# ADKINS, RICHARD v. CODY ALLISON & ASSOCIATES

> Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims · August 9, 2024 · 2024 TN WC 57

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10502503

## Case

- **Court:** Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
- **Decided:** August 9, 2024
- **Citations:** 2024 TN WC 57
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Baker
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

FILED
Aug 09, 2024
01:32 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE COURT OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS
AT NASHVILLE

RICHARD ADKINS, ) Docket No. 2023-06-8627
Employee, )
v. )
CODY ALLISON & ASSOCIATES, ) State File No. 45895-2021
Employer, )
And )
HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO., ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker
Carrier. )
____________________________________________________________________

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER
(DECISION ON THE RECORD)
____________________________________________________________________

Mr. Adkins requested a decision based on a review of the record without an
evidentiary hearing, which Hartford agreed to. Mr. Adkins asked the Court to designate
Dr. Schmidt as his treating physician for pain management and order Hartford to reimburse
him for all pain management expenses. Hartford did not oppose his request, except to assert
that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(iii) prohibits reimbursement to
Mr. Adkins for any amount he paid to his doctors over the fee schedule.

Because Hartford declined to cover his treatment, the Court designates Dr. Schmidt
as the authorized treating physician for pain management. Further, the Court holds the fee
schedule is inapplicable here, and Mr. Adkins is entitled to full reimbursement for all pain
management expenses.

Claim History

Mr. Adkins injured his back from lifting a multi-gallon water container at work. His
panel-selected physician, Dr. James Fish, surgically repaired his back twice.

After the second surgery, Dr. Fish referred Mr. Adkins to pain management
treatment with Dr. Kenneth Sullivan for “a combination of right-sided SI joint dysfunction
and residual pain from his previous 2 surgeries at the L1-L2 level.”

1
When Hartford failed to authorize the referral or offer a panel, Mr. Adkins covered
his own treatment. First, he treated with Dr. Sullivan, the doctor to whom Dr. Fish had
referred him. Without insurance, he paid the doctor personally and in full. After Dr.
Sullivan discontinued care, Mr. Adkins asked Hartford for a panel of pain management
physicians.

When Hartford still declined to offer a panel, he filed a petition and supported his
panel request with opinion letters from Drs. Fish and Sullivan. When asked if the back
injury contributed “more than fifty percent (50%) in causing [the] need for pain
management[,]” Dr. Sullivan checked “yes.” In response to the same question, Dr. Fish
also marked “yes.”

Hartford refused to give a panel, so Mr. Adkins treated with pain management
physician Dr. Alex Schmidt, whom he also paid personally without the use of insurance.

As for out-of-pocket expenses, Dr. Sullivan marked “yes” when asked if the medical
bills Mr. Adkins had incurred for pain management were “reasonable, necessary, and
directly related to” treatment of his work injury.

In his Rule 72 declaration, Mr. Adkins listed his out-of-pocket expenses. He paid
$4,396.01 directly for pain management, and he traveled 145.2 miles for treatment with
Dr. Schmidt and 1,817.2 miles for treatment with Dr. Sullivan.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Mr. Adkins must present sufficient evidence that he is likely to prevail at a final
hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2024); McCord v. Advantage Human
Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Mar. 27, 2015).

For now, he is seeking only “direct reimbursement” of his pain management
expenses and Dr. Schmidt as his treating physician for pain management.

Designation of Authorized Physician

Treatment recommendations and referrals by an authorized physician, like Dr. Fish,
are presumed medically necessary for treatment of a work injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-
6-204(a)(3)(H). Further, when an authorized physician refers an injured worker directly to
a specialist physician, like Dr. Fish’s referral to Dr. Sullivan, the employer has accepted
that referral unless a panel is offered within three business days. Id. at -204(a)(3)(A)(ii).

2
Yet Hartford did not authorize the referral or offer a panel, nor has it produced any
evidence to overcome the presumption of medical necessity afforded to Dr. Fish’s referral
and recommendation for pain management. Instead, Hartford denied coverage.

