# Gateway Radiology Consultants P.A. v. Carranza, in Her Capacity as Admin fo the U.S. Sma

> United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida · June 8, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456294

## Case

- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** June 8, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

ORDERED.

Dated: June 08, 2020 2 - é Zi } Vf
Michael G. Williamson
United States Bankmptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
www.flmb.uscourts.gov
In re: Case No. 8:19-bk-04971-MGW
Chapter 11
Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A.,
Debtor.
□
Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A., Adv. No. 8:20-ap-00330-MGW
Plaintiff,
V.
Jovita Carranza, in her capacity as
Administrator for the U.S. Small
Business Administration, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON CHAPTER 11 DEBTOR’S
ELIGIBLITY FOR PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LOANS
Because of the economic uncertainty caused by COVID-19, more than 20
million Americans have lost their jobs. To keep American workers employed, and to

make sure they get paid, Congress passed the CARES Act, the largest stimulus
package in history. At the heart of the CARES Act is the Paycheck Protection
Program, which provides hundreds of billions of dollars in funding to small

businesses to cover payroll, mortgage interest, rent, and utility costs.
Although referred to as PPP “loans,” the Paycheck Protection Program
functions like a grant. So long as a PPP borrower uses the “loan” for covered
expenses (payroll, mortgage interest, rent, and utilities) the entire “loan” is forgiven.
Because the loans are designed to be forgiven, both Congress and the SBA

Administrator have dispensed with the underwriting typically required for SBA
loans.
Even so, the SBA has promulgated a rule disqualifying debtors from
participating in the Paycheck Protection Program because they supposedly pose an
unacceptably high risk of using PPP “loans” for noncovered expenses, as well as an

unacceptably high risk of not repaying any unforgiven amounts. Gateway Radiology
Consultants, P.A., a chapter 11 debtor, asks the Court to enjoin the SBA
Administrator from disqualifying it from participating in the Paycheck Protection
Program.
The Court concludes that the SBA Administrator exceeded her authority when

she promulgated the rule disqualifying Gateway Radiology from the Paycheck
Protection Program. In order for a borrower to be eligible for a PPP Loan, Congress
could have required borrowers to certify that they are not in bankruptcy. But
Congress chose not to. By engrafting onto the Paycheck Protection Program a
requirement that Congress chose not to insist on, the SBA Administrator exceeded
her statutory authority.
Even if the SBA Administrator had not exceeded her authority, the rule

disqualifying Gateway Radiology from participating in the Paycheck Protection
Program is arbitrary and capricious because:
• the SBA Administrator considered factors Congress did
not intend her to consider (i.e., collectability);
• the SBA Administrator failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem (i.e., how the bankruptcy process
promotes the same public policy as the CARES Act and
how it makes it unlikely a chapter 11 debtor will use a PPP
“loan” for noncovered expenses); and
• the SBA Administrator’s explanation for her rule is
contrary to the evidence before her (i.e., chapter 11 debtors
are less likely to use PPP “loans” for noncovered expenses
and more likely to repay PPP “loans”).
The Court will therefore enjoin the SBA Administrator from disqualifying Gateway
Radiology from participating in the Payroll Protection Program.
I. BACKGROUND1

A. COVID-19 caused the loss of more than 20 million jobs
and threatened the loss of millions more.

On March 13, 2020, the President declared a national emergency.2 Just three
months earlier, Chinese officials detected an outbreak of a novel strain of
coronavirus (known as COVID-19) in Wuhan, China.3 The disease quickly spread to
the United States and other countries. By mid-March, when the President declared a
national emergency, the United States had almost 2,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases,4
and the disease’s rapid spread—thousands of new cases were being reported each
day—was threatening to strain the nation’s healthcare system.5

1 The background section of this opinion recounts the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court may, on its own, take judicial notice of facts that are
generally known within its territorial jurisdiction or facts that can accurately and readily be
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), (c).
That includes publicly available data, such as labor statistics. Tuttle v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Tuttle), 600 B.R. 783, 806 (E.D. Wis. 2019). It can also include other statistics compiled by
government agencies, such as the number of COVID-19 cases when the parties don’t dispute the
number (or, if they do, the existence of publications containing the number of cases) and public
statements about COVID-19, such as the President’s declaration of a national emergency. McGhee v.
City of Flagstaff, 2020 WL 2309881, at *3 – 4 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2020).
2 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-
concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.
3 https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/question-and-answers-hub/q-
a-detail/q-a-coronaviruses.
4 https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html.
5 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-
concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.
To keep our country’s healthcare system from being overwhelmed, and to stem
the tide of what had become a global pandemic, the United States started
implementing social distancing measures. Those measures included statewide Stay-

at-Home orders; closing schools; closing non-essential businesses; banning large
gatherings; and limiting restaurants to takeout or delivery.6 While necessary to
“flatten the curve,”7 the social distancing measures came with a cost.
Personal consumption in March 2020 fell by 7.5%—the largest recorded drop
in history.8 And nonfarm employment dropped by almost 900,000 jobs, before

plummeting by more than 20 million jobs in April.9 Those job losses were
widespread: the leisure and hospitality industry lost 7.7 million jobs (almost half the
industry), while the education and health services industry; the professional and
business services industry; and the retail trade industry each lost more than 2 million

6 https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/state-data-and-policy-actions-to-address-
coronavirus/.
7 “The term “flatten the curve,” originating from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
has been used widely to describe the effects of social distancing interventions.” Laura Matrajt &
Tiffany Leung, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Social Distancing Interventions to Delay or Flatten the
Epidemic Curve of Coronavirus Disease, Emerging Infectious Diseases, August 2020, available at
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/8/20-1093_article#r26.
8 https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/personal-income-and-outlays-march-2020; see also Carlie
Porterfield, U.S. Consumer Spending Sees Sharpest Monthly Drop Ever Recorded, Forbes, Apr. 30, 2020,
available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2020/04/30/us-consumer-spending-sees-sharpest-
monthly-drop-ever-recorded/#469a619420da (“Consumer spending—which drives around 70% of the
U.S. economy—dropped by 7.5% in March, the steepest drop in history since records began being
kept in 1959 according to the U.S. Commerce Department, as businesses close, layoffs abound and
Americans shelter-in-place during the coronavirus pandemic”).
9 https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.
jobs.10 As a result, the unemployment rate skyrocketed from 4.4% to 14.7%—the
largest single-month increase in history.11

B. Congress provided nearly $350 billion in funding for
forgivable loans so small businesses could make payroll.

To provide emergency relief to American workers and small businesses,
Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES
Act”).12 Although the CARES Act was intended, in part, to help American workers
who had already lost their job, much of the $2 trillion in relief provided for under the
CARES Act was intended to preserve American jobs.13 Two of the ways it did so are
relevant here.
First, as part of a $454 billion relief package, Congress directed the Treasury
Department to provide financing to lenders who make direct loans to mid-size
businesses (businesses with between 500 and 10,000 employees).14 In exchange for

10 https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.
11 https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.
12 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
13 Id. at §§ 1102, 4003; see also 166 Cong. Rec. E349-04 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2020) (speech of Rep.
McHenry) (“My ultimate goal for this legislation is to keep Americans employed. Specifically, this
bill will provide relief to our small businesses to help them keep employees on payroll and prepare
those businesses to be up and running as soon as America is open for business again”); 166 Cong.
Rec. E339-01 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2020) (speech of Rep. Jayapal) (“One of the most important things
I heard from my district was the pain and suffering of small business owners and non-profits of all
sizes. The CARES Act creates a Payment Protection Program that helps businesses keep workers on
payroll, through $350 billion in forgivable loans that can also be used for payroll, rent, utilities, and
other necessary costs that will help small businesses weather the crisis.”).
14 CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4003(b)(4), 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
9042).
favorable repayment terms, borrowers have to agree to retain or restore 90% of their
workforce.15 To be eligible for the mid-size loan program, a borrower has to certify
(among other things) that it is not a debtor in bankruptcy.16

