# Ditech Holding Corporation

> United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York · May 28, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10460729

## Case

- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 28, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10460729

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that filings and orders in other courts “are undisputably matters of public record”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------x
In re: :
Case No. 19-10412 (JLG)
:
Chapter 11
Ditech Holding Corporation, et al., :

:
(Jointly Administered)
Debtors.1 :
--------------------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER SUSTAINING THE SIXTY-THIRD AND
FIFTIETH OMNIBUS OBJECTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIMS OF
ROY J. DIXON JR. (CLAIM NOS. 2896 AND 2906) AND DENYING THE VARIOUS
RELATED MOTIONS FILED BY ROY J. DIXON JR.

A P P E A R A N C E S :

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
Attorneys for the Plan Administrator
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153
By: Ray C. Schrock, P.C.
Richard W. Slack, Esq.
Sunny Singh, Esq.
Natasha S. Hwangpo, Esq.
David F. Hill, IV, Esq.

JENNER & BLOCK LLP
Attorneys for the Consumer Representative
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
By: Richard Levin, Esq.

Mr. Roy J. Dixon Jr.
Appearing Pro Se
6394 Emerald Dunes Drive, Unit 201
West Palm Beach, FL 33411

1 The confirmation of the Debtors’ Third Amended Plan (as defined below) created the Wind Down Estates. The
Wind Down Estates, along with the last four digits of their federal tax identification number, as applicable, are
Ditech Holding Corporation (0486); DF Insurance Agency LLC (6918); Ditech Financial LLC (5868); Green Tree
Credit LLC (5864); Green Tree Credit Solutions LLC (1565); Green Tree Insurance Agency of Nevada, Inc. (7331);
Green Tree Investment Holdings III LLC (1008); Green Tree Servicing Corp. (3552); Marix Servicing LLC (6101);
Walter Management Holding Company LLC (9818); and Walter Reverse Acquisition LLC (8837). The Wind Down
Estates’ principal offices are located at 2600 South Shore Blvd., Suite 300, League City, TX 77573.
HON. JAMES L. GARRITY, JR.
U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Introduction2
Roy J. Dixon Jr. (the “Claimant”) filed Proof of Claim No. 2896 (“First Dixon Claim”)
and Proof of Claim No. 2906 (“Duplicate Dixon Claim”) (together, the “Dixon Claims”) against
Ditech Financial LLC (“Ditech”) in these Chapter 11 Cases. Both claims are filed as unsecured
claims in the sum of $303,500 and seek damages occasioned by the foreclosure sale of certain
real property. Both were filed after the Bar Date lapsed.
The matters before the Court are the objections to the Dixon Claims filed by the Plan
Administrator on behalf of Ditech Holding Corporation (f/k/a Walter Investment Management

Corp.) and its debtor affiliates (excluding Reorganized RMS) (collectively, the “Wind Down
Estates”) and the Consumer Representative (the “Objections”).3 The Claimant is proceeding pro
se. He filed a response in opposition to the Objections (the “Response”),4 as well as the
following documents: (i) the Evidentiary Hearing Motion;5 (ii) the Evidentiary Hearing
Scheduling Motion;6 (iii) the Claim Amendment Motion;7 and (iv) the Duplicate Claim

2 Capitalized terms that are not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed in the Objections and the Third
Amended Plan.

3 See Sixty-Third Omnibus Objection to Proofs of Claim (No Basis Consumer Creditor Claims) [ECF No. 2840]
(filed om behalf of the Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative) (the “Sixty-Third Omnibus Objection”);
Fiftieth Omnibus Objection to Proofs of Claim (Duplicate or Amended Unsecured Consumer Creditor Claims) (ECF
No. 3737) (filed on behalf of the Consumer Representative) (the “Fiftieth Omnibus Objection” and together with the
Sixty-Third Omnibus Objection, the “Objections”). References to “ECF No. ” herein are to documents filed in
the electronic docket in these jointly administered cases under Case No. 19-10412 (the “Chapter 11 Cases”).

4 Opposition Response to Consumer Claims Trustee Objection to Proof of Claim [ECF No. 2936].

5 FRCP Rule 60(b)(6) Motion Requesting Evidentiary Hearing Memorandum of Law in Support [ECF No. 3563].

6 Motion Requesting the Court to Schedule a Specially Set Evidentiary Hearing on the Claimant’s Motion
Requesting an Evidentiary Hearing on Claimant’s Proof of Claim [ECF No. 3985].

7 Motion Requesting Leave to File an Amended Proof of Claim [ECF No. 3810].
Response.8 The Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative filed a joint reply to the
Response, and in further support of the Objections (the “Reply”).9 The Claimant filed a Sur-
Reply in further support of the Dixon Claims.10
The Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative contend that the Court should
disallow and expunge the Dixon Claims because they are time barred since they were filed after

the Bar Date lapsed, and, in any event because the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claims
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the claims are barred by res judicata. To address the
Objections, pursuant to the Claims Procedures Order,11 the Court conducted a Sufficiency
Hearing on the Dixon Claims. The legal standard of review at a Sufficiency Hearing is
equivalent to the standard applied to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule
12(b)(6)”).12 See Claims Procedures Order ¶ 3(iv)(a).

8 Response to the Wind Down Estates Consumer Claim Trustee’s Fiftieth Omnibus Objection to Proofs of Claim
[ECF No. 3811].

9 Joint Reply of Plan Administrator and Consumer Claim’s Trustee in Support of the Sixty-Third and Fiftieth
Omnibus Objections with Respect to Claims of Roy J. Dixon (Claim Nos. 2896 and 2906) and in Opposition to (I)
the Motion Requesting Leave to File an Amended Proof of Claim (ECF No. 3810); (II) The Motion Requesting
Evidentiary Hearing Memorandum of Law in Support (ECF No. 3563); and (III) the Motion Requesting the Court to
Schedule a Specially Set Evidentiary Hearing on the Claimant’s Motion Requesting the Court to Schedule a
Specially Set Evidentiary Hearing on the Claimant’s Motion Requesting an Evidentiary Hearing on Plaintiff’s Proof
of Claim (ECF No. 3985) [ECF No. 3994].

10 Claimant Roy Joe Dixon Jr. Reply to Joint Reply of Plan Administrator and Consumer Claims Trustee in
Support of the Sixty-Third and Fiftieth Omnibus Objections With Respect to Claims of Roy J. Dixon (Claim Nos.
2896 And 2906) And in Opposition to (I) The Motion Requesting Leave to File an Amended Proof of Claim (ECF
No. 3810); (II) The Motion Requesting Evidentiary Hearing Memorandum of Law in Support (ECF No. 3563); And
(III) The Motion Requesting The Court to Schedule a Specially Set Evidentiary Hearing on the Claimant’s Motion
Requesting an Evidentiary Hearing on Plaintiff’s Proof of Claims (ECF No. 3985) With Memorandum of Law [ECF
No. 4006].

