# Beher Holdings Trust v. Frascogna

> United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Mississippi · December 20, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10459061

## Case

- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Mississippi
- **Decided:** December 20, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

ZS AMER SO ORDERED,
Sy FD 4 Xe
\ AG Boi ee }
Allis. gf iz Judge Neil P. Olack
Nae ES United States Bankruptcy Judge
□□□ OO Date Signed: December 20, 2019
The Order of the Court is set forth below. The docket reflects the date entered.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
IN RE:

JOSEPH PATRICK FRASCOGNA AND CASE NO. 11-03822-NPO
LISA N. FRASCOGNA,
DEBTORS. CHAPTER 7

BEHER HOLDINGS TRUST PLAINTIFF
VS. ADV. PROC. NO. 18-00128-NPO
JOSEPH FRASCOGNA DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON COMPLAINT OBJECTING
TO DISCHARGE AND TO DETERMINE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT
This matter came before the Court for trial on November 6, 2019 (the “Trial’), on the
Complaint Objecting to Discharge and to Determine Dischargeability of Debt (the “Complaint’)
(Adv. Dkt. 1)! filed by Beher Holdings Trust (the “BHT”) and the Answer and Defenses to

' Citations to docket entries in the above-referenced adversary proceeding (the “Adversary
Proceeding”) are “(Adv. Dkt. #); and citations to docket entries in the above-referenced bankruptcy
case (the “Bankruptcy Case’) are “(Bankr. Dkt. #).
Page 1 of 35

Complaint Objecting to Discharge and to Determine Dischargeability of Debt (the “Answer”)
(Adv. Dkt. 7) filed by Joseph Frascogna (“Frascogna”) in the Adversary Proceeding. The Pretrial
Order (the “PTO”) (Adv. Dkt. 24) was entered on October 24, 2019. At Trial, Daniel D. Ware
represented Frascogna and Jeffery D. Rawlings (“Rawlings”) represented BHT. During the Trial,
BHT introduced into evidence ten (10) exhibits and Frascogna introduced six (6) exhibits.2 The

issues put forth by the parties for Trial included: (1) whether Frascogna breached a contract or
breached a fiduciary duty entitling BHT to damages in the amount of $9,826,585.00; (2) whether
BHT properly designated Dr. Charles C. Edwards (“Dr. Edwards”)3 as an expert in damages; (3)
whether BHT’s cause of action against Frascogna accrued after November 2, 2011, the date of
Frascogna’s bankruptcy filing; (4) whether the actions of Frascogna constituted fraud or
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny so as to except from
discharge any debt owed to BHT pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4); and (5) whether the actions
of Frascogna constituted willful and malicious injury to BHT so as to except from discharge any
debt owed to BHT pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). (PTO at 12). The Court, having considered
the pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel, finds as follows:4

2 The exhibits introduced into evidence at Trial by BHT are cited as “(BHT’s Ex. #). The
exhibits introduced into evidence at Trial by Frascogna are cited as “(Frascogna’s Ex. #).

3 BHT did not send a representative to the Trial aside from Dr. Edwards. Dr. Edwards is
the U.S. investment advisor for BHT and the original settlor. (Test. of Edwards at 10:04:38
10:04:50). At times during the events in question, Dr. Edwards acted as a representative for BHT,
but, at times, Dr. Edwards also acted in his individual capacity. When referring to Dr. Edwards
throughout, the Court will be referring to him in both his role as an individual and as BHT’s
representative, unless the context indicates otherwise.

4 These findings of fact and conclusions of law are made pursuant to Rule 7052 of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this Adversary
Proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. This matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(A) and (I). Notice of the Trial was proper under the circumstances.
Evidentiary Ruling

Interrogatory Response
At the Trial, Frascogna offered into evidence the Responses of William D. Dickson to
Defendant’s Second Set of Interrogatories (the “Interrogatory Response”) (Frascogna’s Ex. ID
Only) that William D. Dickson (“Dickson”) served on Frascogna in a prior action filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (the “District Court”) in Beher Holdings
Trust v. Frascogna v. Dickson, No. 3:15cv7-HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. Jan. 5, 2015) (the “District
Court Action”).5 BHT objected to the Interrogatory Response on the basis of hearsay. The Court
marked this exhibit for identification purposes and took the matter of admissibility under
advisement. Before the Court can make findings of fact, the Court must resolve the admissibility

issue.
Rule 9017 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure applies the Federal Rules of
Evidence to proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017. As a preliminary
matter, the Court considers whether the evidence proffered by Frascogna was relevant to the
Adversary Proceeding. “To be admissible evidence must be relevant, and the resolution of the
question of relevance is in the province of the presiding judge.” Williams v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 629 F.2d 993, 999 (5th Cir. 1980). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any

5 The District Court administratively closed the District Court Action on February 15, 2018
(No. 3:15cv7-HTW-LRA, Dkt. 42) “until such time as the Bankruptcy Court has concluded its
proceedings, or until such time as any of the parties request that this matter be reopened.”
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. Evip. 401.
Frascogna attempted to introduce the Interrogatory Response into evidence to prove that
Dickson removed certain loan documents from his office building prior to November 2, 2011, the
date that Frascogna and his spouse commenced the Bankruptcy Case. Interrogatory Response
provides, in pertinent part:
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please state whether or not you removed the Blue
World Pools documents referenced in Plaintiffs Complaint from your office building located at
234 East Capitol Street, 2nd Floor, Jackson, Mississippi 39201 prior to November 2, 2011.
RESPONSE; Yes.

