# Nationwide Judgment Recovery, Inc. v. Sorrells

> United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Texas · September 27, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10462267

## Case

- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Texas
- **Decided:** September 27, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10462267

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that reckless disregard for the truth combined with the sheer magnitude of the resultant misrepresentation may combine to create an inference of intent to deceive under § 523(a)(2)(B)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
IN RE: §
§
PAMELA ANN SORRELLS § Case No. 20-20100
§
§
Debtor § Chapter 7
§
NATIONWIDE JUDGEMENT §
RECOVERY INC., §
§
Plaintiff §
§
v. § Adversary No. 20-2004
§
PAMELA ANN SORRELLS §
§
Defendant §
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The main question presented in this decision is whether Debtor, as
opposed to a third party, must have committed either a violation of securities
law, or common law fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,
for a debt owed to be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). The
Court is also asked to determine whether Plaintiff, Nationwide Judgment
Recovery Inc., (the “Plaintiff”) is entitled to its summary judgment on its cause
of action alleging that Defendant committed actual fraud in violation 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(A). For the reasons explained in this memorandum the Court finds
that “Nationwide Judgement Recovery, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgement”
(the “Motion”) filed by Plaintiff on September 9, 2021, should be DENIED.

I. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334
and 157. The Court has the authority to enter a final judgment in this
adversary proceeding because it constitutes a statutorily core proceeding
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (I), and (J), and meets all constitutional

standards for the proper exercise of full judicial power by this Court.
II. Facts and Procedure
Pamela Sorrells (the “Defendant”), the debtor in this case, is an individual
residing in Linden, Texas.1 Defendant was an investor in a website called
ZeekRewards.com (“ZeekRewards”). ZeekRewards presented itself as a penny

auction website but was in fact an elaborate Ponzi Scheme. Defendant was only
one of approximately 700,000 people who invested in the ZeekRewards scheme
worldwide.2 Defendant maintains she had no idea that ZeekRewards was a
Ponzi scheme.3
Defendant, unlike the majority of victims of the scam, was one of the few

who received a return on her investment in the scheme.4 Defendant invested a

1 Def. Obj, ECF No. 20 at 1
2 Id.
3 Id. at 2.
4 Id. at 1-2.
total of $1,570.65 into ZeekRewards.5 She received in return a total of
$32,7520.40.6 The class of investors which actually profited from the scheme are

referred to as “net winners.”7 Only 9,000 of the approximately 700,000 total
investors, including Defendant, were net winners.8
Rex Venture Group, LLC d/b/a ZeekRewards.com and Paul R. Burks, its
principal, were the operators of the Ponzi scheme.9 On August 17, 2012, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) filed an action against

ZeekRewards and Burks to shut down the website and attempt to recover the
invested funds (the “SEC Action”).10 The SEC alleged that ZeekRewards and
Burks had committed numerous violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 The SEC also alleged that investors in
ZeekRewards were unaware that the operation was in fact “a massive Ponzi and

pyramid scheme.”12 Importantly for this case, the SEC stated that the investors
in this scheme had played “no role in ZeekRewards’ operations” and that
ZeekRewards and Burks alone operated the scheme.13 Similarly, the SEC
believed that the investors had no part in assigning any payments of winnings.14

5 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 6.
6 Id.
7 DefObj., ECF No. 20 at 1.
8 Id. at 1.
9 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 2.
10 Id.
11 Id. at exhibit F.
12 Id. at exhibit F, pg. 2.
13 Id. at exhibit F, pg. 10.
14 Id. at exhibit F, pg. 11-12.
ZeekRewards and Burks did not contest the SEC’s allegation that their
operation was in fact a Ponzi scheme.15 They also did not contest the SEC

Action in general and consented to a judgement enjoining them from any further
violations of federal securities law.16 Defendant was never a defendant or
participant in the SEC Action.17
As a result of the SEC Action, Kenneth Bell was appointed as receiver for
the estate of ZeekRewards and Burks.18 He was later succeeded in this role by