11 See Order Approving (I) Claim Objection Procedures and (II) Claim Hearing Procedures [ECF No. 1632].

12 Rule 12(b)(6) is incorporated herein by Rule 7012 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the
“Bankruptcy Rules”).
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court sustains the Objections and expunges the
Dixon Claims.13 The Court also denies the Claim Amendment Motion, the Evidentiary Hearing
Scheduling Motion, and the Evidentiary Hearing Motion.
Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction to consider this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334

and the Amended Standing Order of Reference dated January 31, 2012 (Preska, C.J.). This is a
core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
Background
The Dixon Claims14
Claimant was the owner of real property located at 163 Rivera Court, Royal Palm Beach,
Florida 33411 (the “Property”). Response ¶ 1.15 On January 25, 2007, Claimant executed a note
(the “Note”) in favor of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”). See Ex. 1.16 The Note
is secured by a mortgage on the Property (the “Mortgage”), which was recorded on February 2,

13 In support of the Objection, the Plan Administrator and Consumer Representatives also argue that the Claims
should be reclassified as Consumer Creditor Claims because the Claims are not secured by an interest in property of
the Debtors and are they entitled to priority status. Reply ¶¶ 33-42. Given the Court’s determination to expunge the
Claims, the Court does not address the alternative arguments.

14 The Court can properly take judicial notice of the underlying mortgage documents that form the basis for the
Dixon Claims, as well as matters of public record, such as recording documents and court records. See
Memorandum Decision and Order Sustaining the Fifteenth Omnibus Objection (No Basis Consumer Creditor
Claims) With Respect to Claim of Alton W. Obert at 1 (Oct. 3, 2021) [ECF No. 3718] (taking judicial notice of
underlying mortgage documents). See also Sutton ex rel. Rose v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 208 F. App’x 27, 30 (2d
Cir. 2006) (holding that filings and orders in other courts “are undisputably matters of public record”); Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 156, 165-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (taking judicial notice
of property records from a county website); Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Case No. No. 10–CV–4244
(JS)(ARL), 2011 WL 838914, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2011) (holding, in the context of a breach of contract
action arising from a mortgage, that the “Complaint, however, contains limited factual material relating to Plaintiffs’
contractual dispute with Wells Fargo . . . Consequently, the Court largely constructs this section from documents
that it can take judicial notice of, such as the underlying mortgage documents, the state court records, and the related
bankruptcy proceeding).

15 All citations to documents filed by the Claimant, including the Dixon Claims and Response are to the particular
PDF page number of the document.

16 Citations to “Ex. ” are to the exhibits annexed to the Reply.
2007. See Ex. 2. The Mortgage identifies Countrywide as the lender and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for the lender, as the mortgagee. Id. at 1. On April 27,
2009, Countrywide merged into BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, which succeeded to
Countrywide’s interest in the Note. On January 31, 2011, Claimant entered into a modification
agreement with respect to the Mortgage. See Ex. 3. On June 1, 2013, Green Tree Servicing LLC

(which became Ditech in August 2015) began servicing the Mortgage.
The Florida State Court Foreclosure Action
As of October 2014, the Claimant was in default under the Mortgage as he had failed to
make required monthly payments. On October 28, 2014, Ditech initiated a foreclosure action
titled Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Roy J. Dixon, Case No. 2014CA013158 (the “Florida State
Court Foreclosure Action”) by filing a complaint (the “Complaint”) against the Claimant in the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court in Palm Beach County, Florida (the “Florida State Trial Court”).
See Ex. 4. On August 24, 2015, Claimant, acting pro se, filed his answer to the Complaint. See
Ex. 5. In it he alleged, among other things, that Ditech lacked standing to foreclose on the

Property because it failed to provide required notices of default and acceleration, failed to
comply with foreclosure prevention requirements, and violated the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act. See id. The answer also raised a number of other alleged legal deficiencies and
affirmative defenses. See id. at 2-4.
On April 18, 2016, the Florida State Trial Court entered a final judgment of foreclosure
in favor of Ditech. See Ex. 6. On December 20, 2018, the court vacated the judgment because, at
the time it was entered, there were pending interlocutory appeals. See Ex. 7, Order Granting in
Part Defendants’ 1.540(b) Motions to Vacate. On September 27, 2019, after Claimant’s appeals
were dismissed, the Florida State Trial Court entered a final judgment of foreclosure (the “Final
Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment”) in favor of Ditech, setting the sale date for
November 4, 2019. See Ex. 8.
On November 4, 2019, the Property was publicly auctioned (the “Foreclosure Sale”) and
sold for $303,500. See Ex. 9, Foreclosure Certificate of Sale. On April 27, 2021, the Florida
State Trial Court entered its Notice and Order Closing Reopened Case. See Ex. 10.

The Florida State Appellate Court Action
Claimant, acting pro se, filed two appeals of the Final Florida State Court Foreclosure
Judgment to the Florida District Court of Appeal (the “Florida State Appellate Court”); the first
(Case No. 4D19-3246) on October 21, 2019, and the second (Case No. 4D19-3768) on
November 18, 2019. See Ex. 11, Appellate Docket for Case No. 4D19-3246; Ex. 12, Appellate
Docket for Case No. 4D19-3768. On December 10, 2019, the appeals were consolidated into
case No. 4D19-3768. See Ex. 11, Appellate Docket for Case No. 4D19-3246 at 8.
On April 30, 2020, the Florida State Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the Florida
State Trial Court per curiam. See Ex. 13, April 30, 2020 Order. On June 5, 2020, Claimant’s

motion for rehearing was denied. See Ex. 11 at 2. On June 24, 2020, Claimant appealed the
Florida State Appellate Court’s order denying rehearing to the Florida State Supreme Court. See
Ex. 14, Appellants’ Notice of Apeal [sic] to the Florida Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari.
On June 29, 2020, the Florida State Supreme Court dismissed Claimant’s appeal. See Ex. 15,
June 29, 2020 Florida State Supreme Court Order.
The Florida Bankruptcy Court Action
On May 6, 2016, during the pendency of the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action,
Claimant, represented by counsel, filed for bankruptcy (Case No. 16-16588) (the “Dixon
Bankruptcy Case”) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida
(the “Florida Bankruptcy Court”). See Ex. 16, Dixon Bankruptcy Case Docket at 1. On
September 26, 2016, Ditech filed a proof of claim in the Dixon Bankruptcy Case seeking
$308,701.81, the amount then due on the Mortgage. See Ex. 17, Proof of Claim No. 7 filed in the
Dixon Bankruptcy Case (the “Ditech Proof of Claim”).
On October 14, 2016, the Claimant objected to the Ditech Proof of Claim. The Claimant

sought to reduce the amount claimed to $24,000 or less, arguing that Ditech had miscalculated
pre-default escrow payments and that correcting these errors would result in a reduced claim. See
Ex. 18, Objection to Claim on Shortened Notice. On March 17, 2017, Claimant amended his
objection, arguing that Ditech lacked standing to foreclose on the Property because Ditech was
not the servicer on the Note and Claimant was not in default. See Ex. 19, Amended Objection to
Claim. On April 13, 2017, the Florida Bankruptcy Court overruled Claimant’s objection and
allowed the Ditech Proof of Claim. See Ex. 20.
On December 7, 2016, while Ditech and Claimant were litigating the merits of the Ditech
Proof of Claim, Claimant filed an adversary proceeding in the Florida Bankruptcy Court styled

as a class action lawsuit, against Ditech. See Ex. 21, Verified Class Action Adversary Complaint
(Case No. 16-01660) (the “First Bankruptcy Complaint”). In support of the First Bankruptcy
Complaint, the Claimant alleged that Ditech lacked standing in the Florida State Court
Foreclosure Action to foreclose on the Property and had engaged in a fraudulent scheme during
that action to conceal this scheme from the Florida State Trial Court. Id. at 23-39. On January 1,
2017, the Florida Bankruptcy Court granted Claimant’s motion to dismiss the First Bankruptcy
Complaint. See Ex. 22.
On January 17, 2017, Claimant filed a second adversary proceeding (Case No. 17-01019)
(the “Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding”) against Ditech in the Florida Bankruptcy
Court. See Ex. 23, Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding Docket at 1. On January 31, 2017,
Claimant filed an Amended Verified Adversary Complaint (the “Second Bankruptcy
Complaint”). In it he sought to expunge the Ditech Proof of Claim, and to obtain monetary relief
in the form of damages equal to all the money that he paid to Ditech while it serviced the loan,
and declaratory relief that Ditech lacked standing to bring the Florida State Court Foreclosure