Because the date is important in determining whether BHT’s alleged claims accrued pre-petition
or post-petition and, thus, whether BHT’s alleged claims were discharged in the Bankruptcy Case,
regardless of any exception to discharge that might otherwise apply, the Court finds that the
Interrogatory Response is relevant to the Adversary Proceeding.
“Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: the
United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court.” FED. R. Evip. 402. BHT objected to the Interrogatory Response as inadmissible hearsay.
‘Hearsay’ means a statement’ that: (1) the declarant’ does not make while testifying at the current
trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.” FED. R. EvID. 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides
«6 Statement” means a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if
the person intended it as an assertion.” FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
7
To: ecegse@aal.com
Sent: Tue, Mar 29, 2017 6:29 pm
Subject: RE: Beher wire amount
Dr. Edwards,
See Attached Custodial Certification,
Had Pat to prepare agreement if need at no charge.
-Lean send notes to you or Pat can hold them
iil! you call for them.
butch,
Fiom: ccegse .
To: butch ; martha.a.edwards
: Subject: Re: Beher wire amount .
Date: Tue, Mar 28, 2011 9:32 pm
Butch,
Thanks for the Certification. | forwarded to Bermuda. ‘
Pat can hold thern for now. □ .
Does he hold a current MS license to practice law and maintain legal malpractice insurance?
On other subjects:
| sent the-$57,660 due CHFS for loan servicing Nov - Jan.
CHES: Borrowing Base reporting is behind and funds need to be sent to BH & EFP from the lockbox at least bi-
monthly.
CCE

(BHT’s Ex. 9). Dickson’s contemporaneous emails demonstrate Dr. Edwards’s was complacent
about allowing Dickson to maintain control and possession of the Loan Notes when Dr. Edwards
Page 16 of 35

did not have any of Frascogna’s preliminary information before Frascogna signed the First
Custodial Certification. The emails also undermined Dr. Edwards testimony regarding the vetting
BHT required before Frascogna could be named as the custodian. Instead, the emails showed that
the Custodial Certifications were provided by Dickson, not Frascogna, and that Dr. Edwards had
not confirmed that Frascogna was a Mississippi attorney or insured prior to the First Custodial

Certification. Dr. Edwards did not produce any later emails between Dickson and himself that
answered his question, “Does he . . . maintain legal malpractice insurance?” (BHT’s Ex. 9).
Instead Dr. Edwards testified that Dickson confirmed Frascogna’s license and insurance
qualifications. If Dr. Edwards had investigated further, he would have learned that at the time
Frascogna did not maintain any malpractice insurance. (Test. of Frascogna at 11:28:00-11:28:16).
Though Dr. Edwards may have forgotten at the time of his email his alleged encounter with
Frascogna five years earlier in Jackson, Mississippi, the emails indicate he had no knowledge of
Frascogna’s qualifications or professional standing as a licensed attorney.
Frascogna testified that in March of 2011, Dickson, who was operating a business out of a

defunct country club in south Jackson, employed him only to “attest that each of th[e] [Loan] Notes
had in fact been received.” (Test. of Frascogna at 11:05:53-11:06:29). Frascogna understood that
the Loan Notes belonged to Dickson and Dr. Edwards, and that Dickson needed Frascogna to
certify that Dickson had received all of the Loan Notes. (Test. of Frascogna at 11:12:44-11:13:09).
Frascogna agreed to attest to the receipt of the Loan Notes on four separate occasions. Each time
Frascogna completed a Custodial Certification, Dickson paid Frascogna $500.00, for a total of
$2,000.00, from an account owned by CHFS. (BHT’s Ex. 2 at 17-21).
Frascogna received the First Custodial Certification from Allen on or about March 28,
2011.17 (BHT’s Ex. 3; Test. of Frascogna at 11:07:10-11:07:15). The Loan Notes were not
delivered by a “secured third-party carrier” but given to Frascogna by Dickson. (Test. of Frascogna
at 11:17:02-11:17:16). Frascogna testified his understanding of his employment with Dickson for
this transaction was to “go through each batch . . . because there would be a stack . . . and

[Frascogna] sat there and went through to make sure we had in fact received the [Loan] Notes that
were being certified in the Custodial Certification.” (Test. of Frascogna at 11:09:07-11:10:12).
Frascogna checked off that the loan information provided on the accompanying spreadsheet
matched the Loan Notes Dickson had provided to him. (Test. of Frascogna at 11:10:14-11:10:38).
Frascogna performed the same task for the Loan Notes received for the Second Custodial
Agreement, the Third Custodial Agreement, and the Fourth Custodial Agreement. Frascogna
subsequently agreed with Dickson that the Loan Notes needed to be kept safe but that he, who at
the time was renting office space in Dickson’s Building, did not have anywhere to keep them.
(Test. of Frascogna at 11:13:10-11:13:44). Dickson suggested keeping them in a locked filing

cabinet in his office, and Frascogna helped orchestrate the storage of the Loan Notes in the locked

