# C. Sanchez v. PA DOC

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · September 25, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10591369

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 25, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Covey
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10591369

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that [S]ection 8522(b) [of the Sovereign Immunity Act] provides a remedy for inmates when a prison official negligently handles an inmate’s personal property

## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Carlos Sanchez, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Department of :
Corrections; George M. Little, :
Secretary of Pennsylvania Department :
of Corrections; Jamie Sorber, :
Superintendent; Kelly Long, Mail Room :
Supervisor; and Amina McCown, :
H-Unit Manager, : No. 451 M.D. 2023
Respondents : Submitted: August 9, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: September 25, 2024

Before this Court are the preliminary objections (Preliminary
Objections) filed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), DOC
Secretary George M. Little (Little), Superintendent Jamie Sorber (Sorber), Mail
Room Supervisor Kelly Long (Long), and H-Unit Manager Amina McCown
(McCown) (collectively, Respondents) to Carlos Sanchez’s (Sanchez) pro se
Petition for Review (Petition) filed in this Court’s original jurisdiction. 1 After

1
Sanchez originally filed this action in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court
(Common Pleas). By September 7, 2023 order, Common Pleas granted DOC’s Motion to Transfer
the matter to this Court. By October 20, 2023 Order, this Court directed that this matter shall be
treated as a Petition for Review addressed to this Court’s original jurisdiction.
review, this Court sustains the Preliminary Objections in part and overrules them in
part.
Sanchez is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at
Phoenix (SCI-Phoenix). On April 8, 2021, Sanchez submitted a DOC ADM-815-A
Outside Purchase Approval Form, and a DOC ADM-DC-135 $200.00 Cash Slip
seeking permission to purchase orthopedic sneakers (Request). On April 8, 2021,
McCown approved Sanchez’s Request, checking a box on the form directly
following the statement: “This approval is conditional. If the article is not
authorized, disapproved, or fails to meet the requirements of [DOC] policy . . . it will
be returned to the sender at the inmate’s expense.” Petition, Appendix B-1. On
April 15, 2021, DOC deducted $200.00 from Sanchez’s inmate account. On July
21, 2021, McCown notified Sanchez that his sneakers had arrived at SCI-Phoenix’s
mail room. Notwithstanding, Long withheld the sneakers from Sanchez.
On July 26, 2021, Sanchez filed Grievance No. 938127, requesting that
Respondents provide the sneakers to Sanchez or otherwise reimburse him for their
cost. On August 12, 2021, a grievance officer denied Grievance No. 938127,
reasoning that Sanchez had purchased the sneakers through an unauthorized vendor.
The grievance officer acknowledged that McCown had approved Sanchez’s outside
purchase request, but explained that the vendor was not an authorized vendor, and
that final approval is made upon inspection when the item is received. Because the
vendor was unauthorized, Long was required to deny the non-approved item and did
so in compliance with DOC’s policy. On August 20, 2021, Sanchez filed an appeal
which the Facility Manager denied on September 10, 2021. On September 18, 2021,
Sanchez filed an appeal for final review to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate
Grievances and Appeals (OIGA). On December 6, 2021, the OIGA upheld the prior
responses denying Grievance No. 938127.

2
On April 15, 2022 and May 20, 2022, Sanchez submitted a DC-138A
Cash Slip to Long requesting to have Respondents mail the sneakers to his home.
On July 4, 2022, Sanchez filed Grievance No. 988247, alleging that SCI-Phoenix’s
mail room threw away the sneakers without providing him sufficient time to provide
a cash slip to have them sent to his home. Following several appeals, on September
4, 2022, DOC issued a Final Appeal Decision denying Grievance No. 988247. On
January 27, 2023, Sanchez filed the Petition in the trial court seeking compensatory
and punitive damages for negligence and assumpsit. On September 7, 2023, the trial
court transferred the matter to this Court. On November 14, 2023, DOC filed the
Preliminary Objections challenging the Petition’s legal sufficiency.
Initially, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1516(b) authorizes
any party to file preliminary objections to an original jurisdiction petition for review
for the reasons specified in Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule) 1028.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1516(b). Civil Rule 1028(a) authorizes any party to file preliminary
objections based on “legal insufficiency” (demurrer). Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4).

