# Employers Insurance Company of Wausau v. Dan Walker Associates, Inc.

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · February 15, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441676

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 15, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441676

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a “complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations . . . to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory”
- holding that a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions”
- explaining that, in resolving a motion to dismiss, the court must consider the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
- stating that an indemnity obligation “may be imposed” based on a breach of contract
- holding that employers held liable for employee’s acts through respondeat superior may recover in indemnity from employee

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

)
EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY )
OF WAUSAU, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 22-cv-2530
)
DAN WALKER ASSOCIATES, )
INCORPORATED, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING TIMBER STEEL, LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS
A&T BUILDERS, LLC’S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Before the Court is Timber Steel, LLC’s (“Timber Steel”)
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed July 3,
2023. (ECF No. 114.) Timber Steel seeks dismissal of Defendant
A&T Builders, LLC’s, (“A&T”) June 6, 2023 Third-Party Complaint.
(ECF No. 108.) A&T filed a response in opposition to Timber
Steel’s Motion on July 31, 2023, and Timber Steel replied to the
response on August 14, 2023. (ECF No. 117, 122.) For the
following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
I. Background
This suit arises from the partial collapse of a building in
Memphis, Tennessee (“the Property”). (ECF No. 1 at 4-5.)1 Some

1 The facts in this Order are from the Third-Party Complaint
and are found only for purposes of deciding the Motion to
Dismiss.
time in 2018, a portion of the roof of a one-story, concrete and
steel frame commercial structure collapsed during inclement
weather. (Id. at 4.) The owner at the time engaged contractor
Dan Walker Associates, Inc. (“Dan Walker”) to repair the damage.
(Id.) Dan Walker, in turn, hired a number of subcontractors to
provide materials, engineering and design services, and other

needed support. (Id. at 4-5.) The work was completed in April
2020. (Id. at 4.)
On February 28, 2021, the roof again partially collapsed
due to the weather. (Id. at 5.) The collapsed portion was the
same part of the roof that had been repaired. (Id.) Plaintiff
Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, acting as subrogee for
its insured, brought this suit against Dan Walker, A&T, and
other parties engaged in the repair work. (Id. at 1-3.)
Plaintiff brought claims for breach of express warranty,
negligence, negligence per se, and professional negligence.
(Id. at 6-18.) Dan Walker, in turn, brought crossclaims against

A&T under theories of express contractual indemnity, implied
indemnity, and contribution. (ECF No. 12 at 27-30.) On October
31, 2022, the Court issued an order dismissing Timber Steel as a
defendant, pursuant to Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal. (ECF No. 34.)
A&T answered Plaintiff’s complaint and Dan Walker’s
crossclaims on December 14, 2022. (ECF Nos. 48, 49.) On
February 16, 2023, A&T moved to amend its pleadings to file
various crossclaims and counterclaims. (ECF No. 76.) It also
moved to file a third-party claim against Timber Steel. (Id.)
The Court granted A&T’s motion in part and denied it in part.
(ECF No. 112.) As relevant here, it granted A&T’s request to
file a third-party indemnity complaint against Timber Steel.

(Id. at 15.) The Court issued that order on June 27, 2023.
However, A&T had already filed its Third-Party Complaint against
Timber Steel on June 6, 2023. (ECF No. 108.)
In its Third-Party Complaint, brought pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 14(a), A&T alleges that Dan Walker served as the general
contractor to repair the Property. (Id. at 3, ¶ 9.) Dan Walker
retained A&T to repair the Property’s steel components, and the
Property owner retained Stability Engineering, LLC (“Stability”)
to provide structural engineering design services. (Id. at 3-4,
¶¶ 10-11.) A&T, in turn, retained Timber Steel to “detail,
fabricate, and/or manufacture the steel materials and/or

components” pursuant to Stability’s designs, “including but not
limited to the columns, rafters, beams, clips, plates, splices,
washers, bolts and nuts.” (Id. at 4, ¶¶ 14.) A&T alleges that
the Property collapse was caused by “faulty, flawed, or
defective steel materials or components” that Timber Steel made.
(Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 18-19.)
A&T alleges a single count of indemnification against
Timber Steel, asserting that Timber Steel “negligently detailed,
fabricated and/or manufactured the steel materials and
components,” causing the building collapse that is the subject
of this suit. (Id. at 7, ¶ 31.) A&T asserts that Timber
Steel’s materials “weakened the structural integrity of the