17 Neither party produced or made significant issue of the “Custodial File Delivery
Form.032511.docx” indicated as an attachment to Allen’s email. (BHT’s Ex. 3). Frascogna
testified he did not recall receiving a document titled “Custodial File Delivery Form” and
suggested it potentially referenced the spreadsheets attached to the Custodial Certifications. The
Court notes that “Custodial File Delivery Form” is included in the production of documents
Frascogna provided to the trustee in the bankruptcy case filed by CHFS in Case No.
12-01703-NPO (BHT’s Ex. 2 at 14-15; 11:09:30-11:09:45). The Custodial File Delivery Form
was only included with the Fourth Custodial Certification on July 13, 2011. (BHT’s Ex. 2 at 14-
15). The Custodial File Delivery Form referenced a number of undefined terms and an alleged
agreement. Neither party has produced any documents to support the information in the Custodial
File Delivery Form. Therefore, the Court notes the existence of the document but does not find it
significant and the inclusion of the document does not impact its analysis.
cabinet with the receptionist shared by Frascogna and Dickson in Dickson’s Building. (Test. of
Frascogna at 11:13:50-11:14:27).
BHT did not offer into evidence any agreement drafted by Frascogna or approved by BHT,
and Dr. Edwards admitted that BHT and Frascogna did not enter into any written agreement
beyond the Custodial Certifications. (BHT’s Ex. 2; Test. of Dr. Edwards at 10:08:53-10:09:00).

In fact, Dickson’s March 29, 2011 email to Dr. Edwards indicated that Dickson could have
Frascogna “prepare an agreement if need[ed].” (BHT’s Ex. 9). There was no evidence that any
such agreement was ever made, written or verbal.
The Custodial Agreement outlined the duties and responsibilities of the McCarley Firm as
the Custodian of the Home Improvement Loans, but the Custodial Certifications signed by
Frascogna did not contain any of the information in the Custodial Agreement. (Test. of Dr.
Edwards at 10:14:10-10:14:33). The four (4) Custodial Certifications were identical except for
certain details in paragraph (1) and (2) regarding the specific Loan Notes. (BHT’s Ex. 2). The
Custodial Certifications were in the form of a one-page memorandum or letter addressed to BHT

and Stone. The Custodial Certifications included approximately twenty (20) capitalized terms
without any definition or explanation as to their meaning. (BHT’s Ex. 2). Standing alone, the
Custodial Certifications “confirm[ed] and certif[ied]” that Frascogna “received the original Retail
Installment Contracts and Allonges to Promissory Note and/or Retail Installment Contract” for the
Loan Notes included in each of the four transactions from BWP as identified in the “Custodian
File Delivery Form.” (BHT’s Exhibit 2). The fourth paragraph of the Custodial Certifications
waives any representations or warranties as to the “Custodian’s Consumer Mortgage Loan File”
or “any Receivable.” (BHT’s Exhibit 2). The final paragraph states, “Upon release of any
Consumer Loan File, this Custodial Certification shall, as to the Consumer Loan File being
released, be and be deemed to be canceled by Custodian and of no force and effect.”18 (BHT’s
Exhibit 2).
Dr. Edwards and Frascogna disagreed about the nature of the Custodial Certifications and
the scope of Frascogna’s obligations as a custodian of the Loan Notes. Dr. Edwards believed that
by signing the Custodial Certifications, Frascogna was obligated to act in the same way as the

McCarley Firm. (Test. of Dr. Edwards at 10:18:40-10:19:00). Dr. Edwards testified the “custodial
agreement obligations” of Frascogna were “to hold the [Loan Notes] in safe keeping for their
owner, Beher Holdings Trust. That [was] his only obligation.” (Test. of Dr. Edwards at 10:23:44-
10:24:09). Dr. Edwards further testified that the inherit rights, duties, and obligations of Frascogna
as a “custodian” created by the Custodial Certifications derived from common law. (Test. of Dr.
Edwards at 10:26:45-10:27:24). In fact, neither Dr. Edwards nor any representative from BHT
communicated with Frascogna about this transaction in 2011. The only communication from
Frascogna to BHT consisted solely of the Custodial Certifications, which Dickson provided to Dr.
Edwards who in turn provided them to BHT.

During this time, Frascogna was never contacted by Dr. Edwards or any representative
from BHT. Had they contacted him, they would have learned that Frascogna did not hold errors
and omissions insurance or theft protection coverage. (Test. of Frascogna at 11:28:02-11:28:30).
Dickson, and the accompanying documents provided by Allen, were the only source of information
or instruction received by Frascogna regarding his role in the Portfolio #7 transaction. Although
the Custodial Certifications were addressed to “Beher Holdings Trust, Ian Stone, Trustee,

18 At the Trial, counsel for BHT argued that Frascogna knew or should have known that
the Loan Notes were “Consumer Loan File(s)” as used in the final paragraph of the Custodial
Certifications. Frascogna testified that the relationship did not occur to him at the time. (Test. of
Frascogna at 1:10:10-1:11:00).
Wakefield Quin Limited,” Frascogna did not take issue with signing the Custodial Certifications
provided by Allen because of the totality of the circumstances. Dickson’s explanation and
Frascogna’s understanding of the Custodial Certifications was that his singular role was to certify
receipt of the Loan Notes from BHT. (Test. of Frascogna at 1:08:50-1:09:25). From Frascogna’s
understanding, the use of the title “custodian” in the Custodial Certifications and the modest

compensation for his services did not create any ongoing contractual or fiduciary obligation
beyond certifying that Dickson, who gave the Loan Notes to Frascogna to certify in the first place,
had custody of all of the Loan Notes listed on each spreadsheet from BHT. (Test. of Frascogna at
1:11:28-1:12:19). Without further communication from BHT or Dr. Edwards, Frascogna
understood that signing the Custodial Certifications that named him as “Attorney and Custodian”
was for the limited purpose of certifying that all the Loan Notes were received. (Test. of Frascogna
at 1:11:55-1:12:29). As late as February 8, 2012 in an email exchange between Stone and
Frascogna, Frascogna referred to Dickson as “my client” and made no reference to any duty,
obligation, or responsibility to anyone besides Dickson. (BHT’s Ex. 5).