Second, for small businesses (those with 500 employees or fewer), Congress
initially provided $349 billion in funding for the Paycheck Protection Program.17
Under the Paycheck Protection Program, eligible small businesses can borrow up to
two and a half times their average monthly payroll.18 The loan proceeds can be used
to pay:

• payroll costs;
• group health benefits and insurance premiums; and
• mortgage interest, rent, and utilities.19
Although the Paycheck Protection Program refers to the financing as a “loan,”
in all respects it operates as a grant. That’s because the Paycheck Protection Program
provides generous loan forgiveness: if the borrower uses the loan proceeds for payroll

15 Id. at § 4003(c)(3)(D).
16 Id. at § 4003(c)(3)(D)(i)(V).
17 Id. at §§ 1102, 1107; see also DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. SBA, 2020 WL 2315880, at *3
(E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020) (“The SBA quickly exhausted the initial $349 billion in loan guarantees,
and Congress then appropriated an additional $310 billion for loan guarantees under the PPP.”)
(citing The Paycheck Protection and Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-139, 134 Stat.
620, § 101(a)(1).” Id.
18 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(E).
19 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(F)(i). The proceeds can also be used to pay interest on certain debt
obligations incurred before February 15, 2020. Id.
and other approved expenses (referred to as “covered expenses”), the entire loan will
be forgiven.20
Congress imposed few requirements on borrowers and lenders participating in

the Paycheck Protection Program. To be eligible for a PPP Loan, a borrower need
only be a small business concern or a nonprofit organization, veterans organization,
or Tribal business concern with fewer than 500 employees.21 When applying for a
PPP Loan, a borrower must also certify that:

• because of the economic uncertainty caused by COVID-19, the
business needs the PPP Loan for its ongoing operations;
• the business will use the PPP Loan proceeds to retain workers
and maintain payroll or make mortgage interest, lease, and utility
payments; and
• between February 15, 2020 and December 31, 2020, the business
has not and will not receive another PPP Loan.22
Unlike it does for the mid-size loan program, the CARES Act does not require a
small business applying for a PPP Loan to certify that it is not a debtor in
bankruptcy.
In deciding whether to approve a PPP Loan, SBA lenders need only consider
two criteria: (1) Was the borrower operating on February 15, 2020?; and (2) Did the
employer have employees for whom it paid salaries and payroll taxes (or did it have

20 CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1106, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
9005). The bulk of the loan proceeds, though, must be used for payroll: no more than 25% of the
amount forgiven may be for non-payroll expenses.
21 15 U.S.C. § 636(D).
22 15 U.S.C. § 636(G)(i)(I) – (IV).
paid independent contractors)?23 Congress did not direct SBA lenders, to whom
Congress delegated the SBA Administrator’s authority to make and approve PPP
Loans, to consider whether a borrower was in bankruptcy.24

C. Congress authorizes the Small Business Administration
to implement the Paycheck Protection Program.

More than 65 years ago, Congress created the Small Business Administration
to aid, assist, and protect the interests of small businesses.25 Because the country’s
security and economic well-being hinges on maximizing the potential of small
businesses,26 Congress has committed to using all reasonable means to create and
sustain programs that promote investment in small businesses—including
investments that expand employment opportunities.27
This is mainly accomplished by the SBA providing financial assistance to
small businesses—in the form of direct loans, joint loans with a lender, or loan
guarantees—under § 7(a) of the Small Business Act. Under § 7(a), loans must be of
“such sound value or so secured as reasonably to assure repayment.”28

23 15 U.S.C. § 636(F)(ii)(II).
24 Id.
25 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (declaring that “[i]t is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government
should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns
in order to preserve free competitive enterprise”).
26 Id.
27 15 U.S.C. § 631a(b).
28 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(6).
To determine whether a loan is sound, the SBA ordinarily considers the
following criteria set forth in 13 C.F.R. § 120.150: the applicant’s character,
reputation, and credit history; the experience and depth of management; the strength

of the business; past earnings, projected cash flow, and future prospects; the ability to
repay the loan with business earnings; whether the business has sufficient equity to
operate on a sound basis; the potential for long-term success; and the nature and
value of collateral securing the loan.29
When Congress passed the CARES Act, it placed the Paycheck Protection

Program under § 7(a) of the Small Business Act and authorized the Administrator to
issue regulations to carry out the Paycheck Protection Program.30
D. The SBA Administrator’s interim final rule clarified
that PPP Loans do not require underwriting.

On April 15, 2020, the Administrator promulgated an interim final rule for the
Paycheck Protection Program. As you might expect in the case in which a loan is
designed to be forgiven, the SBA’s interim final rule clarified that its normal
underwriting guidelines have gone by the wayside for PPP Loans:
[F]or loans made under the PPP, SBA will not require the
lenders to comply with section 120.150.31

29 13 C.F.R. § 120.150.
30 CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 1102(a), 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
31 Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,811,
20,812 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
Under the SBA’s interim final rule, lenders need only do five things to
underwrite a PPP Loan: (1) confirm receipt of the borrower’s certifications; (2)
confirm receipt of information showing that a borrower had employees for whom the

employer paid salaries and payroll taxes; (3) confirm the dollar amount of the
business’ average monthly payroll costs; (4) follow Bank Secrecy Act requirements;
and (5) review the “Paycheck Protection Application Form.”32 That’s it.
The interim final rule also confirmed the CARES Act’s minimal certification
requirements for PPP Loans. Like the CARES Act, the SBA’s interim rule did not

require borrowers to certify that they were not involved in a bankruptcy case.
E. The SBA decides that debtors are ineligible for PPP Loans.
On April 28, 2020, the SBA issued another interim final rule supplementing its
previous one (“Supplemental Rule”). In the Supplemental Rule, the SBA declared for

the first time that debtors in bankruptcy are ineligible for PPP Loans.33 The SBA’s
meager justification for the Supplemental Rule’s new eligibility requirement was that
debtors are more likely to use a PPP Loan for noncovered expenses and less likely to
be able to repay an unforgiven loan:
The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary,
determined that providing PPP loans to debtors in
bankruptcy would present an unacceptably high risk of an
unauthorized use of funds or non-repayment of unforgiven

32 Id. at 20,815.
33 Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Requirements—
Promissory Notes, Authorization, Affiliation, and Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 23450, 23,451 (Apr. 28,
2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 120 and 121).
loans. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code does not require
any person to make a loan or a financial accommodation
to a debtor in bankruptcy. . . .34

F. Even though Gateway Radiology is in bankruptcy, its
PPP Loan Application was approved.

Gateway Radiology Consultants operates an outpatient imaging, diagnostic,
and interventional radiology center in St. Petersburg, Florida.35 In May 2019,
Gateway Radiology was forced into chapter 11 bankruptcy because of a failed
expansion in Lake Wales, which snowballed into litigation with its medical
equipment supplier, as well as its primary lender. A year after filing for bankruptcy,
Gateway Radiology applied online for a PPP Loan through USF Federal Credit
Union.
The first question on the PPP Loan application asked whether Gateway
Radiology was in bankruptcy. Gateway Radiology claims it answered “yes.” But
Gateway Radiology says when it received a hard copy of its PPP Loan application to
sign, it discovered the answer to the first question had been changed to “no.” It says
the Credit Union admitted that one of its employees had to “upload the application,”
with the implication being a Credit Union employee changed the answer to Question
No. 1. For its part, the Credit Union provided an audit summary that appears to

34 Id.
35 Doc. No. 2 at 1 – 2.
show that Gateway Radiology incorrectly answered that it was not involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding.36
The Court need not decide whether Gateway Radiology truthfully answered

Question No. 1. It’s irrelevant to the ultimate issue this Court must decide. Suffice it
to say the Credit Union approved Gateway Radiology’s PPP Loan application in the
amount of $527,710 based on its mistaken understanding that Gateway Radiology
was not in bankruptcy.

