# William Joseph Namen, II

> United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · April 5, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456426

## Case

- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 5, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456426

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that § 362(a)(1) “makes clear that the ‘continuation’ of a judicial process, such as a garnishment, to collect a debt that arose before the bankruptcy is stayed by the bankruptcy filing.”
- holding that “[n]o action” by the creditor “is unacceptable; no action is action to thwart the effectiveness of the automatic stay.”

## Opinion text

ORDERED.
Dated: April 05, 2023

Jas □□ □ Bureess” ae
United Statés Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

In re:
WILLIAM J. NAMEN, II Case No. 3:22-bk-02272-BAJ
Chapter 11
Debtor.
eee
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW GRANTING
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
This Case came before the Court for trial on January 12, 2023, on the Motion for Sanctions
for Violation of the Automatic Stay (the “Motion”) (Doc. 14), filed by the Debtor, and the Response
in Opposition to the Motion (the “Response”) (Doc. 22), filed by Cadlerock Joint Venture, LP (the
“Creditor”). At the conclusion of the trial, the Court directed the parties to submit post-trial briefs.
The Debtor alleges that the Creditor violated the automatic stay by failing to timely dissolve
a pre-petition Writ of Garnishment (the “Writ”), which resulted in continued post-petition
garnishments detrimental to the Debtor’s reorganization efforts. By the Motion, the Debtor seeks
sanctions against the Creditor for the resulting damages. The Creditor argues that it was not
“required to affirmatively dissolve the Writ simply because [the] Debtor filed for bankruptcy.”
(Doc. 70, p. 2). The Creditor also attempts to shift the blame for the post-petition garnishments
to the garnishee. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the Creditor had an affirmative

duty to dissolve the Writ, and failed to act timely, even after the Court specifically directed the
Creditor to take immediate action to dissolve the Writ. Therefore, the Court will sanction the
Creditor for willfully violating the automatic stay and failing to comply with a court order.
Findings of Fact

The Debtor filed a petition for relief under Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code on November 10, 2022 (the “Petition Date”). The Debtor owns and operates a podiatric
surgery business, William J. Namen, II, D.P.M., P.A., in Jacksonville, Florida.
As of the Petition Date, the Debtor had multiple deficiency judgments against him, which
stemmed from various financial setbacks related to certain business properties and partnerships in
which the Debtor had an interest. (Doc. 4, p. 1). These financial difficulties also resulted in
sizeable IRS liens being entered against the Debtor in 2010 and 2011. Id.
On January 3, 2013, as the result of a foreclosure deficiency, the Circuit Court for the
Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida (the “State Court”) entered a judgment
against the Debtor in the amount of $1,052,039.22, with a statutory interest rate of 4.75% per
annum (the “Judgment”).1 On May 28, 2021, the Judgment was assigned to the Creditor and

subsequently recorded in the Official Records of Duval County, Florida.
On October 4, 2022, the State Court issued the Writ, which named Blue Cross Blue Shield
(“BCBS”) as the garnishee, and William J. Namen, a/k/a William J. Namen, II, as the defendant.
The Writ did not reference any other person or entity. (Cr.’s Ex. 1).
On October 10, 2022, the Creditor served the Writ upon BCBS. In response to the Writ,
BCBS filed an answer in the State Court Action. In the answer, BCBS stated it was financially
indebted to the Debtor and that it would “withhold the sum of $11,838.49 and continue to withhold

1 Duval County Circuit Court Case 16-2010-CA-003818-XXXX-MA. (the “State Court Action”) (Debtor’s Ex. 1).
future payments due and owing to the Defendant until further Order of the Court.” (Cr.’s Ex. 3,
p. 2) (emphasis added).
Soon after the Petition Date, Debtor’s counsel filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy in the State
Court Action to alert the Creditor to the existence of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 and