Matthew E. Orso.19 Once the receivership was put into place in 2016, the
receiver filed Case 3:14-cv-91, Bell v. Disner, et. al., in the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, as a class
action suit against the “net winners” (the “Receiver Class Action”).20 The
Receiver Class Action was filed to recover the profits earned by the net

winners.21 This suit was successful, and the receiver obtained fraudulent
transfer judgements against all “net winners” including Defendant for
investment returns received from the scheme.22 The fraudulent transfer
judgement against Defendant was for a total of $41,875.07 and remains

15 Id. at exhibit C, pg. 20.
16 Id. at exhibit C, pg. 2.
17 Id. at exhibit F, pg. 1-2.
18 Pl. Compl. ECF No. 1 at 3
19 Id. at 2.
20 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 2. The court in Bell v. Disner, et. al., made numerous
findings about the factual background underpinning the judgment against Defendant
relevant to this proceeding. Id. at exhibit C, pg. 1-19.
21 Id. at 3.
22 Id
unpaid.23 On May 30, 2019, the ZeekRewards receiver assigned the judgement
against the net winner class to Plaintiff.24 Nationwide Judgement Recovery,

Inc. was founded in 2019 and has its principal place of business in California.25
On May 6, 2020, Defendant filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition, primarily seeking to discharge the fraudulent transfer judgement
against her from the Receiver Class Action.26 Defendant received a discharge in
her bankruptcy case on November 25, 2020.27 Plaintiff filed this adversary

proceeding on November 20, 2020.28 The complaint seeks a declaration that
Defendant’s debt to Plaintiff is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§
523(a)(2)(A) and 523(a)(19).29 On December 28, 2020, Defendant filed her
answer to the complaint and asked the Court to deny the relief requested.30
Plaintiff filed the Motion on September 8, 2021.31 Defendant filed her objection

to the Motion on November 2, 2021.32 Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant’s
objection on November 16, 2021.33

23 Id.
24 Id. at exhibit E.
25 Id.
26 Debtor’s Voluntary Chapter 7 Petition, Case No. 20-20100 ECF No. 1.
27 Order Discharging Debtor, Case No. 20-20100 ECF No. 12.
28 Pl. Compl, ECF No. 1.
29 Id. at 1.
30 Def. Ans., ECF No. 8.
31 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19.
32 Def. Obj., ECF No. 20.
33 Pl. Reply to Def. Obj., ECF No. 21.
III. Summary Judgement Standard
A court may grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). FED. R. BANKR.
P. 7056 incorporates FED. R. CIV. P. 56 to apply to adversary proceedings. Thus,

if summary judgment is appropriate, the Court may resolve the case as a matter
of law.
The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
court of the basis for its motion and producing evidence which it believes
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323. The manner in which the necessary summary judgment showing can be
made depends upon which party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1077 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994). “A fact is material
only if its resolution would affect the outcome of the action.” Wiley v. State Farm
Fire and Cas, Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2009). “All reasonable inferences

must be viewed in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party, and “any
doubt must resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.” In re Louisiana Crawfish
Producers, 852 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. V. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
IV. Should Defendant’s Late Objection to the Motion Be Considered?
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s objection

to the Motion should not be considered because it was filed late. Local Rule
7056-1(b), and the scheduling order in this case, both require a response in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be filed within 28 days of the
filing of the motion. Defendant failed to meet this deadline and its response in
opposition included no explanation for this failure.

The Court has “broad discretion in interpreting and applying [its] own
local rules adopted to promote efficiency in the court.” Bonner v. Adams (In the
Matter of Adams), 734 F.2d 1094, 1102 (5th Cir. 1984). No trial is yet set in this
case, and the Court had taken no action on the Motion at the time the
Defendant’s response in opposition was filed. The Court finds no prejudice to

Plaintiff caused by the delay. Due to the discretion afforded to the Court when
applying its own local rules and the lack of any apparent prejudice, the Court
will consider Defendant’s late response in opposition. See Marrama v. Citizens
Bank of Massachusetts (In re Marrama), 549 U.S. 365, 375 (2007) (approving
bankruptcy court’s use of equitable powers to deny a conversion to avoid

administrative process which would end up in the same place)); see also
Bywaters v. Alhuneidi (In re Alhuneidi), 632 B.R. 737, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
2021) (this Court used its broad discretion to overlook a defendant’s failure to
comply with a local rule when the failure did not harm plaintiff).
V. Is Defendant’s Debt Nondischargeable
Pursuant to Under 11 § U.S.C. 523(a)(19)?

