# Jah'Quie Brown v. State of Tennessee

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · August 12, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10505202

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 12, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

08/12/2024
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs August 6, 2024

JAH’QUIE BROWN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County
No. C-23-309 Joseph T. Howell, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2024-00327-CCA-R3-PC
___________________________________

The Petitioner, Jah’quie Brown, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. He argues he is entitled to tolling of the
statute of limitations because his trial counsel failed to inform him of his right to file a
direct appeal or petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the judgment
of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.
WEDEMEYER and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

William J. Milam, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jah’quie Brown.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine Orr, Assistant Attorney
General; Jody Pickens, District Attorney General; and Shaun A. Brown, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 15,
2023. Neither the petition, nor the appellate record, contain the judgments of conviction.
According to the petition, the Petitioner was convicted by a Madison County jury of
possession of a firearm, attempted possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with a
suspended license, and sentenced to fifteen years. No direct appeal was filed. The
Petitioner contended that though the post-conviction petition was not filed within the one-
year statute of limitations, his claim should not be barred because he “had [a] lack of
knowledge that [he] couldn’t go back up for another [trial][.]” The State filed a motion to
dismiss the petition because it was untimely. The post-conviction court appointed counsel
to represent the Petitioner, but no amended petition was filed.

The post-conviction court held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, post-
conviction counsel conceded that the petition was untimely and stated that the Petitioner
“would like to offer some testimony as to why no direct appeal was filed and some further
insight as to why [there was a] delay in the filing of this post-conviction petition.” The
Petitioner testified that after his motion for new trial was denied, he was unable to hire
counsel for an appeal. He did not ask the trial court to appoint counsel and was unaware
that was an option. He did not hear from trial counsel after his motion for new trial was
denied. Due to the pandemic, the prison was “locked down” and he was unable to access
the law library. After the pandemic ended in 2022, he started going to the law library and
learned he had a right to appeal his convictions. At the conclusion of his testimony, the
post-conviction court said, “[The Petitioner], and I take him at his word, but there’s nothing
that would authorize the tolling of that statute of limitations under the law.”

The post-conviction court filed an order dismissing the petition as untimely. The
order stated that the trial court filed its order denying the Petitioner’s motion for new trial
on March 27, 2020.1 The Petitioner took no further action until filing the instant petition
more than three years later. The post-conviction court determined that “nothing in the
[Petitioner’s] testimony is a basis for the [c]ourt to extend the [one]-year statute of
limitations.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition
for post-conviction relief. He contends that the statute of limitations should have been
tolled because “he did not receive any information from his attorney concerning his direct
appeal nor any information concerning post-conviction relief.” The State responds, and
we agree, that the Petitioner failed to establish he was entitled to due process tolling.

A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within one (1) year of the date
of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no
appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the date on which the judgment became final.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a). “Time is of the essence of the right to file a petition for post-
conviction relief . . . and the one-year limitations period is an element of the right to file
the action and is a condition upon its exercise.” Id. The timeliness of a petition for post-

1
Neither the motion for new trial, a transcript of the motion for new trial hearing, nor the order
denying the motion for new trial is included in the appellate record.
-2-
conviction relief is therefore jurisdictional, and if the petition is not timely, a court is
without authority to grant or deny relief.

In addition to the statutory exceptions, a court may consider an untimely petition for
post-conviction relief if applying the statute of limitations would deny a petitioner due
process. Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992). Whether due process
requires tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and
fact subject to de novo review. Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tenn. 2013)
(citing Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 355 (Tenn. 2011)). A post-conviction court’s
findings of fact, however, are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates
against them. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court has identified three circumstances in
which due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations: (1) claims arising after the
statute of limitations has expired; (2) claims based on mental incompetence that prevented
the petitioner from complying with the statute of limitations; and (3) claims based on
attorney misconduct. Id. at 623-24. However, equitable tolling “must be reserved for those
rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct—it would
be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice
would result.” Id. at 631-32 (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.
2000)).

A petitioner is entitled to due process tolling based on attorney misconduct if the
petitioner shows that: (1) he or she has been pursuing his or her rights diligently; and (2)
some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. Id. at 631 (citing Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). The first prong “does not require a [petitioner] to
undertake repeated exercises in futility or to exhaust every imaginable option, but rather to
make reasonable efforts. . . . Moreover, the due diligence inquiry is an individualized one
that must take into account the conditions of confinement and the reality of the prison
system.” Id. (quoting Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008)). The
second prong is met when the petitioner’s attorney “abandons the [petitioner] or acts in a
way directly adverse to the [petitioner’s] interest, such as by actively lying or otherwise
misleading the [petitioner] to believe things about his or her case that are not true.” Id.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has highlighted that “[i]n every case in which we have held
the statute of limitations is tolled, the pervasive theme is that circumstances beyond a
petitioner’s control prevented the petitioner from filing a petition for post-conviction relief
within the statute of limitations.” Smith, 357 S.W.3d at 358 (emphasis in original).

Both parties agree that the petition was untimely. Because no direct appeal was
filed, the statute of limitations began to run on March 27, 2020, when the trial court denied
the Petitioner’s motion for new trial. State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999)
(“If a post-trial motion is timely filed, the judgment becomes final upon entry of an order
disposing of the post-trial motion.”); Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c). Accordingly, the deadline for
-3-
filing a post-conviction petition was March 27, 2021. The Petitioner did not file the petition
until November 15, 2023—more than two years after the expiration of the statute of
limitations. The post-conviction court was therefore without jurisdiction to address the
petition unless the Petitioner established that he was entitled to due process tolling.

We conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to due process tolling. First, he failed
to establish he was pursuing his rights diligently. The Petitioner testified that he did not
hear from his trial counsel after his motion for new trial was denied. Because he was unable
to access the prison’s law library during the pandemic, he did not learn he had the right to
appeal until the library reopened in 2022. He did not file his petition, however, until
November 15, 2023. Though he did not specify at what point in 2022 the library reopened,
he waited somewhere between nine months and one year and nine months to pursue his
rights. See Williams v. State, No. E2022-01768-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 7130296, at *4
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2023) (“[E]ven if restricted library access could constitute a
circumstance beyond the Petitioner’s control that prevented a timely filing of his petition—
and it does not—we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to show that he pursued his
rights diligently.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2024). Second, he failed to establish
that some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. This court has routinely
concluded that trial counsel’s failure to advise a petitioner about the right to seek post-
conviction relief does not justify equitable tolling. See McVay v. State, No. W2021-00324-
CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 421112, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2022), perm. app. denied
(Tenn. June 9, 2022); Carter v. State, No. W2018-00285-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 6266166,
at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2019).
Accordingly, this is not one of the rare instances where enforcing the limitations period
would be unconscionable. Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631-32.

CONCLUSION

Because the Petitioner is not entitled to due process tolling, we affirm the judgment
of the post-conviction court.

________________________________________________
CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

-4-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10505202. Public record. Not legal advice.
