# Cyber Litigation Inc.

> United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware · June 28, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456007

## Case

- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
- **Decided:** June 28, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456007

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that Rule 2004 may not be used to circumvent the limits on discovery in a pending proceeding

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
Chapter 11
In re:
Case No. 20-12702 (CTG)
CYBER LITIGATION INC., et al.,
Related Docket No. 401
Debtor.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
The debtor was in the business of detecting and preventing online fraud. Its
business collapsed in September 2020 amidst allegations that the enterprise was
itself largely fraudulent, including claims that the debtor had raised almost $125
million from investors based on fabricated financial statements. In September 2020,
Adam Rogas, the company’s founder and Chief Executive Officer, abruptly resigned
and was sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission for securities fraud. Soon
thereafter, Rogas was arrested and criminally charged with, inter alia, securities
fraud and wire fraud.
Phil Vizzaccaro was a co-founder of the debtor. He was both an officer (having
served as Chief Technology Officer) and a director. He is also the “subject” of an
ongoing criminal investigation. The debtor is conducting its own investigation into
the allegations of prepetition fraud, using the tools available in bankruptcy under
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004, so that it may pursue any available
estate causes of action. In that regard, the debtor seeks to take Vizzaccaro’s

1 This Memorandum Opinion sets out the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, as made applicable to this contested matter under Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9014(c).
deposition. Vizzaccaro has moved the Court to stay that examination, representing
that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in
response to at least some questions that he would expect to be asked. Because a

factfinder in a civil case may draw an adverse inference from a witness’ invocation of
the Fifth Amendment, Vizzaccaro argues that the Rule 2004 examination should be
stayed in deference to his constitutional interests.
While the Court views the question presented here as a close one, if it were
forced to make a binary decision between granting and denying the motion for a stay,
the Court believes that the factors set forth in the governing caselaw would counsel
in favor of granting the motion to stay the examination. The Court believes, however,

that if the debtor would agree to certain conditions that would mitigate the intrusion
on Vizzaccaro’s Fifth Amendment interests, the balance would tip the other way. The
Court accordingly directs the debtor to settle an order, either providing that the
motion is granted, or setting forth the debtor’s consent to the conditions that (as
discussed below) the Court finds would mitigate the intrusion on Vizzaccaro’s Fifth
Amendment rights and denying the motion on that basis.

Factual and Procedural Background
The debtor was a cyberfraud prevention company that developed and sold
electronic tools to help online vendors assess the fraud risks of customer transactions.
Declaration of Daniel P. Wikel, Chief Restructuring Officer of NS8 Inc., in Support of
Chapter 11 Petition and First Day Motions, D.I. 9, at 4. The debtor was founded in
2016 by Rogas and five others (Vizzaccaro among them), with Rogas serving as the
Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and as a member of its board of
directors. Id.
The original “seed money” to fund the debtor’s business operations came from

its founders and a handful of other investors. Thereafter, the debtors were able to
raise money in the venture capital markets, largely through the sale of convertible
preferred stock. By early 2020, the debtor had raised over $123 million from investors
through at least four rounds of securities offerings. Id. at 5. Apparently flush with
cash raised from new investors, in mid-2020 the debtor offered to buy-back its own
shares in a series of tender offers, thus providing early-stage investors holding large
equity positions with the chance to monetize those holdings. Id. at 6. Vizzaccaro

allegedly participated in these tender offers. The debtor alleges that Vizzaccaro, via
the tender offers, received $13.4 million in cash in exchange for equity he held in the
company. Debtor’s Motion for Rule 2004 Examination, D.I. 244, ¶¶ 2-3.
In September 2020, Rogas abruptly resigned. Shortly thereafter, the SEC filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
alleging that Rogas falsified bank statements to show millions of dollars in customer