11 § U.S.C. 523(a)(19) makes debts arising from violations of securities
laws nondischargeable. The provision specifically states that a debt will be
nondischargeable if it:
(A) is for (i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as
that term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934), any of the State securities laws, or any regulation or
order issued under such Federal or State securities laws; or (ii)
common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security; and (B) results, before, on, or after
the date on which the petition was filed, from (i) any judgment,
order, consent order, or decree entered in any Federal or State
judicial or administrative proceeding; (ii) any settlement agreement
entered into by the debtor; or (iii) any court or administrative order
for any damages, fine, penalty, citation, restitutionary payment,
disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other payment owed by
the debtor.

11 § US.C. 523(a)(19). In essence, § 523(a)(19) makes a debt
nondischargeable if two conditions are met. First, the debt must be for a
violation of state or federal securities law, or for common law fraud, deceit,
or manipulation in connection with a sale of any security. Id. Second, the
debt must result from a judgement or court order. Id.
It is undisputed that the second element of this test under § 523(a)(19)(B)
is met in this case because the debt owed to Plaintiff arises from a judgment.34
Regarding the first element under § 523(a)(19)(A), can Plaintiff show that its
judgment either arose from a violation of state or federal securities law, or that

34 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 5.
its judgment is for common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection with
the sale of any security? The facts appear clear that Defendant was not the

person operating the ZeekRewards scheme nor the person committing securities
violations. Rather, Defendant appears to have only benefitted from the
violations committed by others.35 The question is thus whether a debt falls
within the scope of § 523(a)(19)(A) and is “for” a securities law violation when
the debt stems from a violation not committed by the Debtor. Plaintiff argues

that a debtor’s personal culpability is irrelevant so long as the judgement arises
from a securities violation. Defendant argues that a debtor must be personally
culpable for the violation for § 523(a)(19)(A) to be met. Currently, circuits are
split on this question, and no ruling has been made by the Fifth Circuit to bind
this Court’s analysis.

The majority view, adopted by both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, is that
a debt is only “for” a securities law violation, and thus within the scope §
523(a)(19)(A), if the debtor was found to have been the one who committed the
violation. In Sherman, the Ninth Circuit considered “whether a debt can be ‘for’
one of the violations listed in § 523(a)(19)(A) when the debtor has not committed

any of those violations.” In Re Sherman, 658 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). At
issue was a lawyer who, as part of an SEC enforcement action, had been ordered
to disgorge money prepaid to him but not fully earned by the end of litigation.

35 Id.
Id. at 1010. Importantly, the SEC conceded that the debtor had not “committed
any securities violations.” Id. at 1010-11. In its analysis the Ninth Circuit

founds that the meaning of § 523(a)(19) was ambiguous. Id. at 1012-13, 1015.
Thus, the Sherman court used two important goals of the bankruptcy code to
help discern the meaning of the statute. These goals were: “(1) ensuring an
equitable distribution of the debtor's assets to his creditors and (2) giving the
debtor a ‘fresh start.’” Id. at 1015. It also considered the Supreme Court’s

dictate that exceptions to discharge should be construed narrowly and in favor of
the debtor and recognized that the bankruptcy code “limits the opportunity for a
completely unencumbered new beginning to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”
Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1015, citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87
(1991). The Sherman court reasoned that these principles meant that

exceptions to discharge should be “limited to dishonest debtors seeking to abuse
the bankruptcy system in order to evade the consequences of their misconduct.”
Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1015. It therefore ruled that: ”11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)
prevents the discharge of debts for securities-related wrongdoings only in cases
where the debtor is responsible for that wrongdoing. Debtors who may have

received funds derived from a securities violation remain entitled to a complete
discharge of any resulting disgorgement order.” Id. at 1019.
The Tenth Circuit also considered this question in a case with facts like
the present case. In Wilcox, the Oklahoma Department of Securities asked the
bankruptcy court to find that distributions from a Ponzi scheme paid to the
debtors and the resulting judgement against them were nondischargeable.
Oklahoma Dept. of Securities, ex. Rel Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1173

