# Com. v. Lower, D.

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · September 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10593766

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 30, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Olson
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10593766

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a bicycle “clearly f[e]ll[] within the confines of [the] definition” set forth in Section 102 of the Motor Vehicle Code

## Opinion text

J-S20009-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DANNY LEE LOWER :
:
Appellant : No. 761 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 16, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-21-CR-0000486-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 30, 2024

Appellant, Danny Lee Lower, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered May 16, 2023. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

On August 20[,] 2021, at approximately 10:20 [p.m.], Officer
Bradley McAlester [of the East Pennsboro Township Police] was
on patrol in a marked police vehicle when he observed a
motorized bicycle[1] swerving between the road and the right
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 At Appellant’s trial, the parties discussed whether Appellant was operating a

bicycle or motorcycle. Officer McAlester indicted that, after Appellant’s arrest,
he determined that the vehicle qualified as a motorcycle because it had a 79
CC engine. See N.T. Trial, 4/3/23, at 10; see also Trial Court Opinion,
7/7/23, at 2, n.1. As pointed out in the Commonwealth’s brief, however,
whether Appellant’s vehicle is a bicycle or motorcycle “is a distinction without
a difference” because both fall under the definition of “vehicle” as set forth in
the Motor Vehicle Code. Commonwealth’s Brief at 3, n.3; see also 75
Pa.C.S.A. 102; Commonwealth v. Brown, 620 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Pa. Super.
1993) (holding that a bicycle “clearly f[e]ll[] within the confines of [the]
definition” set forth in Section 102 of the Motor Vehicle Code).
J-S20009-24

shoulder, with its rear lights and headlights turned off. [Upon]
observing this [motorized bicycle driving] in an erratic and
unsafe manner, at night, with its operating lights off, Officer
McAlester initiated a traffic stop. Even with his patrol vehicle’s
lights and sirens on, it took the driver of the [motorized bicycle],
later confirmed to be [Appellant], over a minute to pull over.

[When] Appellant [finally] came to a halt[,] Officer McAlester
began speaking with him[. I]t quickly became apparent that
Appellant was unsteady on his feet. [Indeed,] the Motor Vehicle
Recording (hereinafter “MVR”) [demonstrated] Appellant
almost falling over on several occasions during his interaction
with Officer McAlester. As a result, Officer McAlester [asked]
Appellant [if he consumed] alcohol or [any] controlled
substances [that evening]. Appellant admitted to consuming
one beer that evening. … Officer McAlester [then] radioed for
backup and [conveyed his belief] that Appellant was driving
[the motorized bicycle] while under the influence.

[A] second law enforcement officer arrived on-scene [shortly
thereafter and directed Appellant] to perform Standard Field
Sobriety Tests (hereinafter “SFSTs”). At that time, Appellant
[told] the officers . . . that he crashed his [motorized bicycle]
earlier in the evening, [and] display[ed] visible injuries
including blood on his knee and a swollen ankle. Because of
[Appellant’s] injuries, the officers selected SFSTs [that] would
not require Appellant to use his injured leg. [In particular,]
Appellant was asked to perform a one-leg stand[] and divided
attention test[. When] Appellant performed [the
aforementioned] SFSTs, the officers noted “clues” indicating
impairment for both tests. Specifically, Appellant was unable
to perform the one-leg stand[] and Appellant was unable to
keep his head still while tracking Officer McAlester’s finger. [In
addition to the SFSTs performed], Officer McAlester prepared
his portable breathalyzer (hereinafter “PBT”) machine and
directed Appellant to perform a PBT test. The test gave a
positive return for the presence of alcohol. Thereafter,
Appellant was arrested for driving under the influence [(“DUI”)]
and [other] related charges.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/23, at 2-4 (footnote added) (parallel citations and

footnotes omitted).

-2-
J-S20009-24

On April 3, 2023, a non-jury trial was conducted during which Officer

McAlester and Appellant testified. Ultimately, Appellant was convicted of DUI

– general impairment and driving under suspension - DUI related.2 On May

16, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to pay the cost of prosecution,

a total fine of $1,300.00,3 and to undergo a period of supervision for six

months. This timely appeal followed.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Was the evidence sufficient to find Appellant guilty of [DUI -]
general impairment[] in that[] the Commonwealth failed to
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, [that Appellant was
incapable of safe driving]?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Herein, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth presented insufficient

evidence to support his conviction for DUI – general impairment. More

specifically, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to “sufficiently

show that he was incapable of safely riding his [motorized bicycle]” because

he “conducted himself well enough” during the interaction with Officer

McAlester. Appellant’s Brief at 27.
____________________________________________

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), respectively.

