# Gilani v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center

> District Court, N.D. Texas · March 13, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10452685

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** March 13, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10452685

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that dismissal for cheating on a test was disciplinary rather than academic
- holding that plaintiff’s request for a transcript correction was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because defendant deprived him of his constitutional right to attend another medical school
- holding that Ex parte Young exception applied to claims by student seeking to expunge failing grade and plagiarism conviction

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

AL GILANI, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-1461-N
§
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS §
SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL §
CENTER, et al., §
§
Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Order addresses Defendants University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
(“UT Southwestern”), Angela Mihalic, Blake Barker, Andrew Lee, and Dwain Thiele’s
(collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) motion to dismiss [18]. The Court concludes
that Plaintiff Al Gilani has failed to state procedural and substantive due process claims.
However, Gilani has stated a plausible Title VI claim. Accordingly, the Court grants in
part and denies in part the motion.1
I. GILANI’S DISMISSAL FROM UT SOUTHWESTERN
This case arises out of Gilani’s dismissal from UT Southwestern in March 2019.
Pl.’s First. Am. Compl. ¶ 36 [15]. Gilani began medical school at UT Southwestern in the
fall of 2016. Id. ¶ 16. In 2018, UT Southwestern’s Student Promotions Committee

1 Defendants’ motion to stay discovery [22] is denied as moot.
(“SPC”) placed Gilani on academic probation after it determined that Gilani failed a global
health summer research elective in Uganda. Id. ¶¶ 17–23. While on academic probation,
Gilani allegedly failed the gastrointestinal systems course (“GI Course”), and the SPC

dismissed him from medical school. Id. ¶¶ 24–27. Gilani successfully appealed his
dismissal, however, and the SPC reinstated him on the condition that he remediate the GI
Course and remain on academic probation. Id. ¶ 27. When Gilani failed the GI Course
remediation, the SPC dismissed him a second time. Id. ¶¶ 28, 31. Gilani again appealed
his dismissal but was unsuccessful. Id. ¶¶ 33–34.

In March 2021, Gilani brought suit in Texas state court against UT Southwestern
and four members of its academic administration. Defendants subsequently removed the
case to this Court and filed a motion for judgement on the pleadings [6]. The Court granted
the motion in part and granted Gilani leave to amend. Order Granting in Part Mot. J.
Pleadings 1 [14]. In April 2022, Gilani filed his First Amended Complaint alleging two

causes of action: (1) Fourteenth Amendment due process violations2 against the Individual
Defendants in their official and personal capacities; and (2) intentional discrimination
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 against UT Southwestern. Defendants now
move to dismiss both claims.

II. RULE 12(b)(6) LEGAL STANDARD
When addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a court must determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim

2 Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.
for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). “When
reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court must consider the complaint in its entirety,
as well as . . . documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of

which a court may take judicial notice.” Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a district court may properly consider
contracts or other documents that are not attached to the complaint, but are referenced
within it and attached to a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Inclusive Cmtys. Proj.,
Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019).

A viable complaint includes “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet this
standard, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally accepts well-pleaded facts as true and

construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. Horton,
Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
III. IMMUNITY FROM SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
The Individual Defendants assert sovereign immunity and qualified immunity
against Gilani’s section 1983 claims.4 Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 6–13. The Court concludes

that Gilani’s claims for injunctive relief against the Individual Defendants in their official
capacities are not barred by sovereign immunity. However, the Court holds that the
Individual Defendants in their personal capacities may invoke qualified immunity.
Ex Parte Young Applies
It is well-established that the Eleventh Amendment affords nonconsenting states
constitutional immunity in both federal and state courts.5 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527

U.S. 706, 748 (1999); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71, (1989);
Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996). “The preeminent purpose of
state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status
as sovereign entities.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760
(2002) (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)). Similarly, state officials enjoy

immunity. Because a state cannot act but through its officials, a suit against a state official
in his or her official capacity is, de facto, a suit against the state. McCarthy ex rel. Travis