subject property’s [sic] causing excessive deflection of a
supporting beam that resulted in lateral movement.” (Id. at 7,
¶ 28.) A&T maintains that Timber Steel breached its
non-delegable duty to exercise reasonable care in manufacturing
the parts at issue and to make sure that its work was performed
“without flaws, defect or errors, and in a good and workmanlike
manner.” (Id. at 8, ¶¶ 34-35.) A&T argues that, if it is found
liable to any party in the instant suit, Timber Steel is liable
to A&T. (Id. at 8, ¶ 33.)
Timber Steel now moves to dismiss A&T’s Third-Party
Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 114.) Timber Steel argues
that A&T has failed to allege facts demonstrating an express or
an implied indemnification contract between the two parties and
that A&T’s indemnification claim fails. (ECF No. 114-1 at 2.)
On July 31, 2023, A&T filed a response to Timber Steel’s
motion, arguing that it had pled facts sufficient to give Timber
Steel notice that it sought to raise an indemnity claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). (ECF No. 117 at 3.) A&T
concedes that it did not have an express indemnification
contract with Timber Steel, but argues that it is entitled to
indemnification based on its contract for Timber Steel’s
services. (Id. at 4-5.) A&T argues that Timber Steel breached
its contract with A&T and engaged in tortious conduct in

performing the contract. (Id. at 5.) A&T argues that the
contractual relationship imposed an implied indemnity
obligation. (Id.)
Timber Steel replied to A&T’s response on August 14, 2023.
(ECF No. 22.)
II. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
The Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
because there is complete diversity among the parties. A
corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and the
state in which it has its principal place of business. Roberts
v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 874 F.3d 953, 956 (6th Cir. 2017). “A

limited liability company . . . has the citizenship of its
members and sub-members.” Akno 1010 Mkt. St. St. Louis Mo. LLC
v. Pourtaghi, 43 F.4th 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff is a
corporation organized under the laws of Wisconsin and with its
principal place of business in Massachusetts. (ECF No. 1 at 1.)
Defendant Dan Walker is incorporated and has its principal place
of business in Tennessee. (Id. at 2.)
Defendants A&T, Stability, and Geotechnology, LLC
(“Geotechnology”) are limited liability companies. (ECF Nos.
97-99.) Based on the disclosures of the parties, A&T is a
citizen of Arkansas, Stability of North Carolina and Georgia,
and Geotechnology of Delaware and Florida. (ECF Nos. 96-99.)
Pierre Coiron, an individual defendant, is a citizen of North

Carolina. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) There is complete diversity between
Plaintiff and Defendants. Because Plaintiff seeks $1.6 million
in damages, the amount-in-controversy threshold is also
satisfied. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) The Court has diversity
jurisdiction.
The Court also has or would have jurisdiction over existing
counterclaims and crossclaims and those proposed to be added. 28
U.S.C. § 1367; see also Cowley v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No.
2:18-cv-02846, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181601, at *3-4, *9 (W.D.
Tenn. Oct. 21, 2019) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
counterclaim); Butler v. Rigsby, No. 96-2453, 1997 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 16375, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 1997) (“It is well
established that supplemental jurisdiction extends to
cross-claims properly asserted under Rule 13(g) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
State substantive law applies to state law claims brought
in federal court. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938). Where, as here, there is no dispute that a certain
state’s substantive law applies, the Court will not conduct a
choice of law analysis sua sponte. See GBJ Corp. v. E. Ohio
Paving Co., 139 F.3d 1080, 1085 (6th Cir. 1998). Although
whether a party may amend its pleading in federal court is a
procedural matter governed by federal law, the parties agree in
their respective motions and memoranda that, where state law is

