# Robert Davis v. Secretary of State

> Michigan Court of Appeals · August 23, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10525642

## Case

- **Court:** Michigan Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** August 23, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10525642

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that mandamus “will not lie for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or controlling the exercise of discretion reposed in administrative bodies”

## Opinion text

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT DAVIS, UNPUBLISHED
August 23, 2024
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 372008
Court of Claims
SECRETARY OF STATE, LC No. 24-000069-MM

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: N. P. HOOD, P.J., and CAMERON and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this expedited election matter, plaintiff, Robert Davis, appeals as of right from the Court
of Claims’s August 1, 2024 opinion and order, which (as relevant here) granted defendant,
Secretary of State (the “SOS”), summary disposition of all of plaintiff’s remaining claims under a
combination of MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(8). Because the lower court properly granted the SOS
summary disposition of the disputed claims, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of plaintiff’s attempts to prevent the SOS from certifying two different
prospective candidates—William Burton, Jr., and former Judge Kahlilia Yvette Davis—as
candidates for seats on the 36th District Court on the ballot in the upcoming general election. In
the trial court, plaintiff was successful with regard to the latter prospective candidate, and thus he
does not challenge the lower court’s rulings with regard to former Judge Davis. Rather, in his brief
on appeal here, plaintiff challenges only the trial court’s rulings as to his claims regarding Burton’s
candidacy.

Plaintiff’s claims regarding Burton were first asserted as Counts IV (seeking declaratory
relief) and V (seeking mandamus) in plaintiff’s five-count amended verified complaint. In
pertinent part, plaintiff stated the following allegations in support of those claims involving
Burton:

COUNT IV

-1-
Declaratory Judgment Declaring That Defendant Secretary of State, In Her
Official Capacity, Has A Clear Legal Duty Under MCL 168.558(4) of
Michigan Election Law Not To Certify To The Wayne County Election
Commission William Burton, Jr. as a candidate for 36th District Court For
The November 2024 General Election Ballot Because His Affidavit of
Identity Contains A False Statement.

89. Plaintiff incorporates, repeats and realleges the foregoing allegations as
though they were fully set forth and stated herein.

90. For this count, pursuant to MCR 2.605 and MCL 24.263 and 24.264 of
the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), [MCL 24.201 et seq.,] Plaintiff seeks
the entry of a declaratory judgment against the Defendant Secretary of State.

91. Pursuant to MCR 2.605, an actual controversy exists between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant Secretary of State.

92. On April 22, 2024, pursuant to MCL 168.467b and MCL 168.558 of
Michigan Election Law, William Thomas Burton Jr. (“Mr. Burton”) filed with the
Defendant Secretary of State an affidavit of identity, affidavit of constitutional
qualification and approximately 271 nominating petitions to qualify as a candidate
for one of two non[-]incumbent positions on the 36th District Court. (See Burton’s
affidavit of identity attached).

93. MCL 24.263 of the APA provides:

On request of an interested person, an agency may issue a
declaratory ruling as to the applicability to an actual state of
facts of a statute administered by the agency or of a rule or order
of the agency. An agency shall prescribe by rule the form for such
a request and procedure for its submission, consideration and
disposition. A declaratory ruling is binding on the agency and the
person requesting it unless it is altered or set aside by any court. An
agency may not retroactively change a declaratory ruling, but
nothing in this subsection prevents an agency from prospectively
changing a declaratory ruling. A declaratory ruling is subject to
judicial review in the same manner as an agency final decision or
order in a contested case. (emphasis supplied).

94. On June 6, 2024, pursuant to MCL 24.263 of the APA, Plaintiff, as
resident and registered voter of the state of Michigan, submitted a[n] expedited
request for a declaratory ruling to the Defendant Secretary of State concerning
William Burton’s apparent violation of MCL 169.233(6) of the Michigan
Campaign Finance Act [(MCFA), MCL 169.201 et seq.] (See Plaintiff’s June 6,
2024 Request for Expedited Declaratory Ruling submitted to Defendant
attached).

-2-
95. On June 6, 2024, Defendant Secretary of State, through her Director of
Elections, Jonathan Brater, issued a letter to the Plaintiff denying Plaintiff’s request
for the Defendant Secretary of State to issue a declaratory ruling in accordance with
MCL 24.263 of the APA. (See Defendant’s June 6, 2024 Denial letter attached).

