# Mallinckrodt plc

> United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware · May 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456223

## Case

- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
- **Decided:** May 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
In re: ) Chapter 11
)
MALLINCKRODT PLC, et al., ) Case No. 20-12522 (JTD)
) (Jointly Administered)
Reorganized Debtors. )
____________________________________) Re: D.I. 8553

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Reorganized Debtors filed a motion seeking to enforce the discharge injunction
contained in the Plan and Confirmation Order and to enjoin the plaintiffs in a putative class
action from joining Mallinckrodt as a defendant.1 The Motion was briefed and on April 11,
2023, I heard oral argument.2 For the reasons set forth below, I find that the Reorganized
Debtors have not met their burden to establish that the discharge injunction has been violated.
The Motion is therefore denied.
BACKGROUND
On February 18, 2018, a group of property owners (“Plaintiffs”) commenced litigation in
state court in Missouri against the Cotter Corporation (“Cotter”) and others allegedly
responsible for permitting radioactive material from the Manhattan Project3 to contaminate the
local environment.4 While Plaintiffs’ initial complaint did discuss Mallinckrodt’s involvement
with this material, Plaintiffs did not initially assert any claims directly against Mallinckrodt.5
Debtors assert that Plaintiffs intentionally left Mallinckrodt out of the litigation to avoid

1 D.I. 8553, Reorganized Debtors’ Motion for Order Enforcing the Discharge Injunction (the “Motion”).
2 D.I. 8588 (Response in Opposition); 8641 (Reply).
3 The Manhattan Project was the U.S. research project designed to develop the first nuclear weapons.
4 See generally, Second Amended Petition, D.I. 8553, Ex. B. While initiated in state court, this action is
now pending in federal court. See Banks et al. v. Cotter Corp. et al. v. Mallinckrodt LLC et al., No. 20-
CV-1227 (E.D. Mo.) (“Banks Litigation”).
5 See Second Amended Petition, D.I. 8553, Ex. B.
application of the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (“PAA”),6 a federal statute
enacted in 1957 to incentivize progress in atomic energy by reducing liability for entities
undertaking atomic research and other related work.
While Plaintiffs were initially successful, once Cotter joined Mallinckrodt to the action

by way of third-party complaint, the action was removed to federal court. Following a series of
battles on the question of whether Plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the PAA, including a remand
to state court, another removal, and an appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the case eventually landed in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. But while the appeal process was still
ongoing, Debtors filed for bankruptcy.
As the parties awaited a ruling from the Eighth Circuit on the forum issue, Debtors
worked their way through their bankruptcy cases and attempted to negotiate their way to a
consensual confirmation. Although the Plaintiffs did not participate, Debtors negotiated with
Cotter and other defendants regarding the post-confirmation treatment of claims arising out of
Debtors’ processing of radioactive material and the negotiating parties reached an agreement on

the language to be included in the confirmation order. The applicable provision (“Paragraph
268”) states, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Confirmation Order or in the
Plan, any liabilities of Debtor Mallinckrodt LLC that have been asserted in
writing before the Petition Date . . . (for purposes of this paragraph, the
foregoing liabilities shall be referred to as the “Defined Liabilities”) shall
not be discharged, released, enjoined, or otherwise impaired by the Plan or this
Confirmation Order. . . .7

The Confirmation Order was entered on March 2, 2022.

6 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq.
7 D.I. 6660, Order Confirming Fourth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (“Confirmation Order”), ¶
268.
In the meantime, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling regarding the
applicability of the PAA to the Banks Litigation, holding that “[t]he PAA's jurisdictional grant
provides federal question ‘original jurisdiction’ for ‘any public liability action arising out of or
resulting from a nuclear incident’ to the district court located in the district where the incident

occurred.” Banks v. Cotter Corp. (In re: Cotter Corp., (N.S.L.)), 22 F.4th 788, 793 (8th Cir.
2022). Plaintiffs were then faced with deciding between making claims under the PAA or not at
all.
In January of 2023, Plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to add Mallinckrodt as a
defendant and, for the first time, assert claims against it directly. Shortly thereafter, Debtors
filed this Motion.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The Court has jurisdiction to consider this Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and
1334 and the Amended Standing Order of Reference from the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware, dated February 29, 2012. This is a core proceeding under 28

