# Anderson v. Metro By T-Mobile

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · May 28, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441783

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 28, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441783

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding AAA immune from liability due to “doctrine of arbitral immunity”
- discussing the policy considerations of arbitral immunity
- holding that the AAA’s decision to process an arbitration proceeding was protected by arbitral immunity

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE ANDERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 2:22-cv-02523-TLP-atc
v. )
) JURY DEMAND
METRO BY T-MOBILE, T-MOBILE AND )
ITS AFFILIATES, and AMERICAN )
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Dwayne Anderson sued Metro by T-Mobile, T-Mobile and its Affiliates,
(“Metro Defendants”), and the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) (“Defendants”).
(ECF No. 1.) He claims that the Metro Defendants charged him erroneous fees and an
unnecessary insurance deposit for a replacement cell phone. (Id. at PageID 2–3.) Under
Administrative Order 2013-05, the Court referred this case to Magistrate Judge Annie T.
Christoff (“Judge Christoff”), for management of all pretrial matters. Judge Christoff then
granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 6.)
Judge Christoff next screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
entered a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court dismiss all claims
against the AAA with prejudice, dismiss Plaintiff’s RICO claim with prejudice, and dismiss the
remaining state law claims without prejudice. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 35.) For the reasons below,
the Court ADOPTS her R&R.
BACKGROUND AND THE R&R
Plaintiff sued here in August 2022 and moved to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos.
1–2.) His lawsuit stems from two instances in May 2022, in which the Metro Defendants
allegedly overcharged him for cell phone services. (See ECF No. 1.) The first instance involved

a $64 charge for his cell phone plan—Plaintiff contends that these services should only cost $60.
(Id. at PageID 2.) Next, Plaintiff reported his cell phone stolen and sought a replacement. (Id.)
The Metro Defendants charged him a $65 deductible for his new phone, and then $35 for a case
and screen protector. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that these were erroneous charges and that the Metro
Defendants violated RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)), the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act
(“TCPA), and committed fraud. (Id. at PageID 3.)
Plaintiff next sued the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) for the same offenses.
(Id.) In mid-May 2022, Plaintiff lodged his complaint for damages against the Metro
Defendants, following the so-called erroneous charges. (Id.) A pro se administrator for the
AAA contacted him a month later, to let Plaintiff know that the Metro Defendants never

answered his complaint and that they owed $500, payable by mid-July. (Id.) The administrator
explained that the next step is to appoint an arbitrator, and that Plaintiff should tell her when he
wished to proceed. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that he contacted the Metro Defendants’ counsel to settle the claim and
after two discussions, counsel stopped responding. (Id.) After the unsuccessful settlement
attempts, Plaintiff emailed the AAA’s pro se manager about the case’s status on July 18, 2022.
(Id.) Ten days later he sued, alleging that the AAA failed to appoint an arbitrator and render a
judgment in the case. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks ten million dollars in compensatory damages and ten
million dollars in punitive damages. (Id. at PageID 4.)
Judge Christoff screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (See ECF
No. 8.) Judge Christoff explained that summonses can be issued only if the complaint satisfies
the pleading requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and its application in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555–57 (2007). (Id. at PageID 29.)
First, Judge Christoff explained why Plaintiff cannot sue the AAA because it maintains
arbitral immunity. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 30–32.) Judge Christoff then analyzed Plaintiff’s
RICO claim and found that it failed to satisfy the pleading requirement under rule 12(b)(6).
(ECF No. 8 at PageID 34–35.) And since the RICO claim cannot clear the plausibility standard,
the Court has no original jurisdiction over the two remaining state law claims. (Id. at PageID
34–35.) Judge Christoff then recommended that all claims against the AAA be dismissed with
prejudice, Plaintiff’s RICO claim be dismissed with prejudice, and that the remaining state law
claims be dismissed without prejudice because the Court should not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. (Id. at PageID 35.)

LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is a pro se, non-prisoner litigant and proceeding in forma pauperis, the
Court conducts a screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) before issuing process. See also,
Local Rule 4.1(b)(2). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court will dismiss the case at any time if it
determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant.
The standard for determining whether a complaint states a valid claim is identical to the
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is plausible on its face if the “plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). But the court need not accept as true any conclusory

allegation because every legal conclusion in a complaint “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Courts liberally construe pro se complaints and hold them “to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (2011)
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). But even pro se complaints
must satisfy the plausibility standard. See Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)
(“the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.”). And pro se litigants
are not exempt from following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Brown v. Matauszak,
415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011). Courts also “have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants.” Thomas v. Romanowski, 362 F. App’x 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)).
A magistrate judge may submit to a district court judge proposed findings of fact and a
recommended ruling on certain pretrial matters, including whether to dismiss an action for
failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). And “[w]ithin 14 days after being served
with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), “[w]ithin 14 days of being served with a
copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to
the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If the parties do not
object, then a district court reviews an R&R for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory
committee notes. And the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Judge

Christoff entered her R&R in December 2023 and Plaintiff did not object. The Court therefore
reviews the R&R for clear error.
DISPOSITION
After review, the Court agrees with Judge Christoff’s R&R.
I. The AAA Is Immune from Suit Under Arbitral Immunity
Plaintiff sues the AAA for its alleged failure to appoint an arbitrator timely. (ECF No. 1
at PageID 3.) But Judge Christoff correctly found that these claims are barred under arbitral
immunity. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 30.) This Court agrees.
Judicial immunity, the understanding that judges cannot be liable for performing their
duties, is deeply rooted in the legal system. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871). The