requested that the “garnishment placed on Blue Cross Blue Shield [be] released as soon as
possible[.]” (Cr.’s Ex. 4). The Creditor’s attorney responded that “it is not automatic that upon
the filing of a petition for bankruptcy relief that a writ of garnishment is to be dissolved as a matter
of course.” Id.
On November 17, 2022, the Debtor’s attorney again contacted the Creditor’s attorney via
e-mail regarding the dissolution of the Writ and specifically informed the Creditor that BCBS
would “not release any of the pre-petition or post petition receivables until [the Creditor’s
attorney’s] office file[d] a Notice of the dissolution of the garnishment.” Id. The Debtor’s attorney
also stated that while the right to the pre-petition funds could be determined at a later date, “the
creditor certainly ha[d] a duty to release the garnishment as to the post petition receivables.” Id.

The Creditor, however, declined to take affirmative action and attempted to shift the responsibility
and blame onto BCBS. In response, the Debtor filed the Motion.
On December 20, 2022, the Court held a preliminary hearing on the Motion. At the
hearing, the Debtor’s attorney informed the Court that due to the Writ, BCBS was holding pre-
petition funds of the Debtor in the amount of $11,838.49, which had been garnished pre-petition.
The primary focus and concern of the Debtor, however, was to the continued garnishment of post-
petition funds in violation of the automatic stay. The Debtor’s counsel informed the Court that
BCBS would continue to garnish post-petition funds until the Creditor moved to dissolve the Writ.
Although the Creditor acknowledged that BCBS should not continue to garnish and hold post-
petition funds, it also attempted to deflect blame onto BCBS by pointing out that the funds being
held were in the name of the Debtor’s P.A., not the Debtor individually. Despite raising this
“ambiguity,” the Creditor still maintained that it held lien rights to the funds garnished pre-petition
and stated that its focus was on maintaining those lien rights.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court stated that its immediate concern was to ensure
that the Writ be dissolved so that the Debtor’s ability to pay his employees would not continue to
be adversely affected. The Court ordered the Creditor to dissolve the Writ with BCBS and
explicitly stated that the Debtor’s future receivables should not be garnished. The Court’s ruling
that the Creditor was to “immediately file” a Notice of Dissolution in the State Court Action was
clear and unambiguous. (Doc. 31).
Approximately two weeks later, on January 5, 2023, the Court held a continued hearing on
the Motion. The Court learned that despite the Creditor’s initial assurance that it had moved to
dissolve the Writ, it had failed to do so. As a result, BCBS was continuing to garnish earnings
post-petition, which directly impacted the Debtor’s ability to fund payroll. The Creditor informed

the Court that its failure to dissolve the Writ was an “oversight.” Concerningly, the Creditor also
acknowledged that despite its failure to dissolve the Writ, it had filed a “Notice of Intent to Serve
Subpoenas Duces Tecum” on non-debtor parties in the State Court Action in-between hearings.
(Cr.’s Ex. 5). In response, the Court expressed its disappointment and concern over the Creditor’s
failure to comply with the Court’s order. The Court also reiterated how important it was that the
continuing garnishments cease and that the post-petition funds be released because the Debtor’s
ability to make payroll for his medical office’s employees was continuing to be impacted.
Following the hearing, which was almost two months after the Petition Date, the Creditor finally
took affirmative action to dissolve the Writ. (Cr.’s Ex. 2).
The Debtor asserts that the Creditor’s delay in dissolving the Writ resulted in
approximately $70,000 being garnished post-petition, which led to him not being able to fund his
payroll and temporarily losing several employees integral to the efficient running of his medical
practice. The Debtor also testified that approximately one-third of his earnings come from funds

owed to him from BCBS, and that the payments go directly into his PA account. (D’s Ex. 2). In
his post-trial brief, the Debtor asserts that the Creditor violated the automatic stay based solely on
the funds garnished post-petition.
Conclusions of Law
This Case illustrates how matters can escalate when a creditor makes the unilateral decision
that its action or inaction does not violate the automatic stay. The facts and circumstances
surrounding this Case are straightforward. Pre-petition, the Creditor served a Writ of Garnishment
on BCBS, which resulted in an initial pre-petition garnishment of $11,838.49 from funds BCBS
owed from services performed by the Debtor. Post-petition, BCBS continued to garnish funds and
informed the Debtor that the garnishments would continue until the Creditor took affirmative

