# Wieland v. Lakeside Behavioral Health System

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · August 7, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441443

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 7, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441443

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER N. WIELAND, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 2:22-cv-02649-TLP-cgc
v. )
)
LAKESIDE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH )
SYSTEM, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Christopher N. Wieland sued Defendant Lakeside Behavioral Health System
(“Lakeside”) in September 2022. (ECF No. 1.) Under Administrative Order 2013-05, the Court
referred this case to Magistrate Judge Charmiane G. Claxton (“Judge Claxton”) for management
of all pretrial matters. In February 2023, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for lack
subject matter jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. (ECF No. 23.)
Judge Claxton considered Defendant’s motion and entered a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”). (ECF No. 28.) In her R&R, Judge Claxton recommends that this
Court grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (See id.) For the reasons below, the Court
ADOPTS her R&R. As a result, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 23) and
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s suit stems from his July 2022 encounter with the Germantown Police and
Germantown Fire Department—both government entities in Shelby County, Tennessee—
resulting in his involuntary admission at Lakeside. (ECF No. 1.)1 Plaintiff alleges that he
suffered injuries from his time at Lakeside including exposure to the cold temperature in the
building, threats of violence, and unwanted injections. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3–7.)
As a result of these events, Plaintiff sued Defendant here. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges
violations of “18 U.S. Code § 1347, Section 2340A of Title 18, Section 242 of Title 18, 25 CFR

§ 11.404, 10 U.S. Code § 897, 25 CFR § 11.403, 18 U.S. Code § 1201, 10 U.S. Code § 914 –
Art. 114, 28 U.S. Code § 4101.” (Id. at PageID 7.) He also lists these causes of action:
“Endangerment, Intimidation, Torture, Unlawful Forced Injection, Unlawful Detainment,
Multiple Acts of Medical Fraud, Constant Exposure to Gang Activity, Defamataion[.]” (Id. at
PageID 1.)
Defendant then moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, arguing: (1) the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) Plaintiff has stated no claims upon which the Court can grant
relief; (3) Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant with process properly. (See ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff
did not respond to Defendant’s motion timely. So Judge Claxton ordered Plaintiff to show cause

“as to why the Court should not consider the Motion on the record before it” and recommend
granting Defendant’s motion. (ECF No. 24.) Again, Plaintiff failed to respond.
THE R&R

After recounting the factual and procedural history here, Judge Claxton analyzed the
Parties’ legal positions and recommended that this Court grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
(See ECF No. 28.) First, Judge Claxton correctly noted that federal courts must have subject
matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims before it can consider the merits of those claims. (Id.

1 Plaintiff also sued both Germantown Police and Fire Departments. The Court recounts the
facts of Plaintiff’s encounter with these agencies in those suits.
at PageID 108.) Federal courts have limited jurisdiction so they must at least have either federal
question or diversity jurisdiction over the case. And Plaintiff—who brought this suit in federal
court—bears the burden of proving that the Court has jurisdiction. See Moir v. Greater
Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990).
Because “Plaintiff does not allege his citizenship or domicile of any of the parties in this

matter[,]” Judge Claxton concluded that this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. (Id. at PageID
109–10.) Judge Claxton also found that this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction because the
statutes Plaintiff cites are federal criminal statutes that do not confer a private right of action for
Plaintiff. (Id. at PageID 110.)
Judge Claxton correctly noted the legal standard for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Id. at PageID 127.) She also pointed out that courts “liberally construe[]”
pleadings by pro se litigants. (Id. at PageID 128.) Under that standard, Judge Claxton then
addressed Plaintiff’s complaint. At first, she notes that Plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations” have
no factual basis for support. (Id. at PageID 132.) Because these allegations fail to state claims