revenue and bank balances that in fact never existed. D.I. 9 at 6. Following the
revelation of Rogas’ alleged fraud, the debtor retained restructuring counsel, a
forensic accountant, and filed these chapter 11 cases. Id. at 8-9. In October 2020, a
grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment against
Rogas, charging him with federal securities fraud relating to the $123 million in
investments. Indictment, United States v. Rogas, SDNY No. 20-00539, D.I. 7 (Oct.
13, 2020).
In February 2021, the U.S. Attorney’s Office moved to intervene in the SEC

civil action, seeking to stay further civil proceedings against Rogas until the
completion of the criminal matter. United States Motion to Intervene, SEC v. Rogas,
SDNY No. 20-7628, D.I. 46 (Feb. 12, 2021). The U.S. Attorney’s Office obtained the
desired stay on February 23, 2021, after arguing (among other reasons but relevant
to the present case) that allowing the civil and criminal cases to proceed in parallel
would force Rogas to choose between asserting his Fifth Amendment right in the civil
action (and facing the risk that doing so would lead to an adverse inference being

drawn against him) and waiving his Fifth Amendment rights in order fully to defend
himself in the civil action. Stipulation, SEC v. Rogas, SDNY No. 20-7628, D.I. 49
(Feb. 23, 2021).
Since the petition date, the debtor has conducted an active investigation into
the alleged acts of fraud, including looking into potential estate causes of action that
might arise out of those allegations. To that end, the debtor sought authority to

conduct discovery under Rule 2004 regarding cash transfers made by the debtor to
the investors and/or the debtor’s founders, former officers, directors and/or
employees, including Vizzaccaro and his company, Gator.io. Debtor’s Motion for
Order Authorizing Procedures for Rule 2004 Examinations of Transferees, D.I. 194,
at 7. In late January 2021, the Court entered an order approving the debtor’s Rule
2004 motion and authorizing the service of subpoenas on approximately 30
individuals and entities who allegedly received transfers from the debtor. Order
Granting Debtor’s Motion for Order Authorizing Procedures for and Rule 2004
Examinations of Transferees, D.I. 226. The debtor has since obtained court approval

of a number of settlements with transferees who received funds in transactions that
the estate alleged would give rise to avoidance actions in bankruptcy. See, e.g.,
Debtor’s Motion to Approve Settlement with Lillian and Evan Englund, D.I. 352;
Debtor’s Motion to Approve Settlement with Sytze Koolen, D.I. 353; Debtor’s Motion to
Approve Settlement with Paul Korol, D.I. 395.
In response to the Rule 2004 motion, Vizzaccaro’s counsel notified Debtor’s
counsel that that soon after Vizzaccaro received the tender offer proceeds, he founded

Gator.io and transferred approximately $8 million of the $13.4 million in cash
proceeds to the new company. D.I. 244 ¶ 16; D.I. 404 ¶ 4. The debtor then served
Gator.io with a Rule 2004 subpoena. D.I. 330; D.I. 331. The debtor’s Rule 2004
subpoenas direct Vizzaccaro and Gator.io to produce documents and provide
testimony regarding, among other things: (i) payments received on account of the
debtor’s alleged fraudulent tender offers, (ii) the circumstances surrounding

compensation received from the debtor, (iii) communications with Rogas, (iv) the $8
million transferred to Gator.io from Vizzaccaro, and (v) Gator.io’s relationship with
the debtor and any additional transactions between Vizzaccaro or Gator.io and the
debtor. D.I. 194 ¶ 22. The debtor has asserted that it is investigating not only
potential claims for fraudulent conveyance (arising out of the receipt of proceeds from
the tender offer) but also potential claims for breach of fiduciary duty arising from
Vizzaccaro’s role as a director of the debtor.
Following this initial round of subpoenas and responses, Vizzaccaro and