Action and had engaged in various fraudulent acts to conceal this fact. See Ex. 24 at 17-28. On
February 7, 2017, Ditech filed a motion to dismiss the Second Bankruptcy Complaint. In support
of the motion, Ditech asserted that the Second Bankruptcy Complaint was meritless, including
that the action was an impermissible collateral attack on a pending state action, and was barred
by application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Ex. 25 at 7-13. On April 13, 2017, the
Florida Bankruptcy Court granted the motion and dismissed the Second Bankruptcy Complaint.
See Ex. 26. On April 13, 2017, the Florida Bankruptcy Court entered final judgment in the
Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding in favor of Ditech dismissing the Second Bankruptcy
Complaint. See Ex. 27, Final Judgment (the “Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding Final

Judgment”).
The Florida Federal Court Action
On January 8, 2019, while the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action was pending,
Claimant filed suit against Ditech in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida (the “Florida Federal Court”) (Case No. 9:19-cv-80022) (the “Florida Federal Court
Action”), based on allegations that Ditech, through the use of allegedly forged documents
submitted during the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action, had violated the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, and committed mortgage fraud. See Ex. 28, Federal Action Complaint ¶¶ 13-25,
34, 39. Over the next year and a half, the Claimant made numerous amendments to his complaint
and filed a number of motions, and added Bank of America, N.A. as a defendant to the action.
See Ex. 29.
On February 11, 2019 (the “Petition Date”) Ditech and certain of its affiliates (“Debtors”)
filed petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in this Court. On March 8,
2019, Ditech notified the Florida Federal Court that it had filed for bankruptcy and was subject

to the automatic stay. Id. at 17. On March 21, 2019, the Florida Federal Court entered its Order
on Suggestion of Bankruptcy staying the Florida Federal Court Action as to Ditech. See Ex. 30.
The Claimant sought leave to amend the Federal Action Complaint to join three defendants:
Federal Housing Finance Agency, as Conservator of the Federal National Mortgage Association,
the law firm of Roberson, Anschutz & Schneid PL, and Erik T. Samsing in his individual
capacity and to add five new claims.
On July 3, 2019, the Florida Federal Court issued its Order and Opinion on Third Motion
to Amend. See Ex. 31. In it the court noted that on March 8, 2019, Ditech had notified the court
that it had filed for bankruptcy in this Court and that because Claimant sought damages against

Ditech, the Claimant’s complaint was in violation of the automatic stay. Id. at 6-7. The court
found that, “[a]ny actual complaint subsequently filed that seeks monetary damages against
Ditech would violate this Court’s Stay Order and the automatic stay in Ditech’s Chapter 11
bankruptcy case, and is void and without legal effect.” Id. at 7. In response, on July 19, 2019,
Claimant filed his Verified Second Amended Complaint, which dropped Ditech as a defendant
and named only Bank of America, N.A., as a defendant. See Ex. 32.
On March 6, 2020, the Florida Federal Court issued its Final Order Dismissing Case the
verified Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, and directing the clerk of court to close the
matter. See Ex. 33.
The Florida Federal Court Appeal
On April 6, 2020, Claimant appealed the Final Order Dismissing Case to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Ex. 34, Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal. On June 28, 2021, the circuit
court issued its per curiam order and opinion affirming the Final Order Dismissing Case, and
dismissing the Federal Action. See Ex. 35.

The Chapter 11 Cases
As of the Petition Date, the Debtors remained in possession and control of their business
and assets as debtors in possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy
Code. On February 22, 2019, the Court entered an order fixing April 1, 2019 at 5:00 p.m.
(prevailing Eastern Time) as the deadline for each person or entity, not including governmental
units (as defined in section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code) to file a proof of claim in the
Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases (the “General Bar Date”).17 Thereafter, the Court extended the bar
date to April 30, 2019 (the “Extended General Bar Date”) and then further extended the General
Bar Date solely for consumer creditors to June 3, 2019 at 5:00 p.m. (prevailing Eastern Time)
(the “Bar Date”).18

On September 26, 2019, the Debtors confirmed their Third Amended Plan, and on
September 30, 2019, that plan became effective.19 The Plan Administrator is a fiduciary
appointed under the Third Amended Plan who is charged with the duty of winding down,

17 Order Establishing Deadline for Filing Proofs of Claim and Approving the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof
[ECF No. 90].

18 Order Further Extending General Bar Date for Filing Proofs of Claim for Consumer Borrowers Nunc Pro Tunc
[ECF No. 496].

19 Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Ditech Holding Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors [ECF No.
1326] (the “Third Amended Plan”); Order Confirming Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Ditech Holding
Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors [ECF No. 1404]. Notice of (I) Entry of Order Confirming Third Amended
Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Ditech Holding Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors, (II) Occurrence of Effective Date,
and (III) Final Deadline for Filing Administrative Expense Claims [ECF No. 1449].
dissolving and liquidating the Wind Down Estates. See Third Amended Plan, Art. I, ¶¶ 1.130,
1.184, 1.186. The Consumer Representative is a fiduciary appointed under the Third Amended
Plan who is responsible for the reconciliation and resolution of Consumer Creditor Claims and
distribution of funds to holders of Allowed Consumer Creditor Claims in accordance with the
Third Amended Plan. Id., Art. I, ¶ 1.41. Under the plan, the Plan Administrator, on behalf of

each of the Wind Down Estates, is authorized to object to all Administrative Expense Claims,
Priority Tax Claims, Priority Non-Tax Claims, and Intercompany Claims; and the Consumer
Representative has the exclusive authority to object to all Consumer Creditor Claims. See id.,
Art. VII, ¶ 7.1.
The Proofs of Claim, Objections and Responses
On July 16, 2020, Claimant filed the First Dixon Claim seeking $303,500 based on the
Property’s sale price in the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action. See First Dixon Claim at 1.
That claim:
Acknowledges that it was filed after the Bar Date;

Acknowledges that it is not a secured claim, but lists real estate as a basis for
asserting secured status;

Asserts that it is entitled to priority status under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) in the amount
of $303,500, but does not specify which subsection of the statute provides priority
status;

Asserts that Claimant was damaged by Ditech’s Foreclosure Sale of the Property
because Ditech did not own the Note; and

Demands that Ditech turn over the proceeds from the Foreclosure Sale ($303,500)
on the grounds that Ditech’s counsel committed civil theft.