During this time period, Frascogna testified he was unaware of the McCarley Firm’s duties,
had not seen any version of the Custodial Agreement or any of its exhibits except the Custodial
Certification, and was not a party to any document with BHT, Dr. Edwards, Dickson, or CHFS
about any sort of role as a custodian. (Test. of Frascogna at 11:29:00-11:29:15). Frascogna was
also not aware that the Custodial Certifications were a one (1)-page component of a much larger
agreement. The Custodial Agreement was for an entirely separate transaction for the Home
Improvement Loans between different parties with different loan documents. The Rainbow Group
contracted with the McCarley Firm. Frascogna never communicated with or was contacted by
anyone from the McCarley Firm about this entirely separate arrangement. Indeed, Frascogna
received the drafts of the Custodial Certifications via email from Allen, not from Dr. Edwards or
any other representative of BHT. (BHT’s Ex. 3).
Frascogna also testified that at the time he “wrote off” the peculiarity of the circumstances
because Dickson and Dr. Edwards were friends and business partners. (Test. of Frascogna at
11:32:55-11:33:03). Frascogna understood the documents were valuable but never communicated

with anyone other than Dickson regarding the Loan Notes, which he understood to belong to Dr.
Edwards and Dickson as part of their business relationship. Upon completion, Frascogna returned
the Loan Notes to the person who gave the Loan Notes to him, Dickson. Further deemphasizing
the importance of Frascogna’s understanding of his role with Portfolio #7 was the fact that he had
not contracted with anyone but simply signed a document in letter form, and neither Dr. Edwards
nor any other representative from BHT ever contacted him. (Test. of Frascogna at 11:36:30-
11:36:50). Frascogna never provided monthly reports to BHT on the Loan Notes and did not have
any further involvement with the Loan Notes until January of 2012. (Test. of Frascogna at 1:20:15-
1:21:00).

On November 2, 2011, Frascogna and his spouse commenced the Bankruptcy Case.
(Bankr. Dkt. 1). They did not list BHT as a creditor in their bankruptcy schedules. On March 7,
2012, they were granted a discharge of their pre-petition debts under 11 U.S.C. §727 (Bankr. Dkt.
29), and a Final Decree/Order Closing Case (Bankr. Dkt. 29-1) was entered that same day.
Until January of 2012, a representative from BHT never spoke with Frascogna. During the
relationship between Dr. Edwards and Dickson regarding Portfolio #7, Dickson communicated
with Dr. Edwards and Frascogna separately. (Test. of Frascogna at 11:05:37-11:05:54). Often,
the information passed from Dickson to Dr. Edwards and then to BHT, without any indication that
Dickson had consulted Frascogna. (Test. of Dr. Edwards at 10:07:20-10:07:28). BHT and Dr.
Edwards unjustifiably relied on the representations Dickson made to them about Frascogna’s
duties and understanding of those duties.
At some point, Dickson moved the Loan Notes from the locked cabinet to a warehouse in
Panama, the whereabouts of which remain unknown to this day. Frascogna was not aware that
Dickson had moved the Loan Notes or that Dr. Edwards and Dickson’s relationship had “soured.”

(Test. of Frascogna at 1:21:00-1:21:03). Frascogna also was unaware of the consequences for
BHT and Dr. Edwards financial stake if the Loan Notes went missing, because he was not privy
to any of the information surrounding Portfolio #7, he had not communicated with any
representative from BHT or Dr. Edwards, and, since Dickson had custody of the Loan Notes from
the beginning, he did not know there was an issue with his continued custody. (Test. of Frascogna
at 1:23:00-1:24:30).
On January 12, 2012, Stone, on behalf of BHT, sent Frascogna a letter requesting that
Frascogna send the Loan Notes to BHT. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6). This letter was the first
communication from BHT to Frascogna about Portfolio #7. (Test. of Dr. Edwards at

10:02:20-10:02:37; BHT’s Ex. 4).
Frascogna testified, “It was not uncommon at all for someone to get ahold of me to ask
questions like that . . . I was aware of these [Loan] Notes because, just a year before, [Dickson and
I] had done what we did.” (Test. of Frascogna at 1:20:00-1:20:45). When Frascogna received the
letter from Stone asking for the return of the Loan Notes, his impression was, “[I]t’s not like I
wasn’t going to ask Mr. Dickson first if we could do it—but it wasn’t unusual. So, I said sure.”
(Test. of Frascogna at 1:20:00-1:20:45). When Frascogna first contacted Dickson about Stone’s
request for the Loan Notes, Dickson continued to represent to Frascogna that he was collecting the
Loan Notes to return to Stone. (Test. of Frascogna at 1:21:50-1:21:56).
The relationship between Dr. Edwards and Dickson became more contentious on January
20, 2012, when Dr. Edwards sent a letter to CHFS demanding that CHFS cure certain defaults on
the BHT Note by January 31, 2012, or face acceleration of the maturity date. Johnson, 583 B.R.
at 31. CHFS made its last payment on the Mortgage Portfolios in February of 2012.
Frascogna made several attempts to obtain the Loan Notes from Dickson to return to Stone.