U.S.C. § 157(b). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.
DISCUSSION
I. The Parties’ Arguments
As the Plaintiffs’ claims against Mallinckrodt arose prepetition, they are subject to
discharge by Debtors’ bankruptcy unless a specific exception to discharge applies. Plaintiffs
assert that Paragraph 268 of the Confirmation Order is such an exception, because it carves out
from discharge “any liabilities of Debtor Mallinckrodt LLC” with respect to Debtors’ processing
of radioactive materials that “have been asserted in writing before the Petition Date…”.
Plaintiffs argue that Paragraph 268 includes their claims because although they did not attempt to
sue Mallinckrodt directly until recently, their earlier pleadings against Cotter, as well as Cotter’s
pleadings filed against Mallinckrodt, discuss Mallinckrodt’s potential liability in sufficient detail
to satisfy the Paragraph 268’s requirements. Specifically, Plaintiffs cite to the following
allegations contained in their Second Amended Class Action Petition (“Second Amended

Petition”), filed pre-petition:
• Six decades ago, Mallinckrodt received in the downtown St. Louis
area highly concentrated uranium with abnormal levels of radium which
were extremely toxic (¶ 1)
• From 1942 to 1957, uranium ore was processed in downtown St. Louis
City in association with the Manhattan Project (Amended Petition, ¶
62); This downtown St. Louis facility was known as the St. Louis
Downtown Site (the “SLDS”) and was used to process uranium (¶ 63)
• The wastes created by processing at the SLDS are known in the scientific
and regulatory communities as uranium mill tailings and were created as
a result of the milling of uranium ore to produce uranium metal by
Mallinckrodt (¶ 64)
• In the late 1940s, the Manhattan Project acquired a 21.7-acre tract of land
near Lambert Airport to store the hazardous, toxic, carcinogenic
radioactive uranium mill tailings from the uranium processing operations
at the SLDS. The storage site(s) on and near the airport are now referred
to as the St. Louis Airport Site or SLAPS (“SLAPS”) (¶ 65)
• Radioactive uranium mill tailings accumulated locally at SLAPS. These
hazardous, toxic, carcinogenic, radioactive waste materials included
pitchblende raffinate residues, radium-bearing residues, barium sulfate
cake, and Colorado raffinate residues. They were stored locally at SLAPS
along with contaminated scrap. Some of these radioactive wastes were
stored in bulk on the open ground in piles (Amended Petition, ¶ 66)
• From 1953, the SLAPS property was managed and operated by
Mallinckrodt (¶ 77)8

8 Second Amended Petition, D.I. 8553, Ex. B.
Plaintiffs also cite to Cotter’s Third-Party Petition against Mallinckrodt, in which Cotter alleged
that:
• Mallinckrodt owed [the Banks] Plaintiffs a duty as alleged in the
Second Amended Class Action Petition (Third Party Petition, ¶ 70);

• Mallinckrodt failed to use reasonable care that resulted in releases from
the St. Louis Downtown Site, the St. Louis Airport Site, the Latty Avenue
Site, the West Lake Landfill, Mallinckrodt St. Louis Plant, and transit
routes into the surrounding environment, including the alleged Class Area
(Third Party Petition, ¶ 71); and

• In the unlikely event that any damages are assessed against Cotter, which
Cotter denies, any such damages were caused, in whole or in part, by
the conduct, fault, acts, carelessness, omissions, and negligence
of Mallinckrodt, thereby barring any such recovery against Cotter (Third
Party Petition, ¶ 73).9

As these allegations were made in writing, prepetition, Plaintiffs argue, their claims were not
discharged.
Debtors respond that Paragraph 268 cannot be read so broadly as to encompass the mere
suggestion by someone that Mallinckrodt should be held responsible for something, but instead
should be read as requiring a writing that asserts “specific obligations owed to specific
persons.”10 “Liabilities,” they argue, “especially when used in the plural sense, means :‘[a]
financial or pecuniary obligation in a specified amount’ and is synonymous with ‘debt.’”11
Debtors argue that while Cotter has asserted in writing just such a debt by filing its petition for
contribution against Mallinckrodt in the amount of any damages in excess of Cotter’s percentage
of fault, Plaintiffs have not.

9 Third-Party Petition, D.I. 8553, Ex. E.
10 Motion, D.I. 8553 at 11.
11 Id. quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th ed. 2019
II. Applicability of Paragraph 268 to Plaintiffs’ Claims
“An order confirming a plan of reorganization operates as a final judgment binding a
debtor and its successors.” Kravitz v. Samson Energy Co., LLC (In re Samson Res. Corp.), 590
B.R. 643, 649 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018). “For the purposes of enforcement, a [] judgment is to be