(10th Cir. 2012). The Wilcox court found the statute was unambiguous and
ruled that a debt is only “for” a securities law violation if defendant violated
securities law. Id. at 1174-75. The debtors in Wilcox were never accused or
found guilty of violating any securities laws and were only found to have been
unjustly enriched by actions of a third party. Id. at 1176-77. Reviewing the

statutory language, the Wilcox court found that discharging the debt was proper
because “permitting debtors, who were not personally found to be in violation of
securities laws, to obtain relief from a judgment intended only to redistribute
funds among multiple victims of a Ponzi scheme is in accordance with the plain
language of the statute.” Id. at 1177. To adopt the opposing interpretation was

impossible because, while convenient, “the language of the statute cannot
reasonably be stretched that far.” Id.
The Lunsford decision exemplifies the opposing view that a debtor need
not have violated securities law for § 523(a)(19) to prevent discharge of a debt
arising from another party’s violation. Lunsford v. Process Technologies Servs.

(In re Lunsford), 848 F.3d 963 (11th Cir. 2017). In Lunsford, an arbitrator ruled
against a debtor and found he had committed several securities violations. Id.
at 965-66. Later, the bankruptcy court upheld the arbitrator’s findings and
stated that “the arbitration award constituted a judgment for a violation of
securities laws against [debtor] because there is a determination outside the
Bankruptcy Court that [debtor] violated securities laws and because the state
courts confirmed the arbitration award.” Id. at 966. On appeal, the Eleventh

Circuit found that the arbitrator’s decision was sufficient for the bankruptcy
court to find that the debtor had committed a securities violation and found §
523(a)(19) prevented the discharge of his debt. Id. at 967. The Eleventh Circuit
in the alternative ruled that § 523(a)(19) rendered a debt nondischargeable
regardless of a debtor’s conduct so long as a “securities law violation caused the

debt.” Id. at 968. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Congress has limited
other exceptions to discharge based on a debtor’s conduct, so “[i]f Congress had
wanted to limit section 523(a)(19)(A) based on debtor conduct, it could have done
so as it did with other provisions in the statute.” 36 Id.
The Eleventh Circuit considered the Tenth Circuit’s decision in reaching

the opposite conclusion. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Tenth Circuit’s
Wilcox decision without truly considering its merits and explained that the
different circumstances in Wilcox made that decision inapplicable. Specifically,
the Eleventh Circuit said the following:
After Oklahoma obtained judgments for unjust enrichment against
investors in a Ponzi scheme, the Tenth Circuit held that the debtors
could discharge their debts because the judgments at issue were not
for a violation of securities laws but for unjust enrichment resulting

36 Some of the examples the court used to demonstrate this are as follows: “for willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity” § 523(a)(6); “for death or personal injury
caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle” § 523(a)(9); “obtained by use of a
statement in writing ... that the debtor caused to be made or published” § 523(a)(2)(B)(iv);
“for a tax or a customs duty with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return” §
523(a)(1)(C).” Id.
from someone else's violation of those statutes. In contrast,
Lunsford's debt does not arise from a judgment against him for
unjust enrichment. Lunsford was a party to the same decision in
which the state courts entered a judgment against MIPCO for a
violation of securities laws (emphasis added).

Id. at 968-69. The present case has more in common with Wilcox than
Lunsford. Defendant, like the defendants in Wilcox, has not been found to
have committed a securities law violation.37
The Lunsford court also reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Sherman. In its discussion of the case, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed
with the basic principles relied upon by the Ninth Circuit.38 Id. at 969.
Specifically, it departed “from the Ninth Circuit because it grounded its
decision on precedent that does not bind us and followed prescriptions of
general statutory purpose over the text.” Id. This Court declines to follow
this characterization of Sherman. The Supreme Court in Grogan v.
Garner has clearly articulated that providing a “fresh start” to “honest but

unfortunate debtors” is a “central purpose of the [bankruptcy] code.”
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991). For this reason and the
factual differences between Lunsford and the present case, this Court does
not find Lunsford particularly persuasive.