G. The SBA objects to Gateway Radiology’s PPP Loan.

Two weeks later, Gateway Radiology asked the Court to approve the PPP
Loan under Bankruptcy Code § 364, which requires a debtor to obtain court approval
of postpetition financing outside the ordinary course of business.37 In its postpetition
financing motion, Gateway Radiology explained that it needs the PPP Loan
proceeds to fund its operations. Gateway Radiology represented that it intended to
use the loan proceeds for covered—i.e., forgivable—expenses.38
Although the SBA did not object to Gateway Radiology applying for a PPP
Loan or otherwise obtaining postpetition financing, it did object to the entry of any
order finding that Gateway Radiology is eligible to participate in the Paycheck

Protection Program, that the loan approved by the Credit Union is entitled to loan

36 Adv. Doc. No. 9-1.
37 11 U.S.C. § 364.
38 Doc. No. 238 at ¶ 9.
forgiveness, or that the SBA is required to guarantee the loan.39 According to the
SBA Administrator, the Supplemental Rule bars Gateway Radiology from obtaining
a PPP Loan because Gateway Radiology is a debtor in bankruptcy.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Gateway Radiology filed this proceeding seeking a declaration that the
Supplemental Rule is unenforceable for three reasons: First, Gateway Radiology

contends that the SBA Administrator exceeded her authority in promulgating the
Supplemental Rule.40 Second, even if the SBA Administrator did not exceed her
authority, Gateway Radiology contends that the Supplemental Rule is arbitrary and
capricious.41 Third, Gateway Radiology contends that the Supplemental Rule
violates Bankruptcy Code § 525, which generally forbids a governmental entity from

discriminating against a person because the person is a debtor in bankruptcy.42
Because it contends that the Supplemental Rule is unenforceable, Gateway
Radiology asks the Court to enjoin the SBA Administrator from enforcing the
Supplemental Rule to the extent that it disqualifies Gateway Radiology from
obtaining PPP Loans.43

39 Doc. No. 249.
40 Adv. Doc. No. 3 at ¶¶ 13, 29.
41 Id. at ¶¶ 13.
42 Id. at ¶¶ 19 – 21.
43 Id. at ¶¶ 29.
The SBA Administrator maintains that injunctive relief is inappropriate for
two reasons.44 First, as a threshold matter, the SBA Administrator says sovereign
immunity bars this Court from enjoining her from enforcing the Supplemental Rule.

Second, the SBA Administrator says Gateway Radiology cannot show a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of its claims; that it will suffer irreparable harm if
the Court does not enjoin the SBA Administrator from enforcing the Supplemental
Rule; or that enjoining enforcement of the Supplemental Rule would promote the
public interest. The Court disagrees.

A. Sovereign immunity does not bar this Court from
enjoining the SBA Administrator from enforcing the
Supplemental Rule.

There is no question that when Congress created the SBA, it waived sovereign
immunity so that the SBA “could sue and be sued.”45 But there was a caveat: even
though Congress provided that the SBA could sue or be sued, 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1)

44 The SBA also raises a third reason—lack of standing. According to the SBA Administrator,
Gateway Radiology merely seeks an order requiring her to find that Gateway Radiology cannot be
excluded from the Paycheck Protection Program. Because the Credit Union has approved the loan,
Gateway Radiology has not been excluded from the Paycheck Protection Program. Thus, the SBA
Administrator reasons, Gateway Radiology has suffered no injury-in-fact. That argument borders on
frivolous. The loan that was approved is eligible for loan forgiveness and is guaranteed by the SBA.
Unless the SBA Administrator is willing to stipulate that Gateway Radiology’s PPP Loan is
guaranteed by the SBA and eligible for loan forgiveness, which so far she has been unwilling to do,
then the Credit Union will not unfreeze the loan proceeds. It is self-evident, then, that Gateway
Radiology has suffered an injury-in-fact. The SBA Administrator’s standing argument deserves no
further discussion.
45 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1) (providing that “[i]n the performance of, and with respect to, the functions,
powers, and duties vested in [her] by this chapter the Administrator may . . . sue and be sued in any
court of record of a State having general jurisdiction, or in any United States district court, and
jurisdiction is conferred upon such district court to determine such controversies without regard to
the amount in controversy”).
provides that “no attachment, injunction, garnishment, or other similar process . . .
shall be issued against the Administrator.”46
At first glance, § 634(b)(1) appears plain and unambiguous. “No injunction”

means no injunction. And many courts have read § 634(b)(1) that way.47 But that
view is far from universal.48 Indeed, courts are split over whether the scope of the
“no injunction” language in § 634(b)(1). Some courts hold that § 634(b)(1) bars
injunctions in all circumstances, while other courts hold that § 634(b)(1) does not bar
a court from enjoining an agency that has exceeded its statutory authority.49

So far, the Eleventh Circuit has not weighed in on the debate. But, according
to the SBA, the Fifth Circuit has twice held—first in Romeo v. U.S.50 and later in

46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 Ulstein Maritime, Ltd. v. U.S., 833 F.2d 1052, 1056 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Some courts have read the
wording in this way, and concluded that all injunctive relief directed at the SBA is absolutely
prohibited.”) (citing Valley Constr. Co. v. Marsh, 714 F.2d 26, 29 (5th Cir. 1983); Mar v. Kleppe, 520 F.2d
867, 869 (10th Cir. 1975); Romeo v. United States, 462 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 928 (1973); Expedient Servs., Inc. v. Weaver, 614 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1980); Jets Servs., Inc. v.
Hoffman, 420 F. Supp. 1300, 1308–09 (M.D. Fla. 1976)).
48 Ulstein Maritime, 833 F.2d at 1056 (“However, other courts have found that § 634(b)(1) does not bar
injunctions in all circumstances.”) (citing Cavalier Clothes v. United States, 810 F.2d 1108, 1112 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Okla. Aerotronics v. United States, 661 F.2d 976, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Related Indus. v. United
States, 2 Cl. Ct. 517, 522 (1983); Dubrow v. SBA, 345 F. Supp. 4, 7 (C.D. Cal. 1972)).
49 DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. SBA, 2020 WL 2315880, at *3 – 4 (E.D. Mich. May 11,
2020) (ruling that the “Court is persuaded that injunctive relief is available to Plaintiffs” because
“Plaintiffs here seek only to ‘set aside unlawful agency action’”); Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. U.S.
SBA, 2020 WL 2088637, at *3 – 4 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2020); see also Elks Assocs. Funding Corp. v. U.S.
SBA, 858 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (explaining that courts in the D.C. Circuit “have strongly intimated that
injunctive relief is available, at a minimum, when the SBA exceeds its statutory authority”).
50 462 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1972).
Expedient Services, Inc. v. Weaver51—that § 634(b)(1) bars plaintiffs from suing the SBA
for injunctive relief. Because Romeo and Expedient Services were both decided before
October 1, 1981, those decisions would be binding on this Court under Bonner v. City

of Prichard, Alabama, which held that Fifth Circuit cases decided before October 1,
1981 are binding on the Eleventh Circuit.52
While Romeo and Expedient Services are binding precedent, neither decided the
narrow issue here: does § 634(b)(1) bar a court from enjoining an agency from

exceeding its statutory authority? In fact, the Expedient Services Court acknowledged it
sidestepped that issue:
As pointed out by the plaintiff, there are some decisions
indicating that injunctive relief against the Administrator
may be available when he exceeds his authority. However, it
is not necessary for us to decide this issue because the
Administrator clearly did not exceed his authority under
15 U.S.C. § 637(a).53

Thus, this Court is not bound by Romeo and Expedient Services.