relevant, the law of Tennessee applies. (ECF No. 79 at 1-2; No.
81-1 at 5-7; No. 89 at 3.) The Court will apply Tennessee
substantive law.
III. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 provides that a
“defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons
and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for
all or part of the claim against it.” The proposed third-party
plaintiff must “obtain the court’s leave if it files the
third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its
original answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss permits
“a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff
is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the
complaint is true.” Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.
1993). A motion to dismiss tests only whether the plaintiff has
pled a cognizable claim and allows the court to dismiss
meritless cases that would waste judicial resources and result
in unnecessary discovery. See Brown v. City of Memphis, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 868, 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege
facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cooper Butt ex rel.
Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). A claim is
plausible on its face if “the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). “[The] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of
his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s
elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. The court

considers the plaintiff’s complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Ryan v. Blackwell, 979 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512
(6th Cir. 2001)). The court accepts as true all factual
allegations, but does not accept legal conclusions or
unwarranted facts. Theile v. Michigan, 891 F.3d 240, 243 (6th
Cir. 2018).
IV. Analysis
Under Tennessee law, “[i]ndemnity obligations are either
express or implied.” Winter v. Smith, 914 S.W.2d 527, 541 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1995). “Express indemnity obligations arise from the
contracts between the parties, and implied indemnity
obligations, whether called equitable or contractual, are

imposed by law without the consent or agreement of the parties.”
Id. at 541-42. Indemnity may be implied by the relationship
between parties. See Stiver Mktg., Inc. v. Performance Bus.
Forms, Inc., No. 01-A-01-9108-CH-00276, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS
930, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (stating principal may have
indemnity from agent for whose acts principal has been held
liable); Wharton Transp. Co. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 528
(Tenn. 1980) (holding that employers held liable for employee’s
acts through respondeat superior may recover in indemnity from
employee).
Implied indemnity may be imposed “when the obligation [to

indemnify] is a necessary element of the parties’ relationship.”
Winter, 914 S.W.2d at 541. It may, for example, be based on a
contractual relationship in which the contract does not include
an indemnification clause, but contains an implicit right of
indemnification. Time & Sec. Mgmt., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 422
F.Supp.2d 907, 914 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (collecting Tennessee
cases). Even if the contract between the parties does not
address indemnification, “an obligation may be imposed where the
party from whom indemnity is sought breached a contract or
engaged in tortious conduct in performance of contract
obligations.” Id.
Alternately, under traditional Tennessee law, implied
indemnity may be imposed “when justice and fairness demand that

the burden of paying for the loss be shifted to the party whose
fault or responsibility is qualitatively different from the
other parties.” Winter, 914 S.W.2d at 542. That has sometimes
been referred to as “common law indemnity” or “implied-in-law
indemnity.” CMH Mfg., Inc. v. US GreenFiber, LLC, No. 3:12-273,
2013 WL 3324292, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. July 1, 2013).
A&T does not assert that it had an indemnification contract
with Timber Steel. (See generally ECF No. 108.) It can only
prevail under a theory of implied indemnity. Winter, 914 S.W.2d
at 541. A&T does not say whether indemnification should be
implied as a necessary element of the parties’ legal

relationship, or under broad principles of justice and fairness.
Id. at 541-42. A&T’s indemnity claim survives, however, so long
as the Third-Party Complaint contains facts sufficient “to
sustain a recovery on any legal theory, even though it may not
be the theory suggested . . . by the pleader.” Leach v. Taylor,
124 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Tenn. 2004) (emphasis, internal quotation
marks omitted) (explaining that complaints in tort actions
should be read “with a generous eye”); see also Scheid v. Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a “complaint must contain either direct or
inferential allegations . . . to sustain a recovery under some
viable legal theory”). As long as the Third-Party Complaint
contains sufficient facts which, taken together and drawing all

inferences in favor of A&T as the non-movant, states a claim
under some recognized theory of indemnity, Timber Steel’s motion
must be denied.
A&T alleged that it “retained” Timber Steel to “detail,
fabricate and/or manufacture the materials and/or components
required and called for in the Stability design” plans. (ECF
No. 108 at 4, ¶ 14.) In its original complaint -– which A&T
incorporated into its Third-Party Complaint in its entirety --
Plaintiff Employers Insurance Company of Wausau alleged that A&T
“retained Timber Steel to perform as a steel erection
contractor.” (Id. at 6, ¶ 24; ECF No. 108-1 at 4, ¶ 17.) Thus,

