# UNUM Life Insurance Company of America v. Willis

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · February 25, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439984

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 25, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF )
AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:19-cv-02719-STA-jay
)
SHELIA G. WILLIS, TREVOR WILLIS, )
MARCIA ADAMS, MICHAEL HUGHES, )
VIRGINIA KING, and FUNERAL EXPRESS )
FUNDING, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________________________________________________________

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DETERMINATION
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR BIRFUCATION
________________________________________________________________________________

Before the Court is Defendants Trevor Willis, Marcia Adams, Michael Hughes, and Virginia
King’s Motion for Bifurcation (ECF No. 23) filed January 22, 2020, and Motion for the Court to
Determine Conflict of Interest (ECF No. 25) filed January 23, 2020.1 Defendant Shelia G. Willis has
responded in opposition to the Motion for Bifurcation but has not responded to the Motion for
Determination. For the reasons set forth below, both Motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Unum Life Insurance Company of America filed a Complaint in Interpleader (ECF
No. 1) on October 23, 2019. Plaintiff provided a life insurance policy insuring Craig T. Willis as part
of a group life insurance program through Mr. Willis’s employer. (Compl. ¶ 12.) According to the

1 Edgar Willis, who was not a named party in the original pleading, joins the Motions before
the Court. On February 12, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff Unum Life Insurance Company of
America leave to file an amended complaint adding Edgar Willis as a Defendant who claims an
interest in the contested life insurance proceeds. Unum has now filed its Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 34) adding Edgar Willis as a Defendant.
Complaint, Mr. Willis and his wife Defendant Shelia G. Willis divorced in 2012. (Id. ¶ 14.) At the
conclusion of the divorce proceedings, the Chancery Court for Madison County, Tennessee approved
the couple’s marital dissolution agreement as part of its final decree of divorce. (Id. ¶ 15.) The
martial dissolution agreement addressed Mr. Willis’s life insurance with Unum. The agreement stated
that Ms. Willis was “currently named as the beneficiary of [the life insurance] policy and both parties
agree that [Ms. Willis] shall remain as the beneficiary of this policy for as long as [Mr. Willis] has
the policy.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Craig T. Willis died June 20, 2019. (Id. ¶ 18.) Ms. Willis now claims an

entitlement to the full amount of the proceeds of the life insurance based on the language of the marital
dissolution agreement. However, at all times since the inception of the policy, the beneficiary
designation forms filed with Unum assigned Ms. Willis a 50% share of the insurance proceeds and
various shares to other family members of Mr. Willis, including Defendants Trevor Willis, Marcia
Adams, Michael Hughes, Virginia King, and Edgar Willis.
The Court held a scheduling conference in this matter on January 9, 2020. Present at the
conference were counsel for Ms. Willis as well as counsel for the other Defendants who claim an
interest in the life insurance proceeds. Counsel for the other Defendants, Harold Johnson Esq.,
addressed the Court on his concerns about representing all of the other Defendants and the possible
conflict of interest posed by their competing claims to such a joint representation. The Court did not

take up the issue at the scheduling conference but directed counsel to confer with the Tennessee Board
of Professional Responsibility. Defendants now raise the issue of counsel’s possible conflict of
interest in the Motions before the Court.
In their Motion for Bifurcation, Defendants ask the Court to bifurcate the trial in this matter
to determine first whether Ms. Willis is entitled to the full amount of the disputed life insurance
proceeds and only then proceed to consider whether any other Defendant is entitled to a share of the
life insurance. If the Court decides that Ms. Willis is entitled to the full proceeds, then the Court will
not reach the question of whether any other Defendant should receive a share of the proceeds.
Reading between the lines, the Motion implies that bifurcation will allow counsel to represent all of
the claimants to the life insurance and that a possible conflict of interest would only ripen into an
actual conflict once the Court has decided that Ms. Willis should receive only half of the proceeds.
Ms. Willis opposes bifurcation on the grounds that the possibility of two trials would be duplicative
and risk confusion of the issues.
In their Motion for Determination, Defendants seek a ruling from the Court as to whether

counsel has a conflict of interest and, if so, whether the conflict requires him to withdraw from his
representation of Defendants. Counsel explains in the Motion that he has had a longtime friendship
and attorney-client relationship with Defendant Edgar Willis, the brother of the decedent and one of
the individuals named as a beneficiary in one of the beneficiary designation forms filed with Unum.
Counsel agreed to meet with Edgar Willis and the other Defendants Virginia Johnson, Trevor Willis,
Marcia Adams, and Michael Hughes about the dispute over the proceeds to the life insurance. In a
second meeting with the claimants, counsel disclosed to them that he might have a conflict of interest
in representing all of them jointly and received their consent to continue in the representation.
Consistent with instructions from the Court at the scheduling conference, counsel has also contacted
the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility about a possible conflict of interest in continuing