96. As a result of the Defendant Secretary of State denying Plaintiff’s
request to issue a declaratory ruling in accordance with MCL 24.263 of the APA,
in accordance with the Court of Appeals’ holdings in Citizens for Common Sense
in Gov’t v. Attorney General, 243 Mich.App. 43, 51; 620 N.W.2d 546 (2000); and
Huron Valley Sch v Secretary of State, 266 Mich App 638; 702 NW2d 862 (2005),
Plaintiff now has standing to seek declaratory relief in this Honorable Court for this
Court to declare candidate William Burton, Jr. violated MCL 169.233(6) of the
Michigan Campaign Finance Act.

97. In addition to Plaintiff’s request for the Defendant to issue an expedited
declaratory ruling under the APA, Plaintiff also previously submitted a formal
challenge to the Defendant challenging William Burton, Jr.’s affidavit of identity.

98. On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff submitted to the Defendant a challenge
questioning the validity of William Burton Jr.’s affidavit of identity because
Plaintiff believed it contained a false statement with respect to the candidate’s
compliance with the Michigan Campaign Finance Act. (See Plaintiff’s May 1, 2024
challenge attached).

* * *

100. On May 17, 2024, Defendant issued a letter rejecting Plaintiff’s May
1, 2024 challenge to William Burton Jr.’s affidavit of identity. (See Defendant’s
May 17, 2024 letter rejecting Plaintiff’s challenge attached).

* * *

102. On his April 22, 2024 affidavit of identity, Mr. Burton attested to the
statement that as of that date, all statements, reports, late filing fees and fines
required of him and his candidate committee had been filed or paid.

103. However, that statement was FALSE!

* * *

107. . . . [U]nder MCL 168.558(4), an officer, such as the Defendant
Secretary of State, is prohibited from certifying to the Board of Election
Commissioners the name of a candidate who executes an affidavit of identity that
contains a false statement with regard to any information required under MCL
168.558. See Moore v Genesee Co, 337 Mich App 723, 730; 976 NW2d 921
(2021).

-3-
108. As will be explained in further detail below, pursuant to MCL
168.558(4), the Defendant Secretary of State cannot certify to the Wayne County
Board of Election Commissioners Mr. Burton as a candidate for judge of 36th
District Court for the November 2024 general election because as of April 22, 2024,
Mr. Burton’s candidate committee, Committee to Elect William Burton, Jr., had
failed to file required campaign finance reports for the 2022 election cycle that
accurately detailed its “expenditures” and/or “contributions” it received.

* * *

118. Despite clearly receiving more than $1,000 in campaign contributions
for the 2022 election cycle, on July 20, 2022, Mr. Burton’s candidate committee
filed an amended statement of organization with the Defendant Secretary of State
requesting a “reporting waiver” for the 2022 election cycle.

* * *

120. Pursuant to MCL 169.233(6) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act,
because . . . Mr. Burton’s candidate committee clearly received and/or expended
more than $1,000 during the 2022 election cycle, the reporting waiver Mr. Burton’s
candidate committee was improperly granted by the Defendant Secretary of State
on July 20, 2022, was automatically lost. [Sic.]

* * *

126. Accordingly, Mr. Burton falsely attested on his April 2024 affidavit
of identity with respect to his candidate committee’s compliance with the filing
requirements of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Honorable Court enters judgment
and grants the following relief against the Defendant Secretary of State, as follows:

a. Enter a declaratory judgment declaring that the Defendant Secretary of
State has a clear legal duty under MCL 168.558(4) not to certify to the Wayne
County Election Commission the name of William Burton Jr. to appear on the
November 2024 general election ballot as a judicial candidate for judge of the 36th
District Court non-incumbent position because William Burton Jr.’s affidavit of
identity contains a false statement with respect to his candidate committee’s
compliance with the filing requirements of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act.

b. Enter a declaratory judgment declaring that pursuant to MCL 169.233(6)
of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, the Committee to Elect William Burton Jr.
should not have been granted a reporting waiver for the 2022 election cycle and it
automatically lost the reporting waiver the Defendant Secretary of State improperly
granted because the candidate committee received and/or expended more than a
$1,000 during the 2022 election cycle.

-4-
c. Enter a declaratory judgment declaring that pursuant to MCL
169.233(1)(a),[](b) and (2)(a),[](b) and (6) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act,
the Committee to Elect William Burton, Jr. was required to file campaign finance
reports in the year 2022 showing contributions and expenditures . . . .

d. Enter a declaratory judgment declaring that the Defendant Secretary of
State’s certification of William Burton Jr. to the Wayne County Election
Commission as a candidate for judge of the 36th District Court for the November
2024 general election is VOID and UNENFORCEABLE because William Burton
Jr.’s affidavit of identity contains a false statement in violation of MCL 168.558(4).