although Timber Steel argues that A&T failed to plead the
existence of a contractual relationship sufficiently, A&T’s
allegations are sufficient to infer there was a contract between
A&T and Timber Steel. (ECF No. 122 at 3-4); see Ryan, 979 F.3d
at 525 (explaining that, in resolving a motion to dismiss, the
court must consider the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff).
Nonetheless, the right to indemnity is not implied in every
contractual relationship. Striver Mktg., 1991 WL 254564, at *4;
Time & Sec. Mgmt., 422 F.Supp.2d at 914 (stating that an
indemnity obligation “may be imposed” based on a breach of
contract) (emphasis added). A&T has failed to allege facts
showing any “unique special factors indicating the parties’

intent that the party from whom indemnity is sought be
ultimately liable,” or otherwise describe why the “conduct of
the parties or . . . nature of their relationship” warrants the
imposition of indemnity. Striver Mktg., 1991 WL 25464 at *4.
A&T does not, for example, provide a factual basis for believing
Timber Steel’s materials were defective or explain why Timber
Steel should be liable for any alleged defects. The speculative
allegation that Timber Steel is responsible for A&T’s conduct
is, without more, a bare legal conclusion that does not suffice
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544
(holding that a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds

of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions”).2 A&T has failed to show that indemnification was

2 A&T argues that Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a) requires only that
it “alleg[e] sufficient facts to give Timber Steel notice that
A&T seeks indemnification.” (ECF No. 117 at 3.) That
understates Plaintiff’s burden at the pleading stage. Although
a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it
must contain specific factual allegations to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation
a necessary part of its contractual relationship with Timber
Steel, although the contract itself was silent on
indemnification.
A&T has also failed to plead facts showing that it has any
other legal relationship with Timber Steel –- such as a
principal/agent relationship or an employer/employee

relationship -– that confers an indemnity obligation. Striver
Mktg., 1991 WL 254564, at *3; Wharton Transp. Co., 6060 S.W.2d
at 528. At least one court has held that buyers and sellers -–
such as A&T and Timber Steel -- do not have a legal relationship
that implies an indemnity obligation. First Nat. Bank of Chi.
v. Cumberland Bend Invs, L.P., No. M2000-00001-COA-R3-CV, 2002
WL 31835693, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002). A&T does not
argue to the contrary.
A&T’s case is not comparable to those where courts have
imposed indemnity based on principles of justice and fairness.3

marks, citations omitted) (emphasis added). Plaintiff is
required to allege specific facts rather than mere “labels and
conclusions.” Id.

3 Federal district courts differ about whether Tennessee law
still recognizes claims for indemnity based on justice and
fairness following the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in
Owens v. Truckstops of America, 915 S.W.2d 420, 430 (Tenn.
1996). See, e.g. CMH Mfg., Inc., 2013 WL 3324292, at *7;
Siegel-Robert, Inc. v. United Inventory Servs., Inc., No.
07-1206, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128990, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Oct.
14, 2008); but see AutoZone v. Glidden Co., 737 F.Supp.2d 936,
945 (W.D. Tenn. 2010). The Court need not decide the effect of
Owens on indemnification claims based on justice and fairness
In cases where a third-party plaintiff has successfully stated a
claim for implied indemnification, that party has pled specific
facts showing that the indemnitee’s conduct “resulted in . . .
the lawsuits which [the third-party plaintiff] was forced to
defend.” Pullman Standard, Inc. v. Abex Corp., 693 S.W.2d 336,
339 (Tenn. 1985). In Pullman Standard, for example, Pullman

Standard, Inc. was sued after a railroad car that it
manufactured was involved in a train derailment. 693 S.W.2d at
337. Pullman sought indemnification from Abex Corporation, the
manufacturer and designer of the wheels on the Pullman railroad
cars. Id. Pullman alleged that after the derailment, a federal
investigation “drew the conclusion that the cause of the initial
derailment and train wreck was the failure of a wheel”
manufactured by Abex. Id. Pullman also alleged that Abex knew
that its wheel “fracture[d] and fail[ed] under normal railroad
operating procedures,” but “nevertheless deceived” Pullman about
the wheel’s effectiveness. Id. at 340. The Supreme Court of

