# Sims v. City of Jasper

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · August 28, 2024 · 117 F.4th 283

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10560859

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 28, 2024
- **Citations:** 117 F.4th 283
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Civil Rights
- **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Case: 23-40369 Document: 70-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/28/2024

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED
August 28, 2024
No. 23-40369
Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk

Frances Earline Sims, Individually and as dependent administrator of
the Estate of Steven Mitchell Qualls,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

City of Jasper, Texas; Toderick D. Griffin; Sterling
Ramon Linebaugh; Heather Rene O’Dell; Joshua L.
Hadnot,

Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:20-CV-124
______________________________

Before Southwick, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether a district court abused its
discretion in refusing to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of trial.
The Plaintiff, individually and as dependent administrator of her son’s estate,
sued the City of Jasper, Texas, and certain police officers after her son died
while in custody. The Plaintiff argued that the liability and damages phases
of the jury trial needed to be bifurcated to avoid evidence related to damages
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from swaying the jury on the Defendants’ liability. The district court denied
the motion, and the jury found for the Defendants. We AFFIRM.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Steven Mitchell Qualls, who was 28 years old, died in police custody
from an overdose of methamphetamine on January 30, 2019. Sims v. Griffin,
35 F.4th 945, 947–48 (5th Cir. 2022). Less than 72 hours earlier, on the night
of January 28, emergency medical services (“EMS”) took Qualls to Jasper
Memorial Hospital in Jasper, Texas, for “chest pains, agitation, and tachy-
cardia.” Id. at 948. After treatment, Qualls refused to leave the hospital. Id.
Police were called, and they escorted him outside. Id. He was then arrested
for public intoxication. Id.
Sergeant Toderick Griffin and Officer Sterling Linebaugh, two of the
Defendants, took Qualls to the Jasper City Jail for booking. Id. He was
booked at around 10:22 p.m. on January 28. At the time, Qualls was highly
intoxicated and could not answer standard booking questions, so the officers
placed him in a detox cell. Id. The officers did not change Qualls out of his
street clothes as would have been customary policy. Id. At some point, pos-
sibly around the time he was being booked, Qualls swallowed a baggie that
likely contained methamphetamine. Id. “Once in his cell, Qualls’s medical
condition steadily worsened.” Id. “He started incoherently calling out to
jail staff,” yelling for help several times. Id.
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on January 29, Qualls began vomiting “a
dark black liquid, which he smeared around on the floor and rubbed his face
in.” Id. Dispatcher Heather O’Dell, another Defendant, instructed Qualls
to “roll” out of his vomit, but he was unable to comply. Id. Linebaugh then
picked Qualls up to clean him and his cell, causing Qualls to scream in pain.
Id. O’Dell asked Griffin if they should call EMS for help and “Griffin told
her not to.” Id. When O’Dell asked what she should do if Qualls vomited

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again, Linebaugh responded that she should “let him,” and he “laughed that
he didn’t want to ‘hold [Qualls’s] hair.’” Id. (alteration in original).
A few hours later, at around 10:00 p.m., Qualls again vomited a black
liquid, laid in it for a while and smeared it around, and screamed in pain when
officers tried to move him from his bile. Id. A few hours after that, Qualls
vomited a third time and began crying out to officers. Id. No one came to
help. Id. Several hours later, approximately 33 hours after booking, Qualls
was dead. Id.
Qualls’s mother, Frances E. Sims, in her individual capacity and as
administrator of Qualls’s estate, sued Griffin, Linebaugh, O’Dell, Detective
Joshua L. Hadnot, and the City of Jasper under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged
the officers were deliberately indifferent to Qualls’s serious medical needs
and thereby violated his rights under the 14th Amendment; she sought dam-
ages for Qualls’s wrongful death. Sims further claimed the City of Jasper was
liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for
the officers’ alleged misconduct. Sims also asserted claims on behalf of
Qualls’s minor child as his heir.
On the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court
dismissed the claims against Hadnot and the City of Jasper but denied sum-
mary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for Defendants Griffin, Line-
baugh, and O’Dell. Sims v. City of Jasper, 543 F. Supp. 3d 428, 444, 452 (E.D.
Tex. 2021). This court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on interloc-
utory appeal. Sims, 35 F.4th at 952. Thereafter, Sims filed a motion to bifur-
cate the liability and damages phases of trial, arguing the Defendants in-
tended to introduce evidence of Qualls’s prior bad acts and criminal and drug
history, the strained relationship between Sims and Qualls, and other preju-
dicial evidence. Although Sims conceded some evidence may be relevant to
the issue of damages, she argued it was irrelevant to the issue of liability,

