# People v. Williams CA2/6

> California Court of Appeal · August 19, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10511627

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** August 19, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 8/19/24 P. v. Williams CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B330154
(Super. Ct. No. 23CR00323)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

MILES JAMES WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Miles James Williams appeals a judgment following his
conviction of dissuading a witness by use of “threat of force or
violence” (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)),1 a felony (count 2);
three counts of shoplifting (§ 459.5, subd. (a)) (counts 4, 5, and 6);
and trespass (§ 602.1, subd. (a)) (count 7). The trial court
sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of four years. We
conclude, among other things, that: 1) the trial court did not err
by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 (flight showing a
consciousness of guilt); and 2) the court did not abuse its

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
discretion by imposing the upper term of four years for the
conviction on count 2. We affirm.
FACTS
The CVS Incident
(January 2023) (Count 2)
Blake Kiriakidis was the shift supervisor at CVS. The
store has a policy of giving shoplifters a chance to purchase the
items. Employees are not allowed to “physically engage with
them.”
Kiriakidis saw Williams put a jacket under his shirt. He
asked Williams to return the item; Williams walked away.
Kiriakidis touched the jacket. Williams kicked him in the arm
causing his coffee cup to fly over an aisle. He asked Williams to
leave the store. Williams challenged him “to a fight” and said
“Fight me, bitch.” He repeated that phrase 5 to 10 times.
Williams “pursued” Kiriakidis, “throwing punches and kicking in
the air.” Williams threw punches at him 10 to 20 times.
Kiriakidis called 911. Williams tried to grab the phone
from him. Williams became “violent,” he tried to kick and punch
him, and he told Kiriakidis to “get off the phone.” Williams left
the store. He walked 200 to 300 feet to another business. He
then returned to the outside of the CVS store to return the jacket.
Kiriakidis told him to leave the jacket on a bench. Williams
walked away. He was arrested in front of Vons market.
Williams testified that he did not punch Kiriakidis or make
contact with him. He did not prevent Kiriakidis from calling 911.
He did not try to take his phone away. He was told to leave by
the store employees. When the CVS employees were on the 911
call, he said, “You can tell them that it’s Miles.” He said that to
make it easier for them to identify him. He was not “thinking

2
clearly” at the time of this incident. There was a moment at CVS
when he was thinking of taking the jacket. After his initial
contact with Kiriakidis, he was simply trying to return the jacket.
When asked whether he kicked the coffee cup, Williams
responded, ”I felt as though it was an existential threat. It was a
threat to me, how he was holding it.” During his testimony
Williams testified about his prior criminal convictions.
Doctor Rebecca Aponte, a defense forensic psychologist,
testified Williams suffers from Bipolar I, a mental disorder.
People with this disorder may experience episodes of paranoia or
disorganized thinking. When they have such episodes, they may
react in an “agitated state” and “react aggressively.” They may
have delusions about threats that do not exist and aggressively
respond. But if they have such an episode, they will not
necessarily be “aggressive.” Aponte reviewed his medical history.
She concluded there was no evidence that Williams had any
episodes of “recent hallucinations” or recent delusions.
Shoplifting at Marshalls
(January 13 and 14, 2023) (Counts 4 and 5)
Nathaniel Dye, a loss prevention employee at Marshalls,
testified that Williams committed a theft at the store on January
13. Williams put on a flannel shirt and he left the store with that
shirt. Rafael Garcia Aguilar, a loss prevention employee at
Marshalls, testified Williams committed a theft at the store on
January 14. Williams took a backpack and walked out of the
store with it.
Shoplifting and Trespass at Ralphs
(December 2022) (Counts 6 and 7)
Eric Salmeron, the sales manager at Ralphs, testified that
he had to call 911 because of Williams’s conduct in December