* * *

COUNT V

Writ of Mandamus Compelling Defendant Secretary of State Not To Certify
And/Or Decertify William Burton, Jr. As A Candidate For Judge of 36th
District Court For the November 2024 General Election.

127. Plaintiff incorporates, repeats and realleges the foregoing allegations
as though they were fully set forth and stated herein.

128. For this count, pursuant to MCR 3.305, Plaintiff seeks the entry of a
writ of mandamus against the Defendant Secretary of State, in her official capacity.

129. “A writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy for a party seeking to
compel action by election officials.” Davis v Secretary of State, ___Mich.App.___,
___;___ NW2d___ (2023) (Docket No. 362841); slip op at p 9, citing Attorney
General v Bd of State Canvassers, 318 Mich App 242, 248; 896 NW2d 485 (2016).

* * *

134. The Defendant Secretary of State has a clear legal duty not to certify
candidates who have submitted affidavits of identity that do not strictly comply
with the mandatory requirements of MCL 168.558. Davis v Secretary of State, ___
Mich.App.___, ___;___NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 362841); slip op at pp 9-
11; Berry v Garrett, 316 Mich App 37, 42; 890 NW2d 882 (2016); Moore v
Genesee County, 337 Mich.App. 723, ___; 976 NW2d 921, 925 (2021).

* * *

136. Lastly, other than filing the instant action, Plaintiff has no adequate
remedy at law to ensure only qualified candidates that have strictly complied with
the requirements of MCL 168.558 are on the November 2024 general election ballot
for the office of judge of the 36th District Court.

-5-
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests this Honorable Court enters judgment
and grants the following relief against the Defendant Secretary of State, in her
official capacity, as follows:

a. Enter a writ of mandamus compelling the Defendant Secretary of State
not to certify and/or decertify William Burton, Jr. as a candidate for judge of the
36th District Court for the November 2024 general election because his affidavit of
identity does not comply with MCL 168.558 and/or it contains a false statement in
violation of MCL 1687.558(4). [Footnotes omitted; emphases and record citations
in original; some alterations in original.]

The SOS subsequently moved for summary disposition of those two claims under MCR
2.116(C)(4), (C)(8), “and/or” (C)(10), arguing that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over
such claims as a result of plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Specifically,
the SOS argued that (1) under § 15(17) of the MCFA, MCL 169.215(17), as construed in binding
precedent such as Huron Valley Sch v Secretary of State, 266 Mich App 638; 702 NW2d 862
(2005) (Huron Valley), and Citizens for Common Sense in Gov’t v Attorney General, 243 Mich
App 43; 620 NW2d 546 (2000) (Citizens for Common Sense), the SOS has exclusive jurisdiction
to entertain actions seeking to enforce the MCFA; (2) hence, in this case, “the administrative
complaint process described within subsections 15(5) through (12) of the MCFA, MCL
169.215(5)-(12), provide[d] the exclusive means by which Plaintiff c[ould] seek to compel
compliance with the Act by Burton”; (3) indeed, plaintiff had admittedly filed an administrative
complaint in the SOS—based on the same essential allegations at issue here—which was then still
pending, being actively investigated by the SOS, and “being processed according to the” MCFA,
“which sets out timelines and a response and resolution process”; (4) that administrative process
could yet “be resolved in a number of ways”; and (5) in any event, because plaintiff had not yet
exhausted that administrative process, his instant claims involving Burton’s candidacy should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In response, plaintiff argued that the trial court did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the
disputed claims, further contending that, instead of granting the SOS summary disposition of those
claims, the court should instead grant him judgment as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(I)(2).
As relevant here, apropos of the SOS’s jurisdictional argument, plaintiff argued that (1) “on June
6, 2024, Defendant Secretary of State, through her Director of Elections, Jonathan Brater, issued
a letter to the Plaintiff denying Plaintiff’s request . . . to issue a declaratory ruling in accordance
with MCL 24.263 of the APA”; (2) in light of Brater’s denial letter, plaintiff had immediately been
vested with standing to seek a declaratory ruling in the trial court pursuant to MCL 24.264, as
recognized in the very same decisions cited by the SOS—namely, Huron Valley and Citizens for
Common Sense; (3) regardless, “pursuant to MCL 168.558(4) of Michigan Election Law, th[e]
Court ha[d] jurisdiction to determine and declare whether Candidate Burton’s affidavit of identity
contain[ed] a false statement in violation of MCL 168.558(4)”; and (4) plaintiff’s subsequent filing
of an administrative complaint with the SOS was immaterial for the instant purposes because, as
this Court recognized in Huron Valley, 266 Mich App at 647, any determination reached by the
SOS in that administrative process “would not constitute a ‘decision’ and would not resolve the
issues presented in this case because the [SOS] only indicates whether she believes a violation of
the Michigan Campaign Finance Act may have occurred” in resolving such administrative
complaints.