An “employer who elects to deny a claim runs the risk that it will be held responsible
for medical benefits obtained from a medical provider of the employee’s choice[.]” Barrett
v. Lithko Contracting, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 93, at *8 (Dec. 8, 2016).

Because Hartford elected to deny coverage rather than offer a panel, Mr. Adkins
chose his pain management physician. He first tried to obtain coverage from Hartford
before choosing his own doctor. Further, he established treatment with Dr. Schmidt, and
that treatment should not be disrupted. For these reasons, the Court holds Mr. Adkins is
likely to prevail at a final hearing on the designation of Dr. Schmidt as his authorized
physician for pain management.

Reimbursement of Pain Management Expenses

The Appeals Board has offered limited guidance on this issue. “An employer who
fails to provide a panel of physicians runs the risk of having to pay for unauthorized medical
care [if] the trial court determines that a panel should have been provided.” Young v. Young
Elec. Co., 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *16 (May 25, 2016). Moreover,
where “the employee has personally paid for the disputed medical treatment, . . . the
employer shall reimburse the employee personally.” Acevedo v. Crown Paving, LLC, 2023
TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 7, at *14 (Jan. 27, 2023).

Yet the Board has not been asked the difficult question here. The question is not if
Hartford should pay for pain management treatment–or even to whom: it’s how much.

Mr. Adkins argued Hartford waived reduced payment under the medical fee
schedule through noncompliance. By contrast, Hartford contended that—no matter the
circumstances—it is statutorily prohibited from paying Mr. Adkins any more than the
allowed amount under the fee schedule. From Hartford’s perspective, Mr. Adkins is
obligated to recoup any overpayment directly from his doctors.

Hartford’s contention fails to consider three significant sticking points: this Court’s
authority, equity and fairness, and the appropriate context for the prohibition against paying
outside of the fee schedule.

First, this Court has no authority to order doctors to reimburse their patients, nor
any mechanism by which to enforce or oversee that reimbursement. Rather, a workers’
compensation claim is between an injured worker, his employer, and by extension, its
insurer. Id. at *9. Second, equity requires that Mr. Adkins should not bear any further
burden or expense caused solely by Hartford’s noncompliance. The decision to deny him

3
coverage was intentional, which makes burdening him with chasing his doctors for
reimbursement particularly unpalatable. Put simply, he did not create this problem, so it is
not his to fix.

Lastly, pain management treatment was not “covered” treatment when Mr. Adkins
incurred these expenses. The Appeals Board has observed that “employers are prohibited
from paying any medical bill for a covered injury outside the fee schedule[.]” Bragg v.
Premium Servs., LLC, 2023 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 36, at *18 (Aug. 1, 2023)
(quoting Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-18-.15(1)) (emphasis added).

Even so, in Bragg, the Board affirmed a trial court’s order for reimbursement to an
injured worker’s private health insurer–only for the amount due under the fee schedule–for
expenses not covered by workers’ compensation when paid.

In doing so, Bragg focused on the word shall from section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(iii),
which imposes application of the fee schedule without using the word covered like in Rule
0800-02-18-.15(1). Instead, the statute simply instructs that an employer’s liability for
services “shall be limited to the maximum allowable fees” under the fee schedule. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).

However, context here is key. The mandatory language in -204(a)(3)(A)(iii)
immediately follows two other requirements: -204(a)(3)(A)(i), which requires an employer
to offer a panel when an injured worker expresses a need for treatment of a work injury,
and -204(a)(3)(A)(ii), which requires an employer to either accept a direct referral for a
covered injury or offer a panel within three business days.

In other words, the two requirements immediately preceding -204(a)(3)(A)(iii)
concern covered treatment. Hartford chose not to cover pain management treatment when
Mr. Adkins paid these expenses. Mr. Adkins would not have had these expenses if Hartford
had covered the treatment. Rather, Hartford would have paid his doctors directly under the
fee schedule, as the legislature intended.

But here, Hartford chose not to offer coverage as directed under -204(a)(3)(A)(ii)
when Dr. Fish made his direct referral. It also chose not to offer coverage as directed under
-204(a)(3)(A)(i) when Mr. Adkins needed a panel after Dr. Sullivan stopped treating him.