In ruling on preliminary objections, [this Court] must
accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the
petition for review, as well as all inferences reasonably
deduced therefrom. Th[is] Court need not accept as true
conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts,
argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. In
order to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with
certainty that the law will not permit recovery, and any
doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them.
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
every well-pleaded fact in the [petition for review] and all
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the
legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be
sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed
to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When
ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to
the [petition for review].

3
McNew v. E. Marlborough Twp., 295 A.3d 1, 8-9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (quoting
Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citations omitted)).
“‘[C]ourts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the facts pled in
the [petition for review], but also any documents or exhibits attached to it.’ Allen v.
Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).” Foxe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
214 A.3d 308, 310 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
Further,

[w]hile ordinarily a demurrer must be limited to facts
appearing on the face of the challenged pleading, “a
limited exception to the rule against speaking demurrers
exists for documents filed in support of a demurrer where
a plaintiff has averred the existence of certain written
documents and premised his cause of action upon those
documents.”[2]

Richardson v. Wetzel, 74 A.3d 353, 358 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (quoting Barndt v.
Dep’t of Corr., 902 A.2d 589, 591 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)). “Thus, th[is] [C]ourt
may determine only whether, on the basis of the [petitioner’s] allegations, he or she
possesses a cause of action recognized at law.” Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No.
5, by McNesby v. City of Phila., 267 A.3d 531, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
Respondents first contend that Sanchez has failed to assert sufficient
personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing with respect to Little, Sorber, and
McCown. DOC further asserts that Sanchez does not make allegations of Little’s
actual personal involvement but, rather, attempts to apply a chain-of-command
liability theory.

2
Although Sanchez did not attach copies of Grievance Nos. 938127 and 988247 to his
Petition, Respondents attached DOC’s Initial Review Responses, the Facility Manager’s Appeal
Responses, and the Final Appeal Decisions for those Grievances to their Preliminary Objections.
This Court considers them since Sanchez repeatedly references them in his Petition. See
Richardson v. Wetzel, 74 A.3d 353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a public
employee is not vicariously liable for the actions of
subordinates simply because the subordinate is in the
employee’s chain of command. DuBree v.
Commonwealth, . . . 393 A.2d 293, 295-96 ([Pa.]
1978). . . . A public employee’s participation in reviewing
grievances and grievance appeals does not constitute
personal involvement. If no personal involvement is
averred, the public employee is immune from suit.[3]
DuBree, 393 A.2d at 296.

Moody v. Wenerowicz (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 376 C.D. 2021, filed May 31, 2023), slip
op. at 16 (citation omitted).
With respect to Little, Sanchez alleges in the Petition:

24. On July 21, 2021[,] [] Little failed to create a policy,
custom[,] or procedure to ensure the security, care[,] or
safety of [Sanchez’s] personal property during the course
of the unusual confiscation of [Sanchez’s] personal
prop[]erty. This caused certain property item[]s of
[Sanchez] valued in the sum of $200.[00] to get lost and
or distroyed [sic] while in the hands of [Respondents]
Long, Sorber, and McCown.
25. [] [Sanchez] made [] Little aware of the missing
personal property item some[]time after the unusual
confiscation, through the grievance system and the appeal
to [OIGA].

3
The providing of a prison grievance system does not confer
constitutional rights on inmates concerning the handling of
grievances and no cause of action exists for improper
investigation or handling of an inmate grievance. The law is also
clear that the General Assembly’s waiver of sovereign immunity
applies only to claims for compensatory damages and that claims for
punitive damages against the Commonwealth and its agencies and
employees are barred.
Owens v. Commonwealth (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 2624 C.D. 2015, filed Sept. 23, 2016), slip op. at 7
(citations omitted; emphasis added). This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions issued after
January 15, 2008 may be cited “for [their] persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.” Section
414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
The unreported opinions referenced herein are cited for their persuasive value.
5
26. At this point, [] Little had administrative involvement
in the handling of [Sanchez’s] personal property[,] but
Little failed to correct the loss of [Sanchez’s] personal
property item listed in Missing Item and Sought Damages
[sic], while in the hands of [] Sorber, Long, and McCown.
This caused [Sanchez] to continue to suffer a loss of
certain property item[]s valued at the cost of $200.[00.]