with a joint representation of all Defendants. According to the Motion, the Board advised counsel
that his representation in this matter could raise a potential conflict. Counsel now requests that the
Court make a determination about whether counsel should continue to represent all of the claimants.
Should the Court grant Defendants’ Motion for Bifurcation, counsel believes that the conflict will not
require his withdrawal from the case. If the Court decides that Ms. Willis is entitled to the full
proceeds, no other claimant will have any right to a share of the funds. If the Court decides that Ms.
Willis is entitled to only a half share, then the remaining parties “will be in a position to negotiate a
settlement without further proceedings before the Court.” Defs.’ Mot. to Determine 3.
ANALYSIS
The Court finds that Defendants’ Motions are not well taken. The Court declines to decide
whether counsel has a conflict of interest requiring withdrawal in this matter. Counsel has not cited
any legal authority for the Court to make such a determination. A judicial ruling about professional
conflicts of interest, actual or potential, would seem to be inconsistent with the emphasis the

Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct place on the self-regulating nature of the profession and an
individual lawyer’s “exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment.” See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
8, Preamble [10]. In other words, the decision about whether representation comports with a lawyer’s
ethical duties and professional responsibilities is left to the lawyer, not the Court. Therefore, the
Court will not decide whether counsel has a conflict of interest in representing all of the other
Defendants who claim an interest in the life insurance proceeds. The Motion for Determination is
DENIED.
Likewise, Defendants have not shown good cause for the bifurcation of the proceedings in
this case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 permits a district court to order separate trials of “one
or more separate, issues, claims, crossclaims, counter-claims, or third-party claims” if separate

proceedings will be more convenient, avoid prejudice, or “expedite and economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
42(b). “In determining whether separate trials are appropriate, the court should consider several facts,
including ‘the potential prejudice to the parties, the possible confusion of the jurors, and the resulting
convenience and economy.’” Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 403 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1311 (6th Cir. 1997)). Although bifurcation depends
on the facts and circumstances of a case, Saxio v. Titan–C–Mtg, Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1996),
courts typically bifurcate issues for separate trials when a threshold issue could be dispositive of the
litigation. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 309, 317 (6th Cir. 1988).
The Court does not find that a determination of Ms. Willis’s proper share of the life insurance
warrants bifurcation, at least not at this early juncture of the case. The question of bifurcation is
highly fact dependent. But at this stage of the case, the Court has only the untested facts of the
Complaint in Interpleader, and nothing else.2 Without engaging in some fact discovery and then
analyzing the facts under the correct legal standard, the parties themselves may not yet know whether

bifurcation would be appropriate. The only real grounds for bifurcation offered by Defendants is
counsel’s potential conflict of interest. Other than to assert that the Court may be able to decide Ms.
Willis’s rights to the life insurance proceeds without reaching any other party’s right to the proceeds,
Defendants have not identified which questions of fact and law would need to be decided to arrive at
that determination. So Defendants have not shown the Court what ground the first phase of a
bifurcated proceeding would cover and, more important, why such a procedure would be a more
efficient way to decide the case.
And Defendants have also not demonstrated which questions of fact and law would remain
for the second phase of a bifurcated proceeding. Defendants simply assert that in the event the Court
determines that Ms. Willis is entitled to only half of the proceeds, a second phase of the trial may be

unnecessary. Defendants hypothesize that the remaining Defendants could reach a settlement to
compromise their interests in the life insurance proceeds. While this may be true, it remains
speculative at this point. In sum, without a more developed factual record and thorough analysis of
the legal issues, Defendants have not shown how the Court can compartmentalize the issues, much

2 Defendants suppose in their brief that one of the designation of beneficiary forms filed with
Unum may not have Mr. Willis’s actual signature. The Court notes this contention simply to illustrate
that more discovery is needed to develop a more complete record.
less do so in such a way that would serve the interests of judicial economy or achieve greater
convenience for the parties and witnesses.
CONCLUSION
The Court declines to issue a ruling on counsel’s possible conflict of interest. Defendants’
Motion for Determination is therefore DENIED. At this early stage of the case, the Court is not well
situated to decide whether the factual and legal issues of the case would weigh in favor of bifurcation.
As a result, Defendants’ Motion for Bifurcation must also be DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: February 25, 2020.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439984. Public record. Not legal advice.