Id. at 2-6. The Claimant annexed miscellaneous documents in support of the First Dixon Claim.
On September 18, 2020, the Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative filed the
Sixty-Third Omnibus Objection, which lists the First Dixon Claim among the claims subject to
the objection. The Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative object to that claim on the
grounds that it is invalid and was filed after the Bar Date lapsed. On October 15, 2020, Claimant
filed the Response. In it, he alleges that Ditech, by virtue of its bankruptcy filing, is a non-
existent entity and committed civil theft by obtaining the proceeds of the Foreclosure Sale. See
Response at 7-9. He also challenges Ditech’s standing to bring the Florida State Court

Foreclosure Action by alleging that various assignments and other documents and statements
submitted to the Florida State Trial Court were fraudulent. The Claimant also contends that the
state court judge “participated” in Ditech’s alleged fraud. Id.
On October 16, 2020, Claimant filed the Duplicate Dixon Claim seeking $303,500. That
claim:
Acknowledges that it was filed after the Bar Date;

Lists “real estate” as a basis for asserting secured status – although it
acknowledges that it is not a secured claim;

Does not assert that it is entitled to priority status under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a);

Asserts that Claimant was damaged by Ditech’s Foreclosure Sale because he “has
been paying the wrong party for 15 years and has been robbed of his home; and
Demands that the Court allow the Dixon Claims and set an evidentiary hearing on
the claims.” The Claimant annexed the Response and all exhibits thereto to the
First Dixon Claim as exhibits to the claim.

Like the First Dixon Claim, the Duplicate Dixon Claim asserts that it is based on various
other causes of action, including fraud and civil theft arising from Ditech’s servicing of the loan
and the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action. See Duplicate Dixon Claim at 4; Duplicate
Claim Response at 1, 9-12. As such, the Duplicate Dixon Claim is functionally identical to the
First Dixon Claim, except it attaches the Response and all exhibits thereto in place of the
attachments to the First Dixon Claim.
On July 21, 2021, Claimant filed the Evidentiary Hearing Motion. In it, he requests that
this Court set an evidentiary hearing on the First Dixon Claim, pursuant Rule 60(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Evidentiary Hearing Motion at 1.
On October 18, 2021, the Consumer Representative filed the Fiftieth Omnibus Objection,
which lists the Duplicate Dixon Claim among the claims subject to the objection. See Fiftieth

Omnibus Objection ¶ 12.
On November 16, 2021, Claimant filed his Duplicate Claim Response. In it, he asserts
that the Duplicate Dixon Claim is not a duplicate of the First Dixon Claim, but nonetheless states
that, as with the First Dixon Claim, this proof of claim is based on allegations of fraud, civil
theft, and various other causes of action arising from Ditech’s servicing of the loan and the
subsequent Florida State Court Foreclosure Action. See Duplicate Claim Response at 1.
On December 13, 2021, Claimant filed his Claim Amendment Motion. In it, he requests
that this Court allow him to file an amended proof of claim which would list “other claims
against Ditech Financial LLC that were stayed in the Federal District Court For the Southern

District of Florida under Case No. 19-cv-80022.” See Claim Amendment Motion at 1.
On April 8, 2022, Claimant filed his Evidentiary Hearing Scheduling Motion, wherein he
requests that this Court set a separate hearing date for the Evidentiary Hearing Motion.
On April 14, 2022, the Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative filed their Reply
in support of the Objections. They say that the Court should disallow and expunge the Dixon
Claims because:
(i) The proofs of claim were filed approximately one year after the Bar Date even
though both Claimant and his bankruptcy counsel were properly served with
notice of the Bar Date, thus the claims are time barred.
(ii) A resolution of Claimant’s proofs of claim on the merits would require this
Court to review and reject the Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment and
this Court lacks jurisdiction to do so under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

(iii) Claimant is a serial litigant whose claims have already been litigated in both
the Florida State Court Foreclosure Acton and the Second Bankruptcy Adversary
Proceeding. As such, the claims here are barred by res judicata.

Reply ¶¶ 38-65. Alternatively, they contend, in any event, that the Court should reclassify
the Dixon Claims from secured claims to consumer creditor claims, which would limit
the amount of recovery on the claims. Id. ¶¶ 66-73.
On April 20, 2022, Claimant filed his Sur-Reply.
Pursuant to the Claims Procedures Order, the Court conducted a Sufficiency
Hearing on the Claims.
Applicable Legal Standards
Under section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, “a claim . . . proof of which is filed under
section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.” 11 U.S.C. §
502(a). The filing of a proof of claim constitutes “prima facie evidence of the validity and
amount of a claim.” Fed. R. Bank. P. 3001(f). If an objection refuting at least one of the claim’s
essential allegations is asserted, the claimant has the burden to demonstrate the validity of the
claim. See, e.g., Rozier v. Rescap Borrower Claims Tr. (In re Residential Capital, LLC), 15 Civ.
3248 (KPF), 2016 WL 796860, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016); Hasson v. Motors Liquidation
Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), No. 09-50026 (REG), 2012 WL 1886755, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 12, 2012); In re Oneida Ltd., 400 B.R. 384, 389 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom.
Peter J. Solomon Co., L.P. v. Oneida, Ltd., No. 09-cv-2229(DC), 2010 WL 234827 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 22, 2010).
Section 502(b) sets forth the grounds for disallowing a properly filed proof of
claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b); see also Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pacific Gas and
Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 449 (2007) (“But even where a party in interest objects [to a claim], the
court ‘shall allow’ the claim ‘except to the extent that’ the claim implicates any of the nine
exceptions enumerated in § 502(b)”).

In filing the Objections to the Dixon Claims, the Plan Administrator and Consumer
Representative initiated a contested matter. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 advisory committee’s
note (“[t]he contested matter initiated by an objection to a claim is governed by Rule 9014 . . .”).
See also In re Tender Loving Care Health Servs., Inc., 562 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating
that “when a debtor files an objection to a claim, the objection has initiated a contested matter”).
Bankruptcy Rule 9014 governs contested matters. The rule does not explicitly provide for the
application of Bankruptcy Rule 7012. However, Bankruptcy Rule 9014 provides that a
bankruptcy court “may at any stage in a particular matter direct that one or more of the other
Rules in Part VII shall apply.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014. The Court did so here. Under the Claims

Procedures Order, the legal standard of review the Court applies at a Sufficiency Hearing is
equivalent to the standard applied by the Court under Rule 12(b)(6) on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Claims Procedures Order ¶
3(iv)(a). See also In re 20/20 Sport, Inc., 200 B.R. 972, 978 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“In
bankruptcy cases, courts have traditionally analogized a creditor’s claim to a civil complaint
[and] a trustee’s objection to an answer. . . ”).
In applying Rule 12(b)(6) to the Dixon Claims, the Court assesses the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in support of the claims in light of the pleading requirements under Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.20 Rule 8(a)(2) states that a claim for relief must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To meet that standard, the Dixon Claims “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (“Iqbal”) (citations omitted); accord Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (“Twombly”). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; accord Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. To satisfy Rule
12(b)(6), the “pleadings must create the possibility of a right to relief that is more than
speculative.” Spool v. World Child Int’l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). In considering whether that standard is met for a particular claim, the court
must assume the truth of all material facts alleged in support of the claim and draw all reasonable
inferences in the claimant’s favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98
(2d Cir. 2007). However, the court “need not accord ‘legal conclusions, deductions or opinions

that are couched as factual allegations . . . a presumption of truthfulness.’” Hunt v. Enzo
Biochem, Inc., 530 F.Supp.2d 580, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting In re NYSE Specialists Sec.
Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Discussion
As noted, the Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative contend that the Court
should sustain the Objections and dismiss and expunge the Dixon Claims because: (i) the claims
are time-barred since Claimant filed them after the Bar Date lapsed; (ii) the Court lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (iii) because the