51 614 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1980).
52 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“To decide this case, and later Eleventh Circuit cases, we
must decide whether this court shall adopt some established body of law as its body of precedent,
and if so, effective as of its coming into existence, what established body of law will be chosen. For
several reasons we choose the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
as that court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down by that court prior to close of business on
that date. We consider that body of law worthy for governance of legal affairs within the jurisdiction
of this new circuit.”) (footnote omitted).
53 Expedient Servs., 614 F.2d at 58 n.2 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Writing on a clean slate, this Court concludes that § 634(b)(1) does not bar this
Court from enjoining the SBA Administrator from exceeding her statutory authority
for two reasons.

First, § 634’s legislative history confirms that Congress did not intend the
statute to have such a broad scope. The First Circuit, in Ulstein Maritime, Ltd. v. United
States, did yeoman’s work tracing the origin of § 634(b)(1)’s “no injunction” language
back 80 years to the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Housing Administration v.
Burr.54

There, the Supreme Court considered whether an employee could garnish the
FHA to collect on a judgment for unpaid wages.55 At the time, the National Housing
Act provided that the FHA Administrator was authorized “to sue and be sued in any
court of competent jurisdiction.”56 “Sue and be sued,” the Supreme Court said, must

be given its ordinary meaning, which would “embrace all civil process,” including
garnishments.57 Because Congress had established an agency, authorized it to engage
in commercial transactions, and permitted it to sue or be sued, the Supreme Court

54 833 F.2d 1052, 1056 (1st Cir. 1987) (explaining that the “origin and purpose of the language in §
634(b)(1) goes back to the decision in FHA v. Burr”).
55 FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 243 (1940) (“The question presented here is whether the Federal
Housing Administration is subject to garnishment for moneys due to an employee.”).
56 Id. at 244 (explaining that Congress amended the National Housing Act in 1935 by “by adding
thereto the provision that ‘The Administrator shall, in carrying out the provisions of this title and
titles II and III, be authorized, in his official capacity, to sue and be sued in any court of competent
jurisdiction, State or Federal.’”).
57 Id. at 245.
was unwilling to assume Congress implicitly limited the meaning of “sue and be
sued” to preclude garnishments.58 Had Congress intended to prohibit the FHA from
being garnished, the Supreme Court reasoned, Congress would have said so.

After Burr, Congress added language like that found in § 634(b)(1)—language
barring attachment, injunctions, garnishments, and other similar process—to
enabling statutes for other agencies.59 The legislative history for these other statutes—
for example, ones creating the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and Commodity
Credit Corporation—clarifies that Congress added the language to prevent creditors

and others from interfering with an agency’s operations by suing the agency and then
attaching its funds.60 As the First Circuit points out, there is no indication Congress
intended to give the SBA any broader immunity than it did to other agencies.61
Second, it would have been absurd for Congress to have intended to bar courts
from enjoining agencies that have exceeded their statutory authority. Were that the

case, courts would be powerless to stop a constitutional violation:
[Section 634(b)(1)] was not intended to render the agency
immune from injunctive relief in situations where the
agency has exceeded its statutory authority and where an

58 Id.
59 Ulstein Maritime, Ltd. v. U.S., 833 F.2d 1052, 1056 (1st Cir. 1987) (explaining that “language such as
that in § 634(b)(1) was added to enabling statutes to bar the attachment of agency funds and other
interference with agency functioning”).
60 Id. (“While the specific legislative history of § 634(b)(1) is silent on the purpose of this language,
the legislative history of earlier statutes containing the identical wording indicates that it was
intended to keep creditors or others suing the government from hindering and obstructing agency
operations through mechanisms such as attachment of funds.”).
61 Id. at 1057.
injunction would not interfere with the agency's internal
operations. Indeed, if provisions such as § 634(b)(1) meant
that the agency could never be enjoined, then an agency
could adopt unconstitutional policies and continue to
follow them even after a court declared them
unconstitutional. For example, the SBA could adopt a
policy stating that it will extend small business loans only
to companies owned by white men. If § 634(b)(1) means
that the SBA may never be enjoined, then a court could
not enjoin this policy, even though it would be blatantly
unconstitutional.62

The Supreme Court has instructed courts to avoid interpreting statutes in a
way that would produce absurd results if there is an alternative interpretation that is
consistent with the legislative purpose.63 Here, there is an interpretation of §
634(b)(1) that is consistent with the legislative purpose (i.e., preventing creditors from
interfering with an agency’s internal workings) yet does not lead to an absurd result
(rendering courts powerless to enjoin unlawful action): § 634(b)(1) does not bar this
Court from enjoining the SBA Administrator from exceeding her statutory authority.
B. Gateway Radiology is entitled to enjoin the SBA
Administrator from enforcing the Supplemental Rule.

To enjoin the SBA Administrator from enforcing the Supplemental Rule,
Gateway Radiology must show that (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of its claims; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm if the Court does not enjoin

62 Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. SBA, 2020 WL 2088637, at *4 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2020) (citations
omitted).
63 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“It is true that interpretations of a
statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent
with the legislative purpose are available”).
the SBA Administrator from enforcing the Supplemental Rule; (3) the harm it will
suffer if the Court does not grant injunctive relief outweighs the harm the SBA will
suffer if the Court does; and (4) enjoining the SBA from enforcing the Supplemental

Rule is not adverse to the public interest.64 Gateway Radiology has carried its burden
here.
1. Gateway Radiology has a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits.65

The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes this Court to find that the SBA’s
Supplemental Rule is unlawful—and therefore may be set aside—on any one of six
enumerated grounds.66 Grounds for setting aside the Supplemental Rule include
where the SBA Administrator exceeded her authority in promulgating the
Supplemental Rule and where the Supplemental Rule is arbitrary and capricious.67
Both grounds are present here.

64 Harbourside Place, LLC v. Town of Jupiter, Florida, 958 F.3d 1308, 1313 – 14 (11th Cir. 2020).
65 Gateway Radiology has challenged the Supplemental Rule on three grounds. First, Gateway
Radiology says the SBA Administrator exceeded her authority in promulgating the Supplemental
Rule. Second, Gateway Radiology says the Supplemental Rule is arbitrary and capricious. Third,
Gateway Radiology says the Supplemental Rule violates Bankruptcy Code § 525. Because Gateway
Radiology has substantial likelihood of success on the first two grounds, the Court declines to
address the third ground—that the Supplemental Rule violates Bankruptcy Code § 525—on a
preliminary basis.
66 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) – (F) (providing that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions that are found to be arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege
or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory right;
without observance of procedure required by law; unsupported by substantial evidence in a case
subject to 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557; or unwarranted by the facts to the extent the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court).
67 Id. at § 706(2)(A), (C).
a. The SBA Administrator exceeded her
authority when she promulgated the
Supplemental Rule.

The SBA Administrator says that this Court, in determining whether she
exceeded her statutory authority, must be guided by Chevron’s two-step framework.68
Under the two-step Chevron framework, this Court would first ask whether the statute
at issue is ambiguous; if it is, this Court would then ask whether the agency’s
interpretation of the statute is reasonable.69 The Chevron framework presumes that
when a statute is ambiguous, Congress must have implicitly delegated to the agency
the authority to fill in the statutory gaps.70
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that in extraordinary cases,
courts should hesitate to find that Congress implicitly delegated authority to an
agency to fill in statutory gaps.71 Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision

five years ago in King v. Burwell.72
King involved a challenge to the Affordable Care Act. One of the Affordable
Care Act’s key reforms was the creation of “exchanges”—marketplaces that allowed

68 Adv. Doc. No. 11 at 20.
69 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 – 43 (1984).
70 Id. at 843 (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”).
71 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 – 89 (2015) (“‘In extraordinary cases, however, there may be
reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.’ This is
one of those cases.”).
72 Id.
people to compare and buy insurance plans. The Affordable Care Act required states
to create their own exchanges. If a state refused to do so, the Affordable Care Act
required the federal government to create one.