Logically, the legislature would not intend that an employer cherry-pick one
statutory requirement to follow—and retroactively at that—while flouting the remaining
two. In fact, nothing in the statute suggests this requirement deserves retroactive
application.

To be clear, Hartford’s noncompliance is not even the pivotal piece in this puzzle.
For example, even if overwhelming evidence supports an employer’s choice to deny

4
coverage, it is still a choice with inherent risks and consequences. However, if facts unfold
as intended by -204(a)(3)(A), then an employee would ask for care, like Mr. Adkins did,
and an employer would take certain steps to cover that care, culminating in payment of
expenses under the fee schedule.

Rather than noncompliance, the pivotal piece here is coverage and the choice to
deny coverage (in an employer’s case) or to refuse coverage (in an employee’s case). If
Mr. Adkins had refused coverage by not asking for care or refusing to choose from a panel,
then he would be liable for these expenses. See Buchanan v. Mission Ins. Co., 713 S.W.2d
654, 658 (Tenn. 1986) (“An employee may be liable, however, for medical expenses
incurred without consulting the employer.”).

Again, statutory structure and context for the word shall in -204(a)(3)(A)(iii), paired
with the direct and ordinary wording of covered injury in Rule 0800-02-18-.15(1), suggest
the fee schedule applies to covered treatment – without retroactive application.

Additionally, Mr. Adkins’s circumstances are somewhat distinguishable from those
in Bragg, as he has incurred these expenses without the benefit of a private health insurer
to shoulder the costs or to recoup the amount paid in excess of the fee schedule.

Given the limited reach of this Court’s authority, consideration of equity and
fairness, along with the context of the word shall in -204(a)(3)(A)(iii), the Court holds the
medical fee schedule is not applicable here. Hartford must reimburse Mr. Adkins directly
and in full for expenses and mileage he incurred for his pain management treatment.

Finally, the Court finds that Hartford ignored its legal obligations under both -
204(a)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) when: 1) it declined to either accept Dr. Fish’s referral or to provide
a panel within three business days; and 2) when it declined to offer a panel after Mr. Adkins
had expressed a need for pain management care after the discontinuation of Dr. Sullivan’s
treatment.

Therefore, the Court refers Hartford to the Compliance Program of the Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation for appropriate action under section 50-6-118(a)(8) and (9) (2023)
based on its failure to cover treatment and provide a panel of pain management physicians
as required by the Workers’ Compensation Law.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Hartford shall provide pain management treatment with Dr. Alex Schmidt as the
authorized treating physician.

2. Hartford shall reimburse Mr. Adkins for the $4,396.01 he spent on pain management
treatment and pay his mileage.

5
3. The Court refers Hartford to the Compliance Program of the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation for appropriate action based on its failure to provide medical
treatment and to provide a panel as required under section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i) and
(ii).

4. The Court sets a status hearing on Monday, November 18, 2024, at 10:00 a.m.
(CST). The parties must call (615) 741-2113 or (855) 874-0474 to participate.
Failure to call might result in determination of the issues without the party’s
participation.

5. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, compliance
with this Order must occur no later than seven business days from the date of entry
of this Order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3). The
Insurer or Self-Insured Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this
Order to the Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the
seventh business day after entry of this Order. Failure to submit the necessary
confirmation within the period of compliance may result in a penalty assessment for
non-compliance. For questions regarding compliance, please contact the Workers’
Compensation Compliance Unit via email WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov

ENTERED August 9, 2024.

___________________________________
Joshua Davis Baker, Judge
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Order was sent as shown on August 9, 2024.

