# T.D. King v. The Philadelphia Parking Auth.

> Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · July 17, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10471974

## Case

- **Court:** Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 17, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Wojcik, J.
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10471974

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding plaintiff was not permitted to recoup losses he might have avoided by taking an available administrative appeal

## Opinion text

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tony Dphax King, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 301 C.D. 2023
: Submitted: June 4, 2024
The Philadelphia Parking Authority :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge (P.)
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: July 17, 2024

Tony Dphax King (Driver), proceeding pro se, appeals from an order
of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) that granted the
Philadelphia Parking Authority, Steven C. Boc (Boc), and Dennis G. Weldon Jr.’s
(Weldon)1 (collectively, the Authority) motion for summary judgment (Motion) and
dismissed Driver’s claims with prejudice. Driver contends that the trial court erred
or abused its discretion by granting the Authority’s Motion. We affirm.
Driver commenced this action by filing a civil action in municipal court
against the Authority on March 19, 2021, to dispute collection notices for one
parking ticket (No. 726845431 – alleged offense date April 18, 2016) and one red-

1
Boc and Weldon are attorneys for the Authority.
light camera violation (No. RL160219237 - alleged offense date December 28,
2016) (collectively, the Violations). On June 24, 2021, after argument, the
municipal court entered judgment for the Authority on the basis that it lacked
jurisdiction over Driver’s Violations.
On July 10, 2021, Driver appealed this judgment to the trial court. On
August 10, 2021, Driver also filed a complaint and requested a jury trial. In response
to the Authority’s preliminary objections (POs), Driver amended his complaint
twice. In the second amended complaint, Driver asserted that the Authority is not
legally permitted to collect unpaid fines stemming from the Violations issued to him.
Driver asked the trial court to dismiss the Violations. He requested an award of
damages in the amount of $652.95 to compensate him for his alleged “loss of work,
service fees, [and] time invested” incurred in connection with his litigation of the
Violations. Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 11 at 14. Driver also demanded
damages “up to $12,000 to pay the filing fee of $581.17 (which was waived) and
future economic injury (loss of future business opportunity) due to the
PROSECUTION of this matter.” Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
The Authority filed an answer with new matter to Driver’s second
amended complaint. Following the close of discovery, the Authority filed the
Motion seeking summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support. O.R.,
Item No. 18. In the Motion, the Authority asserted that Driver failed to produce
evidence in support of his claims. The Authority also contended that it was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law for several reasons. First, the Authority asserted that
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Driver did not first dispute
the underlying Violations with the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (BAA)
and the Office of Administrative Review (OAR) as required by the Local Agency

2
Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §§551-555, 751-754, and Chapter 12 of The Philadelphia Code
(Traffic Code) before seeking judicial review. Second, the Authority asserted that
the Authority itself is shielded by governmental immunity under Sections 8541-8542
of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§8541-8542 (commonly referred to as the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act). Third, the Authority argued that Driver’s claims for
civil damages against the Authority’s attorneys, Boc and Weldon, were barred by
the doctrine of qualified immunity, which shields government officials and
employees acting within the scope of their duties from liability for civil damages.
Driver filed a response in opposition. By order dated March 2, 2023, the trial court
granted the Authority’s Motion and dismissed Driver’s claims with prejudice
without opinion.
On March 26, 2023, Driver filed a notice of appeal in this Court.2 On
March 29, 2023, the trial court directed Driver to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal (Statement), pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b)),
within 21 days. On April 16, 2023, Driver filed a 6-page Statement containing 23
lettered paragraphs, each containing a purported issue on appeal.
On June 20, 2023, the trial court issued a written opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion) requesting this Court to dismiss Driver’s
appeal on the basis that he “waived review by filing an improperly lengthy and
expansive” Statement. Trial Ct. Op., 6/20/23, at 1. Should this Court reach the
merits of the appeal, the trial court opined that it did not err or abuse its discretion
by granting summary judgment to the Authority and dismissing Driver’s claims with

2
“Our review of a trial court’s order granting summary judgment is de novo, and our scope
of review is plenary; this Court applies the same standard for summary judgment as the trial court.”
Lancaster County Agriculture Preserve Board v. Fryberger, 257 A.3d 192, 199 n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021). “Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
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prejudice. The trial court explained that the Authority demonstrated in its Motion
that Driver failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not challenging the
underlying Violations, did not plead an exception to governmental immunity, and
did not present any claims against individual defendants Boc and Weldon that would
overcome the bar of qualified immunity. Id. at 4. The trial court added that Driver’s
response did not overcome the Authority’s arguments. Id.
We must first examine whether Driver preserved any issues for
appellate review pursuant to Rule 1925(b). Rule 1925(b) provides that, “[i]f the
judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal (‘judge’) desires
clarification of the errors complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order
directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a
concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal (‘Statement’).” Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). “Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon
those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Dowling,
778 A.2d 683, 686-87 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Rule 1925(b) is not satisfied by simply filing a timely statement.
Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2016). “The Statement
shall set forth only those errors that the appellant intends to assert.” Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(i). The Statement must “concisely identify each error that the appellant
intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “The Statement should not be redundant or provide
lengthy explanations as to any error. Where non-redundant, non-frivolous issues are
set forth in an appropriately concise manner, the number of errors raised will not
alone be grounds for finding waiver.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv). “Issues not