4 Defendants also argue that UT Southwestern has sovereign immunity against Gilani’s
section 1983 claims. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 6–8. However, Gilani reiterates in his response
that he asserts no section 1983 claims against UT Southwestern. Pl.’s Br. Supp. Resp. Mot.
Dismiss 10 [23-1].
5 Sovereign immunity includes both immunity from suit and immunity from liability.
Meyers ex rel. Benzig v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 252–53 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, Defendants
waived immunity from suit by removing this case to federal court; however, removal does
not waive immunity from liability. See id. at 255.
v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2004). However, the Eleventh Amendment's
proscription is not absolute.
Recognizing that the Eleventh Amendment threatened to render federal courts

powerless to prevent state violations of the Constitution, the Supreme Court carved out a
narrow exception in Ex parte Young, permitting courts to grant injunctive relief against
state officers to preserve the Constitution as the “supreme law of the land.” Alden, 527
U.S. at 747; see also McCarthy, 381 F.3d at 412. However, the Supreme Court has
curtailed Ex parte Young’s diminution of the Eleventh Amendment by limiting its

availability to only extraordinary circumstances. According to the Supreme Court,
extraordinary circumstances are those in which a suit is filed (1) against a state official, (2)
seeking only prospective injunctive relief, (3) to end a “continuing violation of federal
law.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996). Thus, “to avoid an Eleventh
Amendment bar by means of Ex parte Young, ‘a court need only conduct a straightforward

inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks
relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Cantu Servs., Inc. v. Roberie, 535 F. App’x
342, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v.
Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011)).
In this case, Gilani seeks three forms of injunctive relief: (1) correction of his

transcript to reflect passing grades and no disciplinary actions; (2) release of his transcript;
and (3) removal of an outstanding tuition charge. First Am. Compl. ¶ 100. The Court
holds that Ex parte Young applies to both transcript requests, but not the request to remove
the tuition charge.
1. The Request for Transcript Corrections Satisfies Ex parte Young. – Defendants
argue that the transcript changes contravene Ex parte Young because they are merely
attempts to undue past wrongdoings. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 8–9. The Court disagrees. First,

the relief sought is prospective in effect. The injunction would require the Individual
Defendants to remove any disciplinary action from Gilani’s records, as well as correct his
transcript to reflect passing grades in the GI Course and Global Health Summer Research
Elective.
Second, the relief sought would remedy an alleged ongoing violation of federal

law.6 This Court has previously held that interference with a constitutionally protected
liberty or property interest, such as attending medical school, constitutes an ongoing
violation under Ex parte Young. Shah v. Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Sch., 129 F.
Supp. 3d 480, 496 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (holding that plaintiff’s request for a transcript
correction was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because defendant deprived him of

his constitutional right to attend another medical school), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 88 (5th Cir.
2016) (“[T]he analysis, reasoning, and conclusions of the district court are not only
comprehensive and correct, but . . . our writing separately is unnecessary.”).
Here, Gilani’s complaint states that he has sought to transfer or re-enroll in another
medical school. First Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Therefore, every time he applies to medical

school, UT Southwestern will send the deficient transcript with two failing grades and a
disciplinary note. Sending this transcript may well prevent his acceptance into another

6 This Order of course does not address the merits of Gilani’s claims, but only the
sufficiency of his pleadings.
medical school, which will further deprive him of his protected property interest. See Shah,
129 F. Supp. 3d at 496; see also Shepard v. Irving, 77 F. App’x 615, 620 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding that Ex parte Young exception applied to claims by student seeking to expunge

failing grade and plagiarism conviction). Although Gilani does not explicitly use the words
“ongoing violation,” at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court may draw reasonable
inferences based on the facts set forth in the complaint. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. The
Court thus concludes that Gilani’s request for transcript corrections satisfy Ex Parte Young
and are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

2. The Request for Release of Academic Records Satisfies Ex parte Young. –
Gilani seeks injunctive relief requiring the Individual Defendants to release his transcript
and other relevant academic records. First. Am. Compl. ¶ 100. Defendants concede that
this relief is prospective in effect but argue that Gilani has not alleged that it would remedy
an ongoing violation of his due process rights. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 9–10. As discussed

above, however, the Court can reasonably infer allegations of an ongoing violation based
on the complaint. Like the transcript issues, refusal to release academic records potentially
interferes with Gilani’s constitutionally protected interest in attending medical school. The
Individual Defendants’ ongoing refusal to release his records precludes his ability to
provide the documents necessary to apply to other schools. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that Gilani’s request for his transcript and academic records satisfies Ex parte
Young.7 See Va. Off. For Prot. & Advoc., 563 U.S. 247, 255–56 (2011) (holding that
refusal to release medical records constitutes an ongoing violation).
3. Gilani Has Not Shown That Removing the Tuition Charge Would Remedy an

Ongoing Violation. – Gilani seeks injunctive relief requiring the Individual Defendants to
remove an outstanding tuition charge for the spring 2019 semester. First. Am. Compl. ¶
100. This relief is prospective in effect. However, Gilani has not alleged, and it is not
clear from the complaint, how this relief would remedy an ongoing violation of federal
law. Accordingly, the Court holds that such relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The Individual Defendants Did Not Waive Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity is a defense available to public officials performing
discretionary functions ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.’”
Noyola v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Res., 846 F.2d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The doctrine of qualified immunity balances two
interests: “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