Gator.io moved to stay further Rule 2004 discovery pending the resolution of Rogas’
federal criminal action. D.I. 401. The motion asserts that Vizzaccaro has been
advised by the United States Attorneys’ Office that he is a “subject” of the grand jury
investigation relating to Rogas’ alleged securities fraud and contends that the
“overlap” between the Rule 2004 motion and the criminal matter warrants a stay of
discovery.2 Otherwise, the motion argues, Vizzaccaro would be put to the “Hobson’s
Choice” of having to assert his Fifth Amendment right in response to the Rule 2004

subpoena and face the risk that an adverse inference could be drawn in any future
civil litigation, or waive his Fifth Amendment rights in order to defend against
potential civil liability. D.I. 402 at 8. In response, the debtor contends that the early
stage of the criminal proceedings and the bankruptcy estate’s important interest in
addressing the alleged acts of prepetition fraud outweigh the potential prejudicial
effect of the Rule 2004 examination on Vizzaccaro’s Fifth Amendment interests. D.I.

416 at 9-15.

2 The Department of Justice Manual defines a “target” as a person as to whom the prosecutor
or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime
and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant. An officer or employee
of an organization that is a target is not automatically considered a target even if such
officer’s or employee’s conduct contributed to the commission of the crime by the target
organization. Further, a “subject” of an investigation is a person whose conduct is within the
scope of the grand jury’s investigation. Justice Manual at 9-11.151 (available at
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-11000-grand-jury#9-11.151).
Analysis
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o
person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. In other words, at least in the criminal context, individuals

have a constitutional right to remain silent.3 To give effect to that right, a jury is not
permitted to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s invocation of the Fifth
Amendment in a criminal case.4
While a witness in a civil case is permitted to invoke the Fifth Amendment
(and cannot be compelled to give an answer that may be incriminating),5 the
Constitution does not prohibit a factfinder from drawing an adverse inference from

that invocation.6 “The rule allowing invocation of the privilege, though at the risk of
suffering an adverse inference or even a default, accommodates the right not to be a
witness against oneself while still permitting civil litigation to proceed.”7
Given the pressure that this adverse inference may put on an individual’s Fifth
Amendment right, however, courts have the discretion to stay a civil proceeding
pending an ongoing criminal investigation. A robust body of caselaw identifies the
following factors courts should consider:

(i) the extent of the overlap between the issues in the criminal case and
those in the civil case;

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966).
4 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-615 (1965).
5 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
6 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
7 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999).
(ii) the status of the criminal case, including whether the defendant has
been indicted;

(iii) the private interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously,
weighted against the prejudice to plaintiff caused by the delay;

(iv) the private interests of and the burden to the defendant;

(v) the interests of the courts; and

(vi) the public interest.8

In this Court’s view, this articulation of factors reflects a recognition that
allowing a civil case to proceed against an individual who is facing (or may face)
criminal charges risks putting the defendant (or potential defendant) “between-a-
rock-and-a-hard-place.” A person facing possible criminal charges will often be well
advised (regardless of the individual’s factual innocence or guilt) to invoke the Fifth
Amendment to avoid the risk that testimony may be misconstrued or taken out of
context in a subsequent criminal prosecution. But where a party that does so faces
the risk that a jury in a civil case will be asked to infer, from that invocation, that the
defendant committed the acts in question, it places pressure on the interests the Fifth
Amendment is intended to protect. At bottom, the six-part multi-factor test requires
a court to weigh the extent to which permitting a civil proceeding to go forward will
put such pressure on the invocation of a litigant’s Fifth Amendment rights against

8 See generally E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Anchi Hou, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88566,
at *2 (D. Del. June 9, 2017); Maloney v. Gordon, 328 F. Supp.2d 508, 511 (D. Del. 2004)
(same); Microfinancial, Inc. v. Premier Holidays Int’l, Inc., 385 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2004)
(same); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902-903 (9th Cir. 1989)
(same); SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375-1376 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same).
the need for civil litigation to move forward promptly and for those who hold such
civil claims to seek appropriate redress.
If this Court’s only choice were to make a binary decision between staying the

