# Lundy v. Shelby County Healthcare Corporation

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · November 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10440182

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** November 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

)
D.B., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH )
HIS NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER )
ANTOINETTE LUNDY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 17-cv-02806-SHM-cgc
)
SHELBY COUNTY HEALTH CARE )
CORPORATION AND UNITED STATES )
OF AMERICA, )
)
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff brings this medical malpractice action against
the United States of America as substitute party (the
“Government”) and Shelby County Health Care Corporation
(“SCHCC”). (D.E. No. 38.) Plaintiff sues the Government under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671, et
seq., (the “FTCA”). Plaintiff sues SCHCC for medical
malpractice under Tennessee law. Before the Court is the
Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”), filed
on May 28, 2020. (D.E. No. 76.) Plaintiff has responded, the
Government has replied, Plaintiff has filed a sur-reply, the
Government has filed a sur-sur-reply, and the Motion is ripe
for consideration. (D.E. Nos. 80, 87, 93, 97.) For the
following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
D.B., Plaintiff Antoinette Lundy’s minor child, on whose
behalf she brings this action, sustained injuries because of
allegedly negligent conduct during his delivery on May 2, 2014.
(Amended Complaint, D.E. No. 38 at 447-48.)1

On April 28, 2017, pursuant to Tennessee law, Lundy
notified the health care providers responsible for her and
D.B.’s care that she intended to sue them. (D.E. No. 4-1 at
183-84.) Christ Community Health Services, Inc. (“CCHS”) and
its employees Dr. William G. Mullinax, Dr. Ellisa Rausch Krumm,
and Dr. David Jordan Paslay (the “doctors”) were among the
parties notified. (Id.) On or before May 19, 2017, the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) sent a
letter to Lundy. (D.E. No. 16-2 at 381.) HHS informed Lundy
that it had learned of her intent to sue CCHS employees, that
those employees might have been federal employees at the time

they provided care, and that, if so, the FTCA would be her
exclusive remedy against them. (Id.)
On August 22, 2017, Lundy sued CCHS, the doctors, and
SCHCC for medical malpractice in Tennessee state court. (D.E.

1 Unless otherwise noted, all pin cites for record citations are to
the “PageID” page number.
No. 4-1 at 176.) Lundy served CCHS through its registered agent
on September 1, 2017. (D.E. No. 4 at 173.) CCHS notified the
Government of Lundy’s suit on September 20, 2017. (Id. at 172.)
The Government filed a response on September 27, 2017. (D.E.
No. 4-1 at 327-28.) In its response, the Government said it had
not yet determined whether CCHS and the doctors were federal

employees when they cared for Lundy and D.B. and, as a result,
did not yet know whether federal law would require the
Government to enter a substitution of party. (Id.) On October
13, 2017, while her case was pending in state court, Lundy
filed an FTCA administrative claim against the Government.
(D.E. No. 20 at 393.)
CCHS removed to this Court on November 3, 2017, under 42
U.S.C. § 233(l)(2). (D.E. No. 4.) On December 6, 2017, after
determining that CCHS and the doctors were federal employees at
all relevant times, the Government moved to substitute itself
as defendant in place of CCHS and the doctors. (D.E. No. 12 at

361-62.) The Court granted the Government’s motion on December
11, 2017. (D.E. No. 15.) The next day the Government filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, noting that Lundy
had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required
by the FTCA. (D.E. No. 16 at 370.) The Court granted the
Government’s motion on February 16, 2018, dismissing the case
against the Government without prejudice. (D.E. No. 29.)
On June 28, 2018, Lundy filed a motion for leave to amend
her Complaint to add the Government as a defendant. (D.E. No.
35.) She represented that she had completed the FTCA
administrative claims process and received a final
determination denying her claim. (Id. at 427.) The Court
granted Lundy’s motion. (D.E. No. 36.) Lundy filed her Amended

