJD’s] efforts to
increase uniformity in court operations and thereby improve
the court’s efficiency and accessibility.” Citing past decisions,
however, ERB emphasized that its preference for the largest
possible bargaining unit should not be automatically applied
in a way that would eliminate consideration of the statutory
factors and unreasonably take precedence over the repre-
sentation rights of employees.22 ERB agreed with OJD that

22
See, e.g., Douglas County, 26 PECBR at 391 (preference should not be
“blindly applied” but should be weighed along with statutory factors); IUOE v.
Deschutes County Public Works, 10 PECBR 906, 919 (1988) (nonstatutory policies
should not be applied “automatically” in a way that frustrates employee desires
for representation without furthering other purposes underlying PECBA).
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 821

undue fragmentation would result if OJD’s workforce were
to be organized on a judicial “district-by-district” approach
so that OJD potentially might have to bargain with as many
as 27 different bargaining units. ERB disagreed, however,
that fragmentation would be “the necessary result of finding
the petitioned-for unit appropriate,” and gave several rea-
sons for its disagreement, which we later discuss in detail.
ERB concluded:
“After weighing all of the unit determination factors,
including our preference for larger units, we ultimately
conclude that the proposed unit is an appropriate one. The
petitioned-for employees have a strong and sufficiently dis-
tinct community of interest, and they share certain local-
ized working conditions. We also give more weight to their
desire to be represented, in light of past attempts to orga-
nize a wall-to-wall unit.”
In a detailed dissent, the dissenting member
explained her disagreement with “four aspects of the major-
ity opinion.” First, and “[m]ost fundamentally,” the dissent-
ing member would have given much greater weight to ERB’s
preference for the largest possible appropriate bargaining
unit. The dissenting member extensively discussed and doc-
umented the history of the preference, which is rooted in
what ERB has characterized as the “unique history” of state
employee organizing and bargaining, including the frag-
mentation that existed before and in the early years after
PECBA’s enactment. See Div. of State Lands Employees
Assoc. v. Div. of State Lands, 7 PECBR 6118, 6122, 6129
(1983) (describing history).23 Given the “significance [of the
preference] in the development of orderly labor relations in

23
The problem of fragmentation, although having a history “unique” to state
(as opposed to city and county) employee organizing and bargaining in Oregon, is
not a problem unique to Oregon. Fragmentation has been endemic to public sec-
tor collective bargaining throughout the nation; many jurisdictions, either legis-
latively or administratively, have created wall-to-wall or other large unit prefer-
ences in response. See generally Knapp, Anatomy of a Public Sector Bargaining
Unit, 35 Case W Res L Rev at 397-404 (discussing fragmentation in public sec-
tor collective bargaining and legislative and administrative solutions); Shaw
& Clark, Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector:
Legal and Practical Problems, 51 Or L Rev at 154-61, 163-64 (same); Rock, The
Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 67
Mich L Rev at 1001 (discussing general problem of fragmentation in public sector
collective bargaining).
822 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

State governance,” the dissenting member would have given
the preference particular weight in the context of this “oper-
ationally integrated State employer” that provides a “single
statewide service” of a uniform court system, with employ-
ees who “perform essentially the same duties using essen-
tially the same skills” throughout the state.
Relatedly, the dissenting member disagreed with
the majority’s assessment of the risk of future fragmenta-
tion. In her view, the majority’s willingness to certify such
a small bargaining unit of OJD’s overall workforce did not
provide the level of confidence that ERB has required in
other cases to ensure that potential future bargaining units
would be “relatively limited.”24
Next, at some length, the dissenting member set
out her reasons for disagreeing with the majority’s ulti-
mate finding that the employees in the proposed unit have
a strong and sufficiently distinct community of interest to
constitute an appropriate separate bargaining unit. She
went through each of the Yamhill court-specific personnel
policies identified by the majority (e.g., flex time, use of leave,
part-time employment) and explained why she disagreed
that they amounted to community of interest that is both
stronger than and distinct from the interests of other OJD
employees.
Finally, the dissenting member disagreed with the
majority’s conclusion that the previous efforts to organize a
wall-to-wall bargaining unit of OJD employees should carry
weight in the analysis. The most recent wall-to-wall effort
had been six years before and the record contained no evi-
dence of any attempt to organize “on any other basis other
than a wall-to-wall basis,” such as a regional one. The dis-
senting member declined to infer from that history that the
barriers to representation for this group of employees com-
pelled certification of such a small bargaining unit.

24
As examples, the dissent cited AFSCME v. Washington County, 25 PECBR
466, 476 (2013) (dismissing petition because small unit certification provided “no
confidence” that it would not lead to fragmentation) and LIUNA v. City of Keizer,
18 PECBR 476, 484-85 (2000) (approving proposed smaller bargaining unit for
group of employees because employer already had to bargain with two other
units; third unit would not be added burden).
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 823

