# Sanford v. Armour

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · July 30, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439971

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** July 30, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

GERALD A. SANFORD, SR., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 19-1270-JDT-cgc
)
MARGARET ARMOUR, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING PENDING MOTIONS, DISMISSING COMPLAINT
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On June 28, 2019, Plaintiff Gerald Sanford, who is incarcerated at the South Central
Correctional Facility (SCCF) in Clifton, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. United States District Judge
William L. Campbell, Jr., granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing
fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b), then transferred the matter to this district, where venue
is proper; the case was opened here as case number 19-1139-JDT-cgc. (Case No. 19-1139, ECF
No. 9.)
Sanford filed an amended and supplemental complaint on August 21, 2019, asserting new
claims against six new Defendants that were unrelated to the claims in his original complaint. On
November 18, 2019, the Court issued an order that, inter alia, severed the new claims and
Defendants, (ECF No. 5); those new claims were opened in this separate case, number 19-1270-
JDT-cgc. The “amended” complaint filed August 21, 2019, therefore is the current operative
pleading in this case. Sanford’s claims concern events that occurred during his previous
incarceration at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (HCCF) in Whiteville, Tennessee. He
sues Food Stewards Margaret Armour, Helen Colby, Linda Green, and LaToya Jackson; Food
Service Director Joseph Medina; and Librarian John Johnson. Each Defendant is sued in his or
her individual capacity.
On December 20, 2019, and March 4, 2020, Sanford filed identical motions to clarify the

address where all of the Defendants may be served. (ECF Nos. 6 & 7.) Those motions are
GRANTED. Sanford also filed a motion for status, asking whether the August 2019 amended
complaint had been filed and whether the Defendants have been served. (ECF No. 8.) That motion
also is GRANTED. As stated above, the August 2019 complaint was filed; however, no
Defendants have been served because the complaint is being dismissed.
Sanford argues that the Defendants: (1) unconstitutionally denied him access to the courts
by restricting access to the HCCF law library and/or his inmate legal advisor and also denied him
the ability to act as a “jailhouse lawyer” for other inmates; (2) confiscated discs containing legal
information that had been mailed to Plaintiff; (3) issued false disciplinary reports against him; (4)

unconstitutionally retaliated against him for filing grievances and a Title VI complaint; (5) denied
him assistance and schedule accommodations in performing his prison kitchen job and forced him
to work an excessive number of hours; (6) verbally abused him; (7) denied and/or withheld his
prison job pay; (8) failed to correct HCCF personnel regarding their treatment of Sanford; (9)
mishandled Sanford’s prison grievances; (10) violated various policies of the Tennessee
Department of Correction (TDOC) and the Tennessee Code; and (11) wrongfully transferred him
from HCCF to SCCF, with loss of a portion of his HCCF prison job pay. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID
8-23, 32-34.) Sanford seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs. (Id. at
PageID 42-43.) He further asks to “be free from all retaliatory acts, incidents, and treatments.”
(Id. at PageID 43.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaintC
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint’s “well-
pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal
conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a
complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make
a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011)
(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”
and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Sanford filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights
secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting
under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). For the reasons
explained below, Sanford’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
(1) Access to the courts: Sanford alleges Defendants Johnson and Medina interfered with
his access to the HCCF prison law library. Johnson allegedly provided Sanford with library passes
only during the time slot allotted for Sanford’s unit rather than during the times Sanford was
personally available. Specifically, Sanford argues Johnson should have given him library passes
whenever Sanford was not working at his prison job in the HCCF kitchen. He contends Johnson’s
library pass restrictions interfered with Sanford’s “jailhouse lawyer duties” to provide “legal
advice and counseling to fellow Prisoners.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 8; see also id. at PageID 10-11
(claiming denial of library access on June 3, June 5, and July 15, 2019).) Sanford also alleges
Johnson denied him library access even when he had a pass and effectively denied Sanford “access
to the six computers allotted for population Inmates,” (id. at PageID 9).
Sanford further alleges that Defendant Medina “attempted to refuse Plaintiff access to the
law library” on July 12, 2019, following a dispute about Sanford’s prison job shift reassignments,
his supposed work-pay shortfall, and his filed grievances. (Id. at PageID 17-18.) Additionally,
Defendants Medina and Armour allegedly reassigned his kitchen work hours in July 2019,
supposedly because he “refused to food prep” during a shift. Sanford contends the reassignment

