# Henderson v. City of Memphis

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · March 23, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10440357

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 23, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10440357

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming district court’s dismissal of official-capacity suits

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

)
MARC JOSEPH HENDERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
)
v. ) No. 2:19-cv-2776-SHM-tmp
)
CITY OF MEMPHIS; COLONEL ) Jury Demanded
DARRELL SHEFFIELD (in his )
individual capacity), )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING
IN PART CITY OF MEMPHIS’S MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DENYING
COLONEL DARRELL SHEFFIELD’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Marc Joseph Henderson (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief for
violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.E. No. 43.) Before the Court are three
motions. The first is Plaintiff’s second motion to amend (the
“Motion to Amend”). (D.E. No. 62.) The second is Defendant City
of Memphis’s (the “City”) motion to dismiss. (D.E. No. 45.) The
third is Defendant Colonel Darrell Sheffield’s (“Sheffield”)
motion to dismiss. (D.E. No. 48.) The motions are ripe for
consideration. (See D.E. Nos. 55, 56, 57, 60, 63.) For the
following reasons, the Motion to Amend is DENIED, the City’s
motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART, and
Sheffield’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
I. Background
On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against
Defendants the City, Sheffield, Lieutenant Cecil Davis, and
Lieutenant Glenn Barber seeking relief under § 1983 for
violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (D.E.
No. 1.) The Amended Complaint was filed on March 25, 2020. (D.E.
No. 43.) The Amended Complaint asserts a failure to train or

supervise claim against the City. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 19, 24, 33.) The
Amended Complaint asserts a claim for unconstitutional detention
of Plaintiff for a mental health assessment against Sheffield.
(Id. ¶¶ 9, 14, 16-18, 23-24, 26-28, 32-33.) The Amended Complaint
makes other factual allegations that do not clearly state claims
against either Defendant. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 12-13, 25.) On
August 7, 2020, the Court entered an Order granting a stipulation
of dismissal dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
Davis and Barber. (D.E. No. 71.) For purposes of the motions to
dismiss, the facts are taken from the Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff has been employed by the City as a police officer

since 2011. (Id. ¶ 7.) At all relevant times, Sheffield was
Plaintiff’s commanding officer at the Appling Farms Precinct.
(Id. ¶ 3.)
Between May and November 2018, Plaintiff was experiencing
marital problems. (Id. ¶ 9.) Sheffield became interested in
Plaintiff’s marriage and ordered Plaintiff to do what his wife
wanted in their divorce. (Id.) Sheffield had officers check on
Plaintiff on several occasions because Sheffield had “baseless”
concerns that Plaintiff was depressed or suicidal. (Id.)
On November 13, 2018, Sheffield relieved Plaintiff from
duty “for his own good.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff was coerced into
going to Lakeside Hospital, also “for his own good.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

After three hours without attention at Lakeside Hospital,
Plaintiff requested a patrol car to take him back to the
precinct. (Id. ¶ 15.) Once the patrol car with Plaintiff had
arrived at the precinct, Plaintiff was not allowed out of the
vehicle. (Id. ¶ 16.)
At about 6:00 PM, Plaintiff was instructed to get out of
the car, turn around, and put his hands behind his back. (Id. ¶
17.) Plaintiff was handcuffed. (Id.) After Plaintiff asked to
speak with Sheffield, Sheffield informed Plaintiff that
Sheffield had decided to have Plaintiff committed. (Id. ¶ 18.)
At about 7:30 PM, Plaintiff was transported to Memphis

Mental Health Institute (“MMHI”). (Id. ¶ 28.) After an
assessment, Plaintiff was released some time after midnight on
November 14, 2018, because the doctors at MMHI had found no
reason for an involuntary committal. (Id. ¶ 29.)
The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheffield has a history
of similar conduct and that the City knew or should have known
about that conduct. (Id. ¶ 24.)
On April 7, 2020, the City filed its motion to dismiss
arguing that the Amended Complaint did not contain sufficient
factual allegations to state a § 1983 claim against the City.
(D.E. No. 45.)
On April 8, 2020, Sheffield filed his motion to dismiss
arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (D.E. No.

48.)
On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend
seeking to sue Sheffield in his official capacity as well as his
individual capacity. (D.E. No. 62.)
II. Jurisdiction
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff’s §
1983 claims arise under the laws of the United States.
III. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint that
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion permits the
“defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is

entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the
complaint is true.” Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.
1993) (citing Nishiyama v. Dickson Cty., 814 F.2d 277, 279 (6th
Cir. 1987)). A motion to dismiss tests only whether the plaintiff
has pled a cognizable claim and allows the court to dismiss
meritless cases that would waste judicial resources and result
in unnecessary discovery. See Brown v. City of Memphis, 440 F.
Supp. 2d 868, 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege
facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cooper Butt ex rel.

Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). A claim is plausible
on its face if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court
considers the plaintiff’s complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Ryan v. Blackwell, 979 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 512
(6th Cir. 2001)). The court accepts as true all factual
allegations but does not accept legal conclusions or unwarranted

factual inferences as true. Theile v. Michigan, 891 F.3d 240,
243 (6th Cir. 2018). “The plaintiff must present a facially
plausible complaint asserting more than bare legal conclusions.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-
678).
IV. Analysis
A. The Motion to Amend
On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend. (D.E.
No. 62.) The proposed second amendment would name Sheffield in
his official capacity as well as his individual capacity. (Id.
at 274.)
Motions to amend are to be granted “freely” “when justice
so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). There is an exception to

this liberal standard when the amendment would be futile.
Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728, 737-38 (6th Cir. 2018) (“A
proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not withstand
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).
The proposed amendment to name Sheffield in his official
capacity would be redundant and therefore futile. The City is
already a Defendant. Suit against an individual defendant in
that defendant’s official capacity is identical to suit against
the governmental entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985) (“[A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects
other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”).

Where the governmental entity is already a defendant, suit
against a government officer in that officer’s official capacity
is redundant. Courts routinely dismiss claims against government
officers in their official capacity in those circumstances. See
Doe v. Claiborne Cty., Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996)
(affirming district court’s dismissal of official-capacity
suits); Brooks v. Skinner, 139 F. Supp. 3d 869, 890 (S.D. Ohio
2015) (“[W]hen a § 1983 complaint asserts a claim against a
government entity and a government official in her official
capacity, federal courts will dismiss the official-capacity
claim.”).

Amendment would be futile. The Motion to Amend is DENIED.
B. The City’s Motion to Dismiss
A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional
violations caused by the municipality’s “policy or custom,” where
that “official policy” is the “moving force” behind the
constitutional injury. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To set forth a cognizable §
1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that
(1) agents of the municipality, while acting under color of state
law, (2) violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and (3)
that a municipal policy or policy of inaction was the moving
force behind the violation.” Memphis, Tenn. Area Local, Am.

Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898,
902 (6th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff alleges that the City failed to train or supervise
Sheffield to avoid violating his subordinates’ constitutional
rights. A failure to train or supervise employees adequately can
be an offending policy or custom if the failure to train or
supervise amounts to “‘deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (quoting City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). “To succeed
on a failure to train or supervise claim, the plaintiff must
prove the following: (1) the training or supervision was

inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the
result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3)
the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the
injury.” Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. School
Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006)). “Only where a failure
to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a
municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by our prior cases—can a city
be liable for such a failure under § 1983.” Canton, 489 U.S. at
389; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-
84 (1986) (“We hold that municipal liability under § 1983
attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a

course of action is made from among various alternatives by the
official or officials responsible for establishing final
policy”). “[W]hen city policymakers are on actual or constructive
notice that a particular omission in their training program
causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the
policymakers choose to retain that program.” Connick, 563 U.S.
at 61 (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)).
The City contends that the Amended Complaint does not allege
sufficient facts to support a conclusion that the training
Sheffield received was inadequate. (D.E. No. 45-1 at 185.) The
factual allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to support

Plaintiff’s allegation that “[t]he City had inadequate policies
and inadequate training . . . particularly of persons in high
rank of command.” (D.E. No. 43 ¶ 33.) The Amended Complaint
alleges that the City of Memphis and/or the Memphis Police
Department trained Sheffield in “how and when to make an arrest,
why and when arrests are not appropriate, how to supervise his
subordinates, including how and when (if ever) to intervene in
a subordinate’s personal life.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The Amended Complaint
does not list deficiencies in Sheffield’s training. (See D.E.
No. 45-1 at 184-85.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheffield
“felt empowered” to or had previously: interfered in the

marriages of subordinates, ordered officers to enter
subordinates’ homes, relieved officers from duty without cause,
determined that subordinates needed to receive mental health
treatment, and seized and held subordinates without probable
cause for an indefinite period. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.) Those allegations
state that Sheffield may have acted outside the confines of his
training, but the allegations fail to state that the training he
allegedly received was inadequate. See Birgs v. City of Memphis,
686 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780-81 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555) (dismissing failure to train claim because,
where the complaint stated that “Defendant . . . failed to
properly train and instruct the individual Defendants in the
proper use of force,” “the allegations [were] nothing more than

‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’”).
The City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s failure to train claim
is GRANTED.
The Amended Complaint states sufficient allegations to
support Plaintiff’s “inadequate . . . supervision” claim. (Id.
¶ 33.) The Amended Complaint alleges that Sheffield had a history
of conduct like the allegedly unconstitutional mental health
detention of Plaintiff and the surrounding conduct, and that the
City knew or should have known about Sheffield’s pattern of
conduct. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Amended Complaint alleges that the City
knew about Sheffield’s actions on November 13-14, 2018, did

nothing to stop Sheffield at that time, and has taken no action
to “investigate and/or correct” Sheffield for the alleged
incidents on those dates. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 33); see Taylor v. Michigan
Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant’s]
own deposition showed that he was aware of and at least
acquiesced in the conduct of his subordinates”); cf. Hershberger
v. Town of Collierville, No. 14-2153, 2014 WL 6815189, at *9
(W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2014) (dismissing failure to supervise claim
where supervisor was not involved in unconstitutional conduct
and there were no facts alleged that demonstrated supervisor
“knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional acts”).
Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support a claim that
the City failed to supervise Sheffield.

The City argues that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lacks
sufficient factual allegations to satisfy the deliberate
indifference element of his failure to supervise claim. The Sixth
Circuit recognizes two ways to establish deliberate
indifference. Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 700. “‘One
is failure to provide adequate training in light of foreseeable
consequences that could result from a lack of instruction.’” Id.
at 700-01. (quoting Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir.
1999)) (“In City of Canton, for example, the Supreme Court
indicated that a city could be deliberately indifferent by
failing to train its police officers in the use of deadly force

because it is obvious that the officers will need to use such
force when they are armed with guns and required to arrest
fleeing felons.”) “‘A second type of . . . deliberate
indifference is where the city fails to act in response to
repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its
officers.’” Id. at 701 (quoting Brown, 172 F.3d at 931).
Plaintiff argues that, because “[i]t is particularly
abhorrent for the City to allow a commanding officer to intrude
on the marital issues of those officers under his command,” the
City must have displayed deliberate indifference. (Id.) That
conclusion, even if accepted, does not establish either of the
ways to make out deliberate indifference. It does not demonstrate

that a commanding officer’s interfering in a subordinate’s
marriage is a “foreseeable consequence” that must be addressed
by supervision. Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 700. It
does not demonstrate that the City ignored complaints of
commanding officers’ interfering in subordinates’ marriages. See
id. at 701.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, however, does contain
sufficient factual allegations to state the deliberate
indifference element of his claim that the City failed to
supervise Sheffield. Plaintiff alleges that the City was
deliberately indifferent because “it is clear that [Sheffield]

had conducted himself similarly on other occasions.” (D.E. No.
55-1 at 238.) Plaintiff alleges that the City knew or should
have known that Sheffield had conducted himself similarly on
other occasions. (D.E. No. 43 ¶ 24.) That allegation is analogous
to a municipality’s ignoring complaints of unconstitutional
behavior because it states that the City was or should have been
on notice of the unconstitutional conduct. See Ellis ex rel.
Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 701.
In the Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges facts that
support his claim. Plaintiff alleges that “Sheffield had a
history of similar conduct” to the conduct surrounding his
allegedly illegal arrest of Plaintiff. (D.E. No. 43 ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff alleges that the “City knew or should have known of
Sheffield’s actions to deprive his subordinates, including
Henderson, of their federal rights under the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.” (Id.) Those allegations do not merely
state legal conclusions. They state that Sheffield engaged in a
pattern of behavior that violated his subordinates’
constitutional rights and that the City knew or should have known
about that behavior. Although the allegations lack additional
detail, detailed factual allegations are not required to
withstand a motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A]
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations”).
The Amended Complaint adequately states a failure to
supervise claim against the City. The City’s motion to dismiss
that claim is DENIED. To the extent the Amended Complaint
attempts to state any other claims against the City based on a
Monell theory of liability, the City’s argument that those claims
are based on “broad assertions” is well-taken. (see D.E. No. 45-
1 at 186.) The City’s motion to dismiss any claims other than
the failure to supervise claim, including the inadequately pled
failure to train claim, is GRANTED. Those claims are DISMISSED.
C. Sheffield’s Motion to Dismiss
Sheffield argues that the claim for an unconstitutional
mental health detention of Plaintiff should be dismissed because
Sheffield is entitled to qualified immunity. (D.E. No. 48-1 at