Frascogna emailed Stone on January 25, 2012 that he was, “having the [Loan] Notes arranged for
mailing and expect[ed] to get them out to [Stone] in the coming week.” (BHT’s Ex. 4). On
February 8, 2012, Frascogna emailed Stone stating, “I am meeting with my client this week to go
over the [Loan] Notes requested.” (BHT’s Ex. 4). Dickson, however, continued to delay return
of the Loan Notes, and on February 13, 2012, Frascogna emailed Stone stating that he had met
with Dickson and Dickson asked that Stone contact Dickson “without delay.” (BHT’s Ex. 5).
On February 21, 2012, Frascogna spoke to Stone on the telephone. (BHT’s Ex. 5).
Frascogna testified the exchange was not cordial and that Stone threatened Frascogna. (Test. of
Frascogna at 1:22:12-1:22:45). The email following the telephone call was the first time BHT

referred to Frascogna as “custodian on behalf of Beher Holdings Trust” and that there were “terms
of the custodial agreement and the custodial file delivery forms issued.” (BHT’s Ex. 5). At the
Trial, Dr. Edwards did not explain the “custodial agreement” or the “custodial file delivery forms”
or provide any evidence as to BHT’s understanding of Frascogna’s role as a “custodian on behalf
of Beher Holdings Trust” or the “terms of the custodial agreement.” Moreover, Frascogna
contends and this Court has found no indication that an agreement of any kind existed between
BHT and Frascogna.
Knowing Dr. Edwards’s litigious reputation, Dickson’s “soured” feelings towards Dr.
Edwards, and Stone’s position per the February 21, 2012 telephone call, Frascogna testified he
tried to minimize his involvement and get the Loan Notes from Dickson to avoid getting “dragged
into” the “middle of their war.” (Test. of Frascogna at 1:22:12-1:22:45). Frascogna limited his
communication with Stone and forwarded Stone’s email demands to Dickson. (BHT’s Ex. 5). On
February 27, 2012, Frascogna emailed Stone to notify Stone that he “made a demand of Butch
Dickson to return the requested Loan Notes to [Frascogna] by the close of business this Friday,

March 2, 2012.” (BHT’s Ex. 5). Frascogna forwarded the email to Dickson. (BHT’s Ex. 5).
Frascogna memorialized a telephone conversation, by email, with Dickson on February 24, 2012
asking Dickson to “please make certain to return to me the [Loan] Notes requested by Mr. Stone
by 5:00 p.m. next Friday, March 2, 2012.” (BHT’s Ex. 5). On March 2, 2012, Stone emailed
Frascogna stating that “it is [Frascogna’s] responsibility to retrieve the documents the subject of
the custodial arrangements from Mr. Dickson.” (BHT’s Ex. 5). Frascogna forwarded Stone’s
email to Dickson. (BHT’s Ex. 5). Stone did not attach any documentation or authority indicating
the terms of the “custodial arrangements” that made Frascogna responsible for retrieving the Loan
Notes from Dickson.

On February 15, 2012, CHFS and Dickson sued Dr. Edwards and BHT and others in state
court, seeking a declaration of the parties’ rights. Johnson, 583 B.R. at 31-32. Dr. Edwards and
BHT removed the state lawsuit to the District Court in Case No. 3:12-cv-00252-CWR-LRA and
asserted counterclaims against CHFS and Dickson. In May of 2012, the District Court conducted
a trial, which was interrupted by the filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case by CHFS on May 23,
2012 (Case No. 12-01703-NPO) (the “CHFS Bankruptcy Case”).
During the course of the CHFS Bankruptcy Case, CHFS generated substantial sums of
money. For example, the October 2013 monthly operating report, the last one filed by CHFS as a
DIP, showed an ending cash balance of $9,059,191.49. Johnson, 583 B.R. at 39. Beginning in
the fall of 2013, Dickson began transferring most of CHFS’s cash to accounts in his name or in
the names of affiliated companies. From November 5, 2013, to January 7, 2014, Dickson
transferred approximately $9,095,000.00 from CHFS’s account. In the fall of 2013, Dickson
moved from Jackson, Mississippi to Costa Rica and set up a “rogue” operation of CHFS’s business
there and in Panama. The U.S. Trustee filed an emergency motion for the appointment of a chapter

11 trustee, which this Court granted on December 23, 2013.19
On March 10, 2014, a criminal complaint was filed against Dickson, alleging that Dickson
“conspired to wire approximately $9,095,000.00 from accounts subject to bankruptcy protection
to accounts [he] owned and/or controlled.” (Case No. 3:14-CR-00078-TSL-FKB, Dkt. 1 at 4).
Dickson was detained in Panama in federal custody and deported to the United States while en
route to Costa Rica. Upon his return to the United States, Dickson was arrested for bank fraud
and held without bond. On September 10, 2015, Dickson pled guilty to two counts of bankruptcy
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(2) and (5) and was sentenced to serve fifty-seven (57) months
in a federal correctional facility. See United States v. Dickson, Case No. 3:14-CR-00078-TSL-

FKB, Dkt. 44.
Frascogna filed a Motion to Reopen (Bankr. Dkt. 32) the Bankruptcy Case on January 6,
2016, which the Court denied without prejudice. (Bankr. Dkt. 50). On February 5, 2018,
Frascogna filed a second Motion to Reopen (Bankr. Dkt. 52) in the Bankruptcy Case, which the
Court granted on July 17, 2018. (Bankr. Dkt. 75). On August 23, 2018, Frascogna and his spouse
amended their bankruptcy schedules to add BHT as an unsecured creditor. (Bankr. Dkt. 77 at 7).
BHT initiated the Adversary Proceeding by filing the Complaint on December 21, 2018.