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would be unfairly prejudicial, and would confuse the jury. The Defendants
opposed the motion.
The district court held a two-day pretrial conference to determine
Sims’s bifurcation motion and other evidentiary issues. Although the court
recognized the possible prejudicial effect of introducing the evidence high-
lighted in Sims’s motion, it denied the motion. The court reasoned that this
case was like another unnamed case litigated to the plaintiff’s satisfaction and
the jury would hear the evidence eventually. The court was also concerned
that bifurcation in this case might encourage future litigants to seek bifurca-
tion in other cases. The district court then considered the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 42(b) factors — convenience, prejudice, and expedition and
economy — and found those factors weighed against bifurcation.
At trial, Sims relied on substantially the same evidence presented at
summary judgment, which we have already summarized. See id. at 948. This
evidence included a series of closed-circuit television videos showing the
events leading to Qualls’s death. The jury was shown these videos through-
out the trial. The jury also heard testimony and evidence about Qualls’s ex-
tensive criminal history and drug use, disputes with Sims that led her to call
the police numerous times, and his strained relationship with his son and his
son’s mother, Casey Hutto.
The jury found none of the Defendants liable. The district court en-
tered final judgment against Sims based on the verdict. Sims then filed a mo-
tion for a new trial, which the district court denied. Sims timely appealed
both orders.
DISCUSSION
We review the denial of a motion to bifurcate for abuse of discretion,
recognizing the matter is “within the sole discretion of the trial court.”
Nester v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.3d 151, 162 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting First Tex.

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Sav. Ass’n v. Reliance Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 1171, 1174 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992)). “An
abuse of discretion exists only when there is definite and firm conviction that
the court below committed clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d
1285, 1293 (5th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This court
has previously warned that bifurcation “is not the usual course that should
be followed, and that the issue to be tried must be so distinct and separable
from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.” Alabama
v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978).
The denial of a motion for a new trial is also reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Carley v. Crest Pumping Techs., LLC, 890 F.3d 575, 578 (5th Cir.
2018). “A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are
excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its
course.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985)
(footnotes omitted).
The primary issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying Sims’s motion to bifurcate the liability and damages
phases of trial. 1 Before proceeding to that issue, however, we find it useful to
recount what Sims had to prove to the jury regarding the individual officers’
liability.

_____________________
1
Sims raises two additional issues to preserve them for Supreme Court or en banc
review. She argues the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389
(2015), requires applying an objective standard to officers’ conduct in all pretrial detainee
cases, including deliberate indifference cases. She also argues that we should abolish the
defense of qualified immunity. As the prior panel noted, both arguments are foreclosed by
this court’s or the Supreme Court’s precedent. Sims, 35 F.4th at 950 n.10, 951 n.17. We
therefore do not address them.

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I. Deliberate indifference towards pretrial detainees
As we explained during the Defendants’ qualified-immunity appeal,
“[t]he parties agree that Qualls had a constitutional right to not ‘have [his]
serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the [of-
ficers].’” Sims, 35 F.4th at 949 (second and third alteration in original)
(quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)). “Un-
der our caselaw, ‘[a] serious medical need is one for which treatment has
been recommended or for which the need is so apparent that even laymen
would recognize that care is required.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Golbert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006)). To prove delib-
erate indifference, Sims had to show that each Defendant “(1) was ‘aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of seri-
ous harm exists,’ and (2) actually ‘dr[ew] the inference.’” Id. at 949–50 (al-
teration in original) (quoting Dimon v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752,
755 (5th Cir. 2001)).
We apply a subjective standard for pretrial detainee deliberate indif-
ference claims “based on episodic acts or omissions,” as is the case here. Al-
derson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2017) (quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). Sims did not need to prove that the De-
fendants “subjectively intend[ed] harm to befall” Qualls. Sims, 35 F.4th at
950 n.10 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Instead, subjectivity arises
in the context of what the individual Defendants were actually aware and the
inferences they actually drew at the time. See Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d
633, 648–49 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); see also Garza v. City of Donna, 922
F.3d 626, 635–36 (5th Cir. 2019). The reason for applying the subjective
standard is to focus our inquiry on the constitutional violation. Hare, 74 F.3d
at 649–50. Error or negligence, even when grossly committed, is not a con-
stitutional violation. Id. at 645. Inflicting punishment on pretrial detainees,
however, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at