-6-
In reply, the SOS argued that plaintiff’s attempt to “use the APA to make an end-run around
the MCFA” was fatally flawed “for at least three reasons”: (1) MCL 24.264 only permits parties
to seek declaratory relief “as to the ‘validity or applicability of a rule,’ ” and in this action, plaintiff
was not seeking a declaration regarding the applicability or validity of an administrative rule but
was instead asking the trial court “to apply the statutes in the MCFA to a particular set of facts”
and affirmatively hold that a statutory violation had occurred (emphasis added); (2) regardless,
judicial review under MCL 24.264 is, by that statute’s own terms, unavailable if “an exclusive
procedure or remedy is provided by a statute governing the agency,” and here such an procedure
is, in fact, mandated under the MCFA at MCL 169.215(17); and (3) to seek declaratory relief under
MCL 24.264, a party must demonstrate “that the rule or its threatened application interferes with
or impairs, or imminently threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the”
party, and plaintiff had neither made such a showing nor even alleged that a specific “rule or its
threatened application” would affect his legal rights and privileges.

Following oral argument, the trial court evidently1 invited “the parties to submit
supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the court had jurisdiction to determine whether
certain campaign finance reports were ‘required of’ judicial candidate William Burton Jr.’s
candidate committee on the date in which he signed his affidavit of identity for the 2024 election
cycle.” Plaintiff subsequently did so, arguing that the court did, in fact, have jurisdiction to
consider and decide that question. As authority in support, plaintiff cited Reed-Pratt v Detroit City
Clerk, 339 Mich App 510; 984 NW2d 794 (2021), in which this Court affirmed a trial court’s
decision to deny a request for a declaratory judgment concerning whether the Detroit City Clerk
had a duty to not certify a candidate for inclusion on the ballot based on alleged false statements
in the candidate’s AOI, which were in turn related to the filing of amended campaign finance
reports purportedly required under the MCFA. Plaintiff’s tacit argument was that, because the
Reed-Pratt Court analyzed whether the filing of certain amended reports might have been required
under the MCFA, it necessarily followed that this Court (and the trial court) must have had proper
jurisdiction to do so in that case, which suggested that the same would be true here, as well.

After considering the matter, the Court of Claims granted the SOS summary disposition,
reasoning:

Just this morning, Court of Claims Judge Brock A. Swartzle rendered an
opinion and order agreeing with the SOS that Plaintiff Davis (in a suit seeking to
disqualify other judicial candidates) must “exhaust the administrative process
before seeking judicial review” of MCFA claims. Davis v Benson, unpublished
opinion of the Court of Claims, issued August 1, 2024 (Docket No. 24-95-MB), p.

1
Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with a copy of the relevant motion-hearing transcript.
Given the exigencies of this election matter, the applicable standard of review, and the existence
of an opinion explaining the trial court’s reasoning, we have elected to overlook plaintiff’s failure
to comply with MCR 7.210(B)(1)(a) in this regard. In the future, however, he would be well
advised to strictly comply with the court rules regarding production of the full record on appeal—
failure to do so might lead a panel of this Court to deem issues either waived or abandoned.

-7-
9.[2] In that case, just as in this case, Plaintiff Davis sought disqualification based
upon the claim that a judicial candidate’s affidavit of identity (AOI) was false
because of a violation of the MCFA. Id. But Judge Swartzle explained that
“[p]laintiff cannot bring an action in this Court to obtain a declaration that [a
judicial candidate] has violated or is in violation of the MCFA” because “[t]he
MCFA expressly provides that there is no private right of action under the MCFA.
MCL 169.215(17); see also Huron Valley Sch v Secretary of State, 266 Mich App
638,646; 702 NW2d 862 (2005).” Id. Instead, “[t]he administrative-complaint
process under MCL 169.215(5) through (12) of the MCFA provides the exclusive
means by which plaintiff can seek to compel compliance with the MCFA.” Id.
Here, just as in that case, “[p]laintiff must exhaust the administrative process before
seeking judicial review. See Huron Valley Sch , 266 Mich App at 645-646.” Id.
And here, just as in that case, “[p]laintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies and, therefore, Count IV of his complaint must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.” Thus, the Court cannot reach the merits of Plaintiff Davis’s challenge
to Mr. Burton’s AOI. Instead, the Court must award the SOS summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(4) on Count IV of Plaintiff Davis’s amended verified
complaint and dismiss that claim without prejudice. For the very same reason,
Plaintiff Davis is not entitled to mandamus as requested in Count V of the amended
verified complaint, so the Court shall grant the SOS summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) on that claim because Plaintiff Davis cannot establish a right to
the extraordinary relief he seeks in light of his failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies. [All alterations in original except for bracketed footnote.]