Petition at 3.
DOC avers that Sanchez’s allegations regarding Sorber similarly lack
reference to Sorber’s personal involvement. Regarding Sorber, Sanchez avers:

27. On July 21, 2021[,] [] Sorber was the Facility Manager
of SCI-Phoenix and was responsible for the care, custody
or control of [Sanchez’s] personal property.
28. [] [Sanchez] made [] Sorber aware of the missing
personal property item some[]time after the unusual
confiscation, by reporting the incident through the
grievance system and the appeal to the Facility [M]anager.
29. At this point, Sorber filed [sic] to correct the loss of
certain property item[]s listed in Section Missing Item and
Sought Damages [sic], while in the hands of Long and
McCown. This caused [Sanchez] to conti[nue] to suffer a
loss of certain property item[]s valued at the cost of
$200[.00].
30. On July 21, 2021[,] [] Sorber failed to intervene,
supervise, and ensure that [] Long followed the relevant
procedure mandated by [DOC] Policy . . . , despite []
Sorber being in the best position to correct the problem.

Petition at 4.
With respect to Little and Sorber, the Petition does not include facts
averring personal involvement beyond their role in the chain of command.
Accordingly, this Court agrees that Sanchez has not pled facts that would permit
recovery as against Little and Sorber. Thus, this Court sustains Respondents’
Preliminary Objections with respect to Little and Sorber and dismisses them from
the instant action with prejudice.

6
Unlike Sanchez’s references to Little and Sorber in the Petition,
Sanchez’s allegations regarding McCown reflect McCown’s personal involvement
in approving Sanchez’s Outside Purchase Approval Form, which approval DOC
acknowledged was erroneous. See Petition at 2; Preliminary Objections, Ex. A.
Reliant on said approval, Sanchez effectuated the purchase, which caused the
sneakers to be delivered to the SCI-Phoenix mail room. Accordingly, this Court
concludes that Sanchez has pled sufficient facts to establish McCown’s personal
involvement.
Respondents also argue that Sanchez fails to assert a negligence claim
and, thus, sovereign immunity bars his claim. Section 8522(b)(3) of the act known
as the Sovereign Immunity Act states that “the defense of sovereign immunity shall
not be raised to claims for damages caused by . . . [t]he care, custody[,] or control of
personal property in the possession or control of Commonwealth parties, including
. . . property of persons held by a Commonwealth agency. . . .” 4 42 Pa.C.S. §
8522(b)(3).

Although the Commonwealth and its agencies are
generally shielded by the defense of sovereign immunity,
our General Assembly has waived that defense “as a bar

4
[Where a prisoner] sets forth a claim for damages to his [property]
caused by the care of the [property] while it was in the possession
of Commonwealth parties[,] [b]ased on the plain language of
[S]ection 8522(b)(3) [of the Sovereign Immunity Act], the state
employees may not raise sovereign immunity as a defense . . . . See
Payton v. Horn, 49 F. Supp. 2d 791 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that
[S]ection 8522(b) [of the Sovereign Immunity Act] provides a
remedy for inmates when a prison official negligently handles an
inmate’s personal property).

Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (footnote omitted).

7
to an action against Commonwealth parties[] for damages
arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be
recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a
cause of action if the injury [was] caused by a person not
having available the defense of sovereign immunity.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 8522(a). Thus, “[t]o impose liability on a
Commonwealth party, (1) the alleged negligent act must
involve a cause of action that is recognized at common law
or by a statute, and (2) the case must fall within one of
[the] exceptions to sovereign immunity listed in Section
8522(b)” of . . . the Sovereign Immunity Act. Bufford v.
Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 670 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1996) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)).