denied him access to his inmate legal advisor and injured his ability to comply with unspecified
“statutory and/or Court-imposed deadlines,” thus denying him access to the courts. (Id. at PageID
17.)
Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 821 (1977). This fundamental constitutional right “requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id. at 828; see also
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 395-96 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (a prisoner may have a
constitutional right to inmate legal advisor if necessary to vindicate his right of access to the

courts). However, an inmate does not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal
assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). The touchstone is the meaningful access
to the courts. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has stated: “Bounds
did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis, 518 U.S.
at 351.
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into
litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions
to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the
inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order
to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences
of conviction and incarceration.
Id. at 355 (emphasis in original).
Rather, for a claim of interference with access to courts, an inmate must allege “actual
injury.” Id. at 349. That is, the prisoner must “demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had
been frustrated or was being impeded.” Id. at 353. See also Sampson v. Garrett, 917 F.3d 880,
881 (6th Cir. 2019) ( a plaintiff must “show that the defendants have scuttled his pursuit of a

‘nonfrivolous, arguable’ claim”); Rodgers v. Hawley, 14 F. App’x 403, 409 (6th Cir. 2001) (a
prisoner must show that “prison officials’ conduct . . . hindered his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous
legal claim”). The Supreme Court has held that “the underlying cause of action . . . is an element
that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts
frustrating the litigation.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing Lewis, 518
U.S. at 353 & n.3). “Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action
and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice
to a defendant.” Id. at 416.
Sanford’s contentions do not satisfy this constitutional showing. Mere allegations of

inconvenient library and computer access times (such as Sanford alleges against Johnson), or
contentions that someone “attempted” to refuse him library access (such as Sanford asserts against
Medina), do not demonstrate frustration of a nonfrivolous legal claim. In fact, Sanford does not
identify, in the first instance, any particular legal claim that he was supposedly pursuing at the
subject times. Nor, for that matter, has he shown pursuit of one that was non-frivolous. Sanford
also does not allege that he was unable to research and prepare a non-frivolous legal claim on his
own without the assistance of an inmate legal advisor. Indeed, such a contention would seem to
contradict his allegation that he was a jailhouse lawyer assisting others.
As to Sanford’s contention that Johnson’s library pass restrictions interfered with those
“jailhouse lawyer duties,” his argument does not state a claim warranting relief. “[A]n inmate
does not have an independent right to help other prisoners with their legal claims. Rather, a
‘jailhouse lawyer’s’ right to assist another prisoner is wholly derivative of that prisoner’s right
of access to the courts.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395. See also Evans v. Vinson, 427 F. App’x

437, 445 (6th Cir. 2011) (“there is no constitutional right to assist other prisoners with legal
matters”). Accordingly, “only if [a plaintiff’s] assistance is necessary to vindicate [a fellow
inmate’s] right of access to the courts can [a plaintiff] . . . state a claim of retaliation.” Thaddeus-
X, 175 F.3d at 395. “[O]ne inmate assisting another ‘is protected . . . when the inmate receiving
the assistance would otherwise be unable to pursue legal redress.’” Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928
F.3d 520, 533 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Sanford has not even suggested, much less shown, that his assistance as a jailhouse lawyer was
necessary to vindicate a particular fellow inmate’s specific legal claim.
For all these reasons, Sanford fails to state a colorable claim for denial of access to the