Rule 2004 exam or allowing it to proceed, based on the application of this six-factor
balancing test, the Court would likely conclude that the examination should be
stayed. The Court assesses the six factors set forth in the caselaw as follows:
First, the question of “overlap” is intended to determine whether the questions
the deponent is likely to be asked are the same questions that would implicate the
Fifth Amendment right. The parties dispute whether the issues overlap. Debtor
takes the view that because there is not yet any civil case, just a Rule 2004

examination in which the debtor is seeking to understand potential estate causes of
action, that this is not a case in which the elements of a criminal charge overlap with
those of a pending civil cause of action. D.I. 416 at 12-13. But that misapprehends
the relevant enquiry. Here, the debtor is candid in acknowledging that a critical part
of its Rule 2004 examination will be to inquire whether Vizzaccaro had personal
involvement in (or knowledge of) Rogas’ allegedly fraudulent scheme. Id. ¶ 28. Those

are the very matters that would likely implicate Vizzaccaro’s Fifth Amendment
interests. The Court therefore does believe that there is a substantial overlap,
counseling in favor of staying the Rule 2004 examination.
Second, the Court looks to the status of the criminal case. This factor counsels
against granting a stay. Vizzaccaro has not been indicted. Indeed, the record
indicates that he is a “subject,” not even a “target,” of a criminal investigation. Some
cases could be read to suggest that a court should never stay a civil case on account
of a parallel criminal proceeding unless and until the potential witness in the civil
case has actually been indicted.9 Other cases indicate that the state of the criminal

matter is simply one of the factors that gets weighed in the mix along with the
others.10 This Court believes that in the context of this kind of multi-factor balancing
test that governs this enquiry, the most sensible approach is to treat this as a factor
to be considered in the balance. Here, this factor would counsel against a stay.
Third, the caselaw directs the Court to consider the “plaintiff’s interest,” which
in this context (arising in connection with a Rule 2004 examination rather than a
civil action) requires the Court to consider the strength of the debtor’s interest in

taking the Rule 2004 examination. In the scheme of things, the Court views that
interest as a relatively weak one. That is not to minimize the estate’s interest in
seeking to conduct a thorough investigation of any wrongful acts that led to the
bankruptcy filing and to pursue causes of action that would lead to recoveries for the
benefit of creditors. That is the debtor’s obligation as a fiduciary to the estate, and
the work it has done thus far (leading to several substantial settlements) has already

produced concrete benefits. But as important as Rule 2004 is in providing a
mechanism to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor, including potential estate
causes of action, its importance diminishes once a party conducting such an
investigation is in a position (consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11) to

9 See generally In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., 2007 WL 869577 at *5 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar.
19, 2007).
10 Walsh Sec. v. Cristo Prop. Mgt., 7 F. Supp.2d 523, 527 (D.N.J. 1998).
initiate a civil action. Once such an action is brought, the party is entitled to make
use of the tools of discovery, which then replace the use of Rule 2004 as the means to
establish its case.11 The debtor does not dispute that it has a sufficient basis to assert

estate causes of action against Vizzaccaro and Gator.io. And while the debtor would
undoubtedly prefer to obtain further discovery under Rule 2004, in view of the
debtor’s ability to assert a claim, the need for Rule 2004 discovery in these
circumstances is relatively attenuated. This factor accordingly counsels in favor of
granting the motion to stay.
Fourth, the Court examines the burden on the defendant. In this context, the
relevant factor is the imposition on the potential criminal defendant’s Fifth

Amendment interest. It is not clear that this factor adds much to the analysis beyond
the concerns identified in the first and second factors. The fact that the enquiry is
likely to focus on many of the issues that are the likely the subject of the criminal
investigation suggests that Vizzaccaro has a strong interest at stake; the fact that he
is only a “subject” counsels against a stay. Beyond that, the Court does not believe
there are further material interests that factor meaningfully into the analysis.

