# BNSF Railway Company v. Internal Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers - Transportation Division

> District Court, N.D. Texas · January 14, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10451480

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** January 14, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10451480

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that “claims based on implied terms—specifically, the past practices of the parties . . . —do have some arguable basis sufficient to render this a minor dispute”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:21-cv-0432-P

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SHEET
METAL, AIR, RAIL AND TRANSPORTATION
WORKERS – TRANSPORTATION DIVISION,

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
“It’s déjà vu all over again”—a railway company, a labor union, and
of course, a dispute between the two.1 This case presents the oft-litigated
issue of whether a particular conflict is either a “major” or “minor”
dispute under the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”). Specifically, at issue is
whether it is a major or minor dispute for Plaintiff BNSF Railway
Company (“BNSF”) to require its road-service employees to use company
vehicles in the performance of their duties.
BNSF argues that the dispute is minor while Defendant
International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation
Workers – Transportation Division (“SMART-TD”) argues that it is
major. To those ends, the Parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment seeking declaratory judgments adopting their respective
positions. ECF Nos. 27, 30. As explained below, the Court will GRANT
in part BNSF’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENY SMART-
TD’s Motion for Summary Judgement.

1YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: “I REALLY DIDN’T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID!” 45 (1999).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
BNSF is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce and
headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas. ECF No. 1; see also 45 U.S.C. § 151
First (defining “carrier” under the RLA). And SMART-TD, formerly
United Transportation Union, is the duly authorized representative of
the crafts or classes of train-service employees employed by BNSF. ECF
No. 24; see also 45 U.S.C. § 151 Sixth (defining “representative” labor
organization under the RLA).
B. The Agreement
BNSF and SMART-TD have entered into several collective
bargaining agreements governing the terms and conditions of
employment for train-service employees. One such agreement is the
“1985 National Agreement” (“National Agreement”).2 Relevant to the
instant dispute is Article VIII of the National Agreement, which governs
work requirements for both road and yard crews.3 Article VIII provides,
in relevant part:
Section 1 – Road Crews
Road crews may perform the following work in
connection with their own trains without additional
compensation:
(a) Get or leave their train at any location within the
initial and final terminals and handle their own
switches. When a crew is required to report for duty or
is relieved from duty at a point other than the on and
off duty point fixed for that assignment and such point

2The National Agreement was reached between the National Carriers’ Conference
Committee and the United Transportation Union. Because BNSF is a member of the
National Carriers’ Conference Committee and the United Transportation Union is
SMART-TD’s predecessor, the Parties do not dispute that the National Agreement
governs.
3As the Court understands the industry-specific terms, yard-service employees
typically work within a single rail yard’s “switching limits,” which is the geographical
limit of a rail yard and can cover an area miles outside the boundaries of a switching
yard. Road-service employees work primarily outside of a rail yard and are involved in
the transportation of trains from one yard to another over long distances.
is not within reasonable walking distance of the on and
off duty point, transportation will be provided.
. . . .
Section 3 – Incidental Work
(a) Road and yard employees in ground service and
qualified engine service employees may perform the
following items of work in connection with their own
assignments without additional compensation:
(1) Handle switches
(2) Move, turn and spot locomotives and cabooses
(3) Supply locomotives and cabooses except for
heavy equipment and supplies generally
placed on locomotives and cabooses by
employees of other crafts
(4) Inspect cars
(5) Start or shutdown locomotives
(6) Bleed cars to be handled
(7) Make walking and rear-end air tests
(8) Prepare reports while under pay
(9) Use communication devices; copy and handle
train orders, clearances and/or other
messages
(10) Any duties formerly performed by firemen.
(b) Road and yard employees in engine service and
qualified ground service employees may perform the
following items of work in connection with their won
assignments without additional compensation:
(1) Handle switches
(2) Move, turn, spot and fuel locomotives
(3) Supply locomotives except for heavy
equipment and supplies generally placed on
locomotives by employees of other crafts
(4) Inspect locomotives
(5) Start or shutdown locomotives
(6) Make head-end air tests
(7) Prepare reports while under pay
(8) Use communication devices; copy and handle
train orders, clearances and/or other
messages
(9) Any duties formerly performed by firemen.
Section 4 – Construction of Article
Nothing in this Article is intended to restrict any of the
existing rights of a carrier.
ECF Nos. 29 at 12–14; 32 at 6–8.
C. The Dispute
The instant dispute began roughly three years ago when BNSF
informed SMART-TD that it intended to start requiring certain union-
represented employees to drive company vehicles in the performance of
their duties. SMART-TD objected to the proposed driving policy, arguing
that BNSF could not require union-represented employees to drive
company vehicles under the National Agreement. To resolve these
differences, the Parties exchanged draft proposals that, if agreed to,
would have governed union-represented employees driving company
vehicles in the performance of their duties. See ECF No. 32 at 15–16,
19–20. However, the negotiations were fruitless, and the Parties failed
to reach an agreement. Nonetheless, BNSF implemented its plan
requiring union-represented employees to drive company vehicles in the
performance of their duties. To date, BNSF has been requiring union-
represented employees to drive themselves to and from their trains in
various locations.4 ECF Nos. 29 at 10; 32 at 4.
The Parties (unsurprisingly) disagree about how to classify this
dispute regarding BNSF’s contested driving policy. However, the Parties
(surprisingly) disagree about what the instant dispute encompasses.
On one hand, BNSF’s filings focus on both yard- and road-service
employees—seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the Parties’
dispute over whether train-service employees can be required to drive