courts or denial of the right to be an inmate legal advisor.
(2) Confiscation of discs mailed to Sanford: Sanford alleges that Defendant Johnson
confiscated and retained two “legal CD dis[c]s” containing legal work that had been mailed to
Sanford from the SCCF. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 10.) He states that he lacked access to the discs
when Johnson was absent from work and was thus “unable to work on a particular matter which
had a deadline.” (Id.) At some unspecified later time, Sanford apparently discovered the discs
had been erased and informed other HCCF officials, including Principal Turner and Assistant
Principal McDuffie. (Id.) Sanford does not actually allege that he accused Johnson of erasing the
discs. He alleges only that when Turner and McDuffie “confronted” Johnson about the matter,
Johnson “declared Plaintiff had erased his own legal dis[c]s.” (Id.) Johnson also denied previously
threatening to erase Sanford’s file from the institutional hard drive, even though other library
workers stated they heard Johnson do so. (Id.)
“A prisoner’s right to receive mail is protected by the First Amendment, but prison
officials may impose restrictions that are reasonably related to security or other legitimate

penological objectives.” Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 873-74 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Knop v.
Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1012 (6th Cir. 1992). As the Sixth Circuit has noted, “prison officials may
open prisoners’ incoming mail pursuant to a uniform and evenly applied policy with an eye to
maintaining prison security.” Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1993). However,
“prison officials who open and read incoming mail in an arbitrary and capricious fashion violate a
prisoner’s First Amendment rights.” Sallier, 343 F.3d at 873-74 (citing Parrish v. Johnson, 800
F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986)).
A prison’s security needs do not automatically trump a prisoner’s First Amendment right
to receive mail, “especially correspondence that impacts upon or has import for the prisoner’s legal

rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the right of access to the courts.” Sallier, 343 F.3d at 873-
74 (citing Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 174 (6th Cir. 1996). “In an attempt to accommodate both
the prison’s needs and the prisoner’s rights, courts have approved prison policies that allow prison
officials to open ‘legal mail’ and inspect it for contraband in the presence of the prisoner.” Sallier,
343 F.3d at 873-74 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974)). “Not all mail that a
prisoner receives from a legal source will implicate constitutionally protected legal mail rights.
Indeed, even mail from a legal source may have little or nothing to do with protecting a prisoner’s
access to the courts and other governmental entities to redress grievances or with protecting an
inmate’s relationship with an attorney.” Sallier, 343 F.3d at 874. When it does, courts “must
balance the interest of prison security against the possibility of tampering that could unjustifiably
chill the prisoner’s right of access to the courts or impair the right to be represented by counsel.”
Id. A prisoner can request that constitutionally protected mail be opened (although not read) in
his presence, where prison officials have security concerns warranting inspection for contraband.
Id.

Sanford does not allege that Johnson in fact read the information on the discs. He does not
even allege Johnson was the person who erased the discs, though he appears to assume that was
the case. Sanford vaguely claims the discs were “legal CD dis[c]s,” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 10),
but he does not allege any details about what the discs contained or that the loss of the information
rendered him unable to timely assert any nonfrivolous claims. He also does not demonstrate that
he was otherwise injured or prejudiced by the alleged loss of his legal discs. For these reasons,
Sanford fails to state a First Amendment claim as to his legal discs.
(3) Disciplinary Reports: Sanford claims that at least two false disciplinary reports were
issued against him. First, he alleges Johnson issued a disciplinary report falsely stating that on

July 15, 2019, Sanford had threatened to harm Johnson physically. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 10-11.)
That report subsequently was dismissed. (Id.) Second, he contends Armour reported that Sanford
“fail[ed] to report as scheduled” for work on October 1, 2018, even though he told her it was his
day off. (Id. at PageID 13.) That charge also was dismissed. (Id. at PageID 14.) Sanford also
alleges that on December 29, 2018, Defendant Jackson “falsely alleged [that] Plaintiff threatened
her.” (Id.) He does not allege whether a formal disciplinary charge was issued or, if so, the
disposition of the charge.
A prisoner does not have a due process right to be free of false disciplinary charges.
See Upshaw v. Jones, No. 14-2534-JDT-TMP, 2015 WL 348626, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2015)
(citing Person v. Campbell, 182 F.3d 918, 1999 WL 454819, at *1 (6th Cir. June 21, 1999)
(unpublished)). While a prisoner has a due-process right to call witnesses on his behalf at a
hearing, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647 (1997), prisoners have no right to not to be charged
with or convicted of prison disciplinary offenses. See also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. For these
reasons, Sanford does not state a claim for relief as to “false” disciplinary reports by Johnson,