The Affordable Care Act then provided tax credits to taxpayers to buy
insurance plans—but only for taxpayers who bought an insurance plan through “an
Exchange established by the State.” Even though the Affordable Care Act limited tax
credits to insurance plans bought through an exchange “established by the state,” the
IRS interpreted “an exchange established by the state” to mean an exchange

established by the state or federal government. The petitioners in King challenged the
IRS’s interpretation.
After acknowledging that it often applies the Chevron two-step framework
when analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, the Supreme Court concluded
King was one of those extraordinary cases when it should decline to do so.73

According to the Supreme Court, the tax credits were one of the Affordable Care
Act’s key reforms. Because the availability of credits involved billions of dollars in
spending each year and affected the price of health insurance for millions of people,
whether credits were available on federal exchanges was a “question of deep
‘economic and political significance’ that [was] central to [the] statutory scheme.”74

73 Id.
74 Id. at 2489.
The Supreme Court concluded that “had Congress wished to assign that question to
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”75
So too here. Like the Affordable Care Act, the Paycheck Protection Program

involves billions of dollars of spending ($349 billion to be precise). And, as with the
interpretation of the eligibility for Affordable Care Act tax credits, how eligibility for
PPP Loans is determined could affect millions of Americans. Here, like in King, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to delegate a question of such “economic and
political significance” to the SBA. Thus, it is for this Court to determine the correct

reading of the CARES Act.
In determining the correct reading of the CARES Act, this Court must begin
where the King Court did—with the language of the statute itself. If the statutory
language is plain, courts must enforce it according to its terms.76 To determine

whether language is plain, courts must “read the words ‘in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”77 Here, reading the words of the
CARES Act in context and with a view to the Paycheck Protection Program’s place
in the overall statutory scheme, it is plain Congress did not intend to exclude chapter
11 debtors from the Paycheck Protection Program.

75 Id.
76 Id. (“If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.”).
77 Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
Let’s start with the context of the CARES Act. When Congress passed the
CARES Act, the President had already declared a state of emergency because
COVID-19 was threatening to strain the nation’s healthcare systems; half the nation’s

states had implemented Stay-at-Home orders to “flatten the curve” in hopes of
minimizing the strain on the nation’s healthcare system; close to one million people
had already lost their jobs; and millions more (more than 20 million, as it turns out)
were about to lose theirs.
Now let’s turn to the Paycheck Protection Program’s place in the overall

statutory scheme. In passing the CARES Act, Congress intended the Paycheck
Protection Program to (among other things) help keep American workers employed
and paid. Lest there be any doubt, Congress included the Paycheck Protection
Program (as well as the mid-size loan program) in Title I of the CARES Act, which
it named the “Keeping Workers Paid and Employed Act.”78

Finally, let’s consider the words of the CARES Act itself. In the CARES Act,
Congress specified minimal—yet expansive—eligibility requirements for the
Paycheck Protection Program. Under a subsection titled “Increased Eligibility for
Certain Small Businesses and Organizations,” Congress provided that any small
business concern, other business concern, nonprofit organization, veterans

78 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
organization, or Tribal business concern that has 500 employees or fewer “shall be
eligible” for a PPP Loan.79
And Congress specified that all an eligible borrower needs to do to apply for a

PPP Loan is to certify that the loan is necessary because of the economic uncertainty
caused by COVID-19; the proceeds will be used to retain workers and make payroll
or pay mortgage interest, lease, or utility payments; and the borrower has not or will
not receive another PPP Loan.80 Although it could have done so, Congress chose not
to require borrowers to certify that they were not involved in a bankruptcy case when

applying for a PPP Loan.81
It’s also worth noting that Congress delegated the SBA Administrator’s
decision to make or approve PPP Loans to SBA lenders.82 In delegating that
authority to SBA lenders, Congress instructed lenders to consider only two factors

when making or approving a PPP Loan: (1) Was the business operating on February
15, 2020? (2) Did the borrower have employees for whom it was paying salaries and
payroll taxes?83 Congress did not instruct SBA lenders—who are exercising authority

79 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(I) – (II).
80 Id.at § 636(a)(36)(G)(i)(I) – (IV).
81 Id.
82 Id.at § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii)(I).
83 Id.at § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii)(I) – (II)(bb).
delegated from the SBA Administrator—to consider whether a borrower is in
bankruptcy.84
To recap, even though Congress specified who is eligible for PPP Loans, the

criteria lenders must consider when approving a PPP Loan, and the certifications a
borrower must make to obtain one, Congress did not disqualify chapter 11 debtors
from being eligible for PPP Loans, insist that lenders determine whether a borrower
is in bankruptcy before approving a PPP Loan, or require a borrower to certify that it
isn’t involved in a bankruptcy proceeding to obtain a PPP Loan. Congress’ silence

ought to be conclusive that Congress did not intend to exclude an entire class of
small businesses—chapter 11 debtors—from the Paycheck Protection Program.
The SBA Administrator, however, claims Congress’ silence authorizes her to
engraft an additional eligibility requirement onto the Paycheck Protection Program.85
Not so.

To see why that’s not the case, consider the mid-size loan program. Unlike the
Paycheck Protection Program, which functions like a grant, the mid-size loan
program is a true loan program. Loans made under the mid-size program, unlike
those made under the Paycheck Protection Program, cannot be forgiven. For the
mid-size loan program, Congress required borrowers to certify that they are not a

debtor in bankruptcy.

84 Id.
85 Adv. Doc. No. 11 at 21 – 23.
So Congress knew how to disqualify debtors from eligibility if it wanted to.
Yet it chose not to do so for PPP Loans. As the SBA Administrator concedes, when
“Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in

another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress act[ed]
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”86 Because
Congress chose not to require PPP Loan applicants to certify that they were not
involved in a bankruptcy case, this Court concludes that Congress purposely chose
not to disqualify chapter 11 debtors from the Paycheck Protection Program.87

That makes sense for (at least) two reasons. First, while a borrower’s status as
a debtor matters for the mid-size loan program, it does not for the Paycheck
Protection Program because PPP Loans are designed to be forgiven. Second, the
purpose of the Paycheck Protection Program was to keep American workers
employed and paid. Chapter 11 debtors need PPP Loans as much, if not more than,

other small businesses to retain workers and pay them.

86 Adv. Doc. No. 11 at 20 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
87 The SBA Administrator argues that this conclusion is undermined by Congress’ recent passage of
the HEROES Act, which (among other things) makes critical-access hospitals eligible for PPP Loans
“regardless of the status of such a hospital as a debtor” in a chapter 11 case. Adv. Doc. No. 11 at 23
n.11 (citing The Heroes Act, H.R. 6800, 116th Cong., § 9001(c) (2020)). The SBA says this language
shows the House of Representatives believes additional legislation is required to make a specific
subset of borrowers—chapter 11 debtors—eligible to apply for PPP Loans. Id. That’s one way to
read that language. It’s equally, if not more, likely that the House of Representatives was clarifying
its intent that—contrary to the Supplemental Rule—chapter 11 debtors are eligible for PPP Loans.
In any event, the reference to debtors in the HEROES Act does not change the fact that in one
section of the CARES Act (the mid-size loan program), Congress required borrowers to certify they
were not involved in a bankruptcy proceeding, but in another section of the same Act (the Paycheck
Protection Program), Congress chose not to require borrowers to certify that they were not involved
in a bankruptcy proceeding.
By promulgating the Supplemental Rule, the SBA Administrator disqualified
chapter 11 debtors from the Paycheck Protection Program, thereby denying an entire
class of small businesses the very relief Congress intended to provide. Excluding

chapter 11 debtors from the Paycheck Protection Program conflicts with Congress’
intent in enacting the CARES Act. More important, doing so violates the CARES
Act’s plain language. The SBA Administrator therefore exceeded her authority when
she promulgated the Supplemental Rule.

b. The Supplemental Rule is arbitrary and
capricious.

