# Curran, III v. Fronabarger

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · February 15, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441603

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 15, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441603

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that an official-capacity suit against a judge who presided over state court litigation was barred by the Eleventh Amendment

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN F. CURRAN, III,

Plaintiff,

vs. No. 23-1064-STA-jay

CARL A. FRONABARGER,
et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER PARTIALLY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, Admiralty, Maritime, and
Prize Cases. Subsequently, Plaintiff was allowed to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 26.)
Defendants J. Brent Bradberry, Patrick S. Butler, and the State of Tennessee (“the State
Defendants”) have filed motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 13, 27, 29, 51.) In response, Plaintiff has
filed various miscellaneous motions. (ECF Nos. 37, 41, 45, 47, 56, 59, 64.)
The United States Magistrate Judge has recommended severing the claims raised against
Defendant Carl Fronabarger1 from the State Defendants and then applying the Younger
abstention doctrine and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Bradberry and Butler,
dismissing Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief against the State of Tennessee, and staying
Plaintiff’s claim for money damages against the State of Tennessee. (ECF Nos. 13, 27, 29.) The
Magistrate Judge has also recommended denying the following motions as moot: Plaintiff’s (1)

1 Defendant Fronabarger is not a party to the motions currently under consideration.
Motion to Compel Discovery from Defendants Bradberry and Butler (ECF No. 37); (2) Motion
for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 41); (3) Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply to
Defendants Bradberry and Butler’s Response in Opposition (ECF No. 45); and (4) Motion for
Entry of Default against Defendant Bradberry (ECF No. 47) and also denying Defendant
Bradberry’s second motion to dismiss (ECF No. 51) as moot.2 (Rep & Rec. ECF No. 55.)

Plaintiff has filed a motion to extend the time for filing objections (ECF No. 59) and his
objections (ECF No. 62) to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff’s
motion for extension of time is GRANTED, and the Court will consider his objections as being
timely filed.
When examining a Report and Recommendation, the district court “shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or the specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which an objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1)(c). The Court “may
accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
Magistrate.” Id. A party may file objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen

days of service of the Report and Recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b)(2). Here, Plaintiff has
properly filed objections. However, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s objections are not persuasive.

2 Defendant Bradberry has moved to dismiss the claims against him in his individual capacity
based on both Younger and the doctrine of judicial immunity. (ECF No. 51.) The Court does not
believe that the amended complaint has made claims against either Defendant Bradberry or
Butler in their individual capacities. See Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 775 (6th
Cir.2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002) (reiterating that § 1983 plaintiffs must clearly notify
any defendants of their intent to seek individual liability). However, to the extent that Plaintiff
has made these claims, the Court finds that Defendant Bradberry’s motion should be granted on
those grounds rather than on the ground of mootness as recommended by the Magistrate Judge.
Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in
their judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the absence of any jurisdiction. See Bush
v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). As for Defendant Butler, the prosecutor in the state
court case against Plaintiff, prosecutors are immune from civil suits for any actions that are
intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. See Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009).
Instead, having reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff’s
objections, and the entire record of the proceedings de novo, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Court
finds that the Report and Recommendation should be PARTIALLY ADOPTED.
As an initial matter, the Court denies the State’s first motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13) as
moot because Plaintiff filed an amended complaint after the filing of the first motion to dismiss.

Generally, “[a]n amended complaint supersedes an earlier complaint for all purposes.” In re
Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 731 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2013). Thus, courts
generally hold that pending motions aimed towards the initial complaint are moot. See, e.g.,
Ware v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 2007 WL 2463286, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2007) (denying as moot
pending motion to dismiss). Accordingly, the State’s first motion to dismiss is DENIED on the
ground that it is moot in light of the amended complaint.
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the State Defendants have violated his
constitutional rights by prosecuting him in the Hardin County Circuit Court for matters related to
a salvage operation. Plaintiff contends that the actions related to the salvage operation occurred

in federal waters, and, thus, the State has no jurisdiction to prosecute him. He has asked this
Court to enjoin the underlying state criminal court proceedings and to award him damages
against the State. (Amd. Cmplt. p. 10, ECF No. 26.) In response, the State of Tennessee argues
that (1) the Eleventh Amendment prohibits the award of money damages against it and its
officials3 and (2) Younger abstention bars this Court from interfering with Plaintiff’s pending
state court criminal proceedings.