3 A review of the sentencing transcripts reveals that Appellant’s counsel invited

the trial court to impose fines and costs, that the trial court specified the
amount of fines Appellant was required to pay, and Appellant had the
opportunity to be heard on the subject. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing,
5/16/23, at 2-3. As such, we find that the trial court complied with 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9726(c) (explaining that a trial court “shall not sentence a
defendant to pay a fine unless it appears of record that the defendant is or
will be able to pay it.”).

-3-
J-S20009-24

We review Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge under the

following standard:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment
for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding
a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law
no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated
and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally,
the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Callen, 198 A.3d 1149, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

Appellant was convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

Subsection 3802(a)(1) of the Motor Vehicle Code declares:

(a) General impairment.--(1) An individual may not drive,
operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that
the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating
or being in actual physical control of the movement of the
vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

This Court previously explained:

-4-
J-S20009-24

[T]he Commonwealth [must] prove the following elements: the
accused was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of
the movement of a vehicle during the time when he or she was
rendered incapable of safely doing so due to the consumption
of alcohol. With respect to the type, quantum, and quality of
evidence required to prove a general impairment violation
under Section 3802(a)(1), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
[has previously stated]:

Section 3802(a)(1) . . . is a general [impairment] provision
and[, as such, imposes] no specific restraint upon the
Commonwealth in the manner in which it may prove that
an accused operated a vehicle under the influence of
alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe
driving. ... The types of evidence that the Commonwealth
may proffer in a subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include
but are not limited to, the following: the offender's actions
and behavior, including manner of driving and ability to
pass field sobriety tests; demeanor, including toward the
investigating officer; physical appearance, particularly
bloodshot eyes and other physical signs of intoxication;
odor of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood alcohol level
may be added to this list, although it is not necessary and
the two[-]hour time limit for measuring blood alcohol level
does not apply. Blood alcohol level is admissible in a
subsection 3801(a)(1) case only insofar as it is relevant to
and probative of the accused's ability to drive safely at the
time he or she was driving. The weight to be assigned
these various types of evidence presents a question for the
fact-finder, who may rely on his or her experience,
common sense, and/or expert testimony. Regardless of the
type of evidence that the Commonwealth proffers to
support its case, the focus of subsection 3802(a)(1)
remains on the inability of the individual to drive safely due
to consumption of alcohol - not on a particular blood
alcohol level.

Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 145 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations

omitted).

Upon review, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief. Indeed,

at trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence and testimony demonstrating

-5-
J-S20009-24

that, when Officer McAlester first encountered Appellant, he was “swerving in

between the lines of the roadway, while his vehicle’s operating lights were

turned off, at night.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/23, at 6. Officer McAlester

initiated a traffic stop, but it took Appellant approximately a minute to pull

over. Officer McAlester then approached Appellant who was “wearing

sunglasses, despite it being almost 10:30 [p.m.].” Id. at 7. Upon approach,

Officer McAlester noted that Appellant exhibited signs of intoxication including

bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and an unsteady gait. Officer McAlester also

stated that he detected an odor of alcohol emanating from Appellant’s person.

Officer McAlester asked Appellant if he consumed any alcohol and Appellant

admitted to drinking “one beer” earlier that evening. N.T. Trial, 4/3/23, at

15. In addition, Appellant informed Officer McAlester that he was just involved

in an accident on his motorized bicycle, resulting in an injury to his ankle and

knee. Based upon the forgoing, Officer McAlester asked Appellant to perform

two SFSTs, namely, a one-leg stand and a divided attention test, both of which

Appellant was unable to perform. Finally, Officer McAlester directed Appellant

to perform a PBT test which revealed the presence of alcohol. Thus, viewing

the aforementioned evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

we conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain

Appellant’s conviction for DUI – general impairment.

-6-
J-S20009-24

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/30/2024

-7-

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10593766. Public record. Not legal advice.