Complaint on July 19, 2018, naming the Government and SCHCC as
defendants. (D.E. No. 38.)
On October 30, 2018, the Government filed a Motion to
Dismiss. (D.E. No. 58.) The Government contended that
Tennessee’s health care liability statute of repose deprived
the Court of jurisdiction over the Government. (Id. at 696);
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-116(a)(3) and 29-26-121(c).
The Court denied the Government’s motion because Lundy’s
initial complaint had been filed before the deadline imposed by
the statute of repose, the initial complaint had been dismissed
for reasons not extinguishing her right of action, and the

amended complaint had been filed within one year of the order
of dismissal, which satisfied Tennessee’s savings statute.
(D.E. No. 61 at 740-41.)
On May 28, 2020, the Government filed the instant Motion.
(D.E. No. 76.) The Government argues that Lundy failed to
satisfy the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations for filing
an administrative claim with the federal agency, (Id. at 783),
which would “forever bar[]” her claim against the Government,
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). D.B. was injured on May 2, 2014, and the
Government contends that the latest date the statute of
limitations could have begun to run was May 19, 2014, the date
D.B. was released from the hospital. (D.E. No. 76 at 793.) The
Government contends that the two-year statute of limitations

for filing an administrative claim had run by May 19, 2016, and
that Plaintiff did not file an administrative claim until
October 13, 2017. (Id. at 793-94.) Plaintiff agrees that the
statute of limitations had run before she filed her
administrative claim, but argues that the statute should be
equitably tolled. (See Pl.’s Resp., D.E. No. 80 at 858.)
II. Jurisdiction
The Court has federal-question jurisdiction over Lundy’s
claim against the Government. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, United
States district courts have original jurisdiction “of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” This action was removed under 42 U.S.C. §

233(l)(2), and the Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A).
The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Lundy’s claim
against SCHCC under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). That claim derives
from a “common nucleus of operative fact” with Lundy’s claim
against the Government. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund,
844 F.3d 576, 588-89 (6th Cir. 2016).
III. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on motion of a
party, the court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he moving party is entitled to
summary judgment when the nonmoving party ‘fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.’” George v. Youngstown State
University, 966 F.3d 446, 458 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
The non-moving party has the duty to point out specific
evidence in the record sufficient to justify a jury decision in
her favor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); InterRoyal Corp. v.
Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). When confronted

with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-
moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine dispute for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A
genuine dispute for trial exists if the evidence is “‘such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.’” See Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., 682 F.3d 463, 467
(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “[I]n order to survive a summary
judgment motion, the non-moving party ‘must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.’” Lossia v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 895 F.3d 423, 428
(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is
an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action[,] rather than a disfavored
procedural shortcut.” FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d
289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
IV. Analysis
The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for victims of the torts
of United States employees. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a); Himes v.
United States, 645 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2011). As a

condition of this waiver of sovereign immunity, Congress has
imposed a statute of limitations for FTCA claims. United States
v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979); see 28 U.S.C. §
2401(b). That statute must be strictly enforced. Kubrick, 444
U.S. at 117-18; Chomic v. United States, 377 F.3d 607, 615 (6th
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he statute of limitations in § 2401(b) must be
strictly construed”); see Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156,
160-61 (1981) (“[T]his Court has long decided that limitations
and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued
must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be
implied.”) (internal quotations omitted).
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575

U.S. 402 (2015), made clear that equitable tolling is available
as an exception to the statute of limitations for FTCA claims.
Id. at 420 (“[W]e hold that the FTCA’s time bars are
nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling.”). The
Sixth Circuit has cautioned that courts should apply equitable
tolling to FTCA claims “sparingly.” Ayers v. United States, 277
F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2002). There is a presumption against
equitable tolling for claims against the United States. See
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)
(“Because the time limits imposed by Congress in a suit against
the Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is

evident that no more favorable tolling doctrine may be employed
against the Government than is employed in suits between
private litigants.”); see also Schappacher v. United States,
475 F. Supp. 2d 749, 755 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“[T]here is a
rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling does not apply to
suits against the United States”). The burden to establish
equitable tolling is on the party seeking it. Robertson v.
Simpson, 624 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 2010).
When determining whether the statute of limitations for an
FTCA claim has been equitably tolled, the Sixth Circuit applies
a case-by-case analysis that focuses on five factors. See
Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998).