interpreted as a contract, to which the governing rules of contract interpretation apply.” Harley-
Davidson, Inc. v. Morris, 19 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Spitfire Energy Group,
LLC v. Presidio Petroleum LLC (In re TE Holdcorp, LLC), 2022 WL 951553, at *7 (D. Del.
Mar. 30, 2022) (Confirmation order properly construed in accordance with rules of contract
interpretation). Under the rules of contract interpretation, “[u]nless there is ambiguity, the terms
of the Confirmation Order and the Plan are controlling, and the Court is not free to look to
material beyond the provisions of the Confirmation Order and the Plan.” Kravitz, 590 B.R. at
649.
While both parties here argue that Paragraph 268 is unambiguous, I am not persuaded.
Contract interpretation principles dictate that “[a] contract is not rendered ambiguous simply

because the parties do not agree upon its proper construction.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am.
Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006). “Rather, a contract is ambiguous only when
the provisions in controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or
may have two or more different meanings.” Id. As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained:
Ambiguity does not exist where a court can determine the meaning of a contract
without any other guide than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the
nature of language in general, its meaning depends. Courts will not torture
contractual terms to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no
room for uncertainty. The true test is not what the parties to the contract
intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties
would have thought it meant.
903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006). Applying this standard here, I find it is not clear from the face of
the document what the phrase “any liabilities of Debtor Mallinckrodt LLC” in Paragraph 268 is
intended to encompass. Specifically, I find that the use of the word “liabilities,” in paragraph
268 creates an ambiguity that cannot be resolved from the language in the document alone.

The word “liabilities” is subject to multiple interpretations and, as it is used here, lacks
the precision necessary to clearly convey what is preserved. Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary
itself cautions that liability is a word not easily defined:
“The term ‘liability’ is one of at least double signification. In one sense it is the
synonym of duty, the correlative of right; in this sense it is the opposite of
privilege or liberty. If a duty rests upon a party, society is now commanding
performance by him and threatening penalties. In a second sense, the term
‘liability’ is the correlative of power and the opposite of immunity. In this case
society is not yet commanding performance, but it will so command if the
possessor of the power does some operative act. If one has a power, the other has
a liability. It would be wise to adopt the second sense exclusively. Accurate legal
thinking is difficult when the fundamental terms have shifting senses.”
William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 9 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d
Am. ed. 1919).

Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).
Debtors ask me to apply the definition of “liability” found in Black’s Law Dictionary to
Paragraph 268, arguing that the word “liabilities” as it is used there can only refer to “specific
obligations owed to specific parties.”12 But there are two problems with this argument. First,
Black’s Law Dictionary sets forth two definitions for the word “liability,” not just one. The
complete definition reads:
liability n. (18c) 1. The quality, state, or condition of being legally obligated or
accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by civil
remedy or criminal punishment . —
Also termed legal liability; subjection; responsibility. Cf. FAULT. 2. (often pl.) A
financial or pecuniary obligation in a specified amount; DEBT
.

12 Motion, D.I. 8553 at 11.
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). While I might be inclined to accept Debtors’ argument
that the use of the plural of the word in Paragraph 268 supports the conclusion that the second
definition was intended to apply, there is another problem with Debtors’ proposed definition.
Application of the second, and narrower, definition of “liability” here would exclude Cotter’s

claim as well as Plaintiffs’. Debtors’ proposed definition requires that the asserted obligation be
for a “specified amount.” But as Debtors concede, the claim that Cotter asserted against
Mallinckrodt is for contribution in the amount of “any damages in excess of Cotter’s percentage
of fault.” This is hardly the “specified amount” that Debtors’ definition requires. Yet Debtors do
not dispute that Cotter’s claim passes through. Given the acknowledgement that the parties
intended, at the very least, that Cotter’s claim would be covered by the term “liabilities,”
Debtors’ proposed definition makes no sense.
The alternative definition of “liability” in Black’s does embrace the notion that a liability
can be something less precise. Additionally, this more nebulous characterization aligns with the
common meaning and usage of the word. See e.g., Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/liability (defining “liability” as “1. The quality or
state of being liable; 2. Something for which one is liable; 3. One that acts as a disadvantage”);
The Britannica Dictionary, https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/liability (defining “liability”
as “1. The state of being legally responsible for something. . . .; 2. Something (such as the
payment of money) for which a person or business is legally responsible; 3. Someone or
something that causes problems”). However, application of this broader definition here raises its
own set of problems when Paragraph 268 is read in its entirety and within the larger context.
As Debtors point out, Paragraph 268 appears under the heading “Cotter and Bridgeton
Landfill” in a section of the Confirmation Order that appears to address the disposition of claims
held only by Cotter and Bridgeton Landfill, LLC. While these parties are not mentioned by
name in the first half of the paragraph, the second half expressly provides that any claims held by
Bridgeton or Cotter, other than the aforementioned “liabilities,” shall be released.13 Debtors
argue that Plaintiffs’ proposed reading of the word “liabilities” to encompass their claims would