7 The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d
168 (5th Cir. 2020), requires dismissal of claims against the Individual Defendants not
directly involved in withholding Gilani’s transcript. That precedent applies when plaintiffs
challenge the constitutionality of a state law, and it requires a close connection between a
state actor and the challenged statute. Id. at 179. Here, Gilani does not challenge a state
law. Regardless, the Individual Defendants have not argued that they lack the authority to
release Gilani’s records.
(2009). Because “qualified immunity is designed to shield from civil liability ‘all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,’” denial of qualified
immunity is appropriate only in rare circumstances. Brady v. Fort Bend Cnty., 58 F.3d

173, 173–74 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
In this case, the Individual Defendants have properly raised qualified immunity.
The Court rejects Gilani’s argument that Defendants waived qualified immunity by
removing this case from Texas state court and raising the defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
First, removal does not preclude defendants from asserting qualified immunity. See, e.g.,

Skinner v. Gragg, 650 F. App’x 214, 217–18 (5th Cir. 2016). Second, although qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense, defendants may raise it in a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.8 See, e.g., Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir.
2009).
Because the Individual Defendants have properly asserted qualified immunity, the

Court must assess Gilani’s section 1983 claims to determine (1) whether he has shown a
violation of a constitutional right, and if so, (2) whether that right was “clearly established”
at the time of the public official’s alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001). At the motion to dismiss stage, “it is the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the
complaint that is scrutinized for ‘objective legal reasonableness.’” McClendon v. City of

Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing Behrens v.
Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996)).

8 Defendants also raised qualified immunity in their original answer in state court.
Additional Attach. Notice Removal, Defs.’ Original Answer 2 [2-3].
VI. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
To state a section 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” James v. Tex.
Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Gilani alleges
that the Individual Defendants violated his procedural and substantive due process rights
by interfering with his protected interest in continuing medical school.9 Both claims fail.
Gilani Has Failed to State a Procedural Due Process Claim
The Due Process Clause requires that an individual have “an opportunity to be heard

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” before he is deprived of a property
interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal citations omitted). This
requirement is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.” Shah, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 498. For students dismissed from a public university,
due process requirements depend on whether the dismissal was disciplinary or academic.

For students dismissed for disciplinary reasons, due process requires that “the
student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them,
an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side
of the story.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). An academic dismissal, however,
requires only that the student have meaningful notice and an opportunity to respond. Davis

9 The Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit have assumed, without deciding, that students have
a protected interest in public higher education. Shah, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 497 (collecting
cases assuming due process right to attend medical school).
v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333). A hearing
is not required. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978). Here,
even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Gilani, the Court concludes that his

dismissal was academic and UT Southwestern provided the requisite procedures.
1. Gilani’s Dismissal Was Academic, Not Disciplinary. – “A student is dismissed
for disciplinary reasons when he violates a valid rule of conduct.” Aragona v. Berry, 2012
WL 467069, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (citing Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87). In contrast, a
medical student’s dismissal is academic when the decision “rest[s] on the academic

judgment of school officials that [the student] did not have the necessary clinical ability to
perform adequately as a medical doctor.” Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89–90; see also Mathai v.
Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll., 959 F. Supp. 2d 951, 960 (E.D.
La. 2013) (“[A]n academic dismissal will be found where a student’s scholarship or
conduct reflects on the personal qualities necessary to succeed in the field in which he or

she is studying and is based on an at least partially subjective appraisal of those qualities.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Aragona, 2012 WL 467069, at *6
(holding that dismissal was academic where there was no evidence to suggest that dental
student was punished for behavioral misconduct, and, instead, that student’s “problems
stem[med] largely from his inability to act professionally in his clinical responsibilities.”).

Although Gilani characterizes his dismissal as disciplinary, the complaint and
referenced documents show that it was academic. Gilani alleges that UT Southwestern
placed him on academic probation based on “accusations that [he] made misrepresentations
regarding his research timeline and travel during his time in Uganda.” First. Am. Compl.
¶ 22. He argues that this action constitutes discipline for academic dishonesty, which
entitles him to the protections of a disciplinary dismissal.10 But UT Southwestern’s letter
regarding Gilani’s failure of the summer research course indicates that he was also not

meeting course expectations. The letter states that Gilani was approved for an eight-week
study, but he was in Uganda for only two weeks and failed to complete his research project.
Defs.’ App. 1–2 [8].11 Further, it states that his conduct during the course raised
professionalism concerns based on his inability to take constructive feedback, maintain
communication with course instructors, and show due diligence in his responsibilities. Id.