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650. In this context, “[p]unishment is inflicted only when a prison official
was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to a convicted inmate but was
deliberately indifferent to that risk.” Id. at 649 (emphasis in original).
With these principles in mind, we proceed to the bifurcation issue.
II. Bifurcation
Sims argues the district court’s refusal to bifurcate the liability and
damages phases of trial was unduly prejudicial and essentially converted the
proceedings to a trial of Qualls’s character and relationship with his mother.
She also argues the issues of liability and damages could have been separated
easily without loss of efficiency or economy while preventing undue
prejudice because there would have been little, if any, overlap between the
evidence and witnesses on each issue and the same jury would try both
phases.
“For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize,
the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. When ordering a separate
trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 42(b). Convenience, efficiency, and economy are obviously important
considerations that go to a district court’s inherent discretion to manage its
docket. See In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 1993); 8 Moore’s
Federal Practice § 42.23 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). Avoiding
prejudice, though, seems to be given heightened weight, at least to the extent
it is necessary to reverse an order to bifurcate. See 9A Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2392 (3d ed. 2024). At least one prior panel of this court has
expressed support for this view. See Malin Int’l Ship Repair & Drydock, Inc.
v. Veolia Es Special Servs., Inc., 369 F. App’x 553, 556 (5th Cir. 2010). We
will assess each factor.

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At the same time, we must not displace the district court’s discretion
with our own. As a highly “case-specific procedural matter,” bifurcation is
“within the sole discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse the
court’s decision absent an abuse of that discretion.” Nester, 888 F.3d at 162–
63 (citation omitted). In reviewing the Rule 42(b) factors, therefore, we will
reverse only if we are left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a “clear
error of judgment” occurred. Conkling, 18 F.3d at 1293 (quotation marks
omitted).
a. Convenience
At the pretrial conference, the district court implied that bifurcation
would not “lead to convenience” because it would require two trials and
“the jury is ready to go.” Sims argues bifurcation in this case would have
been more convenient because only one jury was requested for the liability
and damages phases and a finding against her on the former would eliminate
the need for trial on the latter. The same could be said, however, in any case
where liability and damages are both at issue, so this argument only goes so
far. There is no contention that denying or granting Sims’s bifurcation
motion would have inconvenienced any party’s trial preparation or witnesses
or raised new or complex issues. See 8 Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 42.20. Thus, we agree that this factor likely weighs against bifurcation out
of convenience to the jury, and there appears no “clear error of judgment”
in the district court’s weighing of this factor. Conkling, 18 F.3d at 1293.
b. Expedition and economy
The district court concluded bifurcation would not expedite and
economize the trial of Sims’s claims but acknowledged this was a close call.
The district court distinguished this case from those where bifurcation may
be more clearly expeditious, such as those involving counterclaims or third-
party claims. Sims’s argument that bifurcation would aid efficiency is the

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same as her argument on convenience: if the jury ruled against her on liability,
there would be no need for a damages phase. In contrast, the district court
speculated that if the jury found in Sims’s favor on liability, the damages
phase “could well equal . . . time-wise the liability phase.” There is no
contention that trial of one claim would preclude the need to try another
claim or ancillary issues like a statute of limitations or liability release. See 8
Moore’s Federal Practice § 42.20. Thus, like convenience, this
factor weighs against bifurcation, and there was no “clear error of judgment”
by the district court. Conkling, 18 F.3d at 1293.
c. Avoiding prejudice
The most disputed factor is prejudice against Sims. In her bifurcation
motion, Sims identified the type of evidence the Defendants sought to
introduce at trial, recognized that it might be relevant to damages, but argued
it would be irrelevant and highly prejudicial to liability. This included
testimony on Qualls’s drug use and “unstable” lifestyle, prior arrests and
criminal activity, strained relationship with Sims and his minor son, failure
to provide for his son, domestic disputes with his ex-girlfriend (and mother
of his son), and prior altercations with Sims that led to arrests. Sims argued
introducing such evidence at the liability phase would transform the trial
from one on the Defendants’ conduct to one on Qualls’s “misbehavior and
poor choices.”
In considering the motion to bifurcate, the district court recognized
this evidence might have “a lot of prejudicial” effect and “no probative
value” as to liability. Nevertheless, the court refused to bifurcate for several
reasons.
The court indicated this case was very similar to one that it recently
tried. There, a woman with “a long history of criminal acts and obviously a
disappointment to her family” died while in detention, and a family member,