cause these references solely to Cotter and Bridgeton to make no sense. Additionally, Debtors
contend, this expansive reading of “liabilities” would sweep broadly enough to permit anyone to
assert discharged claims otherwise fitting the definition if they simply borrowed sufficiently from
a previously asserted claim. Such a reading would be contrary to both the purpose of the Plan
and bankruptcy reorganization generally. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998)
(“A construction [of statutory exceptions to discharge] so broad would be incompatible with
the well-known guide that exceptions to discharge should be confined to those plainly
expressed.”) (quotations omitted). I agree. Just as with Debtors’ proffered meaning, application
of the plain meaning of the word “liabilities” does not make sense given the remainder of the
paragraph, as well as the larger context of the Confirmation Order and the bankruptcy scheme

generally.
Because none of the commonly used definitions of the word “liability” make sense when
applied to the operative phrase of Paragraph 268, I must conclude that the provision is
ambiguous. “Once the Court determines that a contract is ambiguous, the factfinder may then
consider admissible extrinsic evidence to resolve the parties' intended meaning of the ambiguous
terms.” Victaulic Co. v. ASC Engineered Sols., LLC, Civil Action No. 20-887-GBW, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 180424, at *14 (D. Del. Oct. 3, 2022). Additionally, “Delaware contract law states
that ambiguous provisions are construed against the drafter.” In re NVF Co., 309 B.R. 698, 704–

13 Confirmation Order, D.I. 6660, ¶ 268.
05 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (further stating that “in this case where the Plan is considered an
enforceable contract the interpretation of the ambiguous provisions will be construed against
NVF as the Plan proponent”).
Plaintiffs submitted two forms of extrinsic evidence in support of their proposed

interpretation. The first is a series of emails between counsel for Cotter and counsel for the
Debtors, wherein the language of Paragraph 268 is being negotiated. The email correspondence
shows that Debtors originally proposed that the term “liabilities” be followed by the words “to
[Bridgeton Landfill / Cotter], but that counsel for Cotter would not agree to that inclusion, stating
in their response to Debtor:
We do not agree to the addition of “to [Bridgeton Landfill / Cotter]” in the first
sentence. For example, the Banks plaintiffs allege liability directly against MNK to
plaintiffs and not to Cotter. All liabilities should pass through.14

Debtors’ response included no reply, but simply altered the language of Paragraph 268 to
remove the reference to the parties by name and add the phrase “that have been asserted in
writing before the petition date” without highlight or discussion.15
Plaintiffs argue that this email exchange shows that Debtors understood that it was the
intention of all the negotiating parties that the Plaintiffs’ claims would be preserved along with
Cotter’s. Debtors disagree, arguing that Cotter was mistaken in its belief that either proposal
would preserve claims by the Plaintiffs directly against Mallinckrodt because from Debtors’
perspective, the fact that the Plaintiffs had not filed so much as a proof of claim against
Mallinckrodt meant any direct claims by them would be discharged. But the only evidence
submitted on this issue does not support Debtors’ assertion.

14 Reply, D.I. 8641, Exs. A and B.
15 Id.
The emails demonstrate that Debtors were informed that the counterparty in the
negotiations expected that the claims of both Cotter and the Plaintiffs would be preserved.
Debtors said nothing in response to that suggestion that in any way hinted that they did not agree
with this understanding. On the contrary, they simply deleted the offending language, added an

additional requirement regarding a prepetition writing, and moved on. These actions support the
conclusion that the parties intended for the phrase “any liabilities of Debtor Mallinckrodt LLC
that have been asserted in writing before the Petition Date” to include any prepetition written
assertion by Plaintiffs that Mallinckrodt is responsible for injuries arising out of its processing of
uranium. The question then becomes, did Plaintiffs make such an assertion?
Debtors argue that they did not, focusing on Plaintiffs’ reliance on Cotter’s Third-Party
Petition which asserts Mallinckrodt is liable solely on a theory of contribution. Since
contribution is not the theory asserted in the complaint that Plaintiffs wish to file now, Debtors
argue, Plaintiffs have not satisfied Paragraph 268’s requirement that the liabilities be asserted in
writing prepetition. While I agree that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the allegations made by Cotter in

its Third-Party Petition, Debtors overlook the allegations made by Plaintiffs in their Second
Amended Petition. There Plaintiffs identify Mallinckrodt as one of the parties involved in the
handling of uranium that resulted in harm to the surrounding environment.16 Though the Second
Amended Petition did not include claims by Plaintiffs against Mallinckrodt directly, it would
certainly be reasonable to read it as asserting Mallinckrodt’s liability for the injuries described
therein. In fact, Mallinckrodt read it as doing just that, which Mallinckrodt acknowledged in the
Notice of Removal it filed in the Banks Litigation where it concluded the section of its brief
titled “Plaintiff’s allegations as they related to Mallinckrodt” with the following footnote:

16 See generally Motion, D.I. 8553, Ex. B.
Mallinckrodt obviously disputes these allegations to the extent they suggest
wrongdoing by Mallinckrodt or suggest Mallinckrodt’s liability for the damages
sought.17

Though the parties did not address this admission in their papers or at argument, I find it difficult
to conceive of more straightforward evidence that the Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition can
be reasonably read as asserting that Mallinckrodt is at least partially responsible for injuries
arising out of its uranium processing. As Plaintiffs filed that document prepetition, it is fairly
encompassed within the phrase “any liabilities of Debtor Mallinckrodt LLC that have been
asserted in writing before the Petition Date,” contained in Paragraph 268.
This conclusion is further supported by the Debtors’ schedules, wherein Plaintiffs are
expressly listed as holders of claims against Mallinckrodt. While Debtors argue that the
inclusion of the Plaintiffs and not Cotter on the schedules is clearly a scrivener’s error – that the
person who completed the form was merely copying the case caption and failed to understand
that debtors were only involved in the litigation as third-party defendants – Debtors have
submitted no evidence to support this conclusion. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the
inclusion of Plaintiffs on Debtors’ schedules was a mistake. Int'l Union of Elec. v. Murata Erie
N. Am., 980 F.2d 889, 907 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Under the doctrine of scrivener's error, the mistake of
a scrivener in drafting a document may be reformed based upon parole evidence, provided the
evidence is ‘clear, precise, convincing and of the most satisfactory character’ that a mistake has
occurred and that the mistake does not reflect the intent of the parties.”).
For these reasons, I find that the Debtors have not met their burden of establishing that
Plaintiffs’ attempt to join Mallinckrodt to the Banks Litigation violates the terms of the Plan or
the Confirmation Order. However, this ruling applies only to those plaintiffs expressly named in

17 Notice of Removal, D.I. 8553, Ex. C.
the Banks Litigation and does not extend to those similarly situated on whose behalf the
Plaintiffs have attempted to assert claims. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588,
593, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013) (“a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally
bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified”); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564

U.S. 299, 313 (2011) (“ '[A] nonnamed class member is [not] a party to the class-action
litigation before the class is certified’”) (quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 16, n. 1
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
III. Equitable Estoppel
Debtors also argue Plaintiffs should be precluded from asserting their claims against
Mallinckrodt under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. “Parties claiming equitable estoppel
must establish that (1) a representation of fact was made to them, (2) upon which they had a
right to rely and did so rely, and (3) that the denial of the represented fact by the party making
the representation would result in injury to the relying party.” Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
McCune, 836 F. 2d 153, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1987).

Debtors argue that the Plaintiffs disavowed any claims against Mallinckrodt when they
stated in both pleadings and argument in the Banks Litigation that Mallinckrodt was not the
cause of their injuries and that they were not asserting claims against Mallinckrodt.18 Relying on
these representations, Debtors contend, they drafted Paragraph 268 to address only the claims of
Cotter and Bridgeton. Allowing Plaintiffs to deny this representation now and forcing
Mallinckrodt to participate in the Banks Litigation will cause Debtors to be injured.

18 Motion, D.I. 8553 at 14.
While Debtors make a compelling argument on this issue, they have failed to present any
evidence to support it. I have nothing before me, other than statements of counsel, from which I
could fairly conclude that the Debtors considered the statements made in the Banks Litigation at
all, let alone relied on them in drafting the Confirmation Order. In fact, as discussed above, the
evidence I do have (the emails between counsel) suggests just the opposite. Accordingly, I find
that Debtors have not carried their burden in demonstrating that Plaintiffs should be estopped
from asserting their claims.
For the reasons set forth above, Debtors’ Motion is DENIED.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The Motion as it applies to the named plaintiffs in the action captioned Banks et al. v.
Cotter Corp. et al., No. 20-CV-1227 (E.D. Mo.) (specifically Tamia Banks, Rev. Ronnie Hooks,
Barbara Hooks, Joel Hogan, Kenneth Niebling, Kendall Lacy, Tanja Lacy, Willie Clay, Bobbie
Jean Clay, Angela Statum, and Missouri Rentals Company, LLC), is DENIED.

Dated: May 31, 2023 fo ~f
FF T. DORSEY, U.S.B.J. 7

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456223. Public record. Not legal advice.