4SMART-TD asserts that road-service employees are also required to drive
company vehicles to and from their lodging. The proposal, however, explicitly states
that the “[v]ehicle[s] will not be used for travel to and from lodging.” ECF No. 32 at 22.
Further, BNSF flatly rejected that they are (currently) requiring road-service crews to
drive company vehicles to and from lodging. See ECF No. 40 at 42 (“They’re not driving
to and from lodging. They’re driving in connection with their trains during their tour
of duty to go help.”). Accordingly, the Court does not consider road-service employees
driving company vehicles to and from lodging to be a part of the contested driving
policy that is before the Court.
themselves to their work (rather than be chauffeured to and from those
sites) is minor. See ECF No. 1.
On the other hand, SMART-TD’s filings focus only on road-service
employees—seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that requiring
road-service employees to drive vehicles during the performance of their
duties violates BNSF’s obligations under the RLA. See ECF No. 24.
The Parties clarified this disagreement at the hearing on the Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment.5 See ECF No. 40. Accordingly, based
on the Parties’ representations, the central issue is whether it is a major
or minor dispute for BNSF to require its road-service employees to drive
company vehicles in the performance of their duties.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 12, 2021, BNSF filed this civil action seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against SMART-TD. ECF No. 1. BNSF then filed a
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction (“Motion”) on March 16, 2021. ECF Nos. 7–8. Because there
was no imminent threat of a strike, the Court denied the Motion. ECF
No. 17. On June 7, 2021, SMART-TD answered the Complaint and
asserted a counterclaim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against BNSF. ECF No. 24. After failing to resolve their differences at
mediation, the Parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. See
ECF Nos. 27, 30. The Court held a hearing on the Cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment, see ECF No. 40, which are now ripe for review.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant demonstrates
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