The instant appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

For the reasons stated by the Court of Claims, we agree that the SOS was entitled to
summary disposition of both of plaintiff’s disputed claims.

A trial court’s ruling regarding a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Heaton v Benton Constr Co, 286 Mich App 528, 531; 780 NW2d 618 (2009). As noted, the trial
court cited MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(8) as the respective grounds under which it granted the SOS
summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief (i.e., Count IV in the amended
verified complaint) and his claim for a writ of mandamus (i.e., Count V is that same complaint).

“Summary disposition for lack of jurisdiction under MCR 2.116(C)(4) is proper when a
plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.” Citizens for Common Sense, 243 Mich
App at 50. “In considering a motion challenging jurisdiction under MCR 2.116(C)(4), a court
must determine whether the affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
documentary evidence, demonstrate that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. MCR

2
Plaintiff has also claimed an appeal from that cited opinion and order, but he has not yet moved
to expedite that case. See Docket No. 371928, Davis v Secretary of State.

-8-
2.116(G)(5).” CC Mid West, Inc v McDougall, 470 Mich 878 (2004). On the other hand, as our
Supreme Court explained in Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999):

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed
in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may
be granted only where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter
of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. When deciding
a motion brought under this section, a court considers only the pleadings.
[Quotation marks and citations omitted.]

Several statutes are of prime import in this case and merit quotation at the outset. In
pertinent part, MCL 169.215 provides:

(1) The secretary of state shall do all of the following:

* * *

(e) Promulgate rules and issue declaratory rulings to implement this act in
accordance with the administrative procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL
24.201 to 24.328.[3]

* * *

(2) A declaratory ruling shall be issued under this section only if the person
requesting the ruling has provided a reasonably complete statement of facts
necessary for the ruling or if the person requesting the ruling has, with the
permission of the secretary of state, supplied supplemental facts necessary for the
ruling. . . . Except as otherwise provided in this section, the secretary of state shall
issue a declaratory ruling within 60 business days after a request for a declaratory
ruling is received. If the secretary of state refuses to issue a declaratory ruling, the
secretary of state shall notify the person making the request of the reasons for the
refusal and shall issue an interpretative statement providing an informational
response to the question presented within the same time limitation applicable to a
declaratory ruling. A declaratory ruling or interpretative statement issued under
this section shall not state a general rule of law, other than that which is stated in
this act, until the general rule of law is promulgated by the secretary of state as a

3
Several relevant administrative rules have been promulgated at Mich Admin Code R 169.1, et
seq., including rules governing how administrative complaints may be filed with the SOS under
the MCFA, see Rule 169.51, and setting forth the required form and contents of such complaints,
see Rule 169.52. Administrative rules have also been promulgated concerning the disqualification
of candidates from the ballot based on the contents of their AOI. See Mich Admin Code R 168.1,
et seq.

-9-
rule under the administrative procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.201
to 24.328, or under judicial order.

* * *

(5) A person may file with the secretary of state a complaint that alleges a
violation of this act. Within 5 business days after a complaint that meets the
requirements of subsection (6) is filed, the secretary of state shall give notice to the
person against whom the complaint is filed. The notice shall include a copy of the
complaint. Within 15 business days after this notice is mailed, the person against
whom the complaint was filed may submit a response to the secretary of state. The
secretary of state may extend the period for submitting a response an additional 15
business days for good cause. The secretary of state shall provide a copy of a
response received to the complainant. Within 10 business days after the response
is mailed, the complainant may submit a rebuttal statement to the secretary of state.
The secretary of state may extend the period for submitting a rebuttal statement an
additional 10 business days for good cause. The secretary of state shall provide a
copy of the rebuttal statement to the person against whom the complaint was filed.

(6) A complaint filed under subsection (5) shall satisfy all of the following
requirements:

* * *

(7) The secretary of state shall develop a form that satisfies the requirements
of subsection (6) and may be used for the filing of complaints.