UT Southwestern’s cited reasons for Gilani’s failure go beyond accusations of
academic dishonesty. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995)
(holding that dismissal for cheating on a test was disciplinary rather than academic).
Instead, they include judgments of his performance consistent with the types of decisions
courts have found to be academic. See, e.g., Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89–90 (holding that

dismissal was academic when it “rested on the academic judgment of school officials”
because “[s]uch a judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical
factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision”). Based on the complaint
and referenced documents, Gilani’s failure to meet expectations in the summer course, and

10 Gilani relies on Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995), but as a
Texas Supreme Court case interpreting state constitutional law, Than is not controlling
authority here.
11 A district court may properly consider documents that are not attached to the complaint,
but that are referenced within it and attached to a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See
Inclusive Cmtys. Proj., Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019).
Defendants’ motion to dismiss cites to an appendix supporting its previous motion for
judgment on pleadings. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 4.
subsequent failure of the GI Course, led to his dismissal. The Court concludes that these
reasons constitute an academic dismissal.
2. Gilani Has Failed to Show Defendants’ Violated His Procedural Due Process

Rights. – As discussed in Section VI.A, supra, the due process requirements for an
academic dismissal are notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. Davis, 882 F.2d
at 975. Here, Gilani received notice and an opportunity to respond to each of UT
Southwestern’s decisions. He had an opportunity to appeal the issuance of an academic
warning, his dismissal after failing the GI Course, and his dismissal after failing the

remedial GI Course. First Am. Compl. ¶ 23, 26–27; Defs.’ App 1–8. Indeed, he
successfully appealed his first dismissal from UT Southwestern, which enabled him to take
the GI Course again. First Am. Compl. ¶ 27. Further, Gilani’s dismissal was the result of
a deliberate, multi-year process in which UT Southwestern provided notice of the
consequences of future academic issues. Defs.’ App 1–8. The complaint and referenced

documents thus do not support a plausible inference that Gilani was denied procedural due
process before his dismissal from UT Southwestern.
Because Gilani has failed to state a procedural due process violation, the Individual
Defendants are entitled to dismissal in their official capacities and qualified immunity12 in
their personal capacities. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Gilani’s procedural due process claim.

12 Because Gilani has not sufficiently alleged that Defendants violated his procedural due
process right, the Court need not assess whether the right was clearly established. See
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
B. Gilani Has Failed to State a Substantive Due Process Claim
As discussed in Section VI n.8, supra, the Supreme Court has never recognized a
substantive due process right to continued higher education at a public university. Shah,

129 F. Supp. 3d at 497. The Court will thus follow the approach of the Supreme Court and
Fifth Circuit of assuming, without deciding, that such a right exists.
“An academic dismissal only amounts to a substantive due process violation if it is
‘clearly arbitrary or capricious.’” Doe v. Harwell, 841 F. App’x 663, 670 (5th Cir. 2021)
(unpub.) (citing Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91). Therefore, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that

the defendant’s conduct is “beyond the pale of reasonable academic decision-making” and
“such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
[officials] responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” Doe, 841 F. App’x
at 670.
In this case, Gilani alleges that the Individual Defendants violated his substantive

due process rights by engineering his failure of the GI Course. He claims that Defendants
excluded him from a two-point curve and that he would have passed with the additional
points. First Am. Compl. ¶ 24. He also alleges that Arlene Schahs, Director of Student
Academic Services, confirmed the existence of the curve and “forbid [him] from ever
mentioning the abuse of the curve and informed him he would receive a professionalism

disciplinary form if he disregarded her order.” Id. ¶ 25. Finally, Gilani alleges that after
he took the remediation exam, Defendants strayed from the “usual course of conduct” by
not providing a preliminary score and instead informing him that the “remedial exam had
been hand-graded and that he had failed.” Id. ¶ 25.
The Court concludes that, even taking these allegations as true, they do not meet the
high standard required for a substantive due process violation. Courts must assess
academic decision-making against the background of a student’s entire career at a

university. Shah, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 504; see also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474
U.S. 214, 228 (1985). While excluding a student from a standardized curve may be
frowned upon, given Gilani’s academic record,13 it is not so beyond the pale of academic
reasoning to think that no professional judgment was involved. After all, the Supreme
Court has permitted schools to exclude students with troubled academic backgrounds from

opportunities afforded to others. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 216, 227–28 (finding that a
university’s decision to allow other students, but not plaintiff, to retake an exam did not
constitute a substantive due process violation). Likewise, deviating from standard internal
procedures and hand grading an exam is not so far outside of accepted academic norms as
to constitute a due process violation.