5SMART-TD concedes that the contested driving policy—as applied to yard-service
employees—is a minor dispute. ECF No. 40 at 9–10. The Court therefore analyzes
whether the contested driving policy—as applied to road-service employees—is either
a major or minor dispute. Narrowing the controversy before the Court to entail only
road-service employees does not alter the Court’s analysis, and SMART-TD’s
concession regarding yard-service employees does not go towards the merits. Instead,
that concession merely acknowledges that whether BNSF can require yard-service
employees to drive a company vehicle is a decision left for an arbitrator—not the Court.
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine
dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Bazan ex rel. Bazan v.
Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (“An issue is ‘genuine’
if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or
a sham.”). To demonstrate an issue as to material facts, the nonmoving
party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party must show
sufficient evidence to resolve issues of material fact in its favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at
255. However, it is not incumbent upon the Court to comb through the
record in search of evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material
fact. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). The
nonmoving party must cite the evidence in the record that establishes
the existence of genuine issues as to the material facts. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Finally, when parties file cross
motions for summary judgment, the court “review[s] each party’s motion
independently, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” See, e.g., Six Dimensions, Inc. v.
Perficient, Inc., 969 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Green v. Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 754 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2014)).
B. The Railway Labor Act
“[R]elations between railroads and their workers have often been
stormy.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way
Emps., 143 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (McBryde, J.). “As
another judge noted, ‘the origins of this matter (as well as many other
disputes) can probably be traced back prior to 1894, when Eugene V.
Debs led members of the American Railway Union in a turbulent strike
against the Pullman Palace Car Company of Illinois.’” Id. (quoting Alton
& S. Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 883 F. Supp. 755, 756
(D.D.C. 1995); see also 1 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS BY HARRY S.
TRUMAN: YEAR OF DECISIONS 500–02 (1995) (discussing the “drastic
measures” that might be necessary to quash railroad labor disputes).
Accordingly, the “major purpose of Congress in passing the Railway
Labor Act was ‘to provide a machinery to prevent strikes’” in order to
“safeguard the vital interests of the country” in uninterrupted rail
service. Texas & N. O. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548, 565 (1930); see also 45 U.S.C. § 151a. At the “heart of the [RLA],”
Atlanta & W. Point R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 439 F.2d 73, 77 (5th
Cir. 1971), is the “duty of all carriers . . . and employees to exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements . . . and to settle all
disputes . . . between the carrier and the employees thereof.” 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 First. To that end, the RLA sets out a mandatory and “virtually
endless” process of “negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and
conciliation.” Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481
U.S. 429, 444 (1987).
In the railroad industry, labor disputes have traditionally fallen into
two distinct categories: those that are “major” and those that are
“minor.” Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302–
04 (1989) (“Conrail”). Accordingly, the RLA adopted the phrases “major”
and “minor” as “terms of art.” Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen
(Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region) v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 879
F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2017).
Major disputes find their statutory basis in 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh
and 45 U.S.C. § 156; they “relate[] to disputes over the formation of
collective agreements or efforts to secure them.” Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co.
v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). Stated another way: In a major
dispute, the “issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the
controversy.” Id. Rather, major disputes “arise where there is no such
agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one,” id., and
“[t]hey look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of
rights claimed to have vested in the past.” Wright v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 990 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723).
Minor disputes are based on 45 U.S.C. § 152 Sixth and 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 First; they “relate either to the meaning or proper application of a
particular provision” with reference to a specific situation. BNSF Ry. Co.
v. Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transp. Workers – Transp.
Div., 973 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723)
(cleaned up). In other words, minor disputes “contemplate the existence
of a collective agreement already concluded,” id. (cleaned up), and the
claim central to the dispute is “to rights accrued, not merely to have new
ones created for the future.” Wright, 990 F.3d at 435 (quoting Elgin, 325
U.S. at 723).
To summarize, “a proposed action creates a minor dispute ‘if the
action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties’ collective
bargaining agreement. Where, in contrast, the employer’s claims are
frivolous or obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major.’” BNSF Ry.
Co., 973 F.3d at 335 (quoting Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307). Accordingly, the
proper inquiry is not who is right or wrong on the merits of the contract
interpretation question, but merely whether the carrier’s asserted
contractual position is “arguably justified” or “frivolous.” Conrail, 491
U.S. at 306–07. And if the dispute is capable of resolution by reference
to the express or implied terms of the Parties’ collective bargaining
agreement (i.e., arguably justified), the actual resolution of the dispute
is for the arbitrator—not this Court.
ANALYSIS
The Court will analyze the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment in