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possibly her mother, sued. Despite this “bad evidence,” the court explained
that “people for both sides were very happy with the way that case was tried”
without bifurcating liability and damages. 2 The court stressed that it was not
applying a “one size fits all” standard and that it “hate[s] to say we need to
do it like we did in that other case.” The court ultimately concluded that
bifurcation was not warranted because the jury was going to hear the
prejudicial evidence eventually. The district court explained “the jury is
going to know this isn’t, you know, a saint in jail,” but the jury would be smart
enough to separate the evidence on liability and damages.
Further, the court acknowledged that it was “making a precedent” in
ruling on the motion to bifurcate and granting the motion could encourage
others to seek bifurcation as well. “I’ve got to think about how I run a court,”
it explained, “because . . . once I start bifurcating in this case, the same
arguments could be made” in subsequent cases. When Sims’s attorney
raised concerns that failure to bifurcate might confuse the jury, the court
responded, “I am highly confident, given your expertise in these types of
cases, that you’re going to be able to . . . pars[e] out for the jury the testimony
and the evidence . . . that have nothing to do with Ms. Sims. And I think the
jury is smart enough to . . . see the difference.”
The court also considered how bifurcating could prejudice the
defense, and how not bifurcating could benefit Sims. Counsel for the
Defendants suggested Qualls’s prior drug use and arrest history were
relevant to liability because it might show that Qualls previously detoxed in a
similar manner without incident. This could demonstrate the Defendants’
subjective belief that his vomiting and cries of pain were simply par for the

_____________________
2
The court did not cite or name the case, so it is unclear whether bifurcation was
sought.

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course and did not indicate a serious medical need. The district court
concluded the Defendants were “entitled” to assert this defense and
bifurcating could ultimately prejudice them, requiring retrial if the court’s
decision were later reversed. The court also explained how presenting this
defense could benefit Sims’s case because it could “suggest that perhaps
[Qualls] needs a little extra watchful care.” Ultimately, the court concluded
this was “probably something that we ought to just throw . . . out there and
try the case” without bifurcation.
The district court was in an understandably difficult position. We see
three significant considerations for our evaluation.
First, the district court’s reasoning was sound. It was reasonable for
the district court to consider previous judicial experience in reaching its
decision. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 42(b) recommend
bifurcating “where experience has demonstrated its worth,” though
“separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 42(b) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. Here, the district
court stated it was not employing a routine, “one size fits all” approach to
bifurcation but explained that its prior experience with similar facts suggested
bifurcation was unnecessary. Similarly, no rule or statute prevented the
district court from considering how granting bifurcation in this case might
affect others, given the court’s inherent power to manage its own docket. See
In re Stone, 986 F.2d at 903; see also 9A Wright & Miller, supra, § 2390
(explaining how “the pressures of docket management” affect use of
bifurcation). 3

_____________________
3
To be clear, bifurcation is a “case-specific” inquiry that “is not the usual course”
and must be considered within the facts and context of each case. Nester, 888 F.3d at 163;
Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d at 318. A “one size fits all” approach will not do. Our

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More importantly, the district court was correct in recognizing that
bifurcation might prejudice the Defendants in presenting a viable defense to
liability. To repeat, for the Defendants to be liable in this episodic acts or
omissions case, Sims had to prove the Defendants were actually aware of a
substantial risk of serious harm, not that they “should have been aware” as a
reasonable person would. Hare, 74 F.3d at 650. The Defendants’ prior
experience with Qualls, including his prior arrests, detoxing and other
circumstances, were highly probative of liability.
Defendant O’Dell testified that based on her prior experience with
Qualls, she expected there would be “vomiting,” “noise,” and “mumbling”
from the detox cell that could last as long as three days. Defendant Griffin
similarly testified that there were no significant differences between Qualls’s
2019 arrest and detox — the subject of this case — and Qualls’s incident-free
arrest and detox in 2017, which Griffin personally observed. Griffin
explained that based on his “similar observations” between the two events,
he believed Qualls’s vomiting and cries were “how [Qualls] handle[d] [his]
detoxification.” Although Defendant Linebaugh did not have prior
experience with Qualls, he testified that he relied on O’Dell’s and Griffin’s
representations of their past experience in assessing the situation. The jury
was entitled to consider this testimony when deciding whether the
Defendants “had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm . . . but responded with deliberate indifference to that risk.” Id.
Relegating evidence and testimony of Qualls’s prior arrests to the damages
phase through bifurcation, therefore, would have prejudiced the Defendants.