Young v. Wetzel, 260 A.3d 281, 289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (footnotes omitted).
In contrast to negligent conduct, “[s]overeign immunity is not waived
for intentional acts committed by a Commonwealth employee acting within the
scope of his or her employment.” Paluch v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 175 A.3d 433, 438
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
Regarding Long, Sanchez alleges:

18. [] Long was the mail room officer at all times during
and when [Sanchez’s] orthopedic sneakers arrived at SCI-
Phoenix and was responsible to oversee and handle
[Sanchez’s] personal property with care to ensure
inmates[’] personal property is inventoried as mandated by
[DOC policy].
19. On July 21, 2021[,] [] Long was responsi[]ble to
ensure [Sanchez’s] per[so]nal property was to be
delive[re]d after it was inspected and inventoried . . . .
20. [] Long refused to turn over [Sanchez’s] orthopedic
sneakers to him despite [Sanchez’s] me[di]cal approval to
have them. [] Long continues to hold possession of
[Sanchez’s] personal property.
21. [] Long maintains possession of [Sanchez’s] personal
property without issuing [Sanchez] a [DOC] confiscation
slip.

8
22. On July 21, 2021[,] [] Long failed to provide [Sanchez]
with a[] confiscation slip or deliver [Sanchez’s] personal
property which is valued at $200[.00] after [Sanchez’s]
property was delive[re]d and turned over to [] Long.
23. On July 21, 2021[,] [] Long failed to follow the
procedures and measures of [DOC policies] and was the
result of incompetence, carelessness, or oversight on the
part of [] Long.

Petition at 3.
Respondents contend that Long’s actions were not negligent but, rather,
if tortious, are intentional torts. “Simply labeling the claim as one sounding in
negligence does not make it so where the harm is alleged to have been caused by the
Department’s [intentional] actions . . . .” Johnson v. Wetzel, 238 A.3d 1172, 1181
(Pa. 2020). This Court has defined negligence “as the failure to exercise that care a
reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances.” Lauer v. Millville Area
Sch. Dist., 657 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). In contrast, “conduct which is
undertaken with a particular end in view is not negligent conduct, it is intentional
conduct.” Commonwealth v. Potter, 386 A.2d 918, 924 (Pa. 1978). Notwithstanding
Sanchez’s characterization of Respondents’ conduct as “the result of incompetence,
carelessness, or oversight,” DOC’s grievance responses reveal Sanchez’s claims that
Long intentionally refused to produce the sneakers to Sanchez because they were
not from an approved vendor, despite that McCown had approved the purchase.
Petition at 3. Specifically, the Department’s Initial Review Response informed
Sanchez:

You may only purchase shoes from Correctional
Industries [(CI)] or through Mike’s Better Shoes only for
those with special shoe size needs not available through
CI. DC[-]ADM 815 reads, “An inmate is permitted to
purchase approved items from Approved Vendors. The
facility will disapprove and decline to accept any
purchases not in compliance with this policy.” Therefore,
[] Long was accurate with confiscating the sneakers.

9
Secondarily, in further accordance with DC[-]ADM 815,
“all purchases must be approved prior to being ordered.”
It is understood that [] McCown approved your outside
purchase request. However, “final approval is made upon
inspection when the item is received.” Therefore, the final
inspection by [] Long caught the error made by []
McCown and denied the non-approved items.
Additionally, the institution maintains the right to decline
any package that does not conform to the outside purchase
policy.