action to dissolve the Writ. Although the Debtor’s attorney immediately notified the Creditor of
the bankruptcy filing and contacted the Creditor via email about dissolving the Writ to stop the
continued garnishment of post-petition funds, the Creditor declined to do so. The Creditor’s
refusal to dissolve the Writ, led to the filing of the Motion. At the preliminary hearing on the
Motion, the Court unequivocally ruled that the Creditor was required to immediately dissolve the
Writ and that BCBS was to release to the Debtor any post-petition funds being held. (Doc. 31).
Despite the Court’s oral ruling and clear directive in the Order, the Creditor still failed to take
affirmative action to dissolve the Writ. It was not until after the Court held a continued hearing
on January 5, 2023, and expressed its concern and dismay that the Creditor had failed to follow
the Court’s directive, that the Creditor finally took action to dissolve the Writ.
In support of its position, the Creditor asserts that the Writ was not a continuing writ and
that pursuant to a recent Supreme Court decision it was “not required to affirmatively dissolve the

Writ simply because the Debtor filed for bankruptcy.” (Doc. 70, p. 2); see City of Chicago v.
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585; 208 L. Ed. 384 (2021). The Creditor also attempts to shifts the blame to
BCBS and argues, “BCBS chose to withhold the additional funds, not Cadle. BCBS chose to
ignore the stay, not Cadle.” (Doc. 70, p. 4).
The Court disagrees. First, the Debtor brings the Motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§
362(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). In Fulton, the Supreme Court specially addressed § 362(a)(3) and
recognized that its ruling did not “settle the meaning of other subsections of [§] 362(a).” Fulton,
141 S. Ct. at 592. Further, the Creditor’s interpretation of Fulton, as it relates to § 363(a)(3),
expands beyond the narrow confines set forth by the Supreme Court of maintaining the “status
quo.” Finally, the Creditor’s attempt to shift the blame to BCBS is not permissible.

A. Legal Standard under 11 U.S.C. § 362
The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 is one of the most crucial protections that a debtor
is afforded under the United States Bankruptcy Code. “The automatic stay is necessary to permit
the debtor breathing space so that he may reorganize his affairs, free from the harassment of wage
garnishments, foreclosure proceedings and repossessions. The scope of the automatic stay is
necessarily broad so that debtors may reorganize their affairs in an orderly and equitable fashion.”
In re Briskey, 258 B.R. 473, 477 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2001); see also Mwangi v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (In re Mwangi), 764 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Haw.
Auto. Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1993)) (recognizing that the automatic stay “is
designed to effect an immediate freeze of the status quo by precluding and nullifying post-petition
actions, judicial or nonjudicial, in nonbankruptcy fora against the debtor or affecting the property
of the estate.”).
The Debtor alleges that the Creditor violated the automatic stay under §§ 362(a)(1), (a)(2),

and (a)(3) which provide that the filing of a petition under the bankruptcy code operates as a stay
of:
(1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;

(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;

(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;

11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Further, under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1), “an individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay provided by [ § 362] shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). Historically,
it has been held that “[a] violation of the automatic stay is willful if the party knew the automatic
stay was invoked and intended the actions which violated the stay.” Jove Eng'g v IRS (In re Jove
Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1555 (11th Cir. 1996). The majority of cases, however, in which
specific intent to violate the automatic stay is not required, were decided prior to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019).
The issue in Taggart did not arise under § 362(k), but rather in the context of a violation of
the discharge injunction. The Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court “may hold a creditor in
civil contempt for violating a discharge order where there is not a ‘fair ground of doubt’ as to
whether the creditor's conduct might be lawful under the discharge order.” Id. at 1804. “The
standard is an objective one. A person, regardless of his subjective belief, may be subject to
contempt sanctions when he violates the discharge order based upon an ‘objectively unreasonable
understanding’ of the order's scope.” In re Sanders, No. 8:20-BK-02731-RCT, 2020 WL 6020347,