IV. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS ON REVIEW
On review, OJD raises two challenges to ERB’s
order. First, OJD argues that ERB erred as a matter of law
by certifying a “single-circuit-court” bargaining unit. OJD
urges that any such bargaining unit is per se inappropriate
given the overall structure and purpose of the unified state
court system. Second, OJD argues that, even if a single-
court unit is not per se inappropriate, ERB’s order in this
case is not supported by substantial evidence or substan-
tial reason. More specifically, OJD contends that ERB could
not find on this record that the Yamhill court employees’
shared community of interest is stronger than the interests
of other OJD employees and sufficiently distinct to warrant
a separate bargaining unit. OJD further contends that ERB
did not provide a rational explanation for that conclusion
sufficient to withstand review. We consider each issue in
turn.25
A. Single-Court Bargaining Units in General
In arguing that ERB erred as a matter of law in
certifying a single-circuit-court bargaining unit, OJD
acknowledges that our standard of review is deferential
to ERB’s adjudicative role in weighing and evaluating the
evidence in unit determination cases. See, e.g., Deschutes
County, 40 Or App at 376 (articulating standard). But, OJD
maintains, ERB must make the appropriate unit determi-
nation in a way that comports with the organic legal frame-
work that governs the mission and structure of a given pub-
lic employer. In this context, that framework includes, OJD
urges, the unique structure of OJD and the deliberate legis-
lative mandate for a unified court system that is “centrally
administered at the state level.” OJD emphasizes that, as
part of that legislative mandate, the Chief Justice has the
responsibility to set and apply to all OJD employees uniform
policies on “[m]any mandatory subjects of bargaining—for
example, wages, benefits, and grievance procedures.” OJD
thus asserts:

25
As we will explain, we agree with OJD’s second argument (lack of substan-
tial evidence and substantial reason) and we set aside ERB’s order on that basis.
We consider OJD’s first argument even though it is not dispositive because, as we
later explain, it informs the analysis of the second issue.
824 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

“A single-circuit-court bargaining unit is inimical to
the legislative policy behind the creation of OJD, which
was to promote greater uniformity in employment pol-
icy among the circuit courts. If OJD must bargain sepa-
rately with the employees of a single court, it necessarily
must consider adopting employment policies otherwise set
at the state level that apply only to the employees of that
court. Yet adopting such policies will inevitably lead to
greater administrative fragmentation of the workforce, not
uniformity.”
(Emphasis in original.) For ERB to certify a proposed bar-
gaining unit along lines that fundamentally conflict with
OJD’s legal structure and essential mission is, OJD main-
tains, an error as a matter of law.
In response to OJD’s argument, AFSCME relies
on ERB’s reasoning in its order. ERB agreed (as we ear-
lier described) that a wall-to-wall bargaining unit would be
“much more preferable.” ERB did not agree, however, that “a
single, wall-to-wall bargaining unit” is the only appropriate
unit that may be certified consistently with the legislature’s
uniform state court design. ERB pointed to ORS 243.696(2),
which provides, in part:
“The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall represent
the judicial department in collective bargaining negotia-
tions with the certified or recognized exclusive represen-
tatives of all appropriate bargaining units of officers and
employees of the courts of this state who are state officers
or employees.”
Emphasizing the statute’s plural wording—“all appropriate
bargaining units”—ERB concluded that the legislature con-
templated “at least the possibility of multiple appropriate
bargaining units” within OJD’s workforce. ERB also pointed
to the fact that the legislature expressly made OJD subject
to collective bargaining under PECBA (ORS 8.270) without
providing for any special OJD bargaining unit determina-
tion standards.
ERB also responded to OJD’s concern that certify-
ing the proposed single-court bargaining unit would force it
to bargain separately over personnel policies for the Yamhill
employees, which might lead to one set of policies for them
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 825

and different policies for the unrepresented employees in
OJD. ERB considered that concern unfounded, suggesting
that the proposed unit was unlikely to have a significant
influence on OJD’s personnel and workplace policies:
“Although we are approving the proposed unit as appro-
priate for collective bargaining, we emphasize that noth-
ing in this order or PECBA requires [OJD] to agree to any
particular contract term; rather, PECBA requires only that
[OJD], and the union, collectively bargain in good faith. See
ORS 243.650(4) (‘The obligation to meet and negotiate does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession.’). Moreover, under PECBA, [OJD]
is required to bargain over only mandatory subjects of
bargaining—not statutorily permissive subjects or other
‘subjects that the Employment Relations Board determines
to have a greater impact on management’s prerogative than
on employee wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment.’ ORS 243.650(7)(c). Additionally, PECBA does
not exempt employees from performing their job duties or
complying with work rules (whether the employees orga-
nize court-by-court or wall-to-wall). Thus, after consider-
ing [OJD’s] concerns and the record in this case, we do not
conclude that approving this unit would be inimical to the
standardized and efficient adjudication of cases.”
(Footnotes omitted.)
Finally, although ERB concluded that the legisla-
ture had contemplated at least the possibility of multiple
appropriate OJD bargaining units, ERB did not believe
that certifying bargaining units for many or all of the other
circuit courts would be “the necessary result of finding the
petitioned-for unit appropriate.” ERB reasoned that “[n]oth-
ing in PECBA, or this Board’s rules and case law, require
this Board to continue approving district-based bargain-
ing units just because this Board has approved this one.”
Moreover,
“[a]t this point, granting this petition will result in only
one bargaining unit. The record does not include evidence
that AFSCME or any other labor organization is attempt-
ing to organize additional [judicial] District-based units
or any other bargaining unit. It may well be that the
petitioned-for unit is the only one that the [OJD] ever needs
to collectively bargain with.”
826 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