Name Certified Via Via Service sent to:
Mail Fax Email
Richard House, X richard@richardhouselaw.com
Employee’s attorney
L. Blair Cannon, X l.blair.cannon@thehartford.com
Employer’s attorney
Compliance Program X WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov

____________________________________________
Penny Shrum, Court Clerk
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims
Wc.courtclerk@tn.gov

7
Right to Appeal:
If you disagree with the Court’s Order, you may appeal to the Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Board. To do so, you must:
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled “Notice of Appeal” and file it with the Clerk of the
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims before the expiration of the deadline.
 If the order being appealed is “expedited” (also called “interlocutory”), or if the
order does not dispose of the case in its entirety, the notice of appeal must be filed
within seven (7) business days of the date the order was filed.
 If the order being appealed is a “Compensation Order,” or if it resolves all issues
in the case, the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty (30) calendar days of
the date the Compensation Order was filed.
When filing the Notice of Appeal, you must serve a copy on the opposing party (or attorney,
if represented).

2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten calendar
days after filing the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at any Bureau office
or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the alternative, you may file an
Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau’s website or any Bureau office)
seeking a waiver of the filing fee. You must file the fully-completed Affidavit of Indigency
within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing
fee or file the Affidavit of Indigency will result in dismissal of your appeal.

3. You are responsible for ensuring a complete record is presented on appeal. If no court
reporter was present at the hearing, you may request from the Court Clerk the audio
recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee. If you choose to submit a transcript as part of your
appeal, which the Appeals Board has emphasized is important for a meaningful review of
the case, a licensed court reporter must prepare the transcript, and you must file it with the
Court Clerk. The Court Clerk will prepare the record for submission to the Appeals Board,
and you will receive notice once it has been submitted. For deadlines related to the filing of
transcripts, statements of the evidence, and briefs on appeal, see the applicable rules on the
Bureau’s website at https://www.tn.gov/wcappealsboard. (Click the “Read Rules” button.)

4. After the Workers’ Compensation Judge approves the record and the Court Clerk transmits
it to the Appeals Board, a docketing notice will be sent to the parties.
If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals Board, the Court Order
becomes enforceable. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(3) (expedited/interlocutory
orders) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (compensation orders).

For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
www.tn.gov/workforce/injuries-at-work/
wc.courtclerk@tn.gov | 1-800-332-2667

Docket No.: ________________________

State File No.: ______________________

Date of Injury: _____________________

___________________________________________________________________________
Employee

v.

___________________________________________________________________________
Employer

Notice is given that ____________________________________________________________________
[List name(s) of all appealing party(ies). Use separate sheet if necessary.]

appeals the following order(s) of the Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims to the
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (check one or more applicable boxes and include the date file-
stamped on the first page of the order(s) being appealed):

□ Expedited Hearing Order filed on _______________ □ Motion Order filed on ___________________
□ Compensation Order filed on__________________ □ Other Order filed on_____________________
issued by Judge _________________________________________________________________________.

Statement of the Issues on Appeal
Provide a short and plain statement of the issues on appeal or basis for relief on appeal:
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

Parties
Appellant(s) (Requesting Party): _________________________________________ ☐Employer ☐Employee
Address: ________________________________________________________ Phone: ___________________
Email: __________________________________________________________
Attorney’s Name: ______________________________________________ BPR#: _______________________
Attorney’s Email: ______________________________________________ Phone: _______________________
Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________
* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellant *

LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 1 of 2 RDA 11082
Employee Name: _______________________________________ Docket No.: _____________________ Date of Inj.: _______________

Appellee(s) (Opposing Party): ___________________________________________ ☐Employer ☐Employee
Appellee’s Address: ______________________________________________ Phone: ____________________
Email: _________________________________________________________
Attorney’s Name: _____________________________________________ BPR#: ________________________
Attorney’s Email: _____________________________________________ Phone: _______________________
Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________
* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellee *

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, _____________________________________________________________, certify that I have forwarded a
true and exact copy of this Notice of Appeal by First Class mail, postage prepaid, or in any manner as described
in Tennessee Compilation Rules & Regulations, Chapter 0800-02-21, to all parties and/or their attorneys in this
case on this the __________ day of ___________________________________, 20 ____.

______________________________________________
[Signature of appellant or attorney for appellant]

LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 2 of 2 RDA 11082

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10502503. Public record. Not legal advice.