3
2022. He saw Williams grab a bottle of alcohol and attempt to
leave the store. Salmeron contacted Roderick Talbert, the
security guard. Williams had been previously barred from
entering Ralphs. Talbert told Williams to drop the bottle.
Williams did not comply and he became aggressive. Salmeron
reminded Williams that he was not allowed to enter the store.
Salmeron said Williams “wouldn’t listen to [him]. . . . It looked
like he wanted to punch [them].” Williams eventually set the
bottle down and walked out of the store.
The Judgment
After the jury verdicts convicting Williams on counts 2, 4,
5, 6, and 7, the trial court imposed an aggregate four-year
sentence. The court held a bench trial and found based on court
records that Williams served “two prior prison” or county jail
terms under section 1170, subdivision (h), and this constituted
aggravating sentencing factors under California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(3).2 Williams had a mental illness, but he did not
fall within the lower term presumption under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) for psychological trauma for count 2. It found
other aggravating sentencing factors supported the imposition of
the four-year high term for count 2.
The trial court found: “[Williams’s] prior convictions as an
adult are numerous and increasing in seriousness. He is engaged
in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to the
community . . . . His prior performance on probation or parole
was unsatisfactory.” It found the defense mitigating factors
based on mental health and substance abuse were outweighed by
“the safety of the public.” It imposed the upper term of four years

2 All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

4
on count 2. For counts 4 through 7, it imposed a sentence of 180
days to run concurrently.
DISCUSSION
The Jury Instruction
Williams contends the trial court erred by instructing the
jury with CALCRIM No. 372, which provides: “If the defendant
fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was committed or
after he was accused of committing the crime, that conduct may
show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the
defendant fled or tried to flee, it is up to you to decide the
meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that
the defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself. [¶]
This instruction applies only to Counts 1 through 5.”
The trial court overruled the defense objection to this
instruction. Williams argues there was no evidence of “flight”
because CVS employees “told [him] to leave.” On the way out he
knew there was a 911 call and said, “Tell ‘em it’s Miles.” The
People respond that the crime scene was the store. He left the
store knowing there was a 911 call and walked between 200 and
300 feet away from CVS.
Here there are conflicting inferences regarding why
Williams walked away from CVS. The trial court did not have to
resolve them. It could reasonably allow the triers of fact to do
that. The People did not have to prove flight from CVS. “To
obtain the instruction, the prosecution need not prove the
defendant in fact fled, i.e., departed the scene to avoid arrest,
only that a jury could find the defendant fled and permissibly
infer a consciousness of guilt from the evidence.” (People v.
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328, some italics added.)

5
Moreover, Williams walked out of Marshalls after taking items
without paying. The instruction also applied to these counts.
Williams contends giving the instruction was error because
the prosecutor did not rely on his flight from the stores. (People
v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 367.) But the prosecutor
said the People intended to rely on Williams’s flight, and in the
People’s opening argument, the prosecutor said, “[Williams]
walks out of [CVS] carrying the jacket.” “The instruction did not
assume that flight was established, but instead permitted the
jury to make that factual determination and to decide what
weight to accord it.” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114,
1182-1183, italics added.)
Imposing the Upper Four-Year Term
Williams contends the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the upper four-year term on count 2.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) provides, in relevant
part, “[U]nless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of
the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”
Wiliams argues his “psychological trauma based on his
mental illness invoked the lower term presumption in section
1170, subdivision (b)(6).” (Boldface omitted.)
In People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241, the
appellate court held, “[P]sychological trauma based on mental
illness may be a circumstance qualifying for the lower term

6
presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). To be clear, we
do not hold mental illness alone qualifies for the lower term
presumption. Psychological trauma must attend the illness, and
that trauma must contribute to the crime under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6).” (Italics added.)
Aponte testified Williams has a mental illness. But the
trial court found she did not prove he fell within the lower term
sentencing provision. The trial court decides the credibility of the
witnesses. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) It
determines whether psychological trauma was a contributing
factor. (People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 410, review
granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655.) The court found, “[W]ith regard
to Dr. Aponte’s opinion, I did not find persuasive that his bipolar
disorder caused him to be irritable or paranoid resulting in the
offense. I have no doubt that Mr. Willimas suffers from mental
health issues. And I recognize that he has mental health issues.
But I don’t find that that’s what drove him to commit the crime
he was convicted of.”
Aponte said Williams had a bipolar disorder. But the issue
was whether Williams suffered a psychological “trauma” at the
time he committed the offense, not whether he had a mental
illness. (People v. Banner, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.) The
trial court could reasonably find her testimony was insufficient
on psychological trauma. Aponte reviewed Williams’s medical
history. The CVS incident was recent. She said there was no
evidence that Williams had episodes of “recent hallucinations” or
recent “delusions.” The court could reasonably infer that showed
Williams was not suffering from an episode of a psychological
“trauma” at CVS. Moreover, the store employees who
approached Williams did not create an atmosphere for “trauma.”