Even if other OJD employees desire representation in the
future, ERB declared, “they have various options other than
petitioning to form another [court]-based unit,” such as peti-
tioning to organize on a regional basis or seeking to accrete
to (that is, join) the Yamhill County Circuit Court unit.26 By
way of a footnote, ERB commented that, “[e]ven if this Board
permitted two different bargaining units to be created,” the
representatives of those units and OJD “potentially could
address fragmentation concerns by agreeing to merge the
units or engaging in coalition bargaining.”
As a threshold matter, we agree with ERB that ORS
243.696(2) reflects the legislature’s understanding that it
would be at least possible that more than one bargaining
unit would be appropriate for OJD’s workforce. The plural-
ization of the word “units” in the statute suggests as much
textually. Contextually, however, that conclusion is not free
from doubt. The central purpose of that provision, as its plain
terms reveal, was to add the Chief Justice to the statute as
the designated bargaining representative for OJD. No such
provision had been included in the original Court Reform
Act.27 The amendment came soon after the Court of Appeals
had held that, notwithstanding the omission, OJD was still
fully subject to collective bargaining under PECBA. Lent v.
ERB, 63 Or App 400, 402, 664 P2d 1110, rev den, 295 Or 617
(1983).28 The legislature’s only objective may have been to
26
The “accretion” of a group of unrepresented employees to an existing unit
is not available to the unrepresented employees as a matter of right. It requires
a showing of a requisite level of support among the members of both groups, in
addition to other requirements. OAR XXX-XX-XXXX(4) (requirements for clarifi-
cation petitions that raise issue of adding unrepresented employees to an exist-
ing bargaining unit). ERB, in this case, did not explore the requirements for
accretion. In past decisions, ERB has explained that accretion is available only
for unrepresented employees who, as a group, “do not and cannot constitute an
appropriate bargaining unit” of their own. See Corrections Dept. and Exec. Dept.
and AFSCME, 12 PECBR at 888 (citing past ERB decisions).
27
Context, for purposes of statutory interpretation, includes prior versions of
the statute and existing case law, together with extant circumstances that give rise
to the need for legislation. State v. McNally, 361 Or 314, 325, 392 P3d 721 (2017)
(prior versions of same statute); Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359
Or 309, 322-23, 323 n 7, 374 P3d 829 (2016) (presuming legislative awareness of
relevant case law, prior statutes, and extant dispute between city and utility).
28
Shortly after the Court Reform Act went into effect, then-Chief Justice
Lent filed a declaratory judgment action disputing the extent to which the leg-
islature intended OJD to have to mandatorily bargain under PECBA, as well as
the constitutionality of any requirement that it must. Id. at 402. One argument
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 827

ensure the Chief Justice’s obligation to engage in collective
bargaining on behalf of OJD; pluralizing the word “units”
would have been a natural word choice if the legislature did
not consciously consider whether OJD should be organized
on a wall-to-wall or some other basis.
There is another possibility, however. When ORS
243.696 was amended, multiple petitions were pending
before ERB seeking to certify different configurations of
bargaining units for OJD employees. See generally OPEU-
SEIU, AFSCME v. State Courts and Appellate Law Clerks,
7 PECBR 6199 (1984). The first petition was filed by the
Oregon Public Employees Unit (OPEU) before the Court
Reform Act had even taken effect; that petition sought cer-
tification of a bargaining unit comprised only of the employ-
ees of the state appellate courts. Id. at 6200. After the Court
Reform Act took effect, OPEU filed a second petition and
AFSCME filed a first, each proposing to divide OJD’s work-
force between them based on the OJD employees’ past rep-
resentation when they were county employees.29 While the

that the Chief Justice made on legislative intent was that ORS 243.696 provided
only for the state “Executive Department” to represent “state agencies” in collec-
tive bargaining; it did not include OJD or the Chief Justice. Id. at 404 n 3 (quoting
then-current version of statute and discussing Chief Justice’s argument). The
court rejected that and other of the Chief Justice’s arguments, and held that OJD
was fully subject to PECBA. Id. at 407. Two months after the court issued its deci-
sion, the legislature added the second subsection to ORS 243.696 and included
an emergency clause that made the amendment effective immediately on enact-
ment. See Or Laws 1983, ch 763, § 64 (declaring emergency; effective August 4,
1983); Lent, 63 Or App 400 (decision dated June 8, 1983). A few weeks after the
legislature amended the statute, the Supreme Court denied review in Lent. 295
Or 617, 670 P2d 1033 (order denying review dated August 31, 1983) (table).
29
In its order, ERB explained that, before the Court Reform Act and while
employed by the counties, some of the circuit court employees had been unrep-
resented, but many had been represented, usually by inclusion in county-wide
bargaining units (that is, units that contained other county employees, not just
court employees). Id. at 6202, 6204. OPEU had represented the court employ-
ees in Marion, Linn, Jackson, and Baker counties. AFSCME had represented
the court employees in Benton, Columbia, Coos, Hood River, Lane, Polk, Union,
Wasco, Clatsop, and Tillamook counties, and some but not all court employees in
Multnomah County. The court employees in Klamath, Clackamas, and Yamhill
counties were represented on a court-by-court basis by other labor organizations.
Id. at 6202-03. AFSCME’s petition sought designation of a unit consisting of
all OJD employees except those that had been represented by OPEU and those
employed by the appellate courts. OPEU’s second petition sought designation
of a unit consisting of all OJD employees whom it had represented when they
were employed by the counties, all OJD employees who were unrepresented while
employed by their county, and all employees of the appellate courts. Id. at 6200.
828 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

matter was pending, OPEU changed its position and agreed
that the appellate court employees did not have “any differ-
ent community of interest than the employees of the rest of
the [newly unified] state court system.” Id. at 6201. After
ERB issued a proposed order on the consolidated petitions,
the appellate court law clerks were allowed to intervene to
argue that they should be excluded from the proposed bar-
gaining units. Id. at 6200.