* * *

(9) The secretary of state shall investigate the allegations under the rules
promulgated under this act. . . .

(10) No later than 45 business days after receipt of a rebuttal statement
submitted under subsection (5), or if no response or rebuttal is received under
subsection (5), the secretary of state shall post on the secretary of state’s Internet
website whether or not there may be reason to believe that a violation of this act
has occurred. When the secretary of state determines whether there may be reason
to believe that a violation of this act occurred or did not occur or determines to
terminate its proceedings, the secretary of state shall, within 30 days of that
determination, post on the secretary of state’s Internet website any complaint,
response, or rebuttal statement received under subsection (5) regarding that
violation or alleged violation and any correspondence that is dispositive of that
violation or alleged violation between the secretary of state and the complainant or
the person against whom the complaint was filed. If the secretary of state
determines that there may be reason to believe that a violation of this act occurred,
the secretary of state shall endeavor to correct the violation or prevent a further
violation by using informal methods such as a conference, conciliation, or
persuasion, and may enter into a conciliation agreement with the person involved.

-10-
Unless violated, a conciliation agreement is a complete bar to any further civil or
criminal action with respect to matters covered in the conciliation agreement. The
secretary of state shall, within 30 days after a conciliation agreement is signed, post
that agreement on the secretary of state’s Internet website. If, after 90 business
days, the secretary of state is unable to correct or prevent further violation by these
informal methods, the secretary of state shall do either of the following:

(a) Refer the matter to the attorney general for the enforcement of any
criminal penalty provided by this act.

(b) Commence a hearing as provided in subsection (11) for enforcement of
any civil violation.

(11) The secretary of state may commence a hearing to determine whether
a civil violation of this act has occurred. The hearing shall be conducted in
accordance with the procedures set forth in chapter 4 of the administrative
procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.271 to 24.287. If after a hearing
the secretary of state determines that a violation of this act has occurred, the
secretary of state may issue an order requiring the person to pay a civil fine not
more than triple the amount of the improper contribution or expenditure plus not
more than $1,000.00 for each violation.

(12) A final decision and order issued by the secretary of state is subject to
judicial review as provided by chapter 6 of the administrative procedures act of
1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.301 to 24.306. . . .

(13) When a report or statement is filed under this act, the secretary of state
shall review the report or statement and may investigate an apparent violation of
this act under the rules promulgated under this act. If the secretary of state
determines that there may be reason to believe a violation of this act has occurred
and the procedures prescribed in subsection (10) have been complied with, the
secretary of state may refer the matter to the attorney general for the enforcement
of a criminal penalty provided by this act, or commence a hearing under subsection
(11) to determine whether a civil violation of this act has occurred.

* * *

(17) Except as otherwise provided in section 57 [i.e., MCL 169.2574], there
is no private right of action, either in law or in equity, under this act. Except as
otherwise provided in section 57, the remedies provided in this act are the exclusive

4
Plaintiff does not argue that the exceptions in MCL 169.257 apply here, and it appears that that
provision is inapplicable because it generally regards the use of public resources for campaign
purposes by a public body or person.

-11-
means by which this act may be enforced and by which any harm resulting from a
violation of this act may be redressed. . . . [Emphasis added.]

In addition, MCL 24.263 provides:

On request of an interested person, an agency may issue a declaratory ruling
as to the applicability to an actual state of facts of a statute administered by the
agency or of a rule or order of the agency. An agency shall prescribe by rule the
form for such a request and procedure for its submission, consideration and
disposition. A declaratory ruling is binding on the agency and the person requesting
it unless it is altered or set aside by any court. An agency may not retroactively
change a declaratory ruling, but nothing in this subsection prevents an agency from
prospectively changing a declaratory ruling. A declaratory ruling is subject to
judicial review in the same manner as an agency final decision or order in a
contested case. [Emphasis added.]

On the other hand, MCL 24.264 provides:

Unless an exclusive procedure or remedy is provided by a statute governing
the agency, the validity or applicability of a rule, including the failure of an agency
to accurately assess the impact of the rule on businesses, including small
businesses, in its regulatory impact statement, may be determined in an action for
declaratory judgment if the court finds that the rule or its threatened application
interferes with or impairs, or imminently threatens to interfere with or impair, the
legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff. The action shall be filed in the circuit
court of the county where the plaintiff resides or has his or her principal place of
business in this state or in the circuit court for Ingham county. The agency shall be
made a party to the action. An action for declaratory judgment may not be
commenced under this section unless the plaintiff has first requested the agency for
a declaratory ruling and the agency has denied the request or failed to act upon it
expeditiously. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the determination of
the validity or applicability of the rule in any other action or proceeding in which
its invalidity or inapplicability is asserted. [Emphasis added.]