19 On May 23, 2012, the Bankruptcy Case was assigned originally to U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge Edward Ellington. On February 1, 2017, the Bankruptcy Case and all related adversary
proceedings were transferred to the above-signed Bankruptcy Judge. Johnson, 583 B.R. at 15 n.6.
In the Complaint, BHT alleged that Frascogna owed a contractual and fiduciary duty to
BHT to hold the Loan Notes and that his negligent breach of his duties was the proximate cause
of losses and damages sustained by BHT in the amount of $9,826.585.00. (Adv. Dkt. 1 at 4). BHT
further alleged that the debt owed by Frascogna was nondischargeable20 under either 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(4) because his “actions constitute fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,

embezzlement or larceny” or 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) because his actions “constitute willful and
malicious injury to BHT.” (Adv. Dkt. 1 at 4). Frascogna filed the Answer generally denying any
liability to BHT on January 15, 2019. (Adv. Dkt. 7).
Discussion
I. Establishing a Claim
BHT initiated the Adversary Proceeding before the question of Frascogna’s liability had
been adjudicated. A bankruptcy court cannot declare a debt nondischargeable until the creditor
establishes the existence and amount of that debt. Thus, before reaching the merits of the
dischargeability issue, the Court must address the liquidation of BHT’s claims for breach of

contract and breach of a fiduciary duty. Morrison v. W. Builders of Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison),
555 F.3d 473, 478-80 (5th Cir. 2009). Whether Frascogna is liable to BHT requires an examination
of state law. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450-51 (2007); see
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Cowin (In re Cowin), 492 B.R. 858, 887 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013)

20 The title and last unnumbered paragraph of the Complaint suggest that BHT also
contends that Frascogna should be denied a discharge of all his debts in the Bankruptcy Case, but
the body of the Complaint contains no supporting allegations. BHT’s statement of the legal issues
in the PTO fails to mention 11 U.S.C. § 727. (Dkt. 24 at 12). Because the PTO supersedes the
Complaint and because it otherwise does not appear that BHT intended to pursue such a claim, the
Court will not consider whether Frascogna should be denied a discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 727. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7016.
(finding that Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 479-80 (2011) left intact a bankruptcy court’s
authority to fully adjudge state-law claims in dischargeability actions).
A. Breach of Contract
BHT alleged that Frascogna breached his contractual duty to BHT by failing to maintain
custody of the Loan Notes. BHT’s allegation requires the Court first to determine if an enforceable

contract existed between Frascogna and BHT.
To determine if parties entered into a valid agreement, courts generally apply ordinary
state-law principles governing the formation of contracts. Bowles v. OneMain Fin. Grp., L.L.C.,
927 F.3d 878, 882 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). In Mississippi, “[t]he elements of a contract
are (1) two or more contracting parties, (2) consideration, (3) an agreement that is sufficiently
definite, (4) parties with legal capacity to make a contract, (5) mutual assent, and (6) no legal
prohibition precluding contract formation.” Bowles, 927 F.3d at 882. Contract formation is based
on an objective manifestation of intent to form a contract and is not based on one party’s subjective
intent. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the Court to determine, and if it

is not, the contract should be enforced as written. Royer Homes of Miss. Inc. v. Chandeleur Homes
Inc., 857 So. 2d 748, 751 (Miss. 2003). If the contract is ambiguous, the court should attempt to
“harmonize the provisions in accord with the parties’ apparent intent.” Id. at 752-53 (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Finding evidence of any contractual relationship between BHT and Frascogna is difficult.
There was no written agreement signed by both parties. There was no meaningful communication
between the parties before January 2012. The testimony of Dr. Edwards and Frascogna presented
contrasting narratives of the same series of events. The Custodial Certifications were the only
documents that both parties acknowledged form part of the transaction involving Portfolio #7.
Therefore, the Court begins its analysis by looking to the “four corners” of the Custodial
Certifications. Chandeleur Homes, Inc., 857 So. 2d at 752.
As noted previously, the Custodial Certifications were a series of four letters or memoranda
drafted by Allen, addressed to Stone as trustee for BHT, and signed by Frascogna as “Custodian.”
The Custodial Certifications included approximately twenty (20) capitalized terms without

corresponding definitions. The Custodial Certifications “confirm[ed] and certif[ied]” that
Frascogna “received the original Retail Installment Contracts and Allonges to Promissory Note
and/or Retail Installment Contract.” The final paragraph stated, “Upon release of any Consumer
Loan File, this Custodial Certification shall, as to the Consumer Loan File being released, be and
be deemed to be canceled by Custodian and of no force and effect.” The Custodial Certifications
did not indicate when the “Consumer Loan File” should or should not be released or to whom.
Without definitions of any of the capitalized terms, the only sufficiently definite term in the
Custodial Certifications was Frascogna’s receipt of the Loan Notes. The Custodial Certifications
did not indicate the duration of the relationship or any other duties, obligations, or expectations