They are: “(1) the plaintiff’s lack of notice of the filing
requirement; (2) the plaintiff’s lack of constructive knowledge
of the filing requirement; (3) the plaintiff’s diligence in
pursuing her rights; (4) an absence of prejudice to the
defendant; and (5) the plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining
ignorant of the particular legal requirement.” Jackson v.
United States, 751 F.3d 712, 719 (6th Cir. 2014). Those factors
are neither comprehensive nor material in all cases, and “a
litigant’s failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline due to
unavoidab[le] ... circumstances beyond that litigant’s control
is often the most significant consideration in courts’

analyses, rather than any particular factor of the five-part
standard.” Zappone v. United States, 870 F.3d 551, 556 (6th
Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).
A. Plaintiff was not reasonable in remaining ignorant of
the requirement to file a timely administrative
claim.
The reasonableness of a plaintiff’s ignorance of the legal
requirement to file a timely claim depends on whether plaintiff
had the opportunity to know about the requirement, meaning
actual notice or constructive knowledge, and plaintiff’s
diligence in pursuing the claim. See Warren v. Highlands Reg’l
Med. Ctr., No. 7:18-cv-00101-GFVT, 2019 WL 2250632, at *3 (E.D.
Ky. May 24, 2019) (reasoning that constructive knowledge and
lack of diligence cut against reasonableness of remaining

ignorant of statute of limitations); see also Kellom v. United
States, No. 19-11622, 2020 WL 95805, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 8,
2020) (considering the actual notice, constructive knowledge,
and reasonableness factors together); Dann v. United States,
No. 6:17-32-DCR, 2017 WL 3873702, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 5,
2017) (considering the diligence and reasonableness factors
together).
Before May 19, 2016, the last date for her to file an
administrative claim, Plaintiff had constructive knowledge that
the healthcare providers were deemed federal employees.
Plaintiff could have discovered their status with a reasonably

diligent investigation into the possible defendants, making it
unreasonable that Plaintiff remained ignorant of the
requirement to file a timely claim.
1. Plaintiff had constructive knowledge that CCHS
and Dr. Mullinax were deemed federal employees.
Plaintiff argues that she had no constructive knowledge
that CCHS and Dr. Mullinax were deemed federal employees
because CCHS is and appears to be a religious facility. (Pl.’s
Sur-Reply, D.E. No. 93 at 1445.) Plaintiff argues that she
could have reasonably concluded that CCHS would not receive
federal support because of the separation of church and state.
(Id.) Noting the lack of cases dealing specifically with
religious facilities, Plaintiff relies on Santos ex rel Beato

v. United States, 559 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2009), for the
proposition that the private appearance of the facility affects
whether there is constructive knowledge. (Pl.’s Sur-Reply, D.E.
No. 93 at 1449-50.)
The court in Santos applied equitable tolling to the
plaintiff’s claims. Santos, 559 F.3d at 203. The healthcare
provider appeared to be a “private clinic” staffed with
“private actors,” which did not “alert[]” the plaintiff “to the
need to explore their federal employment status.” Id. at 200-
01. Critical to the court’s holding, however, was the lack of
notice on the healthcare provider’s website. Id. at 201. The

website alerted the public only that the provider received
federal funding and not that the provider was deemed a federal
facility. Id.
The notice on CCHS’s website was different. It alerted the
public that CCHS was deemed a federal facility. (See Pl.’s Sur-
Reply, D.E. No. 93 at 1452.) The notice was clear that CCHS
“has federal Public Health Service deemed status with respect
to certain health or health-related claims, including medical
malpractice claims, for itself and its covered individuals.”
(Def.’s Reply, D.E. 87 at 1233.) More opaque notices on
healthcare provider websites have alerted plaintiffs that the
provider was deemed. See A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo v. United
States, 656 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[C]ommon sense—let

alone years of experience in medical malpractice litigation—
would alert a reasonable advocate to the possibility that a
community health clinic with the professed mission of
‘improv[ing] the health status of underserved communities’”
would be covered by the FTCA).
Although Lundy notes that the notice was not on the
website’s homepage and was not prominently displayed on other
pages, (Pl.’s Sur-Reply, D.E. No. 93 at 1452), the notice was
accessible to the public continuously prior to, during, and
after the period available for Lundy to file her administrative
claim, (Def.’s Reply, D.E. 87 at 1233); see Santos, 559 F.3d at