Tennessee found these allegations sufficient to state an
indemnification claim. A&T’s allegations are far from this
level of specificity.
In AutoZone, AutoZone, Inc. contracted with The Glidden
Company (“Akzo Nobel”) to purchase exterior paints for its new

because, for the reasons described below, A&T has failed to
allege facts that would state an indemnification claim on that
basis.
stores, specifying that the paint should be purchased from BASF
Construction Chemicals, LLC (“BASF”). 737 F.Supp.2d at 940.
When the paint began cracking, peeling, and fading, AutoZone
sued Akzo Nobel for breach of contract. Id. Akzo Nobel sought
indemnification from BASF on the basis that BASF provided
defective products and was responsible for any damages that Akzo

Nobel owed AutoZone. Id. at 944. The court found that Akzo
Nobel had stated an indemnification claim because similar
problems developed with the paint at different stores in
different climates, suggesting that the problems “arose from
defects in the paint products rather than their application.”
Id. at 944 n.1. That permitted the court to infer that “justice
and fairness may demand that BASF indemnify Akzo Nobel for any
liability Akzo Nobel incurs based on BASF’s wrongdoing because
of their qualitatively different degrees of fault.” Id. at 945.
Unlike Akzo Nobel, A&T has pled no facts permitting the Court to
infer that justice and fairness require Timber Steel to

indemnify A&T.4

4 Akzo Nobel sought to amend its complaint to add an
indemnity claim against BASF after discovery had begun, and used
discovery to support its indemnification claim. AutoZone, 737
F.Supp.2d at 942. A&T has not had the benefit of discovery
here. Although this distinguishes AutoZone from the instant
case in some respects, it does not absolve A&T of its obligation
to plead sufficient factual matter to raise its right to relief
above a speculative level.
Although A&T’s Third-Party Complaint repeatedly describes
Timber Steel as negligent, those allegations are insufficient to
state an indemnification claim. (See, e.g., ECF No. 108 at 7,
¶ 31; 8, ¶ 33; 9, ¶¶ 36-37.) In the past, Tennessee courts have
imposed indemnification obligations when the indemnitor, through
“active” negligence, creates a hazardous condition or causes an

injury, and the indemnitee is liable only for “passive”
negligence, i.e., the “mere failure to remedy or discover the
negligence.” Barrett v. Red Food Stores, Inc., No.
01-A-01-9108-CV-00302, 1992 WL 33891, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb.
26, 1992).
However, indemnification based on the active-passive
distinction has been abolished by the Tennessee Supreme Court.
In Owens, that court noted that it had previously adopted a
comparative fault system in which, when multiple tortfeasors
cause a single injury, liability is several and not joint. 915
S.W.2d at 430. Because “each tortfeasor will be liable only for

that proportion of the damages attributable to its fault,” there
would be no need for one tortfeasor to indemnify another. Id. at
430, 433-34. The court held that “there can be no claim for
indemnification based on active-passive negligence because that
distinction is subsumed into the doctrine of comparative fault.”
Id. at 434. A&T cannot plead facts establishing an
indemnification claim based on Timber Steel’s alleged
negligence.
A&T will have a full opportunity, should this matter
proceed to trial, to show that it was not negligent or that part
or all of any liability should be apportioned to other actors.
See Owens, 915 S.W.2d at 434. Under Tennessee law, A&T would not

be liable for any damages apportioned to others. Id. at 430.
A&T’s conclusory allegations that any damages it owes
Plaintiff are attributable to Timber Steel do not state an
indemnification claim under any legal theory. They do not
“raise [the] right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Timber Steel’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. Having decided that A&T has failed to state an
indemnification claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court need not
reach the Rule 14 issues raised by the parties. (ECF No. 114-1
at 8-9; 117 at 5-9).
V. Conclusion

Timber Steel’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 114) is GRANTED.
A&T’s Third-Party Complaint (ECF No. 108) is DISMISSED.
So ordered this 15th day of February, 2024.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441676. Public record. Not legal advice.