The Court acknowledges that the allegations are concerning. However, Supreme
Court precedent requires courts to “show great respect for faculty’s professional
judgement” and significantly limit any review of academic decisions, Ewing, 474 U.S. at
225, and this Court has found no Fifth Circuit case upholding a substantive due process
claim regarding an academic dismissal. Accordingly, the Court holds that Gilani has failed

to allege a plausible substantive due process violation.

13 Gilani argues that he did not have a poor academic record because his failure of the
summer elective was based on a false accusation that he misrepresented his travel. Pl.’s
Suppl. Br. [31] 7–8. However, as discussed in Section VI.A.1., UT Southwestern provided
reasons for his failure apart from his travel time.
Because Gilani has not stated a substantive due process violation, the Individual
Defendants are entitled to dismissal in their official capacities and qualified immunity14 in
their personal capacities. The Court thus grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Gilani’s

substantive due process claim.
VII. TITLE VI CLAIM
Gilani has stated a plausible claim for discrimination under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act. Title VI states, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Thus, to prevail on his Title VI claim, Gilani must show
that (1) Defendants engaged in intentional discrimination based on race, and (2) UT
Southwestern received Federal financial assistance. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
275–76 (2001). UT Southwestern contends only that Gilani has failed to plausibly allege

intentional discrimination. The Court disagrees.
A Title VI complaint must include “specific allegations of acts that were taken with
discriminatory intent.” Mohamed ex rel. A.M. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 252 F. Supp. 3d
602, 627 (N.D. Tex. 2017). “Discriminatory intent may be proven (among other ways) by
departures from procedural norms, a history of discrimination against others similarly

situated, or by circumstantial evidence, such as a pattern of conduct on inexplicable on

14 Because Gilani has not sufficiently alleged that Defendants violated his substantive due
process right, the Court need not assess whether the right was clearly established. See
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
grounds other than race.” DuVall v. Att’y Gen. of Tex., 2008 WL 11453691, at *3 (W. D.
Tex. 2008), aff’d sub nom. DuVall v. Att’y Gen. Off. of Tex., 325 F. App’x 329 (5th Cir.
2009). When a plaintiff provides circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination,

courts apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. See Daniel v. Bd. of
Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 2022 WL 1055578, at **4–5 (5th
Cir. 2022) (unpub.) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in a Title VI case). At
the motion to dismiss stage, however, courts look to the framework as only a “helpful
reference” in determining whether the plaintiff has plausibly alleged intentional

discrimination. Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019).
Indeed, a court would “inappropriately heighten[] the pleading standard by subjecting a
plaintiff’s allegations to a rigorous factual or evidentiary analysis under the McDonnell
Douglas framework in response to a motion to dismiss.” Id.
In this case, Gilani has plausibly alleged that Defendants’ actions leading up to his

dismissal stemmed from intentional discrimination. First, as discussed in Section VI.B,
supra, Gilani alleges several deviations from academic norms such as exclusion from a
standardized curve. See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 28. Second, Gilani names two UT
Southwestern faculty members who told him the university “treated him as it
did . . . because of his race.” Id. ¶ 42. Finally, Gilani alleges UT Southwestern treated

similarly situated students of different races more favorably. He cites two White and
Hispanic students who traveled during a summer research class and “performed
substantially less work,” yet faced no scrutiny regarding their work or travel. Id. ¶ 45.
Gilani also lists an Asian-American student who, like him, failed the GI Course twice but
was permitted to continue his studies. /d. § 47. Further he alleges that a White student
who had “a less-than-exemplary performance on her first five (5) exams” at UT
Southwestern and failed a national medical licensing exam did not face dismissal. /d. {| 48.
Taking these allegations as true, the Court concludes that Gilani has alleged sufficient facts
to “nudge [his] claim across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at
768 (cleaned up) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).
Further, the Court declines to consider Defendants’ arguments that each comparator
is not sufficiently similar. An analysis of whether comparators are actually “similarly
situated” is best suited for the summary judgment phase. Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 768. On
the face of the complaint, it is plausible to infer that UT Southwestern treated Gilani
differently than his non-African-American classmates. Accordingly, the Court denies
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Gilani’s Title VI claim.
CONCLUSION
Because the complaint’s allegations are sufficient to support only Gilani’s Title VI
claim, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court
thus dismisses Gilani’s procedural and substantive due process claims with prejudice.

Signed March 13, 2023.

Chief United States District Jud

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - PAGE 18

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10452685. Public record. Not legal advice.