regarding the Loan Notes. The indefinite terms in the Custodial Certifications and the absence of
a glossary defining these terms render the Custodial Certifications ambiguous.
When a contract is ambiguous, the court may go beyond the text of the document to
determine the parties’ true intent. Chandeleur Homes, Inc., 857 So. 2d at 752-53. At the Trial,
Rawlings’s cross-examination of Frascogna attempted to have Frascogna admit that “Consumer
Loan File(s),” as used in the final paragraph of the Custodial Certifications, were the Loan Notes.
The final paragraph stated, “Upon release of any Consumer Loan File, this Custodial Certification
shall, as to the Consumer Loan File being released, be and be deemed to be canceled by Custodian
and of no force and effect.” Standing alone, the Custodial Certification does not indicate to whom
or at what time the “Consumer Loan File” should or should not be released. If the Court accepts
BHT’s interpretation, then releasing the Loan Notes to anyone, including Dickson, also released
the “Custodian” and canceled the force and effect of the Custodial Certifications. The evidence of
the parties’ intent and understanding beyond the almost meaningless Custodial Certifications fails
to establish a contractual relationship between Frascogna and BHT. Moreover, the arguments and

evidence BHT presented at Trial on the “Consumer Loan File(s)” indicates, standing alone, that
releasing the “Consumer Loan File(s)” to anyone released the “Custodian.”
The evidence to establish Frascogna and BHT as the “parties” of any agreement was not
convincing. Frascogna testified that to his knowledge and understanding, he had not contracted
with anyone but simply signed a letter addressed to Stone and BHT. In the absence of a written
agreement, action and conduct can evidence a contractual relationship. However, neither Dr.
Edwards nor a representative from BHT ever contacted Frascogna until January of 2012. By
remaining silent, BHT did not conduct itself as though there were an ongoing contractual
relationship with Frascogna, and Frascogna reasonably did not understand there to be one.

Further evidencing the lack of any intent to contract with BHT was the payment for the
services rendered by Frascogna. The MPF Agreement between Dickson and BHT divided the
custodian fee between BHT and CHFS. However, Dickson paid Frascogna $250.00 for each hour
he spent on the Custodial Certifications for a total of $2,000.00. Neither Dickson nor BHT
continued to pay Frascogna for any services related to Portfolio #7 after he signed the Fourth
Custodian Certification on July 3, 2011. Additionally, Frascogna, as late as February 8, 2012 in
an email, understood that Dickson was his client, not BHT. The email on February 21, 2012,
following Frascogna’s telephone conversation with Stone, was the first time BHT refers to
Frascogna as “custodian on behalf of Beher Holdings Trust” or to the “terms of the custodial
agreement and the custodial file delivery forms issued.” The evidence suggests that Frascogna
had an attorney-client relationship with Dickson, and that Frascogna was paid for his legal services
by Dickson. BHT’s claim of a contractual relationship with Frascogna is unsupported by the
evidence.
The Court finds that in the absence of evidence of any mutual assent between Frascogna

and BHT, there was no evidence of any objective manifestation of an intent to contract. Parties to
a contract must come to an agreement on the essential elements of the contract. King Metal Bldgs.,
Inc. v. Renasant Ins., Inc., 159 So. 3d 567, 573-74 (Miss Ct. App. 2014). Mutual assent is
described as the “meeting of the minds” and is often evidenced by a written agreement signed by
all parties. Wilkinson Cty. Senior Care, LLC v. Kirkland, 196 So. 3d 1143, 1149 (Miss. Ct. App.
2016). Mutual assent can also be evidenced through the actions and conduct of the parties. Id.
The parties must have a meeting of the minds on the essential elements of the contract, especially
when created without a written agreement.
As the testimony of Dr. Edwards on behalf of BHT and the testimony of Frascogna

demonstrated, the unilateral negotiations through Dickson eliminated mutual assent between the
two parties. Frascogna received the Custodial Certifications, confirmed that the information on
the Loan Notes that Dickson gave him corresponded with the entries on the spreadsheet, signed
the Custodial Certifications, and received payment for his services from Dickson. Dr. Edwards
believed that by signing the Custodial Certifications, Frascogna would act as a “Custodian” in the
same manner as the McCarley Firm. Dr. Edwards, however, also testified that the only “custodial
agreement obligations” of Frascogna were “to hold the [Loan Notes] in safe keeping for their
owner, Beher Holdings Trust.” Even Dr. Edwards’s testimony indicated BHT was unsure of the
scope of Frascogna’s “contractual” obligations. A contract is unenforceable if the material terms
are not sufficiently definite. Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d 266, 270 (Miss. 2003). The Court
finds that a contractual relationship, and any subsequent contractual duty, between BHT and
Frascogna did not exist.21
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The Court next considers whether a fiduciary relationship existed between Frascogna and

BHT in the absence of a contractual relationship. In Mississippi, fiduciary relationships can arise
in a variety of contexts. “Traditional fiduciary relationships are found in cases of trustee and
beneficiary, partners, principal and agents, guardian and ward, managing directors and
corporation.” Robley v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Miss., 935 So. 2d 990, 994 (Miss. 2006) (citation
omitted). Mississippi also recognizes informal fiduciary relationships “in a legal, moral, domestic,
or personal context, where there appears on the one side an overmastering influence or, on the
other, weakness, dependency or trust, justifiably reposed.” Lowery v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,
592 So. 2d 79, 83 (Miss. 1991) (quotations omitted). “Fiduciary relationships often turn on
questions of fact related to exertion of influence, whether a party trusted and relied on another

party, and whether the reliance was justified.” Gibson v. Williams, Williams & Montgomery, P.A.,
186 So. 3d 836, 852 (Miss. 2016).