7
The court said Kiriakidis was “nonconfrontational.” Williams
testified Kiriakidis “very cordially asked me for the jacket back.”
Williams’s counsel told the jury that because Williams was
“seriously mentally ill,” he could not be guilty of a felony. The
jury’s verdict was a rejection of that claim.
In addition, the lower term does not apply where “the court
finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The
court’s findings show that it reached the conclusion required by
the statute. Its paramount concern for imposing the high term
was public safety. The conviction on count 2 and his three prior
felony convictions for resisting an officer with force or violence
(§ 69) showed a dangerous pattern. The court said, “I have to
consider community safety first.” (Italics added.) Its emphasis
on his violent criminal history showed it determined a lower term
would be “contrary to the interests of justice.” The court found
Williams put “individuals and customers in significant danger.”
Its findings show that it found these aggravating factors
outweighed Williams’s alleged mitigating factors. (People v.
Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 725; People v. Castellano (1983)
140 Cal.App.3d 608, 614-615.)
Imposing a Sentence Above the Middle Term
Williams contends the trial court improperly relied on
aggravating factors that were not proven by proper evidence
which contravened section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides, in relevant part,
“The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding

8
the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (Italics added.)
Williams claims the trial court relied on aggravating
factors to support a sentence above the middle term that were not
based on court records or his stipulation. But Williams concedes
that the court relied on “certified records” to find that Williams
served two prior prison or county jail terms and they constituted
aggravating sentencing factors. (Rule 4.421(b)(3).) “[U]nder
amended section 1170(b)(2), a trial court may still impose an
upper term sentence based on one aggravating circumstance the
trial court concludes justifies upward departure from the
presumptive middle term maximum . . . .” (People v. Falcon
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 954, italics added, review granted
Sept. 13, 2023, S281242; see also People v. Sandoval (2007) 41
Cal.4th 825, 839.) Moreover, from properly admitted court
records, the trial court found Williams had three prior felony
convictions for resisting an officer with force or violence. (§ 69.)
The Probation Report
Williams claims the trial court improperly relied on the
probation report to find that he engaged in violent conduct that
was a danger to society; his convictions were increasing in
seriousness; and his performance on probation or parole was
unsatisfactory. He notes one court has held the probation report
is not a court record that can be considered. (People v. Dunn,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) He therefore claims there were
no facts that could be considered from that report.

9
A Forfeited Claim?
The People’s position that this claim was forfeited has
merit. The forfeiture doctrine applies to bar claims on appeal
that were not raised by the defendant at the sentencing hearing.
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353; People v. Achane (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043; In re Beal (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 94,
100.) Williams did not object to the trial court’s consideration of
the probation report at that hearing. (Beal, at p. 100 [defendant
waived objection to probation report by not raising it at the
sentencing hearing].) The probation report documented the
following aggravating sentencing factors: 1) Williams “inflicted
physical injury”; 2) his prior record of criminal conduct “indicates
a pattern of . . . increasingly serious criminal conduct”; and 3) his
“prior performance on probation and parole was unsatisfactory.”
Williams relied on that probation report to support his
sentencing brief. He therefore is estopped to claim the trial court
erred by relying on it. (People v. Gonzalez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
960, 972.) If he believed some of it was inadmissible, he should
have objected in the trial court. (In re Beal, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d
at p. 100.) Because he did not object, he may not claim error on
appeal. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435; Gonzalez,
at p. 972; Beal, at p. 100.) In People v. Hall (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1084, 1101, the defendant raised the same issue.
The court held the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by
relying on the probation report to make aggravating sentencing
factors was forfeited where the defendant failed to object on that
ground in the trial court. (Ibid.)
The Probation Report’s Continuing Role in Sentencing
But even had Williams not forfeited this claim, his
contention that a probation report is inadmissible at sentencing