203 (relying on the lack of “publicly available sources of
information” to equitably toll the statute of limitations); cf.
Warren, 2019 WL 2250632, at *3 (holding that, where notice was
on the healthcare provider’s homepage, “the fact that such
information is easily obtainable online suggests that
[plaintiff’s] lack of knowledge results from a lack of
diligence, and cuts against her ‘reasonableness in remaining
ignorant of [that] particular legal requirement.’”).
Plaintiff argues that she had no constructive knowledge
that Dr. Mullinax was deemed a federal employee. (Pl.’s Sur-
Reply, D.E. No. 93 at 1453.) Plaintiff points out that she had
never met Dr. Mullinax before he delivered D.B. and that,

because Dr. Mullinax used a swear word during the delivery, it
appeared he was not related to the religious provider CCHS.
(Id.)
Lundy had constructive knowledge of Dr. Mullinax’s
relationship with CCHS. Lundy had seen another doctor from CCHS
for her prenatal care. It would be reasonable to conclude that
the doctor who delivered D.B., Dr. Mullinax, would be from the
same organization as the doctor who provided Lundy’s prenatal
care. (Def.’s Sur-Sur-Reply, D.E. No. 97 at 3);2 see D.J.S.-W.
by Stewart v. United States, 962 F.3d 745, 753 (3d Cir. 2020)
(finding plaintiff’s counsel responsible for understanding

common arrangements between doctors and healthcare provider
facilities).
2. Plaintiff was not reasonably diligent.
Due diligence is critical to preserve an FTCA case through
equitable tolling. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 (“We have
generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings

2 PageID not available for this docket entry.
where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in
preserving his legal rights.”); see also Donahue v. United
States, 634 F.3d 615, 629 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Due diligence is a
prerequisite for equitable tolling.”). Any lack of diligence by
her attorneys is imputed to Lundy. See Mason v. Dep’t of
Justice, 39 F. App’x 205, 207 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[F]or purposes

of determining whether equitable tolling applies, the actions
of plaintiffs’ attorneys are attributable to their clients”);
see also Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir.
2013).
Plaintiff argues that, because she sought and obtained
counsel before the two-year statute of limitations had run, she
was diligent. (Pl.’s Sur-Reply, D.E. No. 93 at 1458.)
Plaintiff’s then counsel closed her file, advising that it was
too early to determine what damages D.B. had suffered. (Id. at
1459.) Although it may have been too early to determine
damages, former counsel also had an obligation to research the

possible defendants in the case. Hawver v. Nestorak, No. 13-
11068, 2017 WL 2213571, at *6 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2017)
(“[D]iligence requires reasonable efforts on the part of a
plaintiff to learn the legal identity and employment status of
potential defendants”); see also Bazzo v. United States, 494 F.
App’x 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[Plaintiff] does not detail
what steps counsel took to determine [the doctor]’s employment
status and, thus, does not explain how her affiliation with
[the] federally funded [healthcare provider] would have eluded
a reasonably diligent party.”).
When Plaintiff’s attorneys did begin to research
defendants in the case, they located an address for Dr.
Mullinax, which was available on the Tennessee Department of

Health website. (Def.’s Reply, D.E. No. 87 at 1239.)
Plaintiff’s counsel used that address to send Dr. Mullinax
notice of the suit on April 28, 2017. (Id.) That address was a
CCHS address. (Id.) Had counsel exercised reasonable diligence
earlier, the address would have alerted them that Dr. Mullinax
was a CCHS employee. See D.J.S.-W. by Stewart, 962 F.3d at 753-
54 (“[H]ad [plaintiff’s] counsel visited or searched the
address to which his office sent the request to [the doctor],
he would have discovered that it was a street address for [the
deemed healthcare provider].”). Even after locating Dr.
Mullinax’s CCHS address and using that address to notify him,

Plaintiff waited six months before filing her administrative
claim. (See D.E. No. 20 at 393.)
Plaintiff also argues that, because counsel worked to
obtain complete copies of medical records, Plaintiff was
diligent. (Pl.’s Response, D.E. No. 80 at 867-68.) Although
seeking medical records was one aspect of the diligence that
supported equitable tolling in Santos, seeking medical records
alone is insufficient where counsel did not also correspond
with CCHS or visit CCHS’s facility. See Santos, 559 F.3d at 200
(“[Plaintiff]’s counsel corresponded with [the healthcare
provider], obtained [plaintiff]’s medical records, visited [the
healthcare provider’s] facility, and retained several expert
witnesses.”); see also White by White v. United States, No.