at *2–3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2020).
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Taggart, “some courts have assumed without
deciding that ‘willfulness’ under § 362(k)(1) changed to include Taggart's ‘fair ground of doubt’
standard.” In re Abril, No. 8:20-BK-08218-RCT, 2021 WL 3162637, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. June
24, 2021). The Court will not debate the issue of whether Taggart changed the “willfulness”
standard under § 362(k) because, under either standard, the Court finds that the Creditor’s actions
were willful.
B. The Creditor’s failure to timely dissolve the writ of garnishment is a
willful violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(1) and § 362(a)(2).

Section 362(a)(1) prohibits the “continuation ... of a judicial, administrative, or other action

or proceeding against the debtor ....” As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, a creditor must “dismiss

or stay” pending collection actions:

The continuation against judicial actions includes the maintenance of collection
actions filed in state court . . . A party violating the automatic stay, through
continuing a collection action in a non-bankruptcy forum, must automatically
dismiss or stay such proceeding or risk possible sanctions for willful violations
pursuant to § 362(h).

Eskanos & Adler, P.C., v. Leetien, 309 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). The

court in Eskanos also cautioned that “the automatic stay requires an immediate freeze of the status

quo by precluding and nullifying post-petition actions.” Id.; see also In re Myers, 402 B.R. 370,

372 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2009) (stating that § 362(a)(1) “makes clear that the ‘continuation’ of a
judicial process, such as a garnishment, to collect a debt that arose before the bankruptcy is stayed
by the bankruptcy filing.”). The automatic stay also stops “the enforcement against the debtor, or
against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case.” §
362(a)(2). Ultimately, the automatic stay is meant “to shield the debtor from financial pressure

during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.” Winters By & Through McMahon v. George
Mason Bank, 94 F.3d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 1996).
In this case, the Creditor failed to timely either stay or dismiss the pre-petition garnishment
action against the Debtor, even after the Court directed it to dissolve the Writ.2 Throughout the
case, the Creditor has maintained that it was “not affirmatively required to dissolve the Writ simply
because the Debtor filed for bankruptcy.” (Doc. 70, p. 2). The Creditor’s position, however, is
incorrect under the facts and circumstances of this case. First, the Creditor incorrectly argues that
case law on continuing writs of garnishment is not applicable because it “did not ask for post-
petition funds to be held, did not instruct any funds to be held other than pre-petition, and took no
action to seek a lien on post-petition funds.” Id. at p. 3. The Creditor also impermissibly attempts

to shift blame to BCBS by maintaining that “BCBS was not required to hold post-petition funds,
but unilaterally elected to continue to garnish funds as provided for by Florida Statute § 77.06
(03),” and that “BCBS chose to withhold additional funds, not Cadle. BCBS chose to ignore the
stay, not Cadle.” Id. at p. 4. The Creditor’s arguments are misguided and not aligned with
applicable law.
Under Florida law, a garnishee is required to “retain . . . any deposit, account, or tangible
or intangible personal property in the possession or control of such garnishee” until disposition or

2 The Creditor also failed to take appropriate action as to its alleged claim of lien to the pre-petition funds garnished
by BCBS. Despite adamantly asserting it had a lien on such funds, the Creditor never filed a Motion for Relief from
Stay or other similar motion. See Doc. 70, p. 2 (the Creditor specifically argued that the “case appears to indicate,
unavoidable lien rights with respect to the initial $11,838.49 that was garnished.).
dissolution of the writ. § 77.06(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). Notably, “[i]f a garnishee fails to retain the
property of the defendant or otherwise comply with the writ, the plaintiff may obtain a monetary
judgment against the garnishee.” Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A. v. First Am. Holdings, Inc., 982
So. 2d 628, 632 (Fla. 2008); see also, § 77.081(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2002).