Sixth Circuit has extended a quasi-immunity to other public officials, such as arbitrators, whose
purpose is “functionally comparable to that of a judge.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace,
and Agric. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1185 (6th Cir. 1983) (discussing the policy
considerations of arbitral immunity). The Sixth Circuit explained that this immunity applies if
the arbitrator is acting in his official capacity to resolve issues. Id.
And arbitral immunity not only shields the arbitrator, but the organization sponsoring the
arbitration. Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982). The AAA is
one such sponsoring organization. See e.g., New England Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Am. Arb.
Ass’n, 199 F.3d 542 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the AAA’s decision to process an arbitration
proceeding was protected by arbitral immunity); Royse v. Corhart Refractories Co., 2008 WL
4911117, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2008), as amended (Nov. 14, 2008) (holding that the AAA is
immune from civil liability); Smith v. Shell Chem. Co., 333 F. Supp. 2d 579, 589 (M.D. La.
2004) (finding AAA immune from liability due to “doctrine of arbitral immunity”).

Because Plaintiff’s sole claim against AAA is its alleged failure to appoint an arbitrator,
Judge Christoff found this to be within the AAA’s duties and under the scope of immunity.
(ECF No. 8 at PageID 32.) She then recommended dismissal of all claims against the AAA with
prejudice. (Id.) The Court agrees with her recommendation.
II. Plaintiff Failed to State a RICO Claim
The Court’s next question is whether Defendants’ alleged violation of the TCPA, and
Plaintiff’s $104 dollars in erroneous charges, can support a RICO claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Judge Christoff found that it cannot, and this Court agrees.

RICO makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To establish a
violation of §1962, a plaintiff must show: “1) there were two or more predicate offenses; 2) the
existence of an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce; 3) a nexus
between the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise; and 4) an injury to business or
property by reason of the above.” Frank v. D’Ambrosi, 4 F.3d 1378, 1385 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted).
The “essential element” for a RICO claim is its requirement to prove “two or more

predicate offenses.” Moses v. Gardner, 2017 WL 1364977, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017),
aff’d, 2017 WL 9251805 (6th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017). These predicate offenses are listed in 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1). But Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no such offenses.
First, Plaintiff accuses Defendants of violating the TCPA. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) But
because the TCPA is not a criminal statute, it is not a predicate offense under RICO. See

Bushnell v. Bedford Cnty., 432 F. App'x 472, 474 (6th Cir. 2011). This only leaves Plaintiff’s
generalized “fraud” claim, where he alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1961–68. Except these are
the statutory provisions for RICO and not separate fraud statutes.
What is more, if plaintiff had properly alleged mail or wire fraud, as permitted in §
1961(1), he would have had to comply with the heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Frank v. Dana Corp., 547 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2008). Rule 9(b)
directs a party to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” This
means that Plaintiff would need to describe: 1) a fraudulent statement; 2) the speaker who issued
this statement; 3) when and where the statement was made; and 4) how it was fraudulent.
Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2012). And he

would have to explain how this wire or mail fraud allegation is the proximate cause of his
injuries. Id.
Plaintiff never identifies a single predicate offense, much less two or more that could
show a pattern of racketeering activity. In fact, Defendants’ only alleged wrongdoing is charging
Plaintiff a four-dollar fee, a $65 deductible for a phone replacement, and $35 dollars for cell
phone accessories. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1–2.) Even if this conduct qualified as a pattern of
racketeering activity, all the alleged wrongdoing was directed solely at Plaintiff. (Id.) And civil
Rico claims “with a single objective and a single victim are not sufficient to establish a pattern of
racketeering activity, as they do not sufficiently evidence long-term criminal conduct.” Clair v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 2016 WL 6092715, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2016).
Even when the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, and construes them in
Plaintiff’s favor, they do not satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading requirement. For this reason,

Judge Christoff recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s RICO claim with prejudice. (ECF No. 8 at
PageID 33–34.) This Court agrees with her recommendation.
III. The Court has No Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims
Because Plaintiff’s remaining claims are both state law claims—for a violation of the
TCPA and common law fraud—Judge Christoff correctly found that this Court lacks original
subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8 at PageID 34–35.) And a Court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. See Wojnicz v. Davis, 80 F.App’x 382, 384–85 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[i]f
the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims generally should be dismissed as
well”). Judge Christoff recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s two state law claims because,
following dismissal of Plaintiff’s RICO claim, there is no separate basis for subject matter

jurisdiction, and Plaintiff never explained why the Court should maintain jurisdiction. (See ECF
No. 1 at PageID 1, ECF No. 8 at PageID 34–35.) The Court agrees with Judge Christoff and
adopts her recommendation.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed Judge Christoff’s R&R for clear error and finding none, the Court
agrees with Judge Christoff’s ruling and reasoning. And so the Court ADOPTS Judge
Christoff’s R&R, DISMISSES all claims against the AAA WITH PREJUDICE, DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s RICO claim WITH PREJUDICE and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s state law claims
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of May, 2024.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441783. Public record. Not legal advice.