37 Only Burks and ZeekRewards were charged with security law violations. Pl. Mot. Summ.
J., ECF No. 19 at 2.
38 The 11th Circuit specifically stated that the 9th Circuit ruled as it did to “Further the
supposed ‘purpose’ of the Bankruptcy code to allow a ‘fresh start’ and to protect ‘the honest
and unfortunate debtor.’” Id.
Consequently, this Court agrees with the majority and holds that §
523(a)(19)(A) only applies to except from discharge debts owed by debtors who

themselves committed a securities violation. To adopt Plaintiff’s reading of §
523(a)(19)(A) would require a broad reading of the statute contrary to its plain
language and to the principal that exceptions to discharge are construed
narrowly in favor of debtors. Matter of Miller (In Re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 602
(5th Cir. 1998). There is a difference between a debtor who actively perpetrates

or knowingly takes advantage of a Ponzi scheme, and a debtor who unwittingly
invests in such a scam. Plaintiff has failed show that no material issue of fact
exists that Defendant was the former, and so summary judgement cannot be
granted as Plaintiff requests.
VI. Did Defendant Commit Common Law Fraud in Connection with
the Sale or Purchase of a Security?

In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that its debt is nondischargeable
because Defendant committed common law fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(A)(ii). This claim is
without merit because there is no summary judgment evidence to suggest
Defendant has committed common law fraud in connection with the purchase
sale of a security. Plaintiff relies on the previous state court summary
judgement order in Bell v. Disner to attempt to show a prior finding that

Defendant committed fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
A nearly identical motion for summary judgement involving the same Ponzi
scheme and the same Plaintiff was recently litigated in another bankruptcy
court which succinctly dismissed this argument. National Judgment Recovery

Inc. v. Simons, Adv. No. 21-4027, 2021 WL 5225940 (Bankr. D. Minn. Nov. 9,
2021). As the Simons court put it:
There is nothing in the Summary Judgment Order stating that
Defendant committed a securities violation or that the underlying
fraudulent transfers were in connection with the purchase or sale of
any securities. The Summary Judgment Order is an order on a
fraudulent transfer action. If it concerned a securities violation, the
transactions would have been voidable in their entirety. Defendant
and other Net Winner Class members would have been required to
return all the funds they derived from the Ponzi scheme, not just
net winnings. The Final Judgment is for Defendant’s net winnings,
not for the full amount he received from the Ponzi scheme. The
Summary Judgment Order and Final Judgment are based on
fraudulent transfers under the NCUFTA and do not indicate that
the transfers involved a security or were in connection with the
buying or selling of securities.

National Judgment Recovery Inc. v. Simons, Adv. No. 21-4027, 2021 WL
5225940, at *8 (Bankr. D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2021) (emphasis added). Notably,
this is not the only bankruptcy court that has dealt with this exact claim
brought by this exact Plaintiff. All similar decisions this Court reviewed
reach the same conclusion that there was no finding in Bell v. Disner that
the individuals in the Net Winner Class committed common law fraud nor
that there was a transaction involving the purchase or sale of a security.
In re Holtz, Adv. No. 20-01043, 2021 WL 5596413, at *4-5 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio Nov. 17, 2021); In re Geredine, 632 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2021)(“To date, no court has found or concluded that [d]efendant herself
committed any securities law violation or any securities fraud. The court
in the Disner case did not make any such findings or conclusions.”)

Neither does this Court see any such findings or conclusions in Bell v.
Disner to warrant summary judgment for Plaintiff against Defendant
under § 523(a)(19)(ii).
VII. Is Defendant’s Debt Nondischargeable
Pursuant to 11 § U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A)?

11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge debts obtained by “false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement
respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition.” 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(A). Plaintiff’s Motion seeks summary judgment under the actual fraud
component of § 523(a)(2)(A) against Defendant. Plaintiff’s argument can be
summarized as the idea that Defendant committed actual fraud by being the
recipient of fraudulent transfers from the ZeekRewards scheme.

The Fifth Circuit has stated that actual fraud may be proven by showing
that: (1) the debtor made a representation; (2) the debtor knew that the
representation was false at the time it was made; (3) the debtor made the
representation with the intent and purpose to deceive the creditor; (4) the

creditor relied on the representation; and (5) the creditor sustained a loss as the
proximate result of its reliance on the representation. Selenberg v. Bates (Matter
of Selenberg), 856 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2017). This is different than what is
usually required to show a fraudulent transfer. “Equally important, the
common law also indicates that fraudulent conveyances, although a ‘fraud,’ do
not require a misrepresentation from a debtor to a creditor.” Husky Intern.

Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U.S. 356, 361 (2016). Despite these elements of
actual fraud, the Supreme Court has ruled that “[t]he term ‘actual fraud’ in §
523(a)(2)(A) encompasses forms of fraud, like fraudulent conveyance schemes,
that can be effected without a false representation.” Id. at 359. Though it
declined to adopt a definition of actual fraud for all times and circumstances, the

Supreme Court did state that “‘Actual fraud’ has two parts: actual and fraud.”
Id. at 360. There is no real dispute that the transfers made to Defendant from
the ZeekRewards scheme were fraudulent transfers encompassed within the
term “actual fraud” as described in Husky. What is disputed is whether that
fraud was “actual” on the part of Defendant.

For the fraud to be actual, Plaintiff must make a showing of wrongful
intent on the part of the Defendant. Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court
described this idea as follows:

The word “actual” has a simple meaning in the context of common-
law fraud: It denotes any fraud that “involv[es] moral turpitude or
intentional wrong.” Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709, 24 L.Ed. 586
(1878). “Actual” fraud stands in contrast to “implied” fraud or fraud
“in law,” which describe acts of deception that “may exist without
the imputation of bad faith or immorality.” Ibid. Thus, anything
that counts as “fraud” and is done with wrongful intent is “actual
fraud.”

Id. This intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Caspers v. Van
Horne (In re Van Horne), 823 F.2d 1285, 1287–88 (8th Cir. 1987) (abrogated on
other grounds). Reckless indifference to the truth can in some situations
constitute a sufficient showing of wrongful intent. In re Miller, 39 F.3d 301, 305

(11th Cir.1994); Norris v. First Nat'l Bank in Luling (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27,
30 fn. 12 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that reckless disregard for the truth combined
with the sheer magnitude of the resultant misrepresentation may combine to
create an inference of intent to deceive under § 523(a)(2)(B)); see also Farmers &
Merchants State Bank v. Perry (In re Perry), 448 B.R. 219, 226 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio

2011) (“‘[W]illful blindness’ does not provide a defense to an action brought
under § 523(a)(2)(A) and may instead be used as a factor indicative of fraud.”).
Plaintiff attempts to prove Defendant’s wrongful intent by pointing to a
variety of circumstantial evidence. First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant made
no inquiries into ZeekReward’s financial statements and this inaction is

indicative of her turning a blind eye to its true nature.39 Plaintiff also points to
the fact that Defendant’s received a substantial return on her investment, and
argues Defendant must have realized the scheme’s fraudulent nature in light of
its high return rate.40 Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant actively recruited
others to join the scheme using a script created by ZeekRewards.41

Plaintiff also attempts to use the Ponzi scheme presumption to infer the
wrongful intent of Defendant.42 The Ponzi scheme presumption allows courts to

39 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 23-24.
40 Id. at 24.
41 Pl. Reply Br., ECF No. 21 at 8.
42 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 25.
presume the existence of intent to defraud when transfers are made in
furtherance of a Ponzi scheme. This presumption has been upheld by numerous

federal courts and is well settled law. Janvey v. Brown, 767 F.3d 430 (5th Cir.
2014); Wing v. Dockstader, 482 Fed. Appx. 361, 363 (10th Cir. 2012). However,
the Ponzi scheme presumption applies only to the intent of the Ponzi scheme
perpetrators, not to the intent of victims lured into the scheme. See, e.g., Wiand
v. Lee, 753 F.3d 1194, 1201 (11th Cir. 2014); In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525 F.3d

700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008); S.E.C. v. Resource Dev. Int’l, LLC, 487 F.3d 295, 301
(5th Cir. 2007); In re Petters Co., Inc., 495 B.R. 887, 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2013);
In re Polaroid Corp., 472 B.R. 22, 40-41 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012); In re Dreier
LLP, 452 B.R. 391, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). For the presumption to apply
Plaintiff must prove Defendant was one of the perpetrators of the ZeekRewards

scheme. Plaintiff attempts to make this showing by repeating the same
circumstances used to attempt to show intent. Plaintiff argues that because of
Defendant’s disproportionate profit, Defendant “knew – or at the very least,
should have known, that she was committing a fraudulent act by her active
participation in the ZeekRewards scheme.”43 Plaintiff also reiterates its claim

that Defendant was obligated to recruit others to the scheme using a script
created by ZeekRewards.44