“under a viable legal theory[,]” and because “[n]one of the statutes or regulations stated by
Plaintiff create a private action by which relief can be granted[,]” Judge Claxton recommends
dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(6). (See id. at PageID 132.)
Judge Claxton then notes the correct legal standard for properly serving process on a
defendant under Rule 12(b)(5). (Id. at PageID 132.) And because Plaintiff did not serve process
on Lakeside’s authorized agent, Judge Claxton found that “service of process was insufficient.”
(Id. at PageID 133.) The Court next turns to consider Judge Claxton’s R&R.
LEGAL STANDARD

A magistrate judge may submit to a district court judge proposed findings of fact and
may recommend a ruling on certain pretrial matters, including dismissal of an action for failure
to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). And “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a
copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to
the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
If the parties do not object, then a district court reviews an R&R for clear error. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee notes. And the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). Judge Claxton entered her R&R in late June 2023, and neither party
objected. And the time to do so has now passed. The Court therefore reviews the R&R for clear
error.

DISPOSITION

Finding no clear error and for the reasons below, the Court agrees with Judge Claxton’s
R&R.
I. Plaintiff Failed to Meet his Burden of Showing Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiff has not shown that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his case.
“Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction where there is complete diversity of citizenship.”
Akno 1010 Mkt. St. St. Louis Mo LLC v. Pourtaghi, 43 F.4th 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)). And § 1331 “grants federal district courts subject-matter jurisdiction over all
claims ‘arising under’ federal law.” Cobb v. Cont. Transp., Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir.
2006).
As Judge Claxton noted, “Plaintiff does not allege his citizenship or domicile of any of
the parties in this matter.” (ECF No. 28 at PageID 130.) Section 1332 “authorizes a federal
court to take diversity jurisdiction over a civil action only if the action is between ‘citizens of
different states.’” Farmer v. Fisher, 386 F. App’x 554, 557 (6th Cir. 2010). Because Plaintiff
does not allege the citizenship of the Parties in his complaint here, the Court agrees with Judge

Claxton that Plaintiff has failed “to overcome the presumption against federal subject matter
jurisdiction by pleading an adequate basis for diversity jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 28 at PageID
130 (citing Farmer, 386 F. App’x at 557).)
Plaintiff’s citation of federal statutes also fails to establish the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction through federal question. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 7 (“18 U.S. Code § 1347,
Section 2340A of Title 18, Section 242 of Title 18, 25 CFR § 11.404, 10 U.S. Code § 897, 25
CFR § 11.403, 18 U.S. Code § 1201, 10 U.S. Code § 914 – Art. 114, 28 U.S. Code § 4101.”.)
Simply listing federal statutes does not automatically confer Article III standing because not all
federal laws give one a private right of action.

Plaintiff has no Article III standing to sue using federal criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§
242, 1201, 1347, 2340A) because he is a private citizen, and “a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution . . . of another.” See Crutcher v. Colombo, No. 21-1116,
2021 WL 6803114, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 2021); Saro v. Brown, 11 F.App’x 387, 388 (6th Cir.
2001) (“A private citizen has no authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution; that power is
vested exclusively in the executive branch.”) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693
(1974)). Plaintiff complain about alleged criminal behavior to law enforcement agencies like
his local police, the FBI, or another agency. See id. But only prosecutors on behalf of state or
federal government may bring a criminal case. See id.
The lack of a private right of action dooms Plaintiff’s case here for the rest of federal
statutes he cites. For example, 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.403–4 are parts of a regulation that creates
criminal offenses in the context of Indian Affairs. This regulation provides neither a civil
remedy nor private right of action for a private citizen. See Whitfield v. Cuyahoga Cnty Dep’t of
Child & Fam. Servs., 2021 WL 1634552 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2021). Likewise, 28 U.S.C. §