In balancing the risk of liability for a garnishee, the Florida Legislature “has provided
immunity for any garnishee acting in good faith.” Arnold, 982 So. 2d at 632. Specifically, Florida
Statute § 77.06(3) (2002) states:
In any case where a garnishee in good faith is in doubt as to whether any
indebtedness or property is required by law to be included in the garnishee's
answer or retained by it, the garnishee may include and retain the same, subject to
the provisions of s. 77.19 and subject to disposition as provided in this chapter, and
in such case the garnishee shall not be liable for so doing to the defendant or to any
other person claiming the same or any interest therein or claiming to have sustained
damage on account thereof.

(Emphasis added). Therefore, Florida Statute § 77.06(3), “acts as a shield from liability for
garnishees who have acted in good faith in accordance with their statutory responsibilities.”
Arnold, 982 So. 2d at 633. Other than the Creditor’s bald assertions seeking to shift blame to
BCBS, there is no evidence that BCBS was not acting in “good faith.”
Further, the Creditor was on notice that BCBS would continue to garnish funds.
Specifically, the response filed by BCBS in the State Court Action in answer to the Writ states:
“[g]arnishee will withhold the sum of $11,838.49 and continue to withhold future payments due
and owing to the Defendant until further Order of the Court.” (Cr.’s Ex. 3). The Creditor was also
repeatedly informed by Debtor’s counsel that BCBS was continuing to garnish funds. Based on
the above, the Court finds that BCBS was acting within the guidelines prescribed by Florida law.
Next, the Court will address the Creditor’s misplaced argument which attempts to shift to
BCBS the affirmative duty to stop the continuing post-petition garnishment. See In re Elder, 12
B.R. 491, 494 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that “[n]o action” by the creditor “is unacceptable;
no action is action to thwart the effectiveness of the automatic stay.”). In Elder, the court
recognized that the creditor is the responsible party “to stop the downhill snowballing of a
continuing garnishment,” stating:

Part of what is stayed in 11 U.S.C. [§] 362 is “continuation.” Garnishment involves
a creditor, a garnishee, and a court. Creditor sets in motion the process. Creditor is
in the driver's seat and very much controls what is done thereafter if it chooses. If
the “continuation” is to be stayed, it cannot choose to do nothing and pass the buck
to the garnishee or the court in which the garnishment is filed to effectuate the stay.
Positive action on the part of the creditor is necessary so that “continuation” may
be stayed.

Id. Similar to the court in Elder, another bankruptcy court recognized:
In a garnishment proceeding, no amounts should be seized or withheld from the
Debtor's wages after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. It is clear beyond all doubt
that garnishing creditors are required to take all necessary action to release their
garnishments in order to implement the automatic stay, upon receiving notice of a
bankruptcy filing. This is true even if the garnishment process became effective
prior to the date of the bankruptcy filing and did not, at the time it first became
effective, violate the automatic stay. Indeed, the creditor must not only cease from
taking any affirmative action which would violate the automatic stay, it must also
take all necessary affirmative action to stop proceedings which are in violation of
the automatic stay.

In re Briskey, 258 B.R. 473, 477 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2001) (citing In re Johnson, 253 B.R. 857, 861
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000)); see also In re Myers, 402 B.R. 370 at 373 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2009)
(holding that a “creditor can satisfy its duty either by dismissing the garnishment or by staying it,”
and that once the creditor has notice of the bankruptcy, it “must take affirmative action with respect
to the garnishment and not simply allow it to run its course.”)3; Skillforce, Inc. v. Hafer, 509 B.R.