10
is incorrect. The Penal Code authorizes it to be considered by
trial judges in making sentencing decisions. (§ 1203, subd.
(b)(1).) The statute provides the probation report’s “prior history
and record of the person” may “be considered either in
aggravation or mitigation of the punishment.” (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court has held the probation report is
admissible in sentencing. (People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d
749, 754, fn. 2.) In People v. Cheatham (1979) 23 Cal.3d 829, 836,
the court held a “probation report covers not only ‘the
circumstances surrounding the crime,’ but also ‘the prior history
and record’ of the defendant,” which the trial court may properly
consider. In People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 818, footnote
7, the court held that the trial court’s “conclusion that
defendant’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing
seriousness is supported by the probation report.” In People v.
Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 76, the court held a trial court could
rely on a probation report listing 10 prior convictions to make a
constitutionally adequate aggravating sentencing finding that a
defendant’s prior convictions were numerous.
The statute provides, “[T]he court may consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on
a certified record of conviction . . . .” ( § 1170, subd. (b)(3), italics
added.) The Dunn court interpreted this phrase narrowly to
prohibit a probation report from being considered as a qualified
record of conviction. (People v. Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 403.) But the statute is permissive not prohibitory, and Dunn
did not consider section 1203, subdivision (b)(1), which expressly
authorizes the court to rely on the probation report for
sentencing. Moreover, “[t]he probation report is part of the
superior court record.” (People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th

11
1089, 1096, italics added.) It documents the “circumstances” of
the offense. (People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 891.) It
is an authorized record of prior convictions. (People v. Saelee
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 744, 756 [“Examples of evidence that have
been used to establish a defendant’s criminal history or
disciplinary record include . . . Probation reports” (italics
added)].) The probation report is the most important
comprehensive document to “assist the court” in sentencing.
(Rule 4.411(a)(1)(B).)
The new sentencing statute also specifically authorizes the
trial court to consider “the probation officer’s report” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(4)), which shows the intent to continue to use probation
reports for sentencing decisions. The probation report’s lists of
prior convictions supports findings on aggravating sentencing
factors, and is sufficient to withstand constitutional challenges to
its sufficiency. (People v. Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 76.) The
report may be relied on for sentencing consistent with the goals of
section 1170 because it contains “information that is readily
available from official records”; its lists of “prior convictions and
probation status are well documented”; it documents
“unsatisfactory performance on probation” (People v. Flores
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 501); and it is a part of the court
record that provides a basis for sentencing choices. (§ 1203, subd.
(b)(1); Towne, at p. 76; People v. Sledge, supra,7 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1096.)
The probation report is also essential in determining a
defendant’s right to a fair sentence. We have held “reliable
hearsay statements in a probation report are admissible to show
whether a petitioner is eligible for resentencing under
Proposition 47” and Proposition 64. (People v. Hall (2019) 39

12
Cal.App.5th 831, 838.) In Hall, we ruled, “The trial courts’ ability
to consider reliable hearsay in probation reports is necessary to
assure the fair and efficient implementation of Proposition 64.”
(Id. at p. 840, italics added.) “In many cases the probation report
will be the only document in the court file setting forth the facts
underlying the marijuana offense to which the Proposition 64
petitioner pleaded guilty.” (Ibid., italics added.) Its reliability as
a foundation for sentencing has long been established. (Williams
v. New York (1949) 337 U.S. 241, 249-250; People v. Shenouda
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 358, 368 [facts relevant for sentencing
may be found in “the probation officer’s report”]; People v. Ingram
(1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 435, 439; People v. Hollis (1959) 176
Cal.App.2d 92, 97.)
Moreover, section 1203 is entitled to statutory priority over
section 1170. “[I]f a specific statute is enacted covering a
particular subject, the specific statute controls and takes priority
over a general statute.” (Estate of Kramme (1978) 20 Cal.3d 567,
576.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) is a general statute
governing the standards for imposing a sentence above the
middle term. Section 1203, subdivision (b)(1) is a specific statute
governing the use of probation reports in making sentencing
decisions on aggravating and mitigating factors. On the issue
Williams raises involving the use of probation reports in
sentencing, this specific statute takes priority. (Ibid.)
The suggestion that section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) is a
repeal of the laws that authorize probation reports for sentencing
is not persuasive. That section does not mention probation
reports or section 1203, subdivision (b)(1). In 2023, the
Legislature amended section 1203. But it did not repeal or
modify section 1203, subdivision (b)(1). Section 1203, subdivision