4
included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
The “statement must be sufficiently ‘concise’ and ‘coherent’ such that
the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues to be raised on appeal . . . .”
Ray, 134 A.3d at 1114 (quoting Jiricko v. Geico Insurance Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210
(Pa. Super. 2008)). Rule 1925(b) Statements “must be detailed enough so that the
judge can write a Rule 1925(a) opinion, but not so lengthy that it does not meet the
goal of narrowing down the issues previously raised to the few that are likely to be
presented to the appellate court without giving the trial judge volumes to plow
through.” Arnoldy v. Forklift L.P., 927 A.2d 257, 261 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2007).
“[W]hen appellants raise an ‘outrageous’ number of issues in their
1925(b) [S]tatement, the appellants have ‘deliberately circumvented the meaning
and purpose of Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate
review of the issues [they] now seek to raise.’” Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343,
346 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff’d, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Kanter v. Epstein,
866 A.2d 394, 401 (Pa. Super. 2004)); accord Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d
1, 2 (Pa. Super. 2006); Lineberger v.Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Waiver of the issues is the appropriate remedy for an appellant’s failure to comply
with Rule 1925(b). See, e.g., Brandywine Hospital, LLC v. County of Chester Board
of Assessment Appeals, 291 A.3d 467, 476 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 308 A.3d
779 (Pa. 2023) (appellant waived all issues on appeal by filing a 19-page statement
that contained 90 issues and sub-issues replete with redundancies); Commonwealth
v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2018) (53-page “defamatory rant
against everything and everyone involved in this case show[ed] complete defiance
toward the purpose of appellate review” and merited dismissal of the appeal);

5
Jiricko, 947 A.2d at 210, 213 (waiver found where five-page “virtually
incomprehensible” statement was “an incoherent, confusing, redundant, defamatory
rant”). Cf. Donoughe v. Lincoln Electric Co., 936 A.2d 52, 59-60 (Pa. Super. 2007),
overruled in part on other grounds by Nelson v. Airco Welders Supply, 107 A.3d
146 (Pa. Super. 2014) (issues not waived where 12 allegations of error in a four-page
statement were “fairly straightforward,” were “not vague,” and could be “stripped
of sub-arguments or other extraneous verbiage”); Caln Nether Co., L.P. v. Board of
Supervisors, Thornbury Township, 840 A.2d 484, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)
(statement raising 23 issues, while problematic, did not serve as grounds for
dismissal).
Here, Driver, who represented himself throughout the proceedings,
filed a six-page Statement containing 23 allegations of error. Although Driver’s
Statement was lengthy, it was not so incoherent or vague that it was impossible to
discern the issues Driver intended to raise. Despite the multiplicity of issues raised,
in essence, Driver contends that the trial court erred in granting the Authority’s
Motion upon determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Driver’s collection
challenge because Driver did not exhaust his administrative remedies to challenge
the underlying Violations and the Authority, and the individual defendants were
immune from suit. Driver sufficiently developed these arguments in his brief. We,
therefore, decline to find waiver, and we address these three central issues.

1. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
First, Driver contends that the Authority was not authorized to collect
fees for traffic violations. He claims that the collection action is barred by the three-
year statute of limitations under Section 5553 of the Judicial Code,
42 Pa. C.S. §5553. The Authority violated Section 5553 by instituting collection

6
proceedings four years after the Violations’ offense dates. The Authority has never
referenced nor provided a defense to Section 5553 in any of its pleadings.
Section 5553(a) of the Judicial Code provides that “proceedings for
summary offenses” involving vehicles “must be commenced within 30 days after
the commission of the alleged offense or within 30 days after the discovery of the
commission of the offense or the identity of the offender, whichever is later, and not
thereafter.” 42 Pa. C.S. §5553. Section 5553(e) provides: “No proceedings shall be
held, or action taken pursuant to a summary offense under Title 75 [(relating to motor
vehicles)] subsequent to three years after the commission of the offense.”
42 Pa. C.S. §5553(e).
Here, the alleged offense date for the parking ticket was April 18, 2016,
and for the red-light camera violation was December 28, 2016. On April 26, 2020,
the Authority attempted to collect the unpaid fines associated with the Violations.
On this basis, Driver claims that the Authority had no legal right to collect fines for
the Violations as the collection proceeding or action was time barred by the statute
of limitations under Section 5553 of the Judicial Code.
Driver’s reasoning rests on the false presumption that the collection of
fines is a “proceeding” or “action taken” as used in Section 5553. However, “fine
collection is neither a proceeding nor an action” as defined so as to be barred by the
statute of limitations for motor vehicle summary offenses. Commonwealth v. Marr,
627 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. Super. 1993).3 Therefore, Section 5553 was not implicated
or violated by the fee collection.