3 In Myers, the court accurately noted, “Briskey does not require a garnishing creditor to release its lien on the funds
in the hands of the garnishee or the court through which the garnishment runs. Instead, Briskey requires the judgment
creditor to take affirmative action to stop the proceedings; that is, to cease further, post-petition wage deductions
pursuant to the garnishment and to stop the further distribution of the garnished funds. Nothing in the Briskey holding
requires the judgment creditor to lose its lien on those funds garnished prepetition, which remain in the hands of the
garnishee or the court through which the garnishment ran.” Myers, 402 B.R. at 373.
523, 531 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“A creditor or the creditor's legal representative has an affirmative duty,
post-petition, to discontinue any proceeding it has initiated or continued, or to take other
appropriate steps to halt that proceeding if the proceeding: (i) jeopardizes or threatens in any way
the integrity of the bankruptcy estate, or (ii) exposes the debtor to harassment or coercion or

otherwise inhibits the debtor's ‘breathing spell from [her] creditors.’”).
As previously stated, the Creditor in this case failed to stop the “snowballing” of the Writ,
which in turn directly affected the Debtor’s finances and his ability to pay his employees. Upon
receiving notice of the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the Creditor not only failed to take affirmative
action to dissolve the Writ or stay the case as to the Debtor in state court, but it also failed to
dissolve the Writ after the Court specifically instructed it to do so. Even more baffling, the Creditor
admitted at the continued hearing that it had filed subpoenas on non-debtor parties in the State
Court Action, while at the same time failing to dissolve the Writ. Although the Creditor maintains
that its failure to dissolve the Writ was an honest oversight, the fact remains that the Creditor did
not prioritize the Court’s directive to do so. This is particularly concerning because, at the hearing

on December 20, 2022, the Court emphasized the importance of the Writ being dissolved so that
the Debtor could pay his employees who rely upon their wages to support their families. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court finds the Creditor committed a willful violation of the automatic stay
under § 362(a)(1) and § 362(a)(2).
C. Fulton is not applicable under the facts and circumstances of this
case because the writ of garnishment altered the status quo.

A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court established the principle “that mere
retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate § 362(a)(3) of
the Bankruptcy Code.” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 592. In Fulton, the Court had to determine whether
the City of Chicago’s failure to return debtors’ vehicles which were impounded pre-petition for
the nonpayment of fines violated § 363(a)(3). In rejecting the idea that § 362(a)(3) encompasses
“an affirmative turnover obligation,” the Court stated:
The language used in § 362(a)(3) suggests that merely retaining possession of estate
property does not violate the automatic stay. Under that provision, the filing of a
bankruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the
property of the estate. Taken together, the most natural reading of these terms –
“stay,” “act,” and “exercise control” – is that § 362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts
that would disturb the status quo of estate property as of the time when the
bankruptcy petition was filed.

Id. at 590. Notably, the Court held that the “phrase ‘exercise control’ . . . simply extend[s] the stay
to acts that would change the status quo with respect to intangible property and acts that would
change the status quo with respect to tangible property without ‘obtain[ing]’ such property.” Id.
at 592. Simply stated, “§ 362(a)(3) prohibits collection efforts outside the bankruptcy proceeding
that would change the status quo.” Id. at 591.
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Fulton as to why the City of Chicago was not
in violation of § 362(a)(3) focused on the fact that the status quo was maintained. The instant case
is clearly distinguishable from Fulton because the continued post-petition garnishments materially
altered the status quo. The only aspect of this case that is analogous to Fulton is with respect to
the funds that were garnished pre-petition. The Debtor, however, is not claiming a stay violation
as to those funds.
The instant case is also distinguishable from a Ninth Circuit BAP opinion which held that
a city was not required to dismiss a garnishment proceeding, as it had already moved to stay the
state court action and was “merely preserv[ing] the status quo” when it chose not to “affirmatively
release the frozen bank account funds.” In re Stuart, 632 B.R. 531, 542-43 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2021).
In addition to the city in Stuart immediately moving to stay the non-bankruptcy case, there was
also no continuing post-petition garnishment of the debtor’s funds. See also, Margavitch v.
Southlake Holdings, LLC, Case No. 5:19-bk-05353-MJC, 2021 WL 4597760, at *6 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. Oct. 6, 2021) (finding no violation of the automatic stay because the creditor “maintained the
status quo as of the petition date.”). Notably, the court in Stuart stated,
We emphasize that the City's garnishment did not capture any more funds
postpetition. The result would likely be different, as in certain cases cited by Mr.
Stuart, e.g., In re LeGrand, 612 B.R. 604 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2020), if this were a
wage garnishment which attached to the debtor's postpetition wages or a bank
account garnishment that encompassed postpetition deposits to the account. Here,
neither BOA nor the City was actively collecting any debt from Mr. Stuart; staying
the State Court Action and maintaining the freeze on the accounts was merely a
continuation of the status quo as it existed on the petition date and collected nothing
further from Mr. Stuart.