20 Rule 8 is incorporated herein pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7008.
claims are barred by application of the doctrine of res judicata. The Court considers those
matters below.
Late Filed Claims
As relevant to the Dixon Claims, the Bar Date is June 3, 2019. Claimant filed the First
Dixon Claim and the Duplicate Dixon Claim on July 16, 2020, and October 16, 2020,

respectively. As such, Claimant filed both claims more than a year after the Bar Date expired.
Bar dates are “critically important to the administration of a successful chapter 11
case.” In re Musicland Holding Corp., 356 B.R. 603, 607 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). They are not
designed merely as a “a procedural gauntlet” but rather serve “as an integral part of the
reorganization process” and the efficient administration of bankruptcy cases. Fidelity Bank, N.A.
v. Hooker Investments, Inc., 937 F.2d 833, 840 (2d Cir. 1991). The bar date allows “the parties in
interest to ascertain with reasonable promptness the identity of those making claims against the
estate and the general amount of the claims, a necessary step in achieving the goal of successful
reorganization.” Id. (“If individual creditors were permitted to postpone indefinitely the effect of

a bar order ... the institutional means of ensuring the sound administration of the bankruptcy
estate would be undermined.”). Accordingly, bar dates are strictly enforced. See In re Residential
Cap., LLC, Case No. 12-12020 (MG), 2020 WL 1228646, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2020)
(“a strict application of the [bar date] is needed to effectively manage the claims process…”)
(internal quotations omitted); In re AMR Corp., 492 B.R. 660, 663 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The
bar date is strictly enforced.”); In re Keene Corp., 188 B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“The bar date is akin to a statute of limitations, and must be strictly observed.”).
To satisfy due process there must be “notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950). That is to say that “[n]otice need not be perfect but reasonable based on the
circumstances.” Francis v. Eaton (In re Eaton), 327 B.R. 79, 82–83 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2005)
(citations omitted). An important factor in assessing the adequacy of notice provided by a debtor
to a creditor in a given situation in a bankruptcy case, is whether the creditor to whom the notice

is directed is known or unknown. In re Queen Elizabeth Realty Corp., No. 13-12335 (SMB),
2017 WL 1102865, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2017) (“The nature of the notice [called for
under the Bankruptcy Code] depends on whether the creditor is known or unknown.”) aff'd, 586
B.R. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Avaya Inc., Case No. 17-10089 (SMB), 2018 WL 4381524 at *
3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2018) (same). While actual notice is required if the creditor is a
‘known’ creditor, constructive notice is sufficient where a creditor is ‘unknown.’” DePippo v.
Kmart Corp., 335 B.R. 290, 295–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See also In re BGI, Inc., 476 B.R. 812,
820 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“For unknown creditors, constructive notice, such as notice by
publication, will suffice.”).

The Claimant contends that the Court should excuse his delay in filing the Dixon Claims
because he did not receive timely notice of the Bar Date. First Dixon Claim at 4. The Claimant
was scheduled in these Chapter 11 Cases as a creditor holding an unsecured claim in an unknown
amount which was based in litigation. See Schedules of Assets and Liabilities for Ditech
Financial LLC [ECF No. 290] at 316. Thus, as a known creditor, Claimant was entitled to
receive actual notice of the Bar Date. See In re U.S.H. Corp. of New York, 223 B.R. 654, 658
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)(“[I]f a creditor is known to the debtor, notice by publication is not
constitutionally reasonable, and actual notice of the relevant bar dates must be afforded to the
creditor.”). The record reflects that the Debtors provided the Claimant notice of the Bar Date, as
follows:
On February 25, 2019, the Debtors served notice of the General Bar Date,
together with a sample Proof of Claim form, to the Claimant, by first class mail
directed to the Claimant at the Property–163 Rivera Court, Royal Palm Beach,
FL 33411.21 The Debtors mailed four envelopes containing notice of the General
Bar Date orders to the Property addressed to the Claimant, as follows: Blanche
Dixon and Roy J. Dixon Jr.,22 Roy J. Dixon and Blanche Dixon;23 Roy J. Dixon,
Debtor and Roy Joe Dixon, et. al.,24 respectively.

Between March 29, 2019 and April 2, 2019, the Debtors served multiple notices
of the Extended General Bar Date to the Claimant, by first class mail directed to
the Claimant at the Property.25 The Debtors mailed four envelopes to the Property
containing notice of the Extended General Bar Date addressed to the Claimant, as
follows: Blanche Dixon and Roy J. Dixon Jr. Roy Joe and Blanche Dixon; Roy J.
Dixon and Blanche Dixon; Roy J. Dixon, Debtor; Roy Joe Dixon, et. al.26 The
Debtors also sent notice of the Extended General Bar Date to Claimant, though
his counsel in the Florida Bankruptcy Action by first class mail directed to: “Roy
Dixon, 2001 Palm Beach LKS Blvd 410, c/o K. Drake Ozment, West Palm
Beach, FL 33409.”27

On May 8, 2019, the Debtors sent notice of the further extended consumer bar
date to Claimant, through his counsel in the Florida Bankruptcy Action by first
class mail directed to: “Roy Dixon, 2001 Palm Beach LKS Blvd 410, c/o K.
Drake Ozment, West Palm Beach, FL 33409.”28

21 Affidavit of Service of Forrest Kuffer regarding (I) Notice of Deadlines Requiring Filing of Proofs of Claim
and (II) Proof of Claim Form [ECF No. 142] at 162.

22 Id..

23 Id. at 1095.

24 Id.

25 Ex. 36, Affidavit of Service by Tim Conklin, Ex. B – Service List.

26 Id.

27 Id., Ex. K.

28 Ex. 36, Affidavit of Service by Tim Conklin ¶ 7(b) (“by causing true and correct copies to be enclosed securely
in separate postage pre-paid envelopes and delivered via first class mail to: Roy J Dixon, 2001 Palm Beach LKS
Blvd 410, c/o K Drake Ozment, West Palm Beach, FL 33409.”).
“It is well settled that proof that a letter was properly addressed and placed in the mail
system creates a presumption that the letter was received in the usual time by the addressee.” In
re AMR Corp., 492 B.R. at 663. As a matter of law, that presumption cannot be overcome by the
addressee’s mere assertion that he did not receive the mail at issue. Id. at 663-64 (“Federal courts
in New York have held quite uniformly that an affidavit of non-receipt is insufficient to rebut the

presumption of receipt created by proof of mailing.”); In re Trump Taj Mahal Associates, 156
B.R. 928, 939 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993) (“If a party were permitted to defeat the presumption of
receipt of notice resulting from the certificate of mailing by a simple affidavit to the contrary, the
scheme of deadlines and bar dates under the Bankruptcy Code would come unraveled.”). The
Claimant has failed to rebut that presumption. Moreover, the record reflects that (i) Claimant
occupied the Property until November 2019 (Sur-Reply at 7); (ii) on March 8, 2019, the Debtors
filed a Notice of Bankruptcy Filing and Imposition of Automatic Stay in the Federal Action
(Federal Action Docket at 17); and (iii) on March 21, 2019, the Florida Federal Court issued its
Order of Suggestion of Bankruptcy, which stayed the Federal Action against Ditech because of

its filing for bankruptcy. See Ex. 30, Order on Suggestion of Bankruptcy at 1.
The record is clear that that the Debtors provided Claimant with timely actual notice of
the Bar Date. The Claimant filed the Dixon Claims more than a year after the Bar Date lapsed.
Accordingly, the Dixon Claims are time-barred as late-filed claims. See In re DDi Corp., 304
B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting debtor’s motion to expunge the class Claim as
untimely late); In re Alexander’s Inc., 176 B.R. 715, 723 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting
debtor’s motion to expunge a claim filed one year after the bar date); In re New York Seven-Up
Bottling Co., Inc., 153 B.R. 21, 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting debtor’s motion to expunge
the claims of Great Waters and Poland Spring as untimely).
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) governs late-filed claims in chapter 11 cases. See Pioneer
Inv. Servc. Co. v. Brunswick Associated Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 (1993) (“The ‘excusable
neglect’ standard of Rule 9006(b)(1) governs late filings of proofs of claim in Chapter 11 cases
but not in Chapter 7 cases.”); see also Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd. P'ship v. Enron Corp.
(In re Enron Corp.), 419 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Rule 9006 governs the admission of

proofs of claim filed after a court-ordered bar date.”) Under the Bankruptcy Rules, the court has
discretion to extend a bar date to late filed claims “where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1). In Pioneer, the Supreme Court construed the
phrase “excusable neglect” as it is used in Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) as it relates to late-filed
claims. It found that the determination of “excusable neglect” is an equitable one that takes
account of all of the surrounding circumstances:
These include. . . the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and
its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the
movant acted in good faith.

Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. The burden of proof rests with the party asserting excusable neglect. In
re Enron Corp, 419 F.3d at 121.
The Claimant has not sought leave to file a late-filed claim. Based on the facts in the
record, it is unlikely that he would be able to establish such neglect. However, the Court need not
further consider the matter because, as discussed below, the Dixon Claims are barred by
application of the doctrine of res judicata, and under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court
lacks jurisdiction to give the Claimant the relief he is seeking in the Dixon Claims.
Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
For the Claimant to obtain the relief he seeks in the Dixon Claims, the Court essentially
must look behind the Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment and reject it. However, the
Court lacks jurisdiction to do so. By application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “lower federal
courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that effectively challenge state-court
judgments.” In re Wilson, 410 F. App’x 409, 410 (2d Cir. 2011). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
[applies to] cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting the

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005). In this circuit, there are four requirements that must be met
before the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies: (1) the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in
state court; (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment; (3) the
plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state-court
judgment must have been rendered before the federal court proceedings commenced. Green v.
Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2009) (citing Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d
77, 85 (2d Cir.2005)). Here, all four prongs of the doctrine are satisfied.
The Claimant lost in the state court and the Dixon Claims, Response and Sur-Reply are

direct and explicit attacks on the Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment. See, e.g.,
Response at 6 (“[T]he state court erroneously entered a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of
the defunct plaintiff Green Tree Servicing, LLC and not its successor Ditech financial [sic] LLC
. . .”); Sur-Reply at 7 (“The Claimant is not challenging the April 18, 2016, null and void vacated
final judgment of foreclosure but the September 27, 2019, re-foreclosure of the Claimant’s
family home without a trial or evidentiary hearing, that was unlawfully awarded to Ditech
Financial LLC.”). “Courts in this Circuit have consistently held that any attack on a judgment of
foreclosure is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” In re Moise, 575 B.R. 191, 202
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017) (dismissing adversary complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
seeking to reverse the state court foreclosure judgment); see, e.g., Ford v. US. Dept. of Treasury
IRS, 50 Fed. Appx. 490 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that Rooker–Feldman barred plaintiff's attempt
to seek reversal of the state court foreclosure judgment); In re Demarais, Adversary No. 07–
90223, 2008 WL 3286218, at *4 n.6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that vacatur of the
underlying “Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale would be inappropriate under the Rooker–

Feldman doctrine”).
The Dixon Claims seek damages in the amount of the cash paid for the Property at the
Foreclosure Sale, based upon Ditech’s alleged fraud on the state court. See First Dixon Claim at
1, 5; Duplicate Dixon Claim at 9. The First Dixon Claim also alleges that the foreclosure
proceeding was “unlawful” and intended to “steal the Dixons [’] home.” First Dixon Claim at 5.
Thus, the second prong of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is satisfied because the Claimant
complains of injuries which flow directly from the Final Florida State Court Foreclosure
Judgment. This is a direct attack on that judgment. Rooker-Feldman applies with equal force to
the allowance of a proof of claim. Nath v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 15-CV-3937 (KMK),

2016 WL 5791193, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (applying Rooker-Feldman in the proof of
claims context).
The third prong is satisfied because the Claimant asks the Court to review the Final
Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment and reject it as a product of fraud. See Response at 8
(“The state court Judge John S. Kastrenakes participated in Ditech Financial LLC fraud by
instructing Ditech Financial LLC’s counsel to draft a unilateral final judgment Order that
fraudulently asserted ‘a non-jury trial was held on September 23, 2019 and evidence was
presented.’”).
Finally, the Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment was entered on September
26, 2019, before Claimant filed the Dixon Claims on July 16, 2020 and October 16, 2020. See
Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment at 1; First Dixon Claim at 1; Duplicate Dixon
Claim at 1.
It is plain that the allegations contained in the Dixon Claims arise from the Final Florida

State Court Foreclosure Judgment. In resolving the Dixon Claims, the Court would be required
to look behind the judgment and determine whether the Final Florida State Court Foreclosure
Judgement is the product of alleged fraud. The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to do so
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Borrani v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 820 F.
App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction,
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, over Borrani’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (‘RICO’), 18 U.S.C. § 1961; wire fraud, fraud and deceit, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343
and 1503; and emotional distress claims (claims 1-5 and 9). All of these claims are based on
injuries caused by the state court’s judgment of foreclosure against Borrani and invite the federal

court to review that judgment.”); In re Ward, 423 B.R. 22, 27 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(“[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from reviewing the validity of the
Foreclosure Judgment.”); Gray v. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 07 Civ. 4039, 2009 WL
1787710, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009) (“Courts in this Circuit have consistently held that a
plaintiff who lost possession of his home in a state court foreclosure proceeding is barred by the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine from attacking the state court judgment in federal district court.”);
Goddard v. Citibank, NA, No. 04CV5317 (NGG)(LB), 2006 WL 842925, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2006) (“To the extent that Plaintiff asks that this court find the Judgment of Foreclosure to be
invalid because her mortgage payments were up to date ... I find that this claim is barred by the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine.”).
Application of the Doctrine of Res Judicata
In substance, the Dixon Claims are based on matters adjudicated in both the Florida State
Foreclosure Court Action and the Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding. “[I]t is well settled

that a court may dismiss a claim on res judicata or collateral estoppel grounds under a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.” Linden Airport Mgmt. Corp. v. New York City Econ. Dev. Corp., No. 08 CIV.
3810 (RJS), 2011 WL 2226625, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sassower v. Abrams, 833 F. Supp. 253, 264 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). “When a
defendant raises res judicata or collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense and ‘it is clear from
the face of the complaint, and consideration of matters which the court may take judicial notice
of, that the plaintiff’s claims are barred as a matter of law,’ dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
appropriate.” Id. (quoting Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int'l, 231 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Under both Florida state law and federal law, res judicata precludes the Claimant from

re-litigating the same claims that were actually litigated, or could have been litigated, against
Ditech in the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action and/or Second Bankruptcy Adversary
Proceeding. See Zikofsky v. Marketing 10, Inc., 904 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.2005)
(“[A] court looks not only at the causes of action actually raised in the first suit, but also every
other matter which the parties might have litigated and had determined, within the issues as
framed by the pleadings or as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the
first litigation.”) (internal quotations omitted); In re Residential Capital, LLC, No. 12-12020
(MG), 2015 WL 1567131, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2015) (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,
892 (2008)) (“The doctrine of res judicata precludes the same parties from litigating claims in a
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action if there has been a final judgment on those
claims.”).
The Florida State Court Foreclosure Action
“[T]he preclusive effect of a state court determination in a subsequent federal action is
determined by the rules of the state where the prior action occurred . . . .” New York v. Sokol (In