Finally, the Court weighs the interest of the courts and the public interest.
Here, the fifth and sixth factors are considered together. To be sure, a court always
has an interest in moving matters forward on its docket. And there is a “public
interest” in having the bankruptcy system operate as designed, such that estate

11 See generally In re Wash. Mut. Inc., 408 B.R. 45, 50 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (explaining that
Rule 2004 may not be used to circumvent the limits on discovery in a pending proceeding).
causes of action are timely identified and pursued. But for the reasons discussed
under the third factor, neither of these interests factors very heavily here. There is
no pending civil action. The matter sought to be stayed is simply discovery the debtor

seeks to take under Rule 2004. And while there is a value in allowing it to proceed,
the debtor’s ability to initiate a civil lawsuit mitigates the importance of this
examination in the broader scheme of things.
In light of this assessment of the applicable factors, as described above, if the
Court had no choice but to make a binary decision between granting and denying a
stay, the Court would be inclined to grant it. While the debtor certainly makes
reasonable arguments in opposition to the motion (particularly the emphasis on the

fact that Vizzaccaro is only a subject of the investigation), the Court is persuaded that
the risk to Vizzaccaro’s Fifth Amendment rights is a serious one and that the need
for the Rule 2004 examination in the context of this case is rather attenuated. In
weighing all the factors, the Court would conclude, after a full consideration of the
balance of harms, that the motion should be granted.
The Court does not believe, however, that it is required to make such a binary

choice between granting and denying a stay. Rather, there appears to be ample
authority for a court facing a situation like this one to take other measures to protect
a potential defendant’s Fifth Amendment interests while at the same time
accommodating a legitimate interest in allowing discovery to proceed.12

12 Given that Vizzaccaro is the sole proprietor of Gator.io, and that any information sought
from Gator.io would stem from Vizzaccaro by nature of being the designated representative,
For example, in Harrell v. DCS Equipment Leasing Corp., a trial court
determined, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, to exclude from evidence the fact of
a civil defendant’s prior invocation of his Fifth Amendment right, even though (as

discussed above) the Fifth Amendment does not by its terms prohibit a jury from
drawing an adverse inference from that invocation.13 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id.
at 1466. In an opinion by Judge John Minor Wisdom, the court emphasized that the
“potential prejudice in revealing the invocation of the Fifth Amendment is high,
because the jury may attach undue weight to it, or may misunderstand [a
defendant’s] decision to invoke his constitutional privilege.” Id. at 1465. Because a
trial court has “wide discretion” to exclude evidence when its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
trial court acted “well within his discretion” in excluding the invocation of the Fifth
Amendment.14
This Court similarly believes that it may take appropriate steps to set forth
conditions that would mitigate the prejudice to Vizzaccaro if the debtor were
permitted to proceed with the Rule 2004 exam and to condition the denial of

Vizzaccaro’s motion on the trustee’s agreement to accept those conditions.

the below analysis applies equally to Gator.io, such that those Rule 2004 exams effectively
rise or fall together.
13 951 F.2d 1453, 1465 (5th Cir. 1992).
14 See also Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) (enforcing
protective order to bar access to the transcript in which defendant invoked the Fifth
Amendment to mitigate prejudice to defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights).
In particular, the Court is persuaded that the debtor has a legitimate interest
in learning whether Vizzaccaro would be able to provide useful testimony regarding
the involvement of other parties in Rogas’ alleged fraudulent acts, and it is at least

conceivable that Vizzaccaro may be willing to provide useful testimony in response to
questions about others’ involvement. Accordingly, to the extent the Rule 2004 exam
could proceed in a manner that would not put undue pressure on Vizzaccaro’s Fifth
Amendment interests, it would be appropriate to allow it to go forward.
To that end, the Court is confident that, to the extent this Court is the ultimate
factfinder in any dispute to which Vizzaccaro is a party, it would be able (as the trial
court did in Harrell) to exclude from evidence Vizzaccaro’s invocation of the Fifth

Amendment, and thus significantly reduce the threat posed by the Rule 2004
examination to Vizzaccaro’s Fifth Amendment rights. The examination could
proceed, and Vizzaccaro could invoke the Fifth Amendment whenever appropriate
without being put “between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place,” as he might be if a factfinder
may later draw an adverse inference from his invocation of his Fifth Amendment
rights.