4101 merely defines “defamation” in the “context of when a federal court may recognize a
foreign defamation judgment. It is not itself a private right of action conferring federal question
jurisdiction.” Parker v. Hankook Tire Mfg. Tenn., LP, 2022 WL 4545120 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28,
2022). And Title Ten of the United States Code applies only to the military. 10 U.S.C. §§ 897,
4101.
As Judge Claxton notes, these statutes are either “criminal, apply only to the military, or
specifically apply to Indians.” (ECF No. 28 at PageID 131.) The Court therefore finds that
Plaintiff failed to show Article III standing here.
II. Plaintiff Failed to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted

The Court also agrees with Judge Claxton that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant
to move to dismiss a complaint for such a failure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). And courts
assess whether a complaint states a claim using standards from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678–79 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007). “Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). To avoid dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
Though a court will grant a motion to dismiss if a plaintiff has no plausible claim for
relief, a court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its
allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v.

Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). But a court “need not accept as true legal conclusions
or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (citing Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th
Cir. 2000)).
The Court agrees with Judge Claxton’s analysis on this point.
Here, Plaintiff has made many conclusory allegations including endangerment,
intimidation, torture, unlawful forced injection, unlawful detainment, multiple acts of
medical fraud, constant exposure to gang activity, and defamation without any factual basis
to support the claims. Plaintiff has failed to state any of these claims under a viable legal
theory. Additionally, none of the statutes or regulations stated by Plaintiff create a private
action by which relief can be granted.

(ECF No. 28 at PageID 132.)
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
III. Plaintiff’s Service of Process was Insufficient
Finally, this Court agrees with Judge Claxton that dismissal here is proper under Rule
12(b)(5). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). A court may dismiss a complaint for “insufficiency of
service of process” under Rule 12(b)(5). Plaintiff has the burden to serve a defendant timely
under Rule 4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. “Courts may look to ‘record evidence’ and ‘uncontroverted
affidavits’ in determining whether plaintiffs have met this burden.” See Spencer v. Caracal Int’l,
LLC, 516 F. Supp. 3d 755, 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) (quoting Chapman v. Lawson, 89 F. Supp. 3d
959, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2015)).
Rule 4(h) controls how a plaintiff should serve a corporation like Lakeside:
Unless federal law provides otherwise or the defendant’s waiver has been filed, a
domestic or foreign corporation, or partnership or other unincorporated association
that is subject to suit under a common name, must be served:

(1) in a juridical district of the United States:
(A) in the manner prescribed by Rule (4)(e)(1) for serving an
individual: or
(B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent
authorized by appointment of by law to receive service of
process and—if the agent is one authorized by statute and the
statute so required—by mailing a copy of each to the defendant;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h).
Based on affidavits of Lakeside CEO Joy Golden, Judge Claxton found that Plaintiff
failed to serve process properly. (See ECF No. 28 at PageID 133 (citing ECF No. 18-2).) The
Court agrees with Judge Claxton that Plaintiff did not properly serve process on Defendant under
federal law.
Rule 4(m) gives plaintiffs ninety days to serve process, but that Rule also allows courts to
enlarge that time:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—
on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action
without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a
specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must
extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

See United States v. Oakland Physicians Med. Ctr., LLC, 44 F.4th 565, 568 (6th Cir. 2022)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)). More than ninety days has passed since Plaintiff sued here, and he
has not asked for an extension much less shown good cause for this failure.
But even if the Court gave him more time to serve Defendant, doing so would be futile
for the reasons discussed above. And so the Court will not extend Plaintiff’s time to serve
Defendant with process, nor will it dismiss Plaintiff’s action without prejudice. See Tagert v.
Anakeesta, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-294, 2021 WL 6427962, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2021)
(denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend and motion for extension of service of process when the
allegations in the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint did not cure jurisdictional defects).
CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed Judge Claxton’s R&R for clear error and finds none. And so, the

Court ADOPTS the R&R, GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Lakeside WITH PREJUDICE. Because the Court
dismisses the claims against Defendant now, the Court also DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s
motion to change venue to criminal court to compel discovery (ECF No. 26).
SO ORDERED, this 7th day of August, 2023.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10441443. Public record. Not legal advice.