# Hillsborough County, Florida v. The School Board of Hillsborough County

> District Court of Appeal of Florida · August 19, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10511808

## Case

- **Court:** District Court of Appeal of Florida
- **Decided:** August 19, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10511808

## Opinion text

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, by and through its
Board of County Commissioners,

Appellant,

v.

SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, and
CRAIG LATIMER, in his capacity as the
Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections,

Appellees.

No. 2D2024-1871

August 19, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Emily A.
Peacock, Judge.

Samuel J. Salario, Jr., and Jessica Slatten of Lawson Huck Gonzalez,
PLLC, Tampa, for Appellant.

Kristen M. Fiore and Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; and
Jason L. Margolin and Keenan Molaskey of Akerman LLP, Tampa, for
Appellee School Board of Hillsborough County.

No appearance for Appellee Craig Latimer.

PER CURIAM.
Hillsborough County, by and through the Hillsborough County
Board of County Commissioners, appeals from the trial court order
granting the Hillsborough County School Board's emergency petition for
writ of mandamus.1 We affirm.
On April 2, 2024, the School Board adopted resolution 24-SB-1,
which called for a referendum on an additional millage to be placed on
the November 5, 2024, general election ballot. See § 1011.71(9), Fla.
Stat. (2023). The resolution and the text of the referendum called for the
tax to be imposed from July 1, 2025, until June 30, 2029. See
§ 1011.73(2). The referendum directed the County Commissioners to
instruct Craig Latimer, the Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections,2
to place the measure on the November 5, 2024, general election ballot.
See § 1011.73(3).
On July 17, 2024, the County Commissioners determined that they
had the authority to decide when the School Board's referendum should
go on the ballot. They passed a motion resolving to work with the School
Board on the proper time to place the measure on the ballot with a
recommendation of the November 2026 general election—the County
Commissioners did not definitively place the measure on the 2026 ballot.
The School Board filed an emergency petition for writ of
mandamus, seeking to compel the County Commissioners to direct the
Supervisor of Elections to place the 24-SB-1 referendum on the 2024

1 The trial court's order is a final, appealable order, and we have

jurisdiction. See Browning v. Young, 993 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 1st DCA
2008).
2 The Supervisor of Elections was also named as a respondent in

the School Board's petition. The trial court dismissed the petition as to
the Supervisor of Elections, and that ruling is not at issue in this appeal.

2
general election ballot. In the trial court, the parties disputed which
entity, the School Board or the County Commissioners, had the authority
to decide on which ballot the referendum would be placed. The trial
court granted the petition, determining that section 1011.73 vested the
School Board with the right to select the general election at which the
referendum would be voted on and that the County Commissioners had
the ministerial duty of "calling an election" on the date selected by the
School Board. This appeal followed.3
"In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus the petitioner must
have a clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have
an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action, and the
petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available." Villa Bellini
Ristorante & Lounge, Inc. v. Mancini, 283 So. 3d 972, 976–77 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2019) (quoting Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000)).
Mandamus does not lie if the respondent has discretion in carrying out
the duty. City of Miami Beach v. Mr. Samuel's, Inc., 351 So. 2d 719, 722
(Fla. 1977). In this appeal, the County Commissioners ask us to decide
whether the trial court correctly determined that they had a ministerial
duty to call an election on the date selected by the School Board.
"While the granting of a writ of mandamus petition is typically
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 'to the extent our decision turns on
statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review.' " Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs Broward Cnty. Fla. v. Parrish, 154 So. 3d 412, 417 (Fla.
4th DCA 2014) (quoting Harvard ex rel. J.H. v. Vill. of Palm Springs, 98

3 The County Commissioners' appeal automatically stayed the trial

court's order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(2). On the School Board's
motion, the trial court vacated the stay, and by prior order we expedited
this appeal.