ERB resolved the competing positions of the parties
by invoking its “long-standing policy against fragmenta-
tion” and its “general preference for wall-to-wall units wher-
ever practicable.” Id. at 6204. ERB ordered certification of
a wall-to-wall unit, with one small group excluded: appel-
late law clerks. Id. at 6205. ERB found that those law clerks
had distinct interests from the rest of OJD’s workforce, in
that they were limited duration employees whose “inter-
ests in retirement, transfer, job security, merit promotion,
grievance procedures, vacation accumulation, and many
other mandatory bargaining matters are so distinct” from
those of the other OJD employees that it would be “inappro-
priate to include them” in the wall-to-wall unit that ERB
was certifying. Id. ERB left it to the election process for the
employees in the certified wall-to-wall unit to determine
whether they would prefer to be represented by AFSCME
or by OPEU, or not represented at all. Id. at 6206. As we
know from the collective bargaining history recounted in
the testimony in this case, the OJD employees elected to be
unrepresented.

ERB’s order resolving those petitions had not yet
issued when the legislature amended ORS 243.696 to desig-
nate the Chief Justice as OJD’s bargaining representative in
negotiations with “all appropriate bargaining units.”30 But
AFSCME’s and OPEU’s three petitions had been pending
for some time, and both organizations had been parties to
the litigation in Lent, 63 Or App 400. It is at least plausible

30
ERB’s order issued on January 11, 1984 (id. at 6206), approximately five
months after the amendment to ORS 243.696 on August 4, 1983. Based on the
case numbers assigned to each petition, OPEU’s first petition was filed sometime
in mid- to late-1982, and the other two petitions were filed relatively early in
1983.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 829

(if not highly likely) that the legislature added subsection (2)
to the statute aware that various efforts to organize OJD
employees were in progress. The pluralization of the word
“units” in the amendment therefore may have reflected the
legislature’s conscious choice not to put a “thumb on the
scale” on a matter then-pending and under active consider-
ation by ERB.
That context, coupled with the plural text of ORS
243.696(2), is enough for us to agree with ERB that the stat-
utory scheme governing OJD should not be understood to
dictate that only a wall-to-wall bargaining unit—and no
other configuration—is appropriate for the OJD workforce.31
But the question remains whether a single-court unit—
for the Yamhill County Circuit Court or any other single
Oregon court—is nevertheless inappropriate as a matter of
law, as OJD argues.
If, in its order, ERB had embraced a “single-court”
organizing principle for OJD’s workforce generally, we
would have no reservation agreeing with OJD and declaring
that approach to be erroneous as a matter of law. We ear-
lier recounted the history of Oregon’s uniform court system
and the extensive changes it brought about. We did that at
length because it should not be glossed over. That history
itself makes the compelling case for why collective bargain-
ing for OJD employees cannot take place on a court-by-court
basis throughout the state. To require the Chief Justice to
negotiate and bargain on that basis would return Oregon’s
uniform state court system to the fractured system that
the legislature abolished, with wages, benefits, and myriad
personnel policies and practices set through court-by-court
collective bargaining, rather than centrally and uniformly
for all state court employees regardless of where they work
throughout the state. In turn, the goal of “statewide allo-
cation of resources” to establish “an accountable, equitably

31
OJD, for its part, does not disagree. Before ERB, OJD appeared to have
been more adamant that only a wall-to-wall bargaining unit could comport with
the legal framework for OJD. In its briefing to this court, however, it has moder-
ated its position. OJD now urges that, although ORS 243.696(2) “allows multiple
bargaining units within OJD,” the statute contemplates at most that “different
types of OJD employees” (for example, the lawyers who work in various parts of
OJD), might appropriately form a separate bargaining unit.
830 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

funded and uniformly administered system of justice” (ORS
1.001) would be fundamentally undermined.32
Rather than embrace that organizing principle,
however, ERB explicitly rejected it. It did so by insisting, in
essence, that this certification would be a one-time occur-
rence, with no implications for future OJD bargaining unit
determinations that ERB might be called on to make. ERB’s
reasoning in that regard, however, is neither logically satis-
fying nor legally sound.
ERB began by declaring that nothing in PECBA
or ERB’s rules and case law require ERB to “continue” to
approve other single-court-based bargaining units “just
because [ERB] has approved this one”—a rationale that
comes perilously close to suggesting that ERB permissibly
may make unit determinations ad hoc, without adhering to
guiding principles or uniform criteria from one unit deter-
mination to the next. To be sure, ERB cited as illustrative
(but did not discuss) one of its past decisions, Corrections
Dept. and Exec. Dept. and AFSCME, 12 PECBR 876. There,
ERB declined to certify as an appropriate bargaining unit
a new corrections facility, despite having certified separate
units for certain other corrections facilities in the past. ERB
explained in that case that circumstances had changed
since its past certifications and that the new facility seek-
ing certification would become part of an increasingly “inte-
grated state penal operation”:
“The state is in the process of centralizing operations and
exercising tighter control over management. Labor rela-
tions functions are becoming centralized with the ultimate
authority for all major personnel decisions at the institu-
tions being exercised by the department director, rather
than by management at the institutions as in the past. The
new hires will perform the same duties and have virtually
the same working conditions as do the employees at the
existing institutions. The community of interest among the
current and new employees, in other words, is identical.”

32
The unification of Oregon’s court system under the Court Reform Act
set Oregon apart nationally. As then-Chief Justice Balmer explained in the
ERB hearing, only one other state (New Jersey) has achieved the same level
of unification and central administration for its court system that Oregon has
achieved.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 831

Id. at 889. In contrast to the public employer in that case,
OJD achieved functional integration and highly centralized
control and uniform personnel policies nearly 40 years ago,
with ever-increasing integration, centralization, and unifor-
mity since. The case that ERB cited refutes, rather than
supports, ERB’s reasoning here.