_____________________
conclusion above, however, merely recognizes that judicial experience and case
management may be proper considerations within the broader bifurcation analysis.

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Second, much of Sims’s purported prejudice is at least equally the
result of evidentiary disputes for which standard trial practices, such as
objections or limiting instructions, provide protection. Sims highlights
potentially prejudicial statements made by the Defendants’ counsel during
opening and closing statements, suggesting Sims was responsible for her
son’s death by refusing to pick him up from the hospital when asked to do so.
Even though the district court instructed the parties that such suggestions
were out of bounds, Sims failed to object to the statements at the time, which
is the proper approach for challenging improper jury arguments. See Colburn
v. Bunge Towing, Inc., 883 F.2d 372, 375–76 (5th Cir. 1989). While Sims was
testifying, her counsel also failed to object to the Defendants’ line of
questioning about which she now complains. To the extent those questions
and testimony were overly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or needlessly
cumulative, they could have been challenged through timely objections under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or another relevant evidentiary rule. See Fed.
R. Evid. 103(a)(1).
Of course, Sims filed a motion in limine raising her evidentiary
objections, and the district court ruled on them during the two-day pretrial
conference. To the extent Sims wished to challenge any of those rulings, the
proper approach would have been to object when the evidence or testimony
was introduced at trial. 4 See Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 507 n.26 (5th
Cir. 2008). Even if the district court overruled the objections, the normal
course would be to seek a limiting instruction, which “often will suffice to

_____________________
4
Hutto, the mother of Qualls’s son, testified by deposition about Qualls’s familial
relationships, so Sims’s ability to object further at trial was limited. That said, Sims called
Hutto as a witness at trial and now complains that the testimony was prejudicial. To the
extent this was a litigation strategy to hedge unfavorable testimony, it was a gamble, but a
gamble that does not pay out is not a basis for reversal. See Colburn, 883 F.2d at 376.

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cure any risk of prejudice.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).
This is a far “less drastic measure[]” than bifurcation of trial. 5 Id.
We need not address the merits of the district court’s evidentiary
rulings because they are unpreserved, and Sims does not assert error on
appeal. See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744,
748 (5th Cir. 1987).
Third, we are unpersuaded that this case warrants bifurcation, which
“is not the usual course that should be followed.” Blue Bird Body Co., 573
F.2d at 318. Sims argues courts “routinely sever trials to protect against
prejudice to defendant police officers” in police misconduct civil rights
cases. She then cites several Ninth Circuit and Texas federal district court
cases bifurcating Section 1983 claims against officer defendants from Monell
claims against municipal defendants. Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d
353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 634 (9th
Cir. 1991); Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1999);
Ramirez v. Escajeda, No. 3:17-CV-193, 2021 WL 3778306 (W.D. Tex. Aug.
20, 2021); Sanchez v. Gomez, No. 3:17-CV-133, 2020 WL 919160 (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 26, 2020). Those opinions are inapplicable because they required a
finding of constitutional wrongdoing by the officer defendants before Monell
liability could attach to the municipal defendants. See, e.g., Sanchez, 2020
WL 919160, at *1; Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.
_____________________
5
In her reply brief, Sims argues she did not need to request a limiting instruction
to preserve the bifurcation issue for appeal. That is certainly correct. There is overlap in
the goal of each request, but using instructions to limit the issues for which jurors should
be considering evidence is clearly different than having the evidence presented in a
bifurcated trial. We agree they are not the same issue. We do not address Sims’s
arguments on the sufficiency of limiting instructions in this case, though, because Sims
failed to request one. These instructions can be helpful in limiting the evidence to what it
is for (e.g., damages rather than liability); such an instruction might have been useful here.
See, e.g., Savoie v. Otto Candies, Inc., 692 F.2d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 1982).