Even if the SBA Administrator hadn’t exceeded her authority when she
promulgated the Supplemental Rule, the Supplemental Rule is still arbitrary and
capricious. To be sure, the scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious”
standard is narrow.88 This Court is mindful that it is not to substitute its own
judgment for the SBA Administrator’s judgment.89
Rather, in reviewing whether agency action is “arbitrary and capricious,” this
Court is limited to considering whether the SBA Administrator considered the
relevant factors when promulgating the Supplemental Rule and whether her decision
to exclude chapter 11 debtors from the Paycheck Protection Program was a clear

88 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
89 Id.; see also Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007)
(citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 463 U.S. at 43).
error of judgment.90 Under this standard of review, the Supplemental Rule is
“arbitrary and capricious” if:

• the SBA Administrator relied on factors that Congress did
not intend her to consider;
• the SBA Administrator failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem;
• the SBA Administrator’s explanation for her decision runs
counter to the evidence before the agency; or
• the SBA Administrator’s explanation is so implausible that
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.
Here, the SBA Administrator’s decision to exclude chapter 11 debtors from the
Paycheck Protection Program is based on her determination that “debtors in
bankruptcy would present an unacceptably high risk of an unauthorized use of funds
or non-repayment of unforgiven loans.”91 Putting aside that the basis for the SBA
Administrator’s determination is unclear, the Court concludes that she relied on
factors Congress had not intended her to consider and failed to consider important
aspects of the problem—not to mention her decision is counter to the evidence
before the SBA.

90 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (“In reviewing [an agency’s] explanation, we must
‘consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.’”) (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)).
91 Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—Requirements—
Promissory Notes, Authorization, Affiliation, and Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 23450, 23,451 (Apr. 28,
2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 120 and 121).
i. Congress did not intend for the
SBA Administrator to focus on
collectability.

The SBA Administrator relies on 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(6) as a talisman to ward
off any claim she exceeded her statutory authority. Section 636(a)(6) mandates that
“[a]ll loans made under this subsection shall be of such sound value or so secured as
to reasonably reassure repayment.”92 Because § 636(a)(6) requires loans to be of
“sound value,” the SBA Administrator insists she is authorized to disqualify chapter
11 debtors from the Paycheck Protection Program.93
But that argument ignores the very nature of the Paycheck Protection
Program. Under the Paycheck Protection Program, PPP Loans are structured so that
they don’t have to be repaid. For a loan to be forgiven, all a borrower has to do is use
the loan proceeds for payroll or mortgage interest, lease, or utility payments. Because

PPP Loans are designed to be forgiven, Congress did not intend for the SBA
Administrator to focus on collectability.
In fact, Congress delineated the two “underwriting” factors SBA lenders (who
are exercising authority delegated from the SBA Administrator to make and approve
loans) should consider when making PPP Loans. Neither factor has anything to do

with collectability—much less whether a borrower is in bankruptcy. By taking into

92 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(6).
93 Adv. Doc. No. 11 at 25.
account a borrower’s status as a chapter 11 debtor, the SBA Administrator has
considered a factor Congress did not intend her to consider.
One final note: it’s hard not to notice the SBA talking out of both sides of its

mouth when it comes to its obligations under § 636(a)(6). On the one hand, the SBA
tries to convince the Court that the Paycheck Protection Program’s generous loan
forgiveness features has done nothing to displace § 636(a)(6)’s general mandate to
ensure loans made under § 7(a) of the Small Business Act, where the Paycheck
Protection Program is housed, are of sound value. On the other hand, the SBA

Administrator has excused SBA lenders from complying with 13 C.F.R. § 120.150,
which enumerates the factors the SBA considers to ensure that any loan made under
§ 7(a) is of “sound value.”94 In reality, the SBA Administrator’s reliance on §
636(a)(6) is an after-the-fact justification for an arbitrary and capricious rule.
ii. The SBA Administrator failed to
consider protections afforded by the
chapter 11 bankruptcy process.

Not only did the SBA Administrator consider factors she shouldn’t have, she
also failed to consider factors she should have. Recall that the Supplemental Rule is
premised entirely on the SBA Administrator’s determination that debtors pose an
unacceptably high risk of using PPP Loan proceeds for noncovered expenses, as well
as an unacceptably high risk of nonpayment if the PPP Loan is not forgiven. Yet, in

94 Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 C.F.R. 20,811,
20,812 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
making that determination, the SBA Administrator failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem: how chapter 11 bankruptcy functions.
Begin with the policy behind chapter 11 bankruptcy. The policy of chapter 11

is to provide a forum where troubled businesses can rehabilitate.95 “Chapter 11
embodies a policy that it is generally preferable to enable a debtor to continue to
operate and to reorganize or sell its business as a going concern rather than simply to
liquidate a troubled business.”96 Continued operation of a business is preferable to
liquidation not only because it preserves going-concern value, but because it “can

save the jobs of employees and the tax base of communities, and generally reduce the
upheaval that can result from termination of a business.”97 The SBA Administrator
failed to consider that chapter 11 bankruptcy and the Paycheck Protection Program
share the same policy goal: keeping American workers employed and paid.
Now let’s turn to specific Bankruptcy Code provisions that would eliminate

the “unacceptably high risk” that a chapter 11 debtor would use PPP Loan proceeds
for noncovered expenses. As a starting point, Bankruptcy Code § 364 bars a debtor

95 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); see also In re Paris Indus. Corp., 106 B.R. 339,
341 (Bankr. D. Maine 1989) (“The Bankruptcy Code embodies a governmental policy favoring
reorganization and a fresh start.”).
96 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1100.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. 16th ed.).
97 Id.
from borrowing money outside the ordinary course of business—such as obtaining a
PPP Loan—without court approval.98
Before a bankruptcy court can allow a debtor to borrow money outside the

ordinary course of business, the debtor must give notice to interested parties in the
case, who have a right to object to the proposed financing.99 If the bankruptcy court
is inclined to allow the debtor to borrow money, it can impose conditions on the
debtor doing so. In addition to restricting the debtor’s use of the loan proceeds to
paying expenses set forth in an approved budget, those conditions can also include

requiring the chapter 11 debtor to disclose to the Court and creditors what the loan
proceeds were used for.
What’s more, on top of any narrowly tailored reporting requirements the court
may impose when approving a postpetition loan, chapter 11 debtors in general are
required to file monthly operating reports.100 Those reports, which detail a debtor’s

receipts and disbursements, are scrubbed by skilled professionals at the U.S. Trustee’s

98 11 U.S.C. § 364(b).
99 Id. (providing that court may authorize postpetition financing “after notice and a hearing”).
100 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2015. Bankruptcy Code § 1106(a)(1) incorporates
Bankruptcy Code § 704(a)(8), which requires a debtor in possession operating a business to file
periodic reports and summaries of the business’ operations, including a statement of receipts and
disbursements. The monthly operating reports allow a bankruptcy court and parties in interest to
ascertain (among other things) whether a debtor in possession is grossly mismanaging the
bankruptcy estate, violating cash collateral or other court order, or engaging in unauthorized
disposition of estate assets. Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small
Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,659, 66,660 (Nov. 10, 2014) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 58).
Office. And because they are filed electronically, the monthly operating reports can
be scrutinized by creditors in the case.
So the SBA Administrator has failed to consider that by restricting a debtor’s

use of PPP Loan proceeds to covered expenses and subjecting the debtor’s use of the
funds to scrutiny by creditors and the U.S. Trustee, bankruptcy courts can reduce the
risk that a chapter 11 debtor will use PPP Loan proceeds for noncovered expenses.
Last, consider the extra protections afforded to lenders who loan money to
debtors postpetition, which greatly reduce the risk of nonpayment. If a bankruptcy

court approves a debtor’s postpetition financing motion, the lender is entitled to an
administrative expense claim under Bankruptcy Code § 503(b)(1).101 Administrative
expense claims—such as one for a PPP Loan—must be paid in full by the effective
date of confirmation. The SBA Administrator therefore failed to consider that the
Bankruptcy Code would give priority to repayment of PPP Loans made to chapter

11 debtors (to the extend funds were used for noncovered expenses).
iii. The SBA’s explanation runs counter
to the evidence before the agency.

