# Benoist v. Titan Medical Manufacturing, LLC.

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · September 29, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10440761

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 29, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10440761

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that novelty/complexity, quality of representation, and results obtained are generally subsumed in other factors used to calculate a reasonable fee
- finding that the district court may reduce fees where documentation was inadequate and where hours were not reasonably expended

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

TAYLOR BENOIST, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:19-cv-02704-SHM
)
TITAN MEDICAL MANUFACTURING, )
LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
)

ORDER

On August 4, 2021, Plaintiff Taylor Benoist filed
Plaintiff’s Motion for Payment of Attorney’s Fees (the “Motion”).
(D.E. No. 113.) On August 13, 2021, Defendant Titan Medical
Manufacturing, LLC responded. (D.E. No. 118.) The Motion is
GRANTED IN PART.
I. Background
Both Plaintiff and Defendant vigorously litigated this
case. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on October 16, 2019, alleging
“Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII,”
“Retaliation in Violation of Title VII,” and constructive
discharge. (D.E. No. 1 at 5-6.) Defendant filed an Answer denying
liability and raising affirmative defenses. (D.E. No. 8.)
Both parties served and answered interrogatories and
document requests. Defendant took three depositions. Plaintiff
took eight. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E.

No. 33.) Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim. (D.E. No. 34.) The Court
entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. (D.E. No. 66.) The Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and
constructive discharge. (Id. at 10-19.) The Court denied
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim. (Id. at 19-24.) Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (D.E. No. 67), which the Court denied. (D.E. No.
76.)
Trial commenced on July 12, 2021, and concluded on July 16,

2021. Before trial, Plaintiff had received settlement offers of
up to $15,000. Plaintiff’s counsel, Brian C. Winfrey, asked the
jury to award a total of $1,000,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and
awarded a total of $500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
(D.E. No. 105.) Defendant filed a Motion to Impose Statutory
Cap. (D.E. No. 107.) The Court granted Defendant’s Motion to
Impose Statutory Cap and reduced the jury’s verdict to $50,000.
(D.E. No. 115.)
Plaintiff has now filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (D.E.
No. 113.) The Motion includes a Memorandum of Law, Winfrey’s
Declaration, a Billing Statement, declarations from two Memphis

attorneys, and two prior fee awards. Plaintiff requests
$285,237.50 in fees for Winfrey based on an hourly rate of $475
and 612.5 billed hours. (D.E. No. 113-2.) The billed hours
include 24.0 travel hours. Winfrey billed $237.50 an hour for
travel hours, half the rate he billed for work hours. Defendant
responds that Winfrey’s hourly rate is too high and that the
time billed should be reduced because Winfrey used block billing
and made impermissible billing entries. (D.E. No. 118.)
II. Standards
The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a party
that prevails in a Title VII action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, the court calculates

“the fee applicant’s lodestar, which is the proven number of
hours reasonably expended on the case by an attorney, multiplied
by his court-ascertained reasonable hourly rate.” Hubbell v.
FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir. 2019). “There
is a ‘strong presumption that the lodestar figure—the product of
reasonable hours times a reasonable rate—represents a reasonable
fee.’” Barrow v. City of Cleveland, 773 F. App’x 254, 268 (6th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)). Upward
adjustments to the lodestar are permissible in certain rare and
exceptional cases. See Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 564; Blum
v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 (1984); Geier v. Sundquist,

372 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2004).
To determine the “reasonable hourly rate” component of the
lodestar calculation, the court assesses the “prevailing market
rate in the relevant community.” See Waldo v. Consumers Energy
Co., 726 F.3d 802, 822 (6th Cir. 2013)(emphasis omitted). “The
prevailing market rate is that rate which lawyers of comparable
skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the
venue of the court of record.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). The court is “permitted to rely on a party’s
submissions, awards in analogous cases, state bar association

guidelines, and its own knowledge and experience in handling
similar fee requests.” Id. at 821-22 (internal quotations
omitted).
To determine the number of reasonable hours for the lodestar
calculation, “the standard is whether a reasonable attorney would
have believed the work to be reasonably expended in pursuit of
success at the point in time when the work was performed.”
Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th
Cir. 1990) (abrogated on other grounds Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S.
598 (2001)). The court excludes hours that were “excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” See Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “Hours that are not properly billed to
one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary

pursuant to statutory authority.” Id. Time entries must be
detailed enough to allow the court to evaluate their
reasonableness. See id. at 437 & n.12; Moore v. Freeman, 355
F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2004). If the fee applicant presents an
inadequate documentation of hours, the court “may reduce the
award accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Imwalle v. Reliance
Med. Prod., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 552 (6th Cir. 2008).
III. Analysis
A. Reasonable Hourly Rate
Plaintiff’s Motion is supported by declarations from
William B. Ryan and Robert L. J. Spence, Jr., two respected
Memphis attorneys. Ryan states that a $475 hourly rate was