ERB’s other explanations for how ERB could find
the Yamhill court employees to be an appropriate unit, but
not any other single-court proposed unit, are no more reas-
suring. They reduce to: (1) no other group has yet asked;
(2) if one does, that group can propose something other than
a court-based unit, such as one drawn on regional lines; and
(3) the group can try to join the Yamhill unit. ERB all but
announced that, for future petitions, it would change the
ground rules and it would not consider certifying any future
bargaining unit on the same terms that it had applied in
this case. It is not too uncharitable, we believe, to describe
ERB as having announced a “first come, only served” policy
for the court employees of OJD.

ERB may not approach bargaining unit determi-
nations that way, for the employees of OJD or those of any
other public body. Although it may be correct that nothing
in PECBA requires ERB to approve future petitions for
single-court units “just because” it has approved this one,
a central purpose of PECBA is to provide a “uniform basis”
for recognizing the right of public employees to join organi-
zations and be represented in their employment relations
with their public employer. ORS 243.656(6). Consistently
with PECBA itself, ERB may not act ad hoc and it may not
disregard the cases that have come to ERB before or are
reasonably likely to come to ERB in the future. The same
is true under the Administrative Procedures Act. The point
of reviewing administrative orders for substantial evidence,
substantial reason, and compliance with controlling law is
to ensure that administrative decisions are “rational, prin-
cipled, and fair, rather than ad hoc and arbitrary.” Gordon
v. Board of Parole, 343 Or 618, 633, 175 P3d 461 (2007). And
apart from those statutory sources requiring even-handed
and principled decision-making, ERB has an obligation
under Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution “to
832 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

treat similarly situated people the same.” State v. Savastano,
354 Or 64, 96, 309 P3d 1083 (2013). For ERB to certify this
petition for a single-court bargaining unit of OJD employ-
ees, and no other, requires ERB to provide a rational expla-
nation that is reasonably related to ERB’s task in making
unit determinations and to the petitioning-group before it.
Savastano, 354 Or at 96. ERB’s explanation for why it can
certify this petition, and not like-kind future petitions, dis-
regards those legal constraints on its decision-making role.33
The failure of ERB’s explanation does not, however,
lead us to hold that certification of a single-court or similar
bargaining unit of OJD employees is per se unlawful. The
issue is a close one. As we have concluded, the centralized
structure of OJD and the legislative mandate for a uniform
court system preclude, as a matter of law, organizing all or
most of OJD’s employees in a way that would require collec-
tive bargaining on essentially a court-by-court basis. But it
is one thing to say that OJD’s workforce generally may not
be organized on that basis, and it is another to say that no
group of employees working for any court anywhere in the
state could constitute an appropriate bargaining unit, sepa-
rate and apart from the bulk of OJD’s workforce. We would
need to be able to confidently declare the latter to agree with
OJD.

33
We recognize, as ERB often cautions, that unit determinations are “nec-
essarily fact-driven,” Douglas County, 26 PECBR at 388, and often require an
“analysis tailored to the subject employees and the workplace at issue.” Assoc. of
Oregon Corrections Employees v. Dept. of Corrections and AFSCME, 18 PECBR
441, 446-47 (2000). Fact-matching often is of limited aid in unit determination
cases, given the boundless variation in circumstances between different public
employers (state agencies, counties, and cities), different workforces performing
entirely different jobs (e.g., law enforcement officers, road workers, corrections
staff, maintenance workers, educators, engineers, medical professionals, cleri-
cal staff), in highly incomparable workplaces (prisons, medical facilities, schools,
offices, outdoor environments). Thus, as a general proposition, it is “unlikely that
a prior case involving a different employer will conclusively resolve a future case.”
Douglas County, 26 PECBR at 391 (emphasis added). Here, however, ERB’s obser-
vations about future petitions pertain to the employees of one employer, OJD,
who are all subject to the ultimate direction of a single administrative head—
the Chief Justice—and who all work, as ERB expressly found, “in courthouses
throughout the state[, all with] similar job duties, work hours, and workplaces.”
Factual comparison is not only possible in that context, it is necessary. ERB must
be able to identify meaningful factual distinctions between one group of OJD’s
workforce and some other group of the same workforce to lawfully change the
terms on which the two groups may exercise their right to collectively bargain.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 833

But the record before us is inadequate in that
regard. The record is extensively developed on the uniform
aspects of the state court system, and thus on the interests
that OJD employees throughout the state share under the
centralized policies that the Chief Justice and State Court
Administrator have put in place. We therefore know on
this record what interests are common to the employees of
all courts statewide. But in terms of what might be differ-
ent and might distinguish any one court’s employees from
the rest of OJD’s workforce, the evidence is limited to the
Yamhill County Circuit Court. The record is all but silent on
the other 26 judicial districts (with their 35 circuit courts),
the appellate courts, and the Tax Court in terms of how
working conditions or other collective-bargaining-related
interests of their employees might be so unique or particular
to those courts as to distinguish them from the rest of the
state’s unified court system. For that reason, we are unwill-
ing in this case to go as far as OJD asks and declare that
any single-court bargaining unit—whether for the Yamhill
County Circuit Court or any other state court in Oregon—is
inappropriate as a matter of law.
The issue that we can resolve on this record, how-
ever, is whether the factual evidence and ERB’s reason-
ing are sufficient to support ERB’s determination that the
Yamhill County Circuit Court bargaining unit is an appro-
priate one. Our discussion above informs our analysis in
that regard, as we will explain. We therefore turn to that
issue.
B. The Proposed Yamhill County Circuit Court Bargaining
Unit
As we earlier described, when, as here, a proposed
bargaining unit consists of a subset of a larger workforce,
the appropriate unit determination requires a finding that
the petitioning employees share a community of interest
“sufficiently distinct” from the interests of the excluded
employees to warrant the proposed separate bargaining
unit. Washington County, 20 PECBR at 756. In its order,
ERB found that the Yamhill employees’ community of inter-
est is significantly “stronger than, and distinct from, their
community of interest with other [OJD] employees” based
834 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