Imagine Gateway Radiology was not in chapter 11 bankruptcy. In that
hypothetical world, Hypothetical Gateway Radiology would apply to the Credit
Union for a PPP Loan by filling out a two-page application in which it would answer

101 11 U.S.C. § 364(b) (“The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to obtain
unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt other than under subsection (a) of this section, allowable
under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense”).
eight questions (none of which have to do with creditworthiness); disclose the
number of employees it has, its average monthly payroll, and its loan request; and
check a box indicating how it intends to use the funds (payroll, lease or mortgage

interest, utilities, or other).
Hypothetical Gateway Radiology would have also had to certify that it was
operating on February 15, 2020; it had employees for whom it was paying salaries
and payroll taxes; it needs the loan because of the economic uncertainty caused by
COVID-19; it will use the loan proceeds for covered expenses; it will provide

documentation showing it used the loan for covered expenses; it understands the
loan will be forgiven if it is used for covered expenses (though nonpayroll expenses
can only account for 25% of the forgiven amount); and it has not and will not seek
another PPP Loan.
After confirming receipt of the certifications, the information demonstrating

Hypothetical Gateway Radiology had employees, and the dollar amount of
Hypothetical Gateway Radiology’s payroll, the Credit Union would have then
approved the loan. In the hypothetical world, the Credit Union would have done no
investigation of Hypothetical Gateway Radiology’s creditworthiness, its ability to
repay the loan, or what it intended to use the PPP Loan for.

And once the PPP Loan was approved, the Credit Union would not truly
monitor how Hypothetical Gateway Radiology used the money. Instead, the Credit
Union would rely on the carrot-and-stick approach Congress provided to ensure
repayment: the carrot, of course, is that the loan will be forgiven if it is used for
covered expenses; the “stick” is that Hypothetical Gateway Radiology would have to
repay the loan if it was not used for covered expenses.
Sure, Hypothetical Gateway Radiology would be required to provide the

Credit Union documentation showing it used the loan proceeds for covered expenses.
But the Credit Union would not need to verify the documentation so long as
Hypothetical Gateway Radiology attested that it verified the payments it made were
for eligible costs.102
Now let’s see how that story is playing out in the real world, where Gateway

Radiology is in chapter 11 bankruptcy. Unlike a non-debtor, who can take out a PPP
Loan with little to no oversight, Gateway Radiology had to first ask for this Court’s
approval, even though the PPP Loan had already been approved.
In seeking this Court’s approval, Gateway Radiology (like a typical debtor
seeking a PPP Loan) had to attach a copy of its loan application, along with a

proposed budget detailing how it intends to use the loan proceeds.103 According to its
budget, Gateway Radiology proposes to use $445,000 of the $527,710 in loan
proceeds for payroll, while the remaining $82,710 will be used for rent, health
insurance premiums, and utilities—all of which are covered expenses. Unlike

102 Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,811,
20,815 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (“The lender does not need to conduct
any verification if the borrower submits documentation supporting its request for loan forgiveness
and attests that it has accurately verified the payments for eligible costs. The Administrator will hold
harmless any lender that relies on such borrower documents and attestation from a borrower.”).
103 Doc. No. 238; Adv. Doc. No. 3.
Hypothetical Gateway Radiology, whose certification that it would use the loan for
covered expenses was given only a perfunctory review by the Credit Union, the real
Gateway Radiology’s intention to use the PPP Loan for covered expenses is

scrutinized by creditors, the U.S. Trustee, and (most important) the Court.
If any creditor doubts that the loan will be used for covered expenses, it has
the right to object to the proposed PPP Loan. Indeed, one creditor has already done
so. Philips Healthcare, one of the major creditors in this case, contends that unless
this Court determines that the proposed PPP Loan is eligible for loan forgiveness and

will be used for covered expenses, the Court should deny the motion because
Gateway Radiology hasn’t showed why the funds are necessary or how they will be
repaid.
In effect, Philips Healthcare has raised the same concerns the SBA
Administrator raised in her Supplemental Rule. Philips Healthcare wants to make

sure that the loan proceeds are used for covered expenses and, if not, that Gateway
Radiology can repay the loan. Outside bankruptcy there would be no one to raise
those issues. Because Gateway Radiology is in bankruptcy, however, this Court can
consider and address both those concerns.
To ensure that the loan proceeds are used for covered expenses, the Court can

(if it approves the loan) order Gateway Radiology to use the proceeds only for
payroll, health insurance, rent, and utilities. The Court can also require Gateway
Radiology to file reports with supporting documentation so the Court and interested
parties can verify that Gateway Radiology is using the loan proceeds for covered
expenses. This would be in addition to the Debtor’s monthly operating reports,
which would also show what the loan proceeds were being used for.
Outside bankruptcy, the Credit Union could rely on Hypothetical Gateway

Radiology’s attestation that it used the proceeds for covered expenses. Because
Gateway Radiology is in bankruptcy, however, there will be, as one court aptly put it,
a hundred-eyed Argus watching how Gateway Radiology uses the money.104
What happens if the hundred-eyed Argus spots Gateway Radiology using the
loan proceeds for noncovered expenses? Outside bankruptcy, there would be nothing

anyone could do about it. The loan would simply be subject to repayment. Of course,
there would be no way to know if Hypothetical Gateway Radiology could repay the
loan since there was no underwriting. Because the real Gateway Radiology is in
bankruptcy, the Court can take steps to minimize the amount that will not be
forgiven and increase the chances that the unforgiven amounts are repaid.

The Court can minimize the amount that has to be repaid by turning off the
spigot as soon as the proceeds start flowing out for noncovered expenses. Whereas
outside bankruptcy, the “stick” to prevent a non-debtor from using a PPP Loan for
noncovered expenses is that the money has to be repaid. Inside bankruptcy, the
“stick” is not just that the loan has to be paid—the “stick” also includes possible

contempt or other sanctions for violating a court order barring a debtor from using

104 In re Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of Santa Fe, ___ B.R. ___, 2020 WL 2096113, at *6
(Bankr. D. N.M. May 1, 2020) (“In short, the chapter 11 bankruptcy system is a hundred-eyed
Argus.”).
PPP Loan proceeds for noncovered expenses. Putting that aside, once the amount
that must be repaid has been minimized, the Court can increase the chances it will be
repaid by according the amount owed administrative expense status, which means it

gets paid before other unsecured claims.
Having compared the safeguards in place for PPP Loans made to a chapter 11
debtor with the lack of any similar safeguards for PPP Loans to non-debtors, the
Court cannot find any rational connection between the evidence before the SBA and
the SBA’s Supplemental Rule. Quite the opposite: to the extent that the SBA

Administrator was concerned about PPP Loans being used for noncovered expenses
or not being repaid, her Supplemental Rule is “illogical on its own terms.” When
agency action is “illogical on its own terms,” as is the case here, the agency action is
arbitrary and capricious.105