Preliminary Objections, Ex. A, Initial Review Response at 1.
As described, Long’s confiscation of Sanchez’s sneakers was
“undertaken with a particular end in view” – to prevent Sanchez from possessing
unapproved sneakers in violation of Department policy. Potter, 386 A.2d at 924. It
was thus intentional conduct. Because Sanchez alleges Long’s intentional conduct
was within the scope of his duties, rather than negligence, this Court sustains
Respondents’ Preliminary Objections with respect to Sanchez’s negligence claim
against Long and dismisses the claim with prejudice as to Long.
In their brief, Respondents rely on McCown’s purported lack of
personal involvement beyond approving Sanchez’s sneaker purchase to demonstrate
that McCown is not liable to Sanchez for negligence. According to Respondents,
“[Sanchez] has failed to establish sufficient personal involvement on behalf of []
McCown in the alleged negligent conduct that resulted in his orthopedic sneakers
being improperly confiscated.” Respondents Br. at 14. Respondents raise no other
objection to Sanchez’s negligence claim against McCown. Notwithstanding, having
concluded that Sanchez has alleged McCown’s adequate personal involvement, this
Court overrules Respondents’ Preliminary Objections with respect to Sanchez’s
negligence claims against McCown.

10
Respondents next assert that this Court must dismiss Sanchez’s
assumpsit claim because there is no contractual relationship between Sanchez and
Respondents.
This Court has explained: “An action in assumpsit is a common law
action in which a plaintiff claims that a defendant breached an express or implied
promise to perform some act or make a payment to another.” Jordan v. Overmyer
(Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1863 C.D. 2017, filed Oct. 11, 2018), slip op. at 12 (citing Black’s
Law Dictionary 133 (8th ed. 2004)). “The subject matter for each of [Sanchez’s]
claims . . . is controlled by [DOC] policies and procedures. Such policies and
procedures do not create a contractual relationship between [DOC] and an inmate.
[See] Oatess v. Beard, . . . 576 A.2d 398, 400 ([Pa. Super.] 1990).” Brown v. Dep’t
of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1155 C.D. 2016, filed Aug. 8, 2017), slip op. at 3 (footnote
omitted); see also Martin v. Clark (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 74 C.D. 2018, filed July 27,
2018); Brown v. York Cnty. Prison (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 590 C.D. 2016, filed Oct. 16,
2017).
Here, the process governing Sanchez’s purchase and the approval and
handling of his sneaker shipment were all governed by DOC policies, including
those described on the approval form characterizing the approval as “conditional.”
Petition, Appendix B-1. No contract was created by Respondents’ actions conducted
in accordance with DOC policies. See Brown. Therefore, this Court sustains
Respondents’ Preliminary Objections as to Sanchez’s assumpsit claim and dismisses
such claims with prejudice as to all Respondents.
For all of the above reasons, this Court sustains in part and overrules in
part Respondents’ Preliminary Objections. This Court (1) sustains the Preliminary
Objections for failure to state valid negligence claims against Little, Sorber, and
Long and dismisses Sanchez’s claim with prejudice as to those Respondents; (2)
overrules Respondents’ Preliminary Objections as to McCown; and (3) sustains
11
Respondents’ Preliminary Objections with respect to Sanchez’s assumpsit claim and
dismisses that claim with prejudice as to all Respondents.

_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

12
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Carlos Sanchez, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Department of :
Corrections; George M. Little, :
Secretary of Pennsylvania Department :
of Corrections; Jamie Sorber, :
Superintendent; Kelly Long, Mail Room :
Supervisor; and Amina McCown, :
H-Unit Manager, : No. 451 M.D. 2023
Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2024, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (Department), George M. Little (Little), Jamie Sorber
(Sorber), Kelly Long (Long) and Amina McCown’s (McCown) (collectively,
Respondents) Preliminary Objections to Carlos Sanchez’s (Sanchez) Petition for
Review (Petition) are sustained in part and overruled in part. Respondents’
Preliminary Objections challenging Sanchez’s negligence claims are SUSTAINED
and Sanchez’s negligence claims are DISMISSED with prejudice as to Little,
Sorber, and Long. Respondents’ Preliminary Objections with respect to Sanchez’s
negligence claim against McCown are OVERRULED, and McCown and the
Department are DIRECTED to file an answer to the Petition within 30 days.
Respondents’ Preliminary Objections to Sanchez’s assumpsit claim are
SUSTAINED and the assumpsit claim is DISMISSED with prejudice as to all
Respondents.

_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10591369. Public record. Not legal advice.