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2010). Sims’s bifurcation motion did not seek to split certain claims against
certain defendants from other claims against other defendants; instead, Sims
sought to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of trial for all claims
against all defendants. Sims’s cases, therefore, are distinguishable. 6
The parties debate the applicability of another Ninth Circuit case that
is arguably more analogous to Sims’s. See Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim,
840 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2016). That was a Section 1983 case filed by a mother
seeking noneconomic damages after her son was shot and killed by a police
officer during a foot chase. Id. at 595–96. At trial, the defense presented “a
copious amount of inflammatory and prejudicial evidence” regarding Diaz’s
gang affiliation — including a gang expert’s testimony and pictures of Diaz
holding a gun — and Diaz’s use of methamphetamine. Id. at 598–601. The
gang-related evidence was initially presented as evidence of a “gang gun”
theory of liability to explain why no gun had been found at the scene. Id. at
598–99 & n.6. Evidence of Diaz’s prior drug use was initially presented to
undermine the plaintiff’s claim for damages from the “loss of her
relationship with her son.” Id. at 600 & n.8. Over the course of trial,
however, testimony on both topics shifted from their original purposes: the
gang expert testified on gang activities generally and a toxicology expert
speculated Diaz’s drug use may have affected his behavior on the day of the
shooting. Id. at 599–600. The jury ultimately found the defendant officer
not liable, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the district court abused
_____________________
6
We are also not persuaded by Sims’s reliance on this court’s dicta describing
bifurcation as a “common” or “oft-deployed” tool for case management. See EEOC v.
Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 826 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 2016); Prantil v. Arkema Inc., 986
F.3d 570, 582 (5th Cir. 2021). Whatever might be said of bifurcation generally, it still
requires an individualized, “case-specific” inquiry that “must be approached with
trepidation.” Nester, 888 F.3d at 163; Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d at 318 (citation omitted).
Thus, the propriety of bifurcating one case is not necessarily indicative of the propriety of
bifurcating another.

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No. 23-40369

its discretion in refusing to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of trial.
Id. at 597–98, 603.
Of course, the Estate of Diaz case is not binding on this court. We also
see distinctions. The testimony regarding Diaz’s prior drug use was only
marginally relevant to the plaintiff’s damages, but the evidence presented “at
trial fixated on his drug use on the day of the incident and how it may have
affected his behavior, which had no relevance to his mother’s loss.” Id. at
600 (emphasis in original). Instead, as the Ninth Circuit explained, this
evidence went to the reasonableness of the defendant officer’s conduct and
resulting liability on the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims, despite the
district court’s earlier conclusion that such evidence was irrelevant to
liability because the defendant did not know Diaz was intoxicated at the time
of the shooting. Id. at 601–02 & nn.10, 11. Here, on the other hand,
testimony regarding Qualls’s prior drug use was relevant to liability from the
beginning because it helped establish the Defendants’ defense to Sims’s
deliberate indifference claims.
There is a closer parallel between the gang affiliation testimony in
Estate of Diaz and testimony suggesting that Sims was at fault for refusing to
pick Qualls up from the hospital and that the Defendants were not at fault
because “there was nobody else there to take care of him.” As previously
mentioned, the district court here correctly instructed the parties not to make
such suggestions, and we were clear that Sims did not need to show the
Defendants “subjectively intend[ed] harm to befall” Qualls. Sims, 35 F.4th
at 950 n.10 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). What differentiates
Estate of Diaz, however, is that there, “[t]he following pattern arose: after
improper testimony, [p]laintiffs’ counsel would move to strike the testimony
and the district court would state ‘stricken’ or ‘the last part of the answer
will be stricken.’” 840 F.3d at 599. The Ninth Circuit recognized this
pattern was especially problematic because “gang evidence has the potential

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No. 23-40369

to be particularly prejudicial.” Id. at 602. Even though the district court
issued a limiting instruction after the gang affiliation testimony was
presented, the damage was already done. Id. at 599, 601–02. Here, by
contrast, no objections were made when testimony was presented, and no
limiting instruction was requested. Thus, we are not convinced the
purported prejudice was the result of the district court’s refusal to bifurcate,
as the Ninth Circuit determined in Estate of Diaz. Id. at 602–03.
For these reasons, there was no “clear error of judgment” in the
district court’s weighing of the prejudice factor. Conkling, 18 F.3d at 1293.
* * *
Sims failed to demonstrate a clear error of judgment on any of the
three Rule 42(b) factors. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying her bifurcation motion. See Nester, 888 F.3d at 163. For
similar reasons, Sims has not shown that “the trial was unfair, or prejudicial
error was committed in its course.” Smith, 773 F.2d at 613 (citations
omitted). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Sims’s motion for a new trial. See Carley, 890 F.3d at 578.
AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10560859. Public record. Not legal advice.