principally on the fact that they have “day-to-day working
conditions” that the presiding judge and TCA have discre-
tion to set. Those interests are, ERB concluded, “distinct
enough” from those of other OJD employees to “support
creation of a separate unit” to represent the Yamhill court
employees and no others.
OJD challenges ERB’s community of interest con-
clusion, arguing that it is not supported by substantial evi-
dence and substantial reasoning. Specifically, OJD asserts:
“At its core, [ERB’s] decision was grounded on a conclusion
that the Yamhill County Circuit Court employees have
different enough working conditions from all other OJD
employees that they form a clearly distinct community of
interest. To make a comparison between two things, how-
ever, there must be evidence concerning the nature of both.
But here, there is, at most, evidence in the record concern-
ing a handful of the policies and practices at the Yamhill
County Circuit Court, and no evidence concerning the pol-
icies and practices at other courts[.]”34

OJD further argues that ERB did not adequately explain
how it evaluated the shared and distinct interests of employ-
ees in the proposed unit and explain its conclusion that
those interests were stronger than the interests they have
in common with all other OJD employees:
“For example, the order does not explain why some factual
findings, which potentially indicate a distinct community
of interest—e.g., physically separate locations or separate
immediate supervisors—should have outweighed other
findings of similarities—e.g., identical wages and bene-
fits; identical statewide policies and procedures; ‘similar
job duties, work hours, and workplaces’; similar job func-
tions; identical skills and training requirements; a single
grievance procedure that applies to all employees; and the
ability of circuit court employees to seamlessly cover the
positions of employees at other circuit courts.”

34
The dissenting member of ERB made the same basic point. Without evi-
dence of the policies of other courts, such as those for adjusted work hours, flex
and part-time schedules, and use of accrued leave, she could not agree that the
policies in place for the Yamhill employees could be considered different and
distinct from those of other courts. The majority offered no response to that
point.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 835

We agree that ERB’s “distinct” community of
interest finding lacks the factual support that it requires.
Assessing whether a proposed unit of employees shares a
community of interest that is “distinct” from the employees
excluded from the unit is an inherently comparative exer-
cise. See Washington County, 20 PECBR at 752 n 4 (“The
important factor is not the label of the group, but rather
the community of interest they share when compared to the
interests of other employees.” (Emphasis added.)). To under-
take that analysis, ERB must first examine the shared col-
lective bargaining interests of the employees in the proposed
unit; ERB must then compare those shared interests to the
collective bargaining interests of employees who will be
excluded. See id. at 756-57 (engaging in comparative analy-
sis).35 For the comparison to be meaningful, it is not enough
to examine only the interests that the two groups have in
common—e.g., wages, benefits, and personnel rules—and
contrast them with the internally shared interests of the
petitioning employees—e.g., locally-set policies on part-time
schedules, adjusted daily work hours, and performance
review requirements. The analysis also requires examin-
ing the different and potentially divergent interests of the
excluded employees. In this context, that means examining
the policies in place for other OJD employees in terms of
part-time schedules, adjusted daily work hours, and similar
policies that are set by local court administrators. Without
that comparison, it is not possible to determine the extent to
which the interests of the two groups actually diverge, and
thus are distinct. Neither is it possible to assess whether
any divergence in interests is sufficient to warrant a sepa-
rate bargaining unit for the petitioning employees.36
35
ERB does not always describe the analysis in terms of the “collective bar-
gaining interests” of the employees, no doubt because that is a given. But ERB
has emphasized in some cases that the focus of the community of interest factor
is on the employees’ collective bargaining interests, not interests of a more gen-
eral nature. See, e.g., Fairview Training Center v. AFSCME, 8 PECBR 6666, 6688
(1984) (emphasizing that the analysis requires assessing the “labor relations”
community of interest of employees included and excluded from proposed unit);
Revenue Hearing Officers Assn. v. Dept. of Revenue and OPEU, 7 PECBR 6068,
6091 (1983) (similarly emphasizing that analysis of community of interest factor
evaluates “collective bargaining interests” of employees).
36
The traditional test under federal labor law, from which PECBA’s “com-
munity of interest” factor was borrowed, emphasizes that aspect of the analysis.
Under that traditional test, “the analysis logically begins by considering whether
836 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