21 The parties did not raise the argument that BHT was a third-party beneficiary of a
contractual relationship between Frascogna and Dickson. In reviewing the cases, litigants have
raised the question of a fiduciary duty owed to a third-party beneficiary. Mississippi law requires:
(1) the contract between the original parties must have been entered for the benefit of the third
party; or (2) such benefit is the direct result of the performance within the contemplation of the
parties as shown by its terms. Garrett Enters. Consol., Inc. v. Allen Utils., LLC, 176 So. 3d 800,
804-05 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (internal citations & quotations omitted). Since the parties did not
raise this issue, the Court does not consider the issue, particularly because, BHT, if anything, was
an incidental beneficiary and has no right to seek the enforcement of the terms of a contractual
relationship between other individuals or claim a fiduciary obligation. Garrett, 176 So. 3d at 805.
The Court finds that BHT has not produced evidence to establish a valid, justifiable
fiduciary relationship with Frascogna. Frascogna did not exert any influence over BHT. Before
January of 2012, Frascogna had no contact with BHT. Frascogna received the Custodial
Certifications from Allen, he verified the information with the Loan Notes that Dickson provided
to him, he returned the Loan Notes and Custodial Certifications to Dickson, Dickson sent the

Custodial Certifications to Dr. Edwards, and, it can be inferred that Dr. Edwards forwarded the
Custodial Certifications to BHT. (BHT’s Ex. 9). As the Court already has found, the Custodial
Certifications only certified Frascogna’s receipt of the Loan Notes. BHT did not rely on any other
representations by Frascogna because he made none. Instead, it appears that Dr. Edwards and
BHT relied on Dickson’s representations regarding the custodial arrangement with regard to the
Loan Notes. The Court rejects BHT’s argument that the Custodial Certifications charged
Frascogna with the same obligations and duties as the twelve (12)-page Custodial Agreement,
supplemented by at least six exhibits, charged the McCarley Firm. The Custodial Agreement was
from a different transaction. Frascogna was never contacted by the McCarley Firm. BHT never

instructed Frascogna to collaborate with the McCarley Firm. Frascogna never received a copy of
the Custodial Agreement. BHT’s understanding that Frascogna would perform tasks beyond
certifying receipt of the Loan Notes because of BHT’s understanding of their previous arrangement
with the McCarley Firm was unreasonable and unjustified. Frascogna made no representations to
BHT that he would keep the Loan Notes in a safe location, maintain custody of the Loan Notes
indefinitely, procure insurance, or keep them away from Dickson.
BHT also contended that Frascogna owed a fiduciary duty established by the Mississippi
Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”)—specifically, Rule 1.15. The official comment to
Rule 1.15 provides that “[a] lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a
professional fiduciary.” MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (Miss. Bar Ass’n). The official
comment also states that “[t]he obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those
arising from activity other than rendering legal services.” Id. Here, Frascogna was acting as an
attorney to Dickson. As the Court has found, Frascogna did not breach a fiduciary duty in
performing the services he was hired by Dickson to perform. In Pierce v. Cook, 992 So. 2d 612

(Miss. 2008), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the “[v]iolation of a Rule of Professional
Conduct does not give rise to a cause of action nor does it create a presumption that a legal duty
has been breached.” Id. at 625-26. The Rules are not designed to create a basis for civil liability
but to provide guidance to lawyers. Id. The Court does not find any evidence that supports a
holding that Frascogna violated his fiduciary obligation to BHT because of the services he
rendered as counsel for Dickson in this transaction. The Rules do not create a fiduciary
relationship between BHT and Frascogna.
The Court has found no evidence of a fiduciary relationship between BHT and Frascogna.
Based on the evidence presented at the Trial, Dickson engaged Frascogna for the limited purpose

of confirming and certifying receipt of the Loan Notes in each installment. Dickson and Allen
provided Frascogna with the Loan Notes and Custodial Certifications that confirmed the presence
of the Loan Notes. Frascogna was compensated for his time and returned the Loan Notes to
Dickson. The evidence presented at Trial does not support any ongoing obligation of Frascogna
to BHT or a breach of any fiduciary duty.
C. Dischargeability & Other Issues
In resolving the issues put forth by the parties for Trial, the Court finds that: (1) Frascogna
did not breach a contract or breach a fiduciary duty entitling BHT to damages in the amount of
$9,826,585.00; (2) whether BHT properly designated Dr. Edwards as an expert in damages is
unnecessary to address because the Court finds no basis for BHT’s claim against Frascogna; (3)
whether BHT’s cause of action against Frascogna accrued after November 2, 2011, the date of
Frascogna’s bankruptcy filing, is unnecessary to address as well for the same reason; (4) whether
the actions of Frascogna constitute fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,
embezzlement, or larceny so as to except from discharge any debt owed to BHT pursuant to 11

U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) is unnecessary to address because the Court finds BHT has no claim for breach
of contract or breach of a fiduciary duty; and (5) whether the actions of Frascogna constitute willful
and malicious injury to BHT so as to except from discharge any debt owed to BHT pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) is unnecessary to address as well for the same reason. (PTO at 12).
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that BHT did not meet its burden to prove an
underlying claim against Frascogna. BHT did not establish an existing contractual or fiduciary
relationship between BHT and Frascogna. As a result, the Complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice. A separate final judgment on the Adversary Complaint will be entered in accordance

with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9021.
## END OF OPINION ##

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10459061. Public record. Not legal advice.