reasonable for “top flight trial attorneys in the Western
District of Tennessee” and that his own hourly rate in employment
cases “ranges from $350-450 per hour depending on the complexity
of the matter/case.” (D.E. No. 113-6 at 3.) Ryan has been
licensed to practice in Tennessee for twenty-two (22) years.
(Id. at 1.) Spence states that Winfrey’s hourly rate was
reasonable and that “rates for this type of work for experienced
lawyers range from $350 to $550 depending on the complexity of
the matter and the skill involved.” (D.E. No. 113-5 at 4, 5.)
Spence has been licensed to practice in Tennessee for thirty-
five (35) years. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff has also provided two
recent cases in which the awarding courts found Winfrey’s $475

hourly rate reasonable. (D.E. No. 113-7; 113-8); see Peterson v.
W. TN Expediting, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01164, (W.D. Tenn. June 16,
2021); Hanson v. McBride, No. 3:18-cv-00524 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 2,
2020).
Defendant argues that $375 is a reasonable hourly rate for
Winfrey’s work. (D.E. No. 118 at 8.) Defendant argues that
Winfrey has been licensed for fifteen (15) years and cannot
command the upper end of the rates quoted by Ryan and Spence.
(Id. at 6-7.) Defendant cites recent cases in which the awarding
court approved hourly rates for Ryan and Spence on the low end
of their quoted ranges. (Id.) Defendant argues that the Peterson
award Plaintiff submitted covers Winfrey’s appellate work. (Id.

at 7-8.) The same court found $400 was a reasonable hourly rate
for Winfrey’s work through trial. See Peterson v. W. TN
Expediting, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01164 (W.D. Tenn. June 26, 2020).
Defendant argues that the Hanson award is from the Middle
District of Tennessee, where attorneys charge higher hourly
rates. (D.E. No. 118 at 7.) Defendant contends that the present
case involved straightforward discrimination and retaliation
claims that do not warrant a $475 hourly rate. (Id. at 15.)
The Court finds that $400 is a reasonable hourly rate for
Winfrey’s work in this case. The ranges that Ryan and Spence
quoted for experienced attorneys are appropriate guideposts.

Although Winfrey has only practiced for fifteen (15) years, his
Declaration demonstrates specialized experience and training.
Winfrey has clerked for the National Labor Relations Board and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, served as Trial
Counsel for the United States Department of Labor, and practiced
continually in the employment litigation field. (D.E. No. 113-
4.) The Court selects the approximate midpoint within the quoted
ranges. The present case involved straightforward claims, but
was complicated by parties and witnesses with close personal and
family ties. A $400 hourly rate matches the rate Winfrey received
for his trial work in the first Peterson award. The Hanson award
is not evidence of the prevailing market rate in this venue.

Winfrey argues that his $475 hourly rate is reasonable
because he “handled all attorney work for Ms. Benoist alone and
without the assistance of co-counsel,” although noting that “[a]s
a Member at a large national law firm, [he] certainly could have
retained co-counsel.” (D.E. No. 113-4 at 5.) That argument is
not persuasive. Work that could be performed by an associate or
paralegal does not command partner-level rates. See Hubbell v.
FedEx Smartpost, Inc., No. 14-13897, 2018 WL 1392668, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 20, 2018), aff’d, 933 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019); Mendez
v. FedEx Express, No. 15-CV-12301, 2017 WL 168168, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 17, 2017). Winfrey billed for tasks that an associate
or paralegal could have performed. For example, his Billing

Statement contains entries such as “create preliminary timeline
of events,” “organizing exhibits for deposition discussions,”
and “[r]esearch Burlington and other case law on issues and
elements of retaliation claim.” (D.E. No. 113-2.) Rather than
exclude those entries and similar entries from Winfrey’s billed
hours, the Court has considered the nature of Winfrey’s work in
its selection of a reasonable hourly rate.
B. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended
Defendant requests an across-the-board reduction in the
requested fees because Winfrey’s use of block billing “makes it
difficult to determine with a high degree of certainty exactly
how much time was spent performing many tasks, whether the tasks

were necessary for the litigation, and whether the hours billed
were expended in a reasonable fashion.” (D.E. No. 118 at 8.)
Defendant also identifies specific entries and contends that
they were “excessive/unreasonable” or represent “paralegal,
clerical or non-billable work.” (Id. at 11-14.) Plaintiff argues
that Winfrey’s Billing Statement is “specific and detailed [and]
largely avoids block billing . . . . “(D.E. No. 113-1 at 9.) In
his Declaration, Winfrey says that he “cut from billing entries
for all tasks performed that were even arguably unnecessary,
clerical, or unnecessarily duplicative before submitting [his
fees] to the Court.” (D.E. No. 113-4 at 5).
Block billing refers to a time-keeping method where a lawyer

“enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather
than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.” Oakley v.
City of Memphis, No. 06-2276, 2012 WL 2682755, at *3 (W.D. Tenn.
June 14, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 06-2276,
2012 WL 2681822 (W.D. Tenn. July 6, 2012), aff’d, 566 F. App’x
425 (6th Cir. 2014). Block billing alone does not require the
court to reduce a fee award, although the practice is generally
discouraged. See id. A court may reduce fees where block-billed
entries include non-compensable tasks. See Miller v. Davis, 267
F. Supp. 3d 961, 996–97 (E.D. Ky. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Miller
v. Caudill, 936 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Hensley, 461
U.S. at 433-34 (finding that the district court may reduce fees

where documentation was inadequate and where hours were not
reasonably expended). Clerical tasks are non-compensable. See
Miller, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 996 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins by
Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989)). Clerical tasks include
converting documents, circulating documents, calendaring
matters, and filing motions. See Adkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
393 F. Supp. 3d 713, 720 (N.D. Ohio 2019); Miller, 267 F. Supp.
3d at 996-97.
Winfrey’s block billing warrants a five percent (5%)
reduction to his work hours. Winfrey did not enter total daily
time entries. He did group related tasks into single entries

instead of itemizing. For example, Winfrey’s Billing Statement
contains five entries listed for July 27, 2021, two of which are
reproduced below:
7.27.2021 Conferral with William Ryan and Robert 0.5
Spence Re: Gather and email items for
Declaration for fee award; submission
of billing entries, memorandum, and
declaration for review
7.27.2021 Review hundreds of pages of documents 4.5
submitted by Titan in support of
Statutory Damages Cap Motion; indexing
documents for reference; and
evaluating claims of Titan (3.5);
Research cases Re: Evidence for
statutory caps and burden of proof on
issue

(D.E. No. 113-2 at 17). The first entry shows no itemization. It
is not clear how much time Winfrey spent conferring with Ryan
and Spence and how much time he spent on the “submission” of fee
award materials. The second entry shows some itemization,
represented by time within parentheses, but tasks are grouped.
It is not clear how much time Winfrey spent reviewing, indexing,
or evaluating Titan documents. Both entries include clerical
tasks, specifically “submission of billing entries, memorandum,
and declaration” and “indexing documents.” The entries are
representative of other entries that are block-billed and that
also include non-compensable tasks. Because the Court cannot
determine how much time was spent on these non-compensable tasks
it imposes a 5% reduction in Winfrey’s work hours.1
The Court finds that the entries identified by Defendant

were not clearly excessive or unreasonable. It agrees that some
of the identified entries represent work that should have been
done by an associate or paralegal. The Court will not strike
those hours because the reasonable hourly rate reflects the
nature of Winfrey’s work.
C. Upward Adjustment
Plaintiff asks the Court to consider an upward adjustment
to the fee award based on the “excellent” results obtained at
trial, the quality of representation, and the “complicated” facts
of the case. That request is not well taken. This case is not
rare or exceptional. See Geier, 372 F.3d at 793. Plaintiff’s
reasons for an upward adjustment are presumptively reflected in

the lodestar calculation. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-900 (finding
that novelty/complexity, quality of representation, and results
obtained are generally subsumed in other factors used to
calculate a reasonable fee); Geier, 372 F.3d at 793-95. The
results obtained were good given the legal limit for damages.
Plaintiff asked for $1,000,000 in damages and received $50,000

1 Defendant has not asked the Court to reduce Winfrey’s travel hours.
Winfrey billed three (3) hours for trips to and from Memphis even when
he performed no work during the trip. The Court will not apply the
5% reduction to Winfrey’s travel hours.
after the Court imposed the statutory cap. 2 Winfrey’s
representation was effective, but does not merit an upward
adjustment. The claims and facts of the case were not overly

complicated. The request for an upward adjustment is denied.
D. Calculation of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees
The Court applies a $400 reasonable hourly rate to Winfrey’s
work hours and a $200 hourly rate to Winfrey’s travel hours.3 It
applies a 5% reduction to Winfrey’s work hours, resulting in a
total of 559.1 work hours and 24.0 travel hours. The Court awards
$228,430 in reasonable attorney’s fees.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN
PART.
So ordered this 29th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Samuel H. May, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2 The Court has considered whether a downward adjustment would be
appropriate based on the disparity between the requested fees and the
results obtained. Other courts have approved requested fees where the
ratio between fees and damages obtained was similar to or greater than
the ratio in the current case. See Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126,
1130 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding fee award that represented a 5:1 ratio
to damages, but reversing and remanding for consideration of additional
damages and attorney’s fees); Wheat v. Benton Cty., No. 1:08-CV-01171,
2010 WL 908653 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2010)(approving fees that
represented a 12:1 ratio to damages). A downward adjustment based on
damages obtained would not be appropriate on this record.
3 Winfrey billed travel hours at half his normal rate. The Court
applies the same rule to the reasonable hourly rate.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10440761. Public record. Not legal advice.