three parts. First, the Court determines whether the instant dispute is
either “major” or “minor” under the RLA. As explained below, the Court
concludes that this dispute is minor. Second, the Court concludes that it
is appropriate to enter a declaratory judgment that the dispute in this
case is minor. Finally, because there is no threat of an imminent strike,
the Court declines to grant injunctive relief.
BNSF’s Motion for Summary Judgment will therefore be GRANTED
in part; SMART-TD’s Motion for Summary Judgment, however, will be
DENIED.
A. Whether BNSF Can Require Workers to Drive Company
Vehicles in the Performance of their Duties is a Minor
Dispute.
Despite SMART-TD’s argument that BNSF is violating their
obligations under the RLA, the Court concludes that BNSF’s contested
driving policy is “arguably justified” by the terms of the National
Agreement. BNSF has therefore met the “relatively light burden”
necessary to show that their actions are arguably justified such that the
instant dispute is minor.
1. The National Agreement’s express terms—in particular, Article
VIII—provide an arguable basis for BNSF’s contested driving
policy.
BNSF’s contested driving policy is “arguably justified by the
[express] terms of the parties’ [National Agreement].” Id. at 303. The
instant dispute between the Parties is therefore minor.
Section 2 of Article VIII applies to road-service employees and speaks
to their transportation. It states, in relevant part:
When a crew is required to report for duty or is relieved
from duty at a point other than the on and off duty point
fixed for that assignment and such point is not within
reasonable walking distance of the on and off duty point,
transportation will be provided.
ECF No. 32 at 16 (emphasis added). Importantly, this clause neither
articulates nor requires a specific mode of transportation; instead,
Section 2 merely states that transportation will be provided in some
unspecified form or fashion. Id. Because the plain language requires
only that transportation be provided, it is undoubtedly arguable that
providing a company vehicle to be driven by road-service employees can
satisfy BNSF’s obligations under the National Agreement.
Despite the language of Section 2, SMART-TD argues that road-
service crews have never been required to drive company vehicles to or
from their trains. ECF No. 31 at 4–6. Although SMART-TD may be
correct regarding the past practice—which is ultimately a question for
the arbitrator—the plain language of Section 2 does not require the use
of third-party contractors or BNSF clerks. In fact, any argument that
road-service crews must be driven to and from their point of duty cannot
be based on the plain language of the National Agreement. More to the
point, if the National Agreement does not expressly require a specific
mode of transportation for road-service employees, then it is at least
arguable that BNSF can require road-crews to drive themselves in
company-provided vehicles. Therefore, despite the past practice of
utilizing third-party contractors or BNSF clerks, the plain language of
Section 2 provides an arguable basis for contested driving policy.
Unlike Section 2, which applies only to road-service employees,
Sections 3 and 4 of Article VIII apply to both yard- and road-service
employees. Specifically, Section 3 articulates an “incidental work rule,”
which lists various tasks that an employee may be required to complete
without additional pay. SMART-TD argues that Section 3 “clearly
delineates an exclusive list of job duties that BNSF can require of its
road service employees without additional compensation.” Id. at 10. And
because “[d]riving company vehicles is not included,” BNSF has failed
to assert an arguable basis for its contested driving policy. Id. When read
in isolation, SMART-TD (correctly) asserts that Section 3 enumerates a
list of job duties. However, SMART-TD (incorrectly) bases the assertion
that the list is exhaustive “on limiting language that is not in Article
[VIII].” ECF No. 40 at 9–10.
It is black-letter law that a collective bargaining agreement is not an
ordinary contract. Rather, “it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of
cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.” Conrail, 491 U.S.
at 311–12. As a collective bargaining agreement, the National
Agreement is such a “generalized code” that governs a “myriad of cases.”
Further, Section 3 of this “generalized code” contains no clear limiting
language. It is therefore arguable that there is other incidental work
(not enumerated in Section 3) that BNSF can require both yard- and
road-service employees to perform without unilaterally altering the
National Agreement.
This is supported by the fact that Section 4 explicitly provides:
“Nothing in this Article is intended to restrict any of the existing rights
of a carrier.” ECF Nos. 29 at 14; 32 at 8. By its express terms, the
National Agreement thus acknowledges that BNSF maintains rights
that are not restricted, unless explicitly done so by the express terms of
Article VIII. Id. More to the point, Section 3 does not contain any
limiting language requiring road-service employees to be chauffeured to
and from their job sites or prohibiting road-service employees from
driving company vehicles. Accordingly, it is at least arguable that
Section 3 allows the contested driving policy as a form of incidental work
not enumerated in the National Agreement.
The Court thus concludes that BNSF has met the “relatively light
burden” necessary to show that contested driving policy is arguably
justified by the National Agreement’s express terms such that the
dispute is minor.
2. The National Agreement’s implied terms—as interpreted through
established past practice—provide an arguable basis for the
contested driving policy.
Even without the National Agreement’s express terms, BNSF’s
contested driving policy is “arguably justified” by the “implied
contractual terms, as interpreted through established past practice.”
Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, United Transp. Union, W. Md. Ry. Co. v.
CSX R.R. Corp., 893 F.2d 584, 591–92 (3d Cir. 1990).
Because “collective-bargaining agreements may include implied as
well as express terms,” a Court must consider both the express and
implied provisions when determining whether an action is arguably
justified by the terms of the agreement. Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311. To that
end, the Parties’ “practice, usage[,] and custom” is significant in
interpreting the agreement. Id.; see also Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs &
Trainmen, 879 F.3d at 758 (“[T]he relevant terms of an agreement are
not only those that are written down; they also include the parties’ past
practice, usage, and custom as they carry out their agreement.”).