In re Stuart, 632 B.R. at 543, n. 12. Conversely, the Creditor in this case did not move to stay the
non-bankruptcy case as to the Debtor and impermissibly attempted to shift the burden to BCBS.
Ultimately, the Creditor unabashedly “took the decision-making process into [its] own hands,”4
when it “advised the Debtor that the Writ is a lien that Debtor could challenge as a preference, but
that the law does not require dissolution of a writ automatically upon the filing for bankruptcy.”
(Doc. 70, p. 9). Under the facts and circumstances of this case, however, the Creditor was required
to either stay or dissolve the Writ to prevent the continued post-petition garnishment of funds
which altered the status quo.
As the decision in Fulton is not applicable, the Court will consider the Debtor’s argument
that the Creditor is also in violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(3). Specifically, the
Debtor asserts that the funds garnished post-petition are property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 1186(a)(2), which provides,

4 See In re Roche, 361 B.R. 615, 622 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (recognizing that “[b]y refusing [Debtor’s] repeated
requests for release of the garnishment and by taking no action of their own, Defendants took the decision-making
process into their own hands rather than allowing the court to balance [Debtor’s] rights in the property against the
Defendants' lien rights.).
(a) Inclusions. - If a plan is confirmed under section 1191(b) of this title, property
of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541 of this
title—
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the date of commencement
of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under
chapter 7, 12, or 13 of this title, whichever occurs first.

11 U.S.C.A. § 1186 (West).
On March 30, 2023, the Debtor’s plan of reorganization was confirmed under 11 U.S.C. §
1191(b), which therefore makes post-petition earnings of the Debtor property of the estate. The
Creditor, however, contends that the funds are not property of the estate because the funds belong
to the Debtor’s P.A., and not to the Debtor individually. This argument places the Creditor in an
untenable situation because from the inception of the case, the Creditor has vehemently asserted
its lien rights in the funds garnished pre-petition from the same account. The Creditor cannot
maintain contradictory positions for the sole purpose of advancing its interests. Further, even
assuming, without deciding, that the post-petition earnings cannot be construed as “earnings from
services performed by the debtor,” the Creditor would still be subject to sanctions for failing to
dissolve the Writ pursuant to the Court’s directive to do so.
Conclusion
The “snowballing” effect of the Writ resulted in the post-petition garnishment of
approximately $70,000 in funds BCBS owed for services performed by the Debtor. Ultimately,
the continued garnishments resulted in the Debtor not being able to adequately fund payroll, which
led to him temporarily losing several employees whom he considered integral to the smooth and
efficient running of his medical practice. The cascade of negative consequences could have been
mitigated if the Creditor had moved to stay the State Court Action as to the Debtor or had dissolved
the Writ in a timely fashion. Unfortunately, for all parties, the Creditor decided to play the role of
the Court and interpret on its own what it deemed the law to be. This resulted in damages to the
Debtor, for which the Creditor will now be held responsible. Further, although the Court is here
to adjudicate disputes, the violations of the automatic stay that continued to occur, even after the
Court directed that the Writ should be immediately dissolved, is not a good use of judicial
resources. Creditors should take note of this. All parties would be in a better position today if the

Creditor had not taken matters into its own hands. As the Court has determined that the Creditor
willfully violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362, a second trial will be held on the issue
of damages. A separate order will be entered consistent with these Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Bryan K. Mickler, Esquire, is directed to serve a copy of this Order on interested parties who are
non-CM/ECF users and to file a proof of service within three (3) days of entry of the Order.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456426. Public record. Not legal advice.