To the extent the debtor does ultimately assert a civil claim against Vizzaccaro,
however, the debtor would be entitled to do so in any court of competent jurisdiction,
of which this Court would be just one of potentially many. And even if such an action
were to be brought in this Court, the debtor would be entitled at any time to seek to
withdraw the reference to litigate the claim in the district court. In that event, this
Court’s intent to exclude a Fifth Amendment invocation from evidence would be of
little comfort to Vizzaccaro, who might again find himself “between-a-rock-and-a-
hard-place.”
The debtor, however, could resolve those concerns by committing to bring any

civil action against Vizzaccaro in this Court and further agreeing to consent, under
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (to the extent any such action is a non-core proceeding) to the
entry of final judgment by this Court. That is not to suggest that this Court could or
would require the debtor to do so. The debtor is fully entitled to pursue its claims in
any court of its choosing. In that event, however, the Court would be inclined (for the
reasons described above) to grant Vizzaccaro’s motion to stay the Rule 2004 exam.
The Court concludes, however, that if the debtor were to consent to these two

conditions, the potential risk to Vizzaccaro’s Fifth Amendment interests would be
sufficiently mitigated to tip the balance in favor of permitting the examination to
proceed.
Counsel for Vizzaccaro noted, at argument on the motion, that Vizzaccaro
might not consent to have a civil action proceed before this Court and could very well
insist on a right to a jury trial in any civil action, or otherwise seek to withdraw the

reference. Nothing in the conditions set forth above, however, restricts Vizzaccaro
from proceeding in any manner he chooses. This Court is persuaded that, if the
debtor were to consent to the conditions described herein, the risk to Vizzaccaro’s
Fifth Amendment rights will have been sufficiently mitigated that the motion should
be denied. Vizzaccaro would be fully entitled to later determine (with the benefit of
knowing what transpired in the Rule 2004 examination) that it is nevertheless in his
interest to move to withdraw the reference or otherwise seek to have the matter
proceed in another court (where he may face the risk of an adverse inference from his
invocation of the Fifth Amendment during his Rule 2004 examination). Vizzaccaro

would remain free to proceed however he considers appropriate, and nothing about
the debtor’s consent to the conditions described above (if it is given) would impair
Vizzaccaro’s rights in that regard in any respect.
One final point ought to be made. As the Court’s analysis of the six-factor test
presumably made clear, a key consideration in the Court’s analysis is its judgment
that, in light of all of the information already available, and the debtor’s ability to
proceed directly to asserting a civil claim, the Rule 2004 discovery the debtor seeks

to take is, in the scheme of things, relatively less important than protecting
Vizzaccaro’s Fifth Amendment rights. Nothing in that analysis, however, indicates
how the Court would consider the issue if Vizzaccaro were to seek a stay of a
deposition in an actual civil lawsuit asserting an estate cause of action. In that
situation, the arguments advanced by the debtor about the need for the civil action
to proceed (and perhaps for the propriety of drawing an adverse inference) would be

stronger than they are in the context of this motion. This statement is not to prejudge
in any way how the Court would consider the issue in that context. To the contrary,
all parties would be free to make whatever arguments they considered appropriate,
and the Court would assess the question in the concrete context in which it was
presented. The only point that needs to be made now, however, is that nothing in
this decision resolves that question.
Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, the debtor is directed to settle an order that either (i)
states that the motion is granted; or (ii) contains representations by the debtor that
(a) any civil action the estate may pursue against Vizzaccaro will be brought in this
Court and (b) further consents, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (to the extent any such
action is a non-core proceeding) to the entry of final judgment in this Court in any
such proceeding. To the extent the proposed order contains the representations set
forth in clause (ii) of the preceding sentence, the order should further provide that,
on account of such representations, the motion to stay is denied.

42 ——
uo JIM
Dated: June 28, 2021
CRAIG T. GOLDBLATT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10456007. Public record. Not legal advice.