re Sokol), 113 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). See also Migra v. Warren
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) (“[A] federal court must give to a state-
court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the
State in which the judgment was rendered.”). Although the Court construes the Dixon Claims
liberally, the pro se Claimant is not exempt from the rules of res judicata. See Birl v. Estelle, 660
F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.1981) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party from
compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. One who proceeds pro se with
full knowledge and understanding of the risks involved acquires no greater rights than a litigant
represented by a lawyer, unless a liberal construction of properly filed pleadings be considered

an enhanced right.”) (internal citations omitted); Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Petitioner [appearing pro se] is not, however, excused “from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.”).
The Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgement of Foreclosure was entered by the
Florida State Trial Court and was affirmed on appeal by the Florida State Supreme Court. In
Florida, res judicata applies where there is a judgment on the merits in a prior suit and bars
subsequent litigation where there is: “(1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause
of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality [or
capacity] of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.” Certex USA, Inc. v. Vidal, 706
F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2010); The Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So.2d 108, 119
(Fla.2007); Petillo v. World Savings Bank, FSB, No. 6:08–cv–1255–Orl–19GJK, 2009 WL
2178953, at *4 (M.D.Fla. July 21, 2009). “Importantly, [in Florida] the doctrine of res judicata
not only bars issues that were raised, but it also precludes consideration of issues that could have
been raised but were not raised in the first case.” Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d

101, 105 (Fla. 2001). Res judicata applies to affirmative defenses, as well as all defenses and
compulsory counterclaims that were, or could have been, raised in the prior matter. Liberty
Transp., LLC v. Banyan Air Servs., Inc., 982 So. 2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“If
the elements of res judicata are satisfied, claims, defenses, and compulsory counterclaims are all
barred in a subsequent action.”).
In the context of a foreclosure action, any and all issues related to the amount, validity,
and entitlement to foreclose on a debt must be raised in the foreclosure proceeding or they will
be barred by res judicata. In re Collado, Nos. 09–32049–BKC–AJC, 10–3019–BKC–AJC–A,
2010 WL 3282595, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2010) (“Litigation of defenses and

compulsory counterclaims, are part and parcel to the mortgage foreclosure action wherein the
amount, validity, and entitlement to foreclose the debt were adjudicated. Thus, given that a final
judgment has been entered by a State Court of competent jurisdiction, based on the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, Collado cannot now state a cause of action for fraud which
should have been asserted by way of a compulsory counterclaim and or affirmative defenses in
the foreclosure proceeding.”).
The elements of res judicata under Florida law are satisfied here. As to the first
element—identity of the thing sued for—courts look to whether both actions are grounded in
“the same loan transaction, mortgage, and residential property.” Beepot v. J.P. Morgan Chase
Nat. Corp. Servs., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1358, 1371 (M.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Beepot v. JP
Morgan Chase Nat. Corp. Servs., Inc., 626 F. App’x 935 (11th Cir. 2015); Nivia v. Nationstar
Mortg., LLC, Case No., No. 13–Civ–24080, 2014 WL 4146889, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014)
(“The mortgage loan at issue in the instant suit is the same mortgage loan that was foreclosed in
the state court foreclosure action.”). The Dixon Claims and the Response make clear that all of

the claims arise from the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action. The Claimant takes issue with
the Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment. In support of the Dixon Claims, the
Claimant asserts that Ditech lacks standing to foreclose on the Property. See First Dixon Claim at
16; Duplicate Dixon Claim at 13. The Claimant also seeks monetary damages for the injuries he
allegedly suffered as a result of the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action and entry of the Final
Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment. See First Dixon Claim at 1. Claimant did not seek
monetary damages against Ditech in the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action and he is barred
by the doctrine of res judicata from asserting the claim herein because he could have asserted the
claim in Florida. See Puff 'N Stuff of Winter Park, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1523, 1529 (M.D. Fla.

1996) (“Simply because some remedies sought in the instant case are different from those sought
in state court does not impede the operation of claim preclusion presently”). Because the Dixon
Claims are premised on the same underlying conduct—the Claimant’s default under the
Mortgage, the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action and Foreclosure Sale of the Property—the
Claimant is barred from seeking any remedy for wrongs allegedly arising out of the Florida State
Court Foreclosure Action. Id.
As to the second element—the identity of the cause of action—courts look to “whether
the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the suit are the same in both actions.” Tyson v.
Viacom, Inc., 890 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). Zikofsky v. Mktg. 10, Inc., 904
So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A]court looks not only at the causes of action
actually raised in the first suit, but also at every other matter which the parties might have
litigated and had determined, within the issues as [framed] by the pleadings or as incident to or
essentially connected with the subject matter of the first litigation.”) (internal citations and
quotations marks omitted). As support for the First Dixon Claim, Claimant states that the basis of

his $303,500 claim is “Home Sold $303,500” and “Personal Injury.” See First Dixon Claim at 1.
The Duplicate Dixon Claim states that its basis for seeking damages of $303,500 is “Real estate
property.” See Duplicate Dixon Claim at 2. In the Dixon Claims, the Claimant seeks damages
equal to the amount paid for the Property at auction during the Florida State Court Foreclosure
Action. See Ex. 9, Foreclosure Certificate of Sale. In the Response, the Claimant attacks the
Florida State Court Foreclosure Action, including Ditech’s standing to bring the action. See
Response ¶¶ 8-24; Duplicate Dixon Claim at 6-9. As a matter of law, a Florida court cannot enter
a foreclosure judgment without finding that the plaintiff has standing to foreclose. McLean v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 79 So. 3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“A crucial element in

any mortgage foreclosure proceeding is that the party seeking foreclosure must demonstrate that
it has standing to foreclose.”). As the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action was already
adjudicated, the Florida State Trial Court necessarily found that Ditech had standing to foreclose.
The Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgement is final and the Property was sold. The
Claimant is foreclosed from reasserting the claim again or attacking the judgment through the
claims resolutions process.
The third factor—identity of the parties—is satisfied. Ditech and the Claimant are parties
to the Dixon Claims and are the same parties to the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action.
The fourth factor—identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the complaint
is made—is also satisfied. In applying this factor, courts consider whether the “parties in the
state action had the incentive to adequately litigate the claims in the same character or capacity
as would the parties to the federal action.” McDonald v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 821
F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Ford v. Dania Lbr. & Supply Co., 150 Fla. 435, 7 So.2d

594 (1942)). In the Dixon Claims, the Claimant explicitly asserts the same claims as those
asserted in the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action—that Ditech acted unlawfully which
harmed him in connection with its servicing of his mortgage. The Claimant litigated his claims in
the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action, including whether Ditech had standing to foreclose
and whether Ditech acted as servicer on the loan. Ditech and the Claimant were afforded the
opportunity to raise defenses to protect their respective interests in the Property, which they did.
The Claimant cannot relitigate those claims herein. See Stockton v. Lansiquot, 838 F.2d 1545,
1547 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the fourth res judicata factor is met when “[t]his same
plaintiff sued the same defendants for relief on substantially the same claim, arising from the

same circumstances, and raised the same underlying issues in the federal proceeding as he had
previously raised in the state proceeding.”); Radle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 1464, 1468
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (“The Court finds that [the fourth res judicata factor] has been met. These
Plaintiffs sued the same defendants, or those in privity with them, for the same relief on
substantially the same claims, arising from the same incident.”).
The Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding
In the Dixon Claims, the Claimant reasserts the causes of action he previously raised and
resolved in the Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding. In that action, the Claimant
challenged Ditech’s Proof of Claim filed in his bankruptcy case on the grounds that, among other
things, Ditech lacks standing to file a claim, lacks standing to foreclose on the Property, and
lacks standing to receive payments on the Property. See Ex. 24, Second Bankruptcy Adversary
Proceeding Complaint ¶¶ 13-17. The Florida Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Second Adversary
Action and entered the Second Adversary Proceeding Final Judgment.
Federal law determines the preclusive effect of a federal judgment. Marvel Characters,

Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2002); PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894,
896 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). Under federal law, “res judicata, or claim preclusion, holds that a final
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues
that were or could have been raised in that action.” Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 214 F.3d
275, 284 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Res judicata “bars later litigation if
an earlier decision was (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) by a court of competent
jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the same parties or their privies, and (4) involving the same
cause of action.” EDP Med. Computer Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d
Cir.2007) (quoting In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 762 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir.1985)). “[E]ven

claims based upon different legal theories are barred provided they arise from the same
transaction or occurrence.” L-Tec Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 88 (2d
Cir. 1999).
As a matter of law, final judgments in adversary proceedings are adjudications on the
merits. Lawrence Grp., Inc. v. Barton, 262 B.R. 30, 32 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The September 5,
2000, Memorandum–Decision and Order constituted a final judgment on the merits in the
adversary proceedings. . . . Accordingly, the claim asserted here cannot be relitigated, as the
same claim was previously litigated in the adversary proceedings”). With respect to the first
prong of the res judicata test, the Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding Final Judgment
operates as an adjudication on the merits. The second and third elements are satisfied as well
because there is no dispute that the Florida Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to enter the Second
Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding Final Judgment, and that Ditech and the Claimant are parties
to both the Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding and the Dixon Claims.
The last element is also satisfied. The Claimant, through the Second Bankruptcy

Adversary Proceeding, sought to collaterally attack the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action
and Final Florida State Court Foreclosure Judgment by arguing that Ditech lacked standing to
bring the Florida State Court Foreclosure Action and had engaged in a fraudulent scheme to
conceal that fact from the Florida State Trial Court. See Ex. 24, Second Bankruptcy Adversary
Proceeding Complaint ¶¶ 13-17, 22-28. The allegations in the Second Bankruptcy Complaint are
substantively identical to those raised in support of the Dixon Claims. See First Dixon Claim at
4-6; Duplicate Dixon Claim at 6-9. Therefore, the Second Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding
also bars the Dixon Claims and constitutes sufficient grounds to disallow the claims. Bd. of
Managers of 195 Hudson St. Condo. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assocs., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 463, 470

(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (It is “well settled that a court may dismiss a claim on res judicata or collateral
estoppel grounds on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”).
* * * *
To summarize, the Dixon Claims are time barred because they were filed after the Bar
Date lapsed. Moreover, and in any event, the Court lacks jurisdiction over those claims under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the claims fail to state plausible claims for relief against Ditech
because they are barred by application of the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, the Court
sustains the Objections and expunges the Dixon Claims. In doing so, the Court finds no merit to
the Claim Amendment Motion, the Evidentiary Hearing Scheduling Motion, and the Evidentiary
Hearing Motion.
The Claim Amendment Motion
On December 13, 2021, the Claimant filed his Claim Amendment Motion, wherein he
requests that this Court allow him to file an amended proof of claim which would list “other

claims against Ditech Financial LLC that were stayed in the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Florida under Case No. 19-cv-80022.” Claim Amendment Motion at 1. In
assessing the merits of a request for leave to file an amended claim, courts apply the standards
applicable under Federal Rule 15 to motions to amend a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; In re
Ditech Holding Corp., No. 19-10412, 2021 WL 4530339, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2021).
Rule 15 is made applicable herein by Bankruptcy Rule 7015.
At bottom, leave to amend a claim generally is freely given, except in cases in which it
would be futile to do so. A proposed amendment to a claim is considered to be “futile” if the
claim, as amended, fails to state a legally cognizable claim or fails to raise triable issues of fact.

AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 726 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“Leave to amend may be denied on grounds of futility if the proposed amendment fails to state a
legally cognizable claim or fails to raise triable issues of fact”) (citing Milanese v. Rust-Oleum
Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110-11(2d Cir. 2010)). Repleading a claim is futile when the defects in the
claim are substantive, rather than the product of inartful or procedurally deficient pleading. See
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a court did not err in denying
a pro se litigant leave to amend because “[t]he problem with Cuoco's causes of action is
substantive; better pleading will not cure it. Repleading would thus be futile. Such a futile
request to replead should be denied.”).
As set forth above, the Court expunged the Dixon Claims because they are barred by
application of the doctrine of res judicata, they are time barred, and the Court lacks jurisdiction
to grant the relief sought in the claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. None of these defects
can be cured by the amendment proposed by the Claimant. The defects are incurable and leave to
amend is futile. Lobaito v. Chase Bank, 529 F. App'x 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a

district court did not err in denying a pro se litigant leave to amend where “the defects in his
complaint were substantive, and leave to amend would have been futile.”).
The Evidentiary Hearing Motion and Evidentiary Hearing Scheduling Motion
In the Evidentiary Hearing Motion, Claimant requests that this Court set an evidentiary
hearing on the First Dixon Claim, based on Federal Rule 60(b)(6). That rule is inapplicable for
two reasons: (i) it permits courts to grant relief from a judgment and the Court lacks jurisdiction
under Rooker-Feldman to grant the Claimant the relief he seeks from the Final Florida State
Court Foreclosure Judgment; and (ii) the Clams Procedures Order establishes procedures for
scheduling and conducting evidentiary hearings on proofs of claims. The Evidentiary Hearing

Motion does not comply with that order. In the Evidentiary Hearing Scheduling Motion, the
Claimant requests that this Court set a separate hearing date on the Evidentiary Hearing Motion.
The Evidentiary Hearing Scheduling Motion and Evidentiary Hearing Motion are procedurally
improper and run afoul of the Claims Procedures Order.
Under that order, the Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative have the option of
scheduling the Claim Hearing as either a “Merits Hearing” (evidentiary hearing) or a
“Sufficiency Hearing” (a non-evidentiary hearing). Claims Procedures Order ¶ 3(iv)(a),(b). The
Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative scheduled the hearing on the Dixon Claims as
a Sufficiency Hearing. Under the Claims Procedure Order, the Claimant is not entitled to a
Merits Hearing unless he demonstrates at the Sufficiency Hearing that the Dixon Claims state
claims for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). He has failed to do so. For the reasons set forth above, the
Court finds that the Claimant has failed to plead facts demonstrating that the Dixon Claims state
plausible claims for relief against the Debtors. The Claimant is not entitled to a Merits Hearing
(i.e., an evidentiary hearing on the Dixon Claims).

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains the Objections and expunges the Dixon
Claims.29 In addition, the Court denies the Claim Amendment Motion, the Evidentiary Hearing
Motion and the Evidentiary Hearing Scheduling Motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, New York
May 28, 2022

/s/ James L. Garrity, Jr.
Hon. James L. Garrity, Jr.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

29 The Court need not and will not consider the balance of the Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative’s
arguments in support of the Objections.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10460729. Public record. Not legal advice.