13
(b)(1), coupled with section 1170, subdivision (b)(4) [on probation
reports], shows a strong legislative intent to maintain and
continue the Arbuckle, Cheatham, Black, and Towne line of cases
which authorize the use of probation reports in sentencing.
Consequently, section 1203, subdivision (b)(1) is the current law
and it must be considered with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).
(People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475; Wilkoff v. Superior
Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 353.)
These two provisions are harmonious which negates the
claim that there has been an implied repeal of section 1203,
subdivision (b)(1). (Tan v. Appellate Division of Superior Court
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 130, 138.) Probation reports record
convictions based on jury verdicts and pleas. Reliance on that
type of criminal record history is well established and consistent
with the goals of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). (Rule
4.411(a)(1)(B); People v. Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 501.)
Lawmakers were also aware of Arbuckle, Cheatham, Black, and
Towne, and the longstanding use of probation reports in
sentencing. (Rule 4.411(a)(1)(B).) They could have changed the
admissibility of these reports, but they elected not to for good
reason. Such a change would have a drastic impact on the ability
of sentencing courts to make sentencing choices. (Williams v.
New York, supra, 337 U.S. at pp. 249-250.) It also would render
current statutory provisions, which authorize the use of these
reports for sentencing, to be meaningless and would lead to a
contradictory statutory scheme. We do not interpret statutes to
lead to such “absurd results.” (Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51
Cal.4th 113, 119.)
In People v. Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pages 500-501,
the court considered the impact of Senate Bill No. 567 and section

14
1170, subdivision (b)(2). It held that a trial court properly relied
on the probation report to make findings on the defendant’s prior
convictions and his performance on probation. (Flores, at p. 501.)
The Court of Appeal concluded it could determine whether to
affirm the judgment by considering the aggravating sentencing
circumstances documented in the probation report. It ruled, ”The
report further established Flores’s unsatisfactory performance
while on probation.” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court denied review
and denied a request to depublish the opinion.
In People v. Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at page 942,
footnote 10, the court considered section 1170, subdivision (b)(2),
and citing People v. Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th 63, 76, 82, it ruled,
“[W]e presume prior conviction findings made from a probation
report would remain constitutionally sound.”
Other Issues
Williams’s claim that the trial court exclusively relied on
the probation report to make its aggravating sentencing findings
is not true. It had independent documentation to support its
findings that Williams engaged in violent conduct and that his
convictions were of increasing seriousness. From his conviction
on count 2 and from properly admitted court records, the court
found Williams had three prior felony convictions for resisting an
officer with force or violence.
The sentencing statute (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)) also does not
prohibit a defendant from stipulating to facts that constitute
aggravating factors. (People v. Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 410.) The prosecutor and defense counsel disagreed about
what caused Williams’s behavior, but there was no disagreement
about Williams being a long time repeat offender. Williams’s
counsel said Williams was “incarcerated for the majority of his

15
adult life,” and “time and time again [Williams] is released from
[jail].”
Williams also admitted in his trial testimony that he had a
substantial prior criminal record. In 2006, he was convicted of
felony stalking. In 2018, he was convicted of assault with force
likely to cause great bodily injury. In 2020, he was convicted of
grand theft. He admitted that in 2022 he had three convictions of
resisting arrest by law enforcement “with violence.” His criminal
history also included prior theft convictions.
Reliance on Williams’s Testimony about Prior Convictions
The People’s claim that the trial court could rely on
Williams’s trial testimony about his prior record to base its
findings on aggravating sentencing factors is correct.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) allows a defendant’s
stipulation about his or her criminal history to be considered in
sentencing. Here Williams voluntarily disclosed his criminal
history and testified about it in his defense case. Facts a
defendant admits and a defendant’s admissions in testimony may
be considered in sentencing. (People v. Sandoval, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 836; People v. Thoma (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1096,
1102 [a defendant’s admissions made prior to a guilty plea may
be relied on to find the fact of a prior conviction]; People v. Harris
(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 104, 108.) There was no error.

16
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

17
Von Deroian, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and J. Michael Lehmann,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10511627. Public record. Not legal advice.