43 Id..
44 Id. at 26-27.
Defendant strenuously denies that she was willfully ignorant of the true
fraudulent nature of the scheme, and claims she had no knowledge of its

nefarious nature.45 She argues instead she never reviewed the scheme’s
financial documents because she had no experience or ability to evaluate such
statements.46 Moreover, Defendant reasonably points out that she should not be
considered one of the perpetrators of the ZeekRewards scheme because the SEC
itself stated that “Qualified Affiliates [had] no role in ZeekReward’s

operations”47 and that “unbeknownst to its investors, ZeekRewards [was], in
reality, a massive Ponzi scheme.” Id.
What the Court is left with are two opposed factual interpretations
regarding the intent of Defendant. Movant’s burden under the summary

judgement standard has not been met. There exist genuine issues of material
fact whether Defendant possessed the intent necessary to commit actual fraud,
and whether Defendant was a perpetrator of the ZeekRewards scheme such that
the Ponzi scheme presumption might be applied against her. Consequently, this
issue is inappropriate for summary judgement.

45 Def. Obj., ECF No. 20 at 3.
46 Id. at 4.
47 Defendant was one such “qualified affiliate.” Id.
VIII. Constructive Trust
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that debt owed to it by Defendant is the subject of

a constructive trust imposed in the original state court case.48 However, the
Court will not consider this argument because Plaintiff failed to include this
claim in their complaint.49 A party is not allowed to raise a claim in a summary
judgment which was not pled in the operative complaint. See Cutrera v. Board of
Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (claim raised for

first time in the context of a summary judgment motion is “not properly before
the court”); Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1345 fn. 2 (10th Cir.1997)
(holding that the court will not consider claims first raised in a motion for
summary judgment and not contained in the complaint); Charles v. Rice, 28 F.3d
1312, 1319 (1st Cir.1994) (affirming a district court's refusal to adjudicate an

equal protection claim that plaintiff failed to assert in his complaint); FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(a) (stating that “[a] party claiming relief may move . . . for summary
judgment on all or part of the claim” (emphasis added)). The timeframe for
Plaintiff to amend their complaint as a matter of right has long since passed.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend its complaint to include

this claim regarding the existence of a constructive trust. Consequently, the
Court will not consider this issue.

48 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 28.
49 See generally Pl. Compl., ECF No. 1.
IX. Issues Precluded from Re-Litigation
For the previously mentioned reasons, Plaintiff’s requested judgement in

its favor as a matter of law must be denied. Nevertheless, certain facts have
been established. The following facts are relevant to the issues before the Court
and have been established in this proceeding under the guidelines of Local
district Court Rule CV-56, as incorporated by Local Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7056(d).50 These facts will not be re-litigated at the trial for this

adversary proceeding.

50 Local District Court Rule CV-56 directs a movant to include a Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts and to support such a statement with “appropriate citations to proper
summary judgment evidence.” It directs a respondent that any response “should be
supported by appropriate citations to proper summary judgment evidence.” With regard to
the disposition of the motion, the rule states:

(c) Ruling. In resolving the motion for summary judgment, the court will assume
that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party
are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are
controverted in the response filed in opposition to the motion, as supported by
proper summary judgment evidence. The court will not scour the record in an
attempt to unearth an undesignated genuine issue of material fact.