Given plaintiff’s admissions below that he had, in fact, filed an administrative complaint
that remained pending before the SOS—regarding the same essential alleged MCFA violations at
issue in this action—the SOS was entitled to summary disposition of his claim seeking a writ of
mandamus. See Powers v Dignan, 309 Mich 530, 533; 16 NW2d 62 (1944) (“Powers’ petition for
a writ of mandamus must be denied without prejudice, pending a formal administrative hearing on
the charges . . . because mandamus is not a writ of right but of grace and discretion, and will not
lie to compel a public officer to perform a duty dependent upon disputed and doubtful facts.”); WA
Foote Mem Hosp v Dep’t of Pub Health, 210 Mich App 516, 524-525; 534 NW2d 206 (1995)
(“the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition because plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies”); Tuscola Co Abstract Co, Inc v Tuscola Co
Register of Deeds, 206 Mich App 508, 510; 522 NW2d 686 (1994) (“Mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy and is appropriate only when there is no other remedy, legal or equitable,
that might achieve the same result.”). See also Teasel v Dep’t of Mental Health, 419 Mich 390,

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410; 355 NW2d 75 (1984) (holding that mandamus “will not lie for the purpose of reviewing,
revising, or controlling the exercise of discretion reposed in administrative bodies”).

Nor are we persuaded by plaintiff’s arguments that, with regard to both of his disputed
claims, the pending administrative-complaint process under MCL 169.215(5) does not afford him
an adequate remedy. In support of that proposition, plaintiff primarily relies on Huron Valley, 266
Mich App at 647, in which this Court held that the defendant in that case—again, the SOS—had
not rendered a “campaign finance decision” by sending a letter “indicating that she had reason to
believe that violations of § 57 of the MCFA were occurring.” This Court further held:

The letter further warned that if a violation were ultimately determined after a
hearing, sanctions would follow. Thus, in order to properly challenge defendant’s
interpretation of the MCFA, plaintiffs should have first made a request for a
declaratory ruling under § 15(2) [i.e., former5 MCL 169.215(2)]. If defendant
refused to make such a ruling, then plaintiff could have sought a declaratory
judgment in the circuit court. Further, if defendant made a declaratory ruling that
plaintiffs disagreed with, then plaintiffs could have sought review of that ruling in
the circuit court. Because [former] § 15(16) of the MCFA states that there is no
private cause of action in law or equity, plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action is
precluded. [Huron Valley, 266 Mich App at 647 (citation omitted).]

Based on the above-quoted passage, in the trial court, plaintiff argued that any determination
reached by the SOS in the pending administrative process “would not constitute a ‘decision’ and
would not resolve the issues presented in this case because the [SOS] only indicates whether she
believes a violation of the [MCFA] may have occurred[.]” But aside from ignoring the factual
differences between this case and Huron Valley—and conflating the “declaratory ruling” process
under MCL 169.215(2) with the distinct administrative “complaint” process described in
subsection (5) of that statute (and some of the subsections that follow it)—plaintiff’s argument in
this regard is founded on the fallacious presupposition that because a prior SOS acted in a certain
way in response to a different factual scenario in the past, it follows that the current SOS will act
in the same way when responding to a different factual scenario. And although it is true that, after
investigating the allegations in the administrative complaint, the SOS will initially be required to
“post on the secretary of state’s Internet website whether or not there may be reason to believe that
a violation of this act has occurred,” see MCL 169.215(10) (emphasis added), plaintiff fails to
recognize that, in such an event, that same subsection also requires the SOS to take certain
additional affirmative steps. First, “[i]f the secretary of state determines that there may be reason
to believe that a violation of this act occurred, the secretary of state shall endeavor to correct the
violation or prevent a further violation by using informal methods such as a conference,
conciliation, or persuasion, and may enter into a conciliation agreement with the person involved.”
MCL 169.215(10). And “[i]f, after 90 business days, the secretary of state is unable to correct or

5
After Huron Valley was decided in 2005, MCL 169.215 was been amended in ways that are,
except as otherwise noted in this opinion, seemingly irrelevant to the analysis here, though it bears
mention that the amendments altered the numbering of some of the subsections as cited in Huron
Valley. See 2012 PA 31; 2012 PA 277; 2015 PA 269.