Accordingly, “either express or implied contractual terms, as
interpreted through established past practice, will serve to classify a
dispute as minor.” Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 893 F.2d at 591–92; see
also Bhd. of Ry. Carmen (Div. of TCU) v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 894 F.2d 1463, 1469 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that “claims
based on implied terms—specifically, the past practices of the
parties . . . —do have some arguable basis sufficient to render this a
minor dispute”).
“The type of past practice relied on need not be identical to be the
challenged practice to satisfy the carriers’ burden of showing arguable
contractual justification.” Bhd. Ry. Carmen of U.S. & Can., Div. of
Transp. Commc’ns Union v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 944 F.2d 1422, 1429 (8th
Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Conrail, 491 U.S. at 315–20 (railroad’s past practice
of requiring drug testing as part of employee physicals only when a drug
problem was known or suspected satisfied railroad’s burden of showing
arguable contractual justification when it began requiring routine drug
screening of employees).
As expected, BNSF argues that the Parties’ past practice provides an
arguable basis for the contested driving policy while SMART-TD argues
that it does not. Specifically, SMART-TD argues that the past practice
relates solely to yard-service employees and has no applicability in the
road-service-employee context. To those ends, the Parties submitted
dueling affidavits as evidence of the Parties’ past practice. See ECF Nos.
35, 38. The Court, however, is not deciding the merits of whether the
past practice does in fact allow BNSF’s contested driving policy. Rather,
the Court is deciding only whether the evidence in the record provides
an arguable basis for the contested driving policy.
Here, the Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the affidavits
of either Party. Further, the affidavits—arguing over whether the
Parties’ past practice gives rise to an implied term applicable to road-
service employees—demonstrate that the heart of the dispute is over
whether a right has accrued based on the Parties’ past practice, not
whether a new right is being created for the future. See Conrail, 491
U.S. at 303. And while it is indeed arguable that the past practice
specific to yard-service employees does not establish an implied term
that supports the contested driving policy, the opposite is also arguable.
In sum, resolution of the instant dispute will turn on the application
or interpretation of the express or implied terms of Article VIII of the
National Agreement—i.e., the instant dispute is comprehended within
an existing agreement between the Parties. The Court therefore
concludes that BNSF has met the “relatively light burden” of
establishing that this dispute is minor under the RLA.
B. A Declaratory Judgment That the Instant Dispute is a Minor
Dispute is Appropriate.
Because the Parties’ dispute is neither conjectural nor hypothetical,
the Court concludes that it is appropriate to enter a declaratory
judgment that the dispute is minor. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Int’l Assoc.
of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transp. Workers – Transp. Div., No. 3:15-
CV-1029-M, 2016 WL 1242627, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2016) (“In the
Fifth Circuit, the issue of whether a dispute between a railroad carrier
and an employee union is properly classified under the RLA as a major
or minor dispute is clearly a controversy subject to resolution under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.”).
To start, there is a genuine dispute as to whether BNSF’s actions are
arguably justified by the Parties’ National Agreement. And which
dispute-resolution procedures are available to the Parties can be
determined only by classifying this dispute as either major or minor.
Thus, “given the nature of dispute-resolution proceedings under the
RLA, the Parties would suffer hardship should the Court withhold
consideration.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen,
595 F. Supp. 2d 722, 735 (N.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d sub nom., BNSF Ry. Co.
v. United Transp. Union, 337 F. App’x 409 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly,
a judicial decision by this Court will allow the Parties to properly resolve
the instant dispute pursuant to the RLA. BNSF’s Motion will thus be
GRANTED in part to the extent that it seeks a declaratory judgment
that this dispute is “minor” under the RLA.
C. Injunctive Relief is Not Appropriate.
Although the Court concludes that it is appropriate to enter a
declaratory judgment, it declines to grant injunctive relief. The record
before the Court does not establish an immediate threat of a strike.
While SMART-TD has yet to give assurances that it agrees that the
instant dispute is a minor dispute, it has also failed to make credible
representations that the union-represented employees plan to strike
over the dispute. Merely taking the position that the dispute is major
should not be equated with the threat of a strike. Rather, SMART-TD’s
litigation position should be viewed in the context of the RLA, which
encourages hard bargaining. See, e.g., Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Air Line Pilots
Assn, 67 F.3d 961, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1995) “Employers and unions can
be expected to take aggressive bargaining positions and freely threaten
dire consequences when they are rejected.”). BNSF’s Motion will thus be
DENIED in part to the extent that it seeks injunctive relief.
ORDER
As explained above, the Court concludes that the instant dispute can
be resolved by interpreting the Parties’ 1985 National Agreement—.e.,
BNSF’s contested driving policy is “arguably justified” by the express or
implied terms of the National Agreement. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that the instant dispute between the Parties is a minor
dispute subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions of the RLA.
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that BNSF’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED in part to the extent that it seeks a
declaratory judgment that this dispute is “minor” under the Railway
Labor Act.
The Court further ORDERS that BNSF’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED in part to the extent that it seeks injunctive
relief.
The Court further ORDERS that SMART-TD’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 14th day of January, 2022.
Dare 7 betta
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10451480. Public record. Not legal advice.