3
An “action” is defined as “any action at equity or law.” 42 Pa. C.S. §102; see Marr, 627
A.2d at 758. “Proceeding” is defined as including “every declaration, petition or other application
which may be made to a court under law or usage or under special statutory authority, but the term
does not include an action or an appeal.” 42 Pa. C.S. §102; see Marr, 627 A.2d at 759.
7
Insofar as Driver is attempting to dispute the underlying Violations
themselves, which led to the fines being placed into collection, Driver did not
exhaust the administrative remedies available. Under Section 752 of the Local
Agency Law, “[a] person aggrieved by an adjudication of a local agency who has a
direct interest in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the
court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals” under the Judicial Code.
2 Pa. C.S. §752. The Traffic Code details the administrative process for disputing
parking and red-light camera violations. See Phila. Code §§12-2807(3), 12-3010,
12-3011. A person who has received a parking ticket from Philadelphia Traffic
Court may contest the violation. Phila. Code §12-2807(8). If a person fails to
answer or fails to appear at a hearing when required to do so or fails to timely contest
the parking violation by mail or electronic submission, the Parking Hearing
Examiner shall fix the appropriate fine and assess appropriate costs and fees, if any.
Phila. Code §12-2807(3). Similarly, a person who has received a red-light violation
may request a hearing within 30 days to contest the liability of the alleged notice and
has the right to appeal the decision. Phila. Code §§12-3009(1), 12-3011. A person
aggrieved by a parking ticket or red-light camera violation may contest final orders
to the trial court within 30 days. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 902, 903; 42 Pa. C.S. §§933, 5571.
However, Driver never contested the Violations. Consequently, the
Authority began collection on the unpaid fines related to those Violations. Critically,
having failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review
regarding the collection of the fines, the trial court lacked jurisdiction. See Badio v.
Philadelphia Parking Authority (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1065 C.D. 2014, filed February
26, 2015) (holding trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the
appellant’s failure to properly appeal parking tickets and contest auction-related

8
court orders);4 see also Jonnet v. Bodick, 244 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. 1968) (holding
plaintiff was not permitted to recoup losses he might have avoided by taking an
available administrative appeal). Thus, the trial court properly entered summary
judgment in favor of the Authority.

2. Governmental Immunity
Next, Driver contends that the Authority is not immune from suit under
the Judicial Code. We disagree.
Section 8541 of the Judicial Code provides governmental immunity for
local agencies, such as the Authority. 42 Pa. C.S. §8541. Specifically, under Section
8541, “no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a
person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or
any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S. §8541. Section 8542 lists exceptions to immunity
that apply if certain conditions are met. 42 Pa. C.S. §8542. Section 8542(a)
provides:

(a) Liability imposed.--A local agency shall be liable for
damages on account of an injury to a person or property
within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of the
following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as
a result of one of the acts set forth in subsection (b):

(1) The damages would be recoverable under
common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the
injury were caused by a person not having available a
defense under section 8541 (relating to governmental
immunity generally) or section 8546 (relating to defense
of official immunity); and

4
Unreported memorandum opinions of this Court filed after January 15, 2008, may be
cited for their persuasive value pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 126(b), and Section 414(a) of the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures,
210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
9
(2) The injury was caused by the negligent acts of
the local agency or an employee thereof acting within the
scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the
categories listed in subsection (b). As used in this
paragraph, “negligent acts” shall not include acts or
conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual
malice, or willful misconduct.
42 Pa. C.S. §8542(a). The exceptions must relate to vehicle liability; the care,
custody, or control of personal property; real property; trees; traffic controls and
street lighting; utility service facilities; streets; sidewalks; care, custody, or control
of animals; and sexual abuse. 42 Pa. C.S. §8542(b)(1)-(9). Driver failed to plead
any of those exceptions. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the Authority
was immune from suit.

3. Qualified Immunity
Third, Driver contends that qualified immunity defense does not protect
official conduct that violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.
Because individual defendants Boc and Weldon violated Section 5553 of the Judicial
Code, Driver contends that they are not immune from suit. We disagree.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials and
public servants “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal
citation and quotations omitted). It provides immunity “so long as those officials
did not violate individual rights which were clearly established at the time, and about
which a reasonable government official would have known.” Johnson v. Wetzel,
238 A.3d 1172, 1178 (Pa. 2020). It protects a public servant who has not engaged
in actionable conduct from the possibility of suit not just as a mere defense to

10
liability. DuBree v. Commonwealth, 393 A.2d 293, 295 (Pa. 1978); see Dorsey v.
Redman, 96 A.3d 332, 344 (Pa. 2014).
Here, Driver contends that Boc and Weldon are not entitled to
immunity based solely on his position that they violated his statutory rights arising
under Section 5553 of the Judicial Code in collecting fines for the Violations and
defending this action. Having concluded above that Section 5553 was not violated,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Boc and Weldon are
immune from suit.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

11
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tony Dphax King, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 301 C.D. 2023
:
The Philadelphia Parking Authority :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of July, 2024, the order of the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas dated March 2, 2023, is AFFIRMED.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10471974. Public record. Not legal advice.