2. Unless an injunction is issued, Gateway
Radiology will suffer irreparable harm.

In its motion for temporary injunction, Gateway Radiology alleges that it has
seen a 55 – 60% decrease in patient volume at its outpatient imaging, diagnostic, and
interventional radiology center since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic; that it
needs the PPP Loan to shore up its finances so that it can continue serving the

105 Am. Fed’n. of Gov’t Emps. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 470 F.3d 375, 381 (D.C. 2006).
community as a front-line medical services provider during the pandemic; and
without the PPP Loan, it may not survive as a going concern.106
The SBA suggests that such a “meager showing is purely speculative, and in no

way imminent.”107 The Court is unpersuaded that the harm is as speculative and
remote as the SBA cavalierly suggests. In any event, the SBA’s argument is
misplaced: to prove irreparable harm, Gateway Radiology need not prove that it will
go out of business if it doesn’t get the PPP Loan. To establish irreparable harm,
Gateway Radiology must show that remedies at law—such as money damages—are

inadequate.108
Here, Gateway Radiology cannot be compensated by money damages. Under
the Paycheck Protection Program, Gateway Radiology is eligible for more than
$500,000 in financing that is designed to—and almost certainly will be—forgiven.
But funding under the Paycheck Protection Program, as the SBA has acknowledged,

is “first-come, first-served.”109 If the Court does not enjoin the Supplemental Rule,
the funding allocated to Gateway Radiology will be used for a PPP Loan to another
borrower.

106 Adv. Doc. No. 3 at ¶ 29(b).
107 Adv. Doc. No. 11 at 28.
108 Council v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 2010 WL 98984, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2010) (citing Ebay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
109 Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,811,
20,813 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120).
By the time it is determined that debtors are eligible for PPP Loans, all the
Paycheck Protection Program funding will be gone. And Gateway Radiology will not
have access to another $500,000 in funding that basically functions like a grant. That

is classic irreparable harm.
3. The harm Gateway Radiology will suffer if no
injunction is issued far outweighs any harm the
SBA will suffer if an injunction is issued.

In its opposition, the SBA Administrator does not bother arguing that the SBA
will suffer any harm if the Court enjoins her from enforcing the Supplemental
Rule—much less that any harm it will suffer will outweigh the harm Gateway
Radiology will suffer if the Court does not enjoin her from enforcing the
Supplemental Rule. Presumably that’s because it’s unlikely the SBA will suffer any
harm.
Admittedly, the SBA has a theoretical risk of harm. If Gateway Radiology
does not use the PPP Loan for covered expenses, the PPP Loan will not be forgiven,
which means what is essentially a grant will convert to a loan. If Gateway Radiology
is unable to repay any unforgiven amounts, the SBA will be on the hook for the
unpaid balance (which, theoretically, could be the entire $527,710). That risk,

however, can be mitigated—basically to zero.
As the Court has already pointed out, it must first approve the PPP Loan. As
part of the approval process, creditors and the U.S. Trustee have an opportunity to
object if there is reason to believe Gateway Radiology will not use the PPP Loan
proceeds for covered expenses or if Gateway Radiology does not have the ability to
repay the loan in the unlikely event it is not forgiven. To ensure that Gateway
Radiology uses the PPP Loan for covered expenses, the Court can order Gateway

Radiology to restrict its use of funds to covered expenses. And to increase the
likelihood that any unforgiven amount will be repaid, the Court can award the Credit
Union an administrative expense for any noncovered expenses. All of this will be
overseen by the hundred-eyed Argus.
Thus, it’s unlikely the SBA will suffer any harm. To the extent it does, that

harm would be far outweighed by the harm Gateway Radiology will suffer if the
Court does not enjoin the SBA from enforcing the Supplemental Rule (at least to the
extent it disqualifies Gateway Radiology from the Paycheck Protection Program).
4. Enjoining the SBA Administrator from
disqualifying debtors from the Paycheck
Protection Program will further Congress’
objective in passing the CARES Act.

The SBA contends that enjoining the Supplemental Rule would disserve the
public interest because the proposed injunction would: (1) short-circuit the rapidly
evolving political and administrative landscape in response to COVID-19; (2)
substitute Gateway Radiology’s preferred policy for the SBA’s stated policy; and (3)
“throw a wrench into policymakers’ evolving responses to COVID-19.”110

110 Doc. No. 11 at 29 – 30.
Throw a wrench into policymakers’ evolving responses? It’s hard not to be
flabbergasted by the SBA Administrator’s (pardon the banal expression) “through the
looking glass” approach to promoting the public interest: in what world does

disqualifying an entire class of troubled small businesses—perhaps those who need it
the most—from obtaining grants to pay employees so their workers don’t lose their
jobs somehow promote the public interest, but ensuring that the $349 billion in relief
flows to those who need it the most constitute “throwing a wrench” into Congress’
response to COVID-19?

Congress passed the CARES Act “[t]o provide emergency assistance . . . for
individuals, families, and businesses affected by the 2020 coronavirus pandemic.”111
In doing so, Congress created the Paycheck Protection Program, which basically
provides $349 billion in grants so small businesses can pay their employees, and
made sure as many small businesses were eligible for the grants as possible. By

enjoining the Supplemental Rule, at least to the extent it disqualifies Gateway
Radiology from the Paycheck Protection Program, the injunction would be
promoting the public interest by giving effect to Congress’ intent. Far from throwing
a wrench into Congress’ response to COVID-19, the Court would be preventing the
SBA from inexplicably doing so.

111 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, S. 3548, 116th Cong. (2020).
III. CONCLUSION
“When an administrative agency sets policy, it must provide a reasoned
explanation for its action. That is not a high bar, but it is an unwavering one.”112 It is

up to this Court to ensure that the SBA Administrator has cleared that bar by
engaging in reasoned decision-making.”113
The SBA Administrator’s decision-making here was anything but reasoned.
Although Congress chose to require mid-size businesses to certify they were not in
bankruptcy to participate in the mid-size loan program, it chose not to impose a

similar requirement on small businesses wanting to participate in the Paycheck
Protection Program.
The SBA Administrator concedes that when Congress knows how to say
something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling.”114 But rather than treating
Congress’ silence as controlling, the SBA treats it as a dog whistle to exclude chapter

11 debtors from the Paycheck Protection Program because of the supposed
unacceptably high risk that PPP Loans will be not be forgiven or collectable.
Any reasonable person would see that Congress was not concerned about
collectability. PPP Loans are designed to be forgiven, which is why Congress and the

112 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45 (2011).
113 Id. at 53 (“[C]ourts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged in
reasoned decisionmaking.”)
114 CBS Inc. v. PrimteTime24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith), 206 F.3d 1389, 1394 (11th Cir. 2000)).
SBA have dispensed with traditional underwriting requirements. And in any event,
the chapter 11 process makes it more—not less—likely chapter 11 debtors would use
PPP Loans for covered expenses, in which case the loans would be forgiven. Thus,

the SBA Administrator’s explanation for the Supplemental Rule is contrary to the
evidence before her.
Although the bar for agency action is not a high one, the SBA Administrator
failed to clear it here. This Court will therefore enjoin the SBA Administrator from
enforcing the Supplemental Rule to the extent it disqualifies Gateway Radiology

from participating in the Paycheck Protection Program.

Attorney Joel Aresty is directed to serve a copy of this Memorandum Opinion on
interested parties who are non-CM/ECF users and file a proof of service within
three days of entry of this Memorandum Opinion.

Joel M. Aresty, Esq.
Joel M. Aresty P.A.
Counsel for the Debtor

Christopher J. Emden
Counsel for Jovita Carranza,
in her capacity as
Administrator for the U.S. Small
Business Administration

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456294. Public record. Not legal advice.