3 The amended complaint does not appear to seek any kind of relief against Defendants
Bradberry and Butler. However, to the extent that it does, the discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment and Younger as they apply to the State likewise applies to Defendants in their
official capacities. See Boone v. Kentucky, 72 F. App’x 306, 307 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiff’s]
request for monetary relief against the prosecutors in their official capacities is deemed to be a
The Magistrate Judge issued his recommendation based only on Younger. However, the
Court will look first at the State’s Eleventh Amendment argument before considering the
Younger doctrine. The Eleventh Amendment bars private individuals from suing a state for
money damages in federal court unless the state consents or Congress has otherwise abrogated
the state’s immunity. As the Supreme Court has explained, “The ultimate guarantee of the

Eleventh Amendment is that non-consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in
federal court.” Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363
(2000). “Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996, 999 (6th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff may
not sue the State Defendants for money damages. See Fouse v. Tennessee, 2016 WL 4194245, at
*2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2016) (“Supreme Court precedent holds that actions against state
officials and state employees sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are the
equivalent of actions against the state itself.”) Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim(s) for money damages, the motions to dismiss of the State and its officials must be

granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Alternatively, the doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), bars this
Court from interfering in Plaintiff’s underlying state court proceeding. The Magistrate Judge
correctly stated that the Younger abstention doctrine “applies when the state proceeding 1) is
currently pending, 2) involves an important state interest, and 3) affords the plaintiff an adequate
opportunity to raise constitutional claims.” Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir. Cir.
2006). Here, as determined by the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff is the subject of an ongoing

suit against the state and also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.); Bennett v. Thorburn, 1988
WL 27524, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 1988) (concluding that an official-capacity suit against a
judge who presided over state court litigation was barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
criminal prosecution in the state court; the State of Tennessee has an important state interest in
enforcing its criminal laws; and the criminal proceedings at the state level offer a more than
adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims Plaintiff believes he has. No exception to
Younger applies in this case. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that it should abstain
from interfering with the state court criminal proceedings. “A district court deciding to abstain

under Younger has the option of either dismissing the case without prejudice or holding the case
in abeyance.” See Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 866 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the
motions to dismiss, including the claim for injunctive relief, are granted on this ground also.
In summary, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED, and the Report and
Recommendation is ADOPTED as modified. The Court finds that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for money damages because those claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, and the claims against the State Defendants are dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Court will abstain from
hearing Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief under the Younger abstention doctrine.4 Thus, the

State Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 27, 29) are GRANTED on these grounds, and
the claims against the State of Tennessee and its officials, Defendants Bradberry and Butler, are
DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss filed before the amended complaint (ECF No. 13) is
DENIED as moot.

4 Plaintiff may attempt to argue that the state court proceedings against him have now been
resolved. However, Younger applies when there is a relevant state court proceeding pending at
the time the federal action is filed irrespective of the fact that the state proceeding may be
subsequently dismissed during the pendency of the federal action. See Federal Express Corp. v.
Tennessee Pub. Serv. Com’n, 925 F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir.1991) (subsequent dismissal of state
court action did not affect the abstention analysis under Younger); Zalman v. Armstrong, 802
F.2d 199, 204 (6th Cir.1986) (Younger abstention applies even though state proceeding was
dismissed after federal action was filed); Nash v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Metro. Hous. Auth., 2008 WL
1869020 (N.D. Ohio Apr.24, 2008) (action was pending for purposes of Younger abstention
despite subsequent dismissal of state action).
Defendant Bradberry’s motion to dismiss the individual claims against him (ECF No. 51)
is GRANTED on the ground that, as a state official, he is immune from claims for money
damages, the Court will abstain from deciding any claims for injunctive relief against him under
Younger, and he is entitled to absolute immunity for decisions made in his role as the judge in
the underlying state case.

Plaintiff’s (1) Motion to Compel Discovery from Defendants Bradberry and Butler (ECF
No. 37); (2) Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 41); (3) Motion for Extension of Time to File
Reply to Defendants Bradberry and Butler’s Response in Opposition (ECF No. 45); and Motion
for Entry of Default against Defendant Bradberry (ECF No. 47) are DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s
motion for extension of time to file objections (ECF No. 59) is GRANTED.5
Subsequent to the filing of the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff filed a motion for
an evidentiary hearing (ECF No. 56) and a second motion to compel discovery. (ECF No. 64.)
These motions are also DENIED as moot.
This matter will proceed against Defendant Fronabarger as the sole defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: February 15, 2024

5 Plaintiff may re-file his action against the State Defendants “upon the exhaustion of his state
court remedies in the event that he is convicted on the underlying criminal charges.” Olivier v.
State, 2017 WL 9732080, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2017). However, the claims for money
damages against the State Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441603. Public record. Not legal advice.