Thus, any failure by a respondent to controvert the material facts set forth in any of the
motions or to support such a challenge by references to proper summary judgment
evidence, results in the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the
movant “admitted to exist without controversy.” E.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV–56(c).
1. On November 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint to determine the
dischargeability of a debt owed to it by the Defendant pursuant to 11

U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(19) and 523(a)(2)(A).51
2. On December 28, 2020, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff’s
complaint.52
3. On August 17, 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed Case
3:12-cv-519, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Rex Venture Group,

LLC d/b/a ZeekRewards.com and Paul Burks, in the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte
Division.53
4. On August 17, 2012, the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division in Case 3:12-cv-519,

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Rex Venture Group, LLC d/b/a
ZeekRewards.com and Paul Burks, appointed Kenneth D. Bell as Receiver
of over the assets and estate of ZeekRewards.54
5. Defendant invested a total of $1,570.65 into ZeekRewards.55
6. Defendant received in return a total of $32,752.04 from her participation

in ZeekRewards.56

51 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 4.
52 Id.
53 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at exhibit D.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 6.
56 Id.
7. Defendant was a net winner from the ZeekRewards scheme. 57
8. The relief requested in the complaint arises out of a final judgment

entered against the Defendant on August 14, 2017, in Case 3:14-cv-91,
Bell v. Disner, et. al., in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division (the “Receiver Class
Action”).58
9. The final judgment against Defendant in the Receiver Class Action was

for “Net Winnings” of $31,181.39 and Pre-Judgment Interest of
$10,693.68, for a total final judgment amount of $41,875.07.59 Pursuant to
the terms of the final judgment, post-judgment interest accrues at the rate
specified under 28 U.S.C. 1961 from the date of entry until the judgment
is paid in full.60

10. The causes of action asserted by the receiver against Defendant in the
Receiver Class Action were for violations of the North Carolina Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, for Common Law Fraudulent Transfer, and for
imposition of a constructive trust.61
11. The November 29, 2016, order granting motion for summary judgment in

the Receiver Class Action found that ZeekRewards operated as a Ponzi

57 Id.
58 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at 5.
59 Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19 at exhibit D.
60 Id.
61 Id.
scheme and that transfers to net winners occurred because of the
fraudulent scheme.62

12. Defendant did not review financial statements (balance sheet, profit and
loss statement, income statement, statement of cash flows) nor state or
federal income tax returns of ZeekRewards prior to making her
investment in the ZeekRewards scheme.63
13. The November 29, 2016, order granting motion for summary judgment in

the Receiver Class Action found that defendants, including the Defendant
in this adversary, “did not provide ‘reasonably equivalent value’ for their
[net] winnings.64
14. The November 29, 2016, order granting motion for summary judgment in
the Receiver Class Action granted summary judgment in favor of the

receiver on his cause of action for violations of the North Carolina Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 65
15. The November 29, 2016, order granting motion for summary judgment in
the Receiver Class Action granted summary judgment in favor of the
receiver on his cause of action for a constructive trust. 66 Specifically that

Court stated that:

62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 6-7.
65 Id. at 25.
66 Id. at 27.
“Imposing a constructive trust under the circumstances herein
furthers the Receiver’s ability to recover the assets of the
ZeekRewards Ponzi scheme and distribute them to the net losers,
thus making the victims as whole as possible. Accordingly,
summary judgment in favor of the Receiver is appropriate.” 67

16. The November 29, 2016, order granting motion for summary judgment in
the Receiver Class Action did not grant summary judgment in favor of the
receiver on his cause of action for a common law fraudulent transfer.68
Specifically that Court stated that:
“Likewise, the Court finds it unnecessary to analyze the Receiver’s
alternative claim for common law fraudulent transfer.”69

X. Conclusion
Based upon the Court’s consideration of the pleadings, the summary
judgment evidence submitted therewith, the relevant legal authorities, and for
the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that the “Motion for Summary
Judgement” filed by Plaintiff, Nationwide Judgement Recovery Inc., is hereby
DENIED. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate it was entitled to a judgement as a
matter of law regarding the dischargeability issues raised under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(19) and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Therefore, these claims must be
determined through a trial on the merits.

67 Id.
68 Id. at 25.
69 Id. at fn. 6.
However, numerous facts have been established through the summary
judgment evidence tendered to the Court. Because the Court has not granted
the relief sought by the Plaintiff's “Motion for Summary Judgment,” it is
appropriate to state the material facts that are not genuinely in dispute
pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 56(g). These established facts as set forth in this
memorandum shall not be re-litigated at the trial for this adversary proceeding.
An appropriate order consistent with this opinion shall be entered by the Court.

Signed on 09/27/2022

THE HONORABLE JOSHUA P. SEARCY
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

27

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10462267. Public record. Not legal advice.