3
So. 3d 645, 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). "The 'plain meaning of the statute
is always the starting point in statutory interpretation.' " Alachua County
v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (quoting GTC, Inc. v. Edgar,
967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007)). "A 'statute should be interpreted to
give effect to every clause in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to
all of its parts' and is not to be read in isolation, but in the context of the
entire section." Fla. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC,
986 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Jones v. ETS of New Orleans,
Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 914–15 (Fla. 2001)). And we must "exhaust 'all the
textual and structural clues' that bear on the meaning of a disputed
text." Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (quoting
Watson, 333 So. 3d at 169).
Section 1011.73 provides in pertinent part:
(2) MILLAGE AUTHORIZED NOT TO EXCEED 4 YEARS.—The
district school board, pursuant to resolution adopted at a
regular meeting, shall direct the county commissioners to call
an election at which the electors within the school district
may approve an ad valorem tax millage as authorized under
s. 1011.71(9). Such election may be held at any time, except
that not more than one such election shall be held during any
12-month period. Any millage so authorized shall be levied
for a period not in excess of 4 years or until changed by
another millage election, whichever is earlier. If any such
election is invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction,
such invalidated election shall be considered not to have been
held.

(3) HOLDING ELECTIONS.—All school district millage
elections shall be held and conducted in the manner
prescribed by law for holding general elections, except as
provided in this chapter. A referendum under this part shall
be held only at a general election, as defined in s. 97.021.

(4) FORM OF BALLOT.—

4
(a) The district school board may propose a single millage or
two millages, with one for operating expenses and another for
a local capital improvement reserve fund. When two millage
figures are proposed, each millage must be voted on
separately.

(b) The district school board shall provide the wording of the
substance of the measure and the ballot title in the resolution
calling for the election. The wording of the ballot must
conform to the provisions of s. 101.161.
....

(7) EXPENSES OF ELECTION.—The cost of the publication of
the notice of the election and all expenses of the election in
the school district shall be paid by the district school board.

The County Commissioners insist that they have discretion to set
the date of the election because under section 1011.73(2) they have the
duty to "call an election" and that the phrase "call an election" means to
pick a time during which an election will be held. In support of this
argument, the County Commissioners cite various definitions of "call an
election" and In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 60 So. 2d 285, 287
(Fla. 1952).
In the advisory opinion, the supreme court addressed whether
under section 100.111(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1951), the governor had
the authority to fix the date of an election when the statute contemplated
an election "to be called by the governor." 60 So. 2d at 286. At the time,
section 100.111(2)(c) provided:
When a vacancy occurs later than thirty days before the first
primary and before forty days prior to the general election, it
shall be subject to a special first primary and if necessary
seven days later a special second primary to be called by the
governor. Ten days shall be allowed from the time the
vacancy occurs in which to specially qualify and the name of
the person nominated in the special primary shall be placed

5
on the general election ballot but in event the general election
ballots have already been printed then a separate ballot shall
be prepared.

60 So. 2d at 286 (quoting § 100.111(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1951)). The court
reasoned that "if a statute imposes a duty upon a public officer to
accomplish a stated governmental purpose, it also confers by implication
every particular power necessary or proper for complete exercise or
performance of the duty that is not in violation of law or public policy."
Id. at 287. Consequently, the court opined that the governor necessarily
had the authority to fix the date of the special election because the lack
of such authority would make it impossible for the governor to call the
election as provided for by the then-applicable version of section
100.111(2)(c). 60 So. 2d at 287.
In re Advisory Opinion does not command the outcome advocated
for by the County Commissioners. The statute at issue in that case and
the statute at issue in this case are materially distinguishable. Section
100.111(2)(c) placed the sole authority on the governor to "call" the
election. That statute did not give the authority to any other entity to
direct the governor to do so. In contrast, section 1011.73(2) expressly
gives the School Board the authority to direct the County Commissioners
to call an election.
Further, we cannot decide this issue by defining "call an election"
as it is used in section 1011.73(2) in a vacuum. Rather, we must
consider the context of the statute and give effect to every clause in
section 1011.73, according meaning and harmony to all of it parts. See
ContractPoint Fla. Parks, 986 So. 2d at 1265. And while the County
Commissioners argue that the legislature must have intended for them to
have discretion in setting the date of the election because there must be