ERB did not make the needed comparison in this case.
ERB considered the shared collective bargaining interests of
all OJD employees in wages, benefits, personnel policies, and
similar uniform OJD workforce policies. ERB also examined
the interests that the Yamhill employees share among them-
selves in terms of the administrative policies that their presid-
ing judges and TCA have some latitude to set (e.g., part-time
schedules, adjustable work hours, performance evaluations).
But ERB did not examine any locally-set administrative pol-
icies in place for any other of the state’s 26 judicial districts
and 35 circuit courts (or the appellate or tax courts). Nor could
it. The record is all but silent on that score.37 ERB therefore
could not compare and contrast the workplace conditions of
the petitioned-for unit has an internal community of interest using the tradi-
tional criteria[.]” The Boeing Co., 368 NLRB No 67, slip op at 3 (Sept 9, 2019).
Then, “a comparative analysis of excluded and included employees” is required.
Id. That means more than just assessing the internal shared interests of the
employees in the proposed unit and their shared interests with the excluded
employees. The analysis also requires considering the distinct interests of the
excluded employees so that the shared and distinct collective bargaining inter-
ests of both groups—i.e., the included and excluded employees—can be compar-
atively analyzed and weighed. Id. at 4; see also PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB
No. 160, slip op at 5-7, 10 (Dec 15, 2017) (extensive discussion of traditional test).
37
What little evidence exists in the record suggests the likelihood of similar
and often common local court workplace policies, not significantly dissimilar or
sui generis ones. At least twice annually, presiding judges and the Chief Justice
meet as a group to discuss “best practices” at the circuit court level and be “on the
same page” as much as possible. TCAs do the same. With the passage of time since
the initial unification of the state courts, TCAs as a group have seen the value
of uniformity and have made the conscious decision to influence their respective
courts to become increasingly uniform with the others. The record reveals other
ways that individual courts work together to share policies and practices as well.
For example, the TCA for the Yamhill County Circuit Court, before becoming the
TCA there, worked in the circuit courts in Marion and Multnomah counties, as
well as in the State Court Administrator’s Office. Some of the discretionary poli-
cies and practices that she has implemented—such as annual performance eval-
uations for all staff—were in place in her other work environments. In setting
work performance expectations as part of the performance evaluation process,
she drew from those in place in Marion County when she worked there, and she
also researched the work performance expectations used in several other courts.
As another example, the presiding judges and TCAs for several of the courts in
the Willamette Valley (i.e., those in Yamhill, Linn, Benton, and Polk counties)
expect to work together on the statutorily mandated “business continuity plans”
for each of their courts, with the goal of being able to assist each other if one court
were damaged by a fire, a flood, or other disaster and needed to relocate staff to
work at another courthouse. Cross-court efforts of that kind are likely to encour-
age individual courts to coordinate their locally set workplace policies. In short,
what evidence there is in the record about the personnel policies and practices of
individual courts throughout the state provides a basis to infer that those policies
and practices are significantly similar and often the same, not the opposite.
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 837

the Yamhill employees with those of the employees in the rest
of OJD. Without that comparison and possible contrast, it is
not possible to know whether and how much those workplace
policies actually differ court-to-court. And without knowing
that, it is not possible to assess if the Yamhill employees’ col-
lective bargaining interests are “distinct” from those of the
rest of the OJD workforce to any significant degree.
ERB did not explain how it could make its “distinct”
community of interest finding without the comparison that
is inherent in that statutorily mandated factor. ERB’s order
suggests a possible rationale, however. ERB described the
Yamhill County Circuit Court presiding judge and TCA as
having exercised their administrative discretion to adopt
a number of personnel policies and practices “that acutely
affect the petitioned-for employees, and only those employ-
ees.” ERB also described the presiding judges and TCAs
of each of the circuit courts as having “significant author-
ity and discretion over a variety of personnel matters * * *
that acutely affect their court’s employees (and only those
employees).” Those observations suggest that ERB may
have reasoned that the mere existence of some adminis-
trative policy discretion at the local court level, regardless
of how that discretion is exercised, gives the employees of
each court a “distinct” community of interest, because each
court’s employees, and only those employees, have a collec-
tive bargaining interest in how that discretion is exercised
in their court; no comparison of policies from one court to
the next was therefore required.
That rationale—if it was ERB’s rationale—would
be a blueprint for court-by-court bargaining units. If the
Yamhill employees have a “distinct” community of interest
because they, and only they, are subject to the discretion-
ary policy choices of their presiding judge and TCA, then
the employees of each circuit court (and of the appellate and
tax courts) also have a “distinct” community of interest of
their own. Likewise, if the Yamhill employees’ community
of interest is “sufficiently distinct” to warrant a separate
bargaining unit for the same reason, and requires no com-
parison to the policies implemented in other courts to see
whether or how they differ, then the employees of the other
courts can make the same case for bargaining units of their
838 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

own. As we have concluded, however, an organizing princi-
ple for OJD’s workforce that would require OJD to negotiate
and bargain on a court-by-court basis is fundamentally at
odds with the legislature’s uniform court system structure.
For ERB to certify the proposed unit on that rationale would
be an error as a matter of law.
We therefore agree with OJD that, on this record,
ERB could not reasonably conclude that the proposed unit of
Yamhill County employees share a “distinct” community of
interest. ERB did not and factually could not make the nec-
essary comparison between the employees in the proposed
unit and the rest of the OJD workforce that its “distinct”
community of interest conclusion requires. Without that fac-
tual comparison, ERB’s order is not supported by substan-
tial evidence.
For related reasons, we also agree that ERB’s order
is not supported by substantial reason. ERB concluded that
the Yamhill employees share a community of interest that
is “significantly stronger than” the interests they share with
other OJD court employees. ERB likewise concluded that
the Yamhill employees’ shared interests were “sufficiently”
distinct for a bargaining unit consisting only of the Yamhill
employees. ERB did little to explain those qualitative assess-
ments. ERB merely listed, in a highly generalized way, the
interests that Yamhill employees share with the rest of the
employees in OJD, and identified a few policies set at the
local level that affect the Yamhill employees “and only those
employees.”
On other facts, ERB’s conclusion might require little
explanation of how the facts that ERB found support the con-
clusion that ERB reached. If the interests of a petitioned-for-
unit of employees differ from those of the excluded employees
in terms of the most basic subjects of collective bargaining—
wages, hours, the jobs they perform, and the physical envi-
ronment in which they perform them, for example—listing
those differences may be explanation enough for a conclusion
that those employees have a sufficiently distinct community
of interest to warrant a separate bargaining unit. See, e.g.,
Fairview Training Center, 8 PECBR at 6687-88 (identifying
those differences in comparison of guards and nonguards at
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 839