213.) “[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under §
1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct
was ‘clearly established at the time.’” Dist. of Columbia v.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards,
566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). The right in question must be
specifically defined, particularly in the Fourth Amendment
context. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). Although
the Supreme Court’s “‘caselaw does not require a case directly
on point for a right to be clearly established, existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S.
Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam)).
Plaintiff alleges facts in the Amended Complaint
establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
Plaintiff alleges that he was handcuffed and placed in the back
of a patrol car without probable cause or a warrant and taken
for a mental health evaluation. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 22, 24, 26, 28.) The
Fourth Amendment provides protections against such mental health
seizures or arrests without probable cause that “the person
seized poses a danger to himself or others.” See Fisher v.
Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 842-43 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Monday v.
Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Sheffield does not contest that an arrest was made, but
argues that such a warrantless arrest was permitted under
Tennessee law. (D.E. No. 48-1 at 214.) Sheffield cites Tenn.
Code Ann. § 33-6-401, which permits a mental health seizure or
arrest if the “person has a mental illness or serious emotional
disturbance” and “the person poses an immediate substantial
likelihood of serious harm under § 33-6-501 because of the mental
illness or serious emotional disturbance . . . .” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 33-6-401. Section 33-6-501 provides:
IF AND ONLY IF
(1)(A) a person has threatened or attempted suicide or

to inflict serious bodily harm on the person, OR
(B) the person has threatened or attempted homicide or
other violent behavior, OR
(C) the person has placed others in reasonable fear of
violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, OR
(D) the person is unable to avoid severe impairment or
injury from specific risks, AND
(2) there is a substantial likelihood that the harm
will occur unless the person is placed under
involuntary treatment,
THEN
(3) the person poses a “substantial likelihood of
serious harm” for purposes of this title.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-501.
Tennessee’s statutory scheme governing warrantless mental
health detentions “appears to be at least as stringent as federal
law.” Reeners v. Troup, No. 3:15-cv-00625, 2020 WL 409746, at
*16 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2020). In Reeners, the court concluded
that, even given Tennessee’s statutory scheme, the officers
involved in a mental health seizure or arrest required probable
cause that the persons seized posed a danger to themselves or
others. Id. at *20-*21.
The Amended Complaint adequately alleges that Sheffield
violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Reliance on

Tennessee’s warrantless detention statute requires probable
cause that Plaintiff was a danger to himself or others. Sheffield
argues that the Amended Complaint establishes that Plaintiff was
having marital problems that were leading to a divorce. (D.E.
No. 48-1 at 214.) That fact does not establish that Plaintiff
posed a danger to himself or others or that Plaintiff was
mentally ill or having a serious mental disturbance. Cf. Reeners,
2020 WL 409746, at *17-*21 (detailing the facts of case where
even combination of delusions by the person in question and his
harassment of the police did not create probable cause). The
allegations in the Amended Complaint demonstrate that Sheffield
violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The right to be free from a mental health seizure or arrest

absent probable cause to believe the person is a danger to
himself or others was clearly established at the time of
Plaintiff’s arrest. Monday, 118 F.3d at 1102 (“The Fourth
Amendment requires an official seizing and detaining a person
for a psychiatric evaluation to have probable cause to believe
that the person is dangerous to himself or others.”); Fisher,
398 F.3d at 843-49 (applying the Monday standard to facts of
case and holding that “[i]t is clearly established that an
officer may not [e]ffect a mental health seizure without probable
cause”); Reeners, 2020 WL 409746, at *21 (“[T]he plaintiff had
a clearly established right not to be subjected to a mental

health detention in the absence of probable cause to believe he
posed a substantial risk of imminent harm to himself or others”);
Goodwin v. Hamilton Cty., Tenn., No. 1:05-cv-71, 2008 WL
11452106, at *13 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2008) (“[T]he right to be
free from seizure in the context of a mental health seizure on
less than probable cause was clearly established at the time of
this incident as reflected in the 1997 case of Monday v.
[O]ullette, 118 F.3d at 1102.”). The caselaw in this circuit
requiring probable cause prior to a mental health detention dates
from 1997. Plaintiff’s right to be free from seizure was clearly
established at the time of the events alleged in the Amended
Complaint.
Sheffield is not entitled to qualified immunity on the §

1983 claim against him. His motion to dismiss is DENIED.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Amend is DENIED.
The City’s motion to dismiss is DENIED to the extent that it
seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s failure to supervise claim and
GRANTED as to all other § 1983 claims against the City.
Sheffield’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this _23d__ day of March, 2021.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10440357. Public record. Not legal advice.