1:17-cv-882, 2018 WL 9944972, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2018)
(“Taking all measures necessary to bring a state malpractice
claim is insufficient to show diligence in FTCA cases.”).
Plaintiff waited more than a year and a half after the
statute had run before filing her administrative claim. She was
not reasonably diligent.
B. Defendant would be prejudiced by equitably tolling
the statute of limitations.
Defendant argues that it has been prejudiced by the late
filing because Lundy said that she had memory issues, which
were likely exacerbated by the delay in filing. (Def.’s Reply,
D.E. No. 87 at 1242.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant was not
prejudiced by the delayed filing because there are no material
issues Lundy failed to recall. (Pl.’s Sur-Reply, D.E. 93 at
1459-60.)
The possibility of litigating at all can be sufficient
prejudice to preclude equitable tolling. Warren, 2019 WL
2250632, at *3 (“[I]t is apparent that should the Court toll
the limitations period, the United States would be subject to
all the expenses associated with discovery and trial
preparation”); Jackson v. United States, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL
361010, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (“Defendant would be
prejudiced were the Court to apply equitable tolling. Defendant
would be required to litigate a matter that unquestionably was

filed beyond the limitations period and over which Congress did
not intend to waive sovereign immunity.”), aff’d, 751 F.3d 712
(6th Cir. 2014).
Whether Defendant would be prejudiced is not determinative
because no other factors support equitable tolling. See Baldwin
Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (“Although
absence of prejudice is a factor to be considered in
determining whether the doctrine of equitable tolling should
apply once a factor that might justify such tolling is
identified, it is not an independent basis for invoking the
doctrine and sanctioning deviations from established

procedures.”).
C. The action against the remaining defendant is
remanded to state court.
The Court has discretion in deciding whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim against SCHCC.
Plaintiff’s action is properly before this Court because the
Government is a defendant. SCHCC is not deemed a federal
healthcare provider and did not remove based on diversity. See
J.S.R. ex rel. Rojas Polanco v. Washington Hosp. Ctr. Corp.,
667 F. Supp. 2d 83, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The fact that Non-
federal Defendants might have removed the case on the basis of
diversity is irrelevant—that factual scenario simply never
existed.”) (emphasis in original). Because the Court grants the

Government’s Motion, no claim remains over which the Court had
original jurisdiction. “[I]t is apparent that trial courts do
possess some discretion to decide a pendent state law claim
once the federal basis for jurisdiction is dismissed.” Province
v. Cleveland Press Pub. Co., 787 F.2d 1047, 1055 (6th Cir.
1986). That discretion is “minimal,” id., and “[t]his circuit
has moved away from the position that the court has discretion
to retain jurisdiction over a pendent state claim where the
federal claim has been dismissed before trial.” Serv., Hosp.,
Nursing Home and Pub. Emps. Union v Commercial Prop. Servs.,
755 F.2d 499, 506 n.9 (6th Cir. 1985).

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claim against SCHCC. That claim is governed by
Tennessee law, and Tennessee courts are better able to address
it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction”); United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726
(“[P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff's right. . . . Needless decisions of state law should
be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice
between the parties. . . . Certainly, if the federal claims are
dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well.”).

Plaintiff’s claim against SCHCC is REMANDED to the Circuit
Court of Shelby County, Tennessee. See Desir v. Steward Health
Care Sys., LLC, 109 F. Supp. 3d 401, 408 (D. Mass. 2015) (“The
remaining claims all arise under state law and are
appropriately litigated in state court. . . . Therefore, the
remaining [claims] are remanded to the state court.”).
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Lundy’s claim against SCHCC is
REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee.
SO ORDERED this _17th_ day of November, 2020.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10440182. Public record. Not legal advice.