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prevent further violation by these informal methods, the secretary of state shall” either refer the
matter to the Attorney General for enforcement of criminal penalties or “[c]ommence a hearing as
provided in subsection (11) for enforcement of any civil violation.” MCL 169.215(10). After
holding such a hearing, the SOS can take certain enforcement actions directly if she “determines
that a violation of this act has occurred[.]” MCL 169.215(11). Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s
arguments, the pending administrative process will not necessarily end with the SOS merely
issuing an informal statement regarding whether there is reason to believe that a violation of the
MCFA “may” have occurred. Rather, the process could instead end with the SOS finding that a
violation did occur and then taking active steps to enforce the MCFA.

In addition, although it is true that the timeline for handling such administrative complaints,
as set forth under MCL 169.215(5) and (10), is fairly protracted, and it is also true that changes to
the applicable timeline have been made since Huron Valley was decided,6 “time sensitivity and
futility are not exceptions to the MCFA’s administrative procedures.” See Huron Valley, 266 Mich
App at 647. On the contrary, as this Court explained in Huron Valley, 266 Mich App at 648:

The plain language of [former] § 15(16) of the MCFA provides that the remedies
afforded by the act “are the exclusive means by which this act may be enforced . . .
.” (Emphasis added). Even if plaintiffs’ claims of time sensitivity or futility had
merit, the MCFA nonetheless clearly requires plaintiffs to exhaust their
administrative remedies before seeking review in the courts. [Ellipsis in original.]

Accord Citizens for Common Sense, 243 Mich App at 54. Given that the operative statutory
language remains the same, we conclude that we are bound to follow that rule of law. See MCR
7.215(J)(1).

Given plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the MCFA, we also
find his arguments regarding the APA to be unavailing. Put simply, even assuming, arguendo,
that plaintiff is correct—i.e., that despite MCL 169.215(17)’s plain language specifying that
proceedings under the MCFA represent the “exclusive means by which th[e] act may be enforced
and by which any harm resulting from a violation . . . may be redressed,” the Court of Claims
would nevertheless somehow have jurisdiction under the APA to issue a declaratory ruling about
the proper interpretation of the MCFA as it applies in this particular case—it does not follow that
it would have been proper for the Court of Claims to exercise such jurisdiction before plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies. See Citizens for Common Sense, 243 Mich App at 50 (“The
circuit courts of this state have subject-matter jurisdiction to issue declaratory rulings, injunctions,
or writs of mandamus. However, if the Legislature has expressed an intent to make an
administrative tribunal’s jurisdiction exclusive, then the circuit court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over those same areas.”) (citations omitted and emphasis added).

For that same basic reason, we are not persuaded by plaintiff’s attempts to rely on Reed-
Pratt as authority for the proposition that it would have been proper for the Court of Claims to
exercise jurisdiction over the disputed claims. Again, plaintiff conflates the question of whether

6
See 2012 PA 277 (adding certain timing requirements to MCL 169.215(10)); 2015 PA 269
(further amending the timing requirements under subsection (10)).

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the Court of Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction over claims like the ones in dispute here—i.e.,
“the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending,” Bowie v Arder, 441
Mich 23, 39; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted)—with the distinct
question of whether it would be appropriate for the Court of Claims to exercise jurisdiction in this
case despite plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff also fails to
recognize that Reed-Pratt is materially distinguishable from the instant case in several respects.
Among other things, the SOS was not a party to the action in Reed-Pratt, the action was filed in
circuit court (not the Court of Claims), and because the parties raised no argument in this Court as
to whether the plaintiff had duly exhausted her administrative remedies under the MCFA, this
Court neither addressed nor decided that issue. Moreover, as this Court noted in Reed-Pratt, 339
Mich App at 514 n 1, in that case, there was evidence suggesting that the plaintiff had “filed a
request with the Secretary of State and the State Director of Elections” related to the claims at
issue, and the SOS and Director of Elections did not timely respond. In contrast, here plaintiff
admits that the Director of Elections did respond to his initial inquiry, directing him to file an
administrative complaint; that plaintiff subsequently did so; and that the administrative-complaint
process remained pending at the time the Court of Claims issued its disputed decision. Put
differently, plaintiff simply misunderstands the nature of what this Court held—and more
importantly did not hold—in Reed-Pratt.

For all of those reasons, we perceive no error in the lower court’s disputed holdings, let
alone any error that might warrant reversal.

Affirmed.

/s/ Noah P. Hood
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Anica Letica

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10525642. Public record. Not legal advice.