secure state mental health institution; summarily conclud-
ing two groups have distinct community of interests war-
ranting two bargaining units). The need for explanation is
greater, however, when the differences between two groups
relate to workplace differences that are not as central to
collective bargaining and are not the kind of interests that
typically create significant conflicts among employees. See
Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F2d 1087, 1091 (7th
Cir 1984) (“The greatest conflicts of interest among workers
are over wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions.”). As
federal courts have observed in their review of NLRB deci-
sions for substantial reason:
“Merely recording similarities or differences between
employees does not substitute for an explanation of how
and why these collective-bargaining interests are relevant
and support the conclusion. Explaining why the excluded
employees have distinct interests in the context of collec-
tive bargaining is necessary to avoid arbitrary lines of
demarcation.”
Constellation Brands, U.S. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 842
F3d 784, 794-95 (2nd Cir 2016).
What thought process led ERB to its conclusion in
this case? More specifically, why did ERB conclude that the
Yamhill employees’ interests in certain locally-set policies
(e.g., part-time schedules, adjustable daily work hours, and
performance evaluation requirements) were so significant
as to outweigh and eclipse the uniform policies for all OJD
employees governing their wages, job security (grievance
procedures, layoffs, etc.), medical and dental benefits, retire-
ment programs, leave accrual types and rates, and court-
house security, among the many other uniform OJD working
conditions that are relevant to collective bargaining? ERB
did not explain.38 But it needed to. ERB generally discounts
38
ERB likewise did not explain how its finding that Yamhill employees are
relatively isolated physically and socially from other OJD employees supports its
“distinct community of interest” conclusion. In federal labor cases, interaction and
exchange among employees can have relevance in assessing an “intersection of
interests” among employees whose wages, benefits, hours, and physical environ-
ments differ and who otherwise do not have common enough interests to be in the
same bargaining unit. See, e.g., Pac SW Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F2d 1032, 1042-43
(9th Cir 1978) (illustrative facts and analysis). The relevance of limited contact
and interchange between OJD employees in the context of OJD’s functional inte-
gration and uniform wages, benefits, and personnel policies is not obvious.
840 Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. OJD - Yamhill County

the kind of workplace variations that it relied on here, find-
ing instead that they do not create a distinct community of
interest when all employees in a workforce share the “basic
terms and conditions of employment,” such as “similar pay,
work hours, overtime, seniority, lay-off, holidays, vacations
and sick leave benefits, health benefits, retirement benefits,
[and] grievance procedures.” Assoc. of Public Employees, 10
PECBR at 891 (emphasis added). We have identified no ERB
decision, and ERB cites none, where a public employer has
had the functional integration, central administration, and
uniformity in its policies that OJD has, yet ERB has found
a “distinct” community of interest for such a small group
of employees (27 of 1,200) based on the kind of workplace
variations that the Chief Justice permits (but has ultimate
authority to control). Without an explanation of how ERB
reasoned from the facts to its conclusion, ERB’s order lacks
substantial reason.
AFSCME does not directly respond to OJD’s sub-
stantial evidence and substantial reason arguments. For
the most part, AFSCME characterizes OJD’s arguments as
amounting to a disagreement with how ERB weighed the
relevant statutory and administrative factors, particularly
its administrative preference for larger units. AFSCME
then relies on our deferential standard of review. See, e.g.,
Deschutes County, 40 Or App at 376 (court defers to ERB on
weight to be given various criteria in unit determinations).
Indeed, AFSCME goes so far as to urge that, even if we find
“some fault” with ERB’s evaluation of the relevant criteria,
we must still affirm ERB’s order because of the “broad scope
of authority delegated to ERB by the legislature” to make
appropriate bargaining unit determinations.
In that regard, AFSCME characterizes “appropri-
ate bargaining unit” as a delegative term within the mean-
ing of Springfield Education Assn., 290 Or 217, and argues at
some length that ERB has particular license in making unit
determinations without judicial interference. “Appropriate
bargaining unit,” however, is statutorily defined in terms
of the two procedural routes that can result in such a unit:
ERB certification or the employer’s voluntary recognition.
ORS 243.650(1). ERB does not have exclusive province over
unit determinations. What the legislature has delegated to
Cite as 304 Or App 794 (2020) 841

ERB is the authority, when it makes appropriate unit deter-
minations, to supplement the statutorily mandated crite-
ria by considering other like factors. See ORS 243.682(1)(a)
(ERB “shall consider such factors as community of inter-
est”). We do not discount the importance of ERB’s interpre-
tative role in advancing that generally expressed legislative
policy, both through rulemaking and adjudicating contested
petitions for unit certification. But, in that regard, ERB
performs the same significant function—not one somehow
broader in scope or administrative license—as other admin-
istrative bodies whose decisions affect important public and
private interests.
Neither ERB’s role in adjudicating contested peti-
tions for unit certification nor our appropriately deferential
standard of review insulates ERB’s decision from judicial
review for substantial evidence and substantial reason. As
this court has explained, the fact that an administrative
body may use its experience to evaluate and understand evi-
dence is not “a substitute for evidence presented at a hear-
ing.” Rolfe, 53 Or App at 951. And the Supreme Court, after
quoting Rolfe with approval, has emphasized the impor-
tance of substantial evidence review, even for bodies that,
like ERB, have particularly specialized expertise:
“The substantial evidence rule is a safeguard for anyone
faced with the possibility of adverse consequences from
a decision of an administrative agency. The rule loses its
meaning if it is interpreted as leaving to the internal ‘exper-
tise’ of agency personnel, rather than to the external scru-
tiny of appellate courts, the critical question whether the
facts of the case permit the administrative choice involved.”

Drew, 322 Or at 499. The same is true of review for sub-
stantial reason, which requires administrative agencies
“to demonstrate in their opinions the reasoning that leads
the agency from the facts that it has found to the conclu-
sions that it d

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10600154. Public record. Not legal advice.