6
a reason for their presence in the statute, the County Commissioners'
mere presence in the statutory process does not mean that they have
discretion to set the date of the election. The legislature simply elected to
have the County Commissioners serve as the mechanism by which the
School Board's measure is placed on the ballot.4
This is illustrated by the context of section 1011.73, including the
rights and obligations of the School Board under Florida's Constitution
and part II of chapter 1011, titled Funding for School Districts. The
School Board has the authority to "operate, control and supervise all free
public schools within the school district and determine the rate of school
district taxes within the limits" imposed by the Florida Constitution. Art.
IX, § 4(b), Fla. Const.; see also § 1003.02(1)(g)1, Fla. Stat. (2024)
("[S]chool boards must . . . arrange for the levying of district school taxes
necessary to provide the amount needed from district sources.").
Section 1011.71(9) provides that "a school district may levy, by
local referendum or in a general election, additional millage for school
operational purposes . . . . Millage elections conducted under the
authority granted pursuant to this section are subject to s. 1011.73."

4 County commissioners have the general authority to place

questions or propositions on the ballot. See § 125.01(1)(y), Fla. Stat.
(2023). School boards do not have this general authority. See art. IX, §
4(b), Fla. Const.; § 1001.42, Fla. Stat. (2023) (outlining the powers and
obligations of district school boards). Although county commissioners'
general authority to place questions or propositions on the ballot is
subject to a majority vote of the county commissioners, § 125.01(1)(y),
the more specific provision of section 1011.73(2) imposing a ministerial
duty to call an election as directed by school boards controls in this case.
See McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) ("[A] specific statute
covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering
the same and other subjects in more general terms.").

7
Reading these provisions together, section 1011.73(2) requires that the
School Board exercise its authority to levy additional millage under
section 1011.71(9) by resolution adopted at a regular meeting.
§ 1011.73(2). Control of the wording of the substance and the ballot title
lies with the School Board. § 1011.73(4)(b). And the statute empowers
the School Board to direct the County Commissioners to "call an
election" on the matter. § 1011.73(2). The election can be "at any time,
except that not more than one such election shall be held during any 12-
month period." Id. Further, the election can only be held during a
general election. § 1011.73(3). Finally, the School Board is responsible
for the associated costs. § 1011.73(7). Reading section 1011.73(2) in
context with the School Board's constitutional and statutory rights and
obligations, it is apparent that the School Board's directive to the County
Commissioners necessarily includes the date of the election and that the
County Commissioners' duty is to adhere to the date directed by the
School Board—a purely ministerial task. Cf. Volusia County v. Eubank,
151 So. 2d 37, 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) ("The duty of the Board to call an
election under [chapter 138] is strictly ministerial in character and
mandatory upon the filing of a petition as provided by law.").
The foregoing analysis of the plain statutory language compels our
conclusion. Bolstering that conclusion is the fact that construing the
statute as granting the County Commissioners' discretion to select the
date of the election would give the County Commissioners the ability to
upend the School Board's authority to levy additional millage and the
School Board's control over the substance of the measure to appear on
the ballot. One need only look to the facts of this case for demonstration.
Here, the School Board exercised its tax authority and control over the
substance of the measure for the ballot. That measure expressly called

8
for the tax to be imposed from "July 1, 2025[,] through June 30, 2029."
In refusing to call the election as directed by the School Board, the
County Commissioners have effectively overridden the School Board's
decision as to the dates the tax should be imposed and its control over
the language of the measure.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order granting the School
Board's mandamus petition. We make no comment as to additional
millage proposed by the School Board—whether to approve the measure
is for the voters to decide.
Affirmed.

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

9

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10511808. Public record. Not legal advice.