Armour, and Jackson.
(4) Retaliation: Sanford claims unconstitutional retaliation by several of the Defendants.
First, he argues that Green and Armour, who supposedly share a familial in-law relationship,
together worked “reprisal/retaliation” upon him in relation to the October 1, 2018, kitchen shift
incident. He claims they falsely alleged his failure to report for work. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 13-
14.) Sanford also alleges that Defendants Armour, Colby, Green and Jackson exhibited “abusive,
retaliatory, and unprofessional treatment.” (Id. at PageID 20.) He contends that he “received
retaliatory and unprofessional treatment from Colby and Jackson” when he returned to work on
May 29, 2019. (Id.) Third, Sanford alleges Medina made him work “a tremendous amount of

hours” in retaliation for Plaintiff’s kitchen-work grievances. (Id.)
The Court reviews prisoner retaliation claims under the First Amendment. See Harbin-
Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Retaliation on the basis of a prisoner’s exercise
of his First Amendment rights violates the Constitution.”). A claim of retaliation has three
elements:
(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken
against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements
one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the
plaintiff’s protected conduct.
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394. “Protected conduct, for the purposes of a First Amendment
retaliation claim, encompasses a prisoner’s efforts to access the courts in . . . civil rights claims.”
Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 607 (6th Cir. 2002); see Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 391. “[T]he
plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or
motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct.” Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d

1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1977)). Filing a grievance is protected conduct. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th
Cir. 2010).
Sanford offers generalized suggestions of the Defendants’ grievance-related ill-will. But
he does not identify any causal connection between (1) his filing of the grievances and (2) adverse
action that Green, Armour, Colby, Jackson, and/or Medina took against him as a result. At most,
Sanford suggests interpersonal discord. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at PageID 12 (“Green told Plaintiff
to stop [walking away] because she was not finished talking yet. Plaintiff asked, ‘Why are you
yelling at me? . . . I’m almost 50, I miss the message and shut down when people yell at me.’”).)

For these reasons, Sanford fails to state a retaliation claim.
(5) Claims concerning prison job conditions and scheduling: Sanford makes numerous
allegations against various Defendants related to various conditions of his kitchen job and the
scheduling of his shifts. The claims can be addressed together, as none of them state a colorable
claim for relief. Sanford first contends that on December 29, 2018, Jackson “attempted to force
Plaintiff to do something unsafe which was placing three milk creates [sic] of eggs in a 100g
cooking pot.” (Id. at PageID 14.) Jackson also allegedly retaliated against him for tardy breakfast
production on January 4, 2019, by later replacing Sanford with another inmate worker. (Id. at
PageID 15.) Medina then allegedly told Sanford on January 15, 2019, that the kitchen staffing list
“could not be adjusted” to give Plaintiff a shift, even though multiple other inmates were called to
work during that time. (Id. at PageID 15.) However, Sanford also states that from February 26,
2019, to May 25, 2019, Medina compelled him to “work a tremendous amount of days and hours.”
(Id. at PageID 16.)
Sanford further contends that Colby and Jackson “unlawfully denied [him] work in the

institutional kitchen” on May 25, 2019, and June 9, 2019, because of Sanford’s “near altercation
with an Inmate” the day before, even though the other inmate was allowed back to work the same
day of the altercation. (Id. at PageID 16.) On June 18, 2019, Armour allegedly would not allow
anyone to assist Sanford on the job, “forc[ing] him to cook and bake at the same time. . . . [which]
is normally a two person job.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 17.) He further contends Medina and Armour
reassigned his work shifts in July 2019, purportedly because he “refused to food prep” during a
shift. Sanford argues that he could not access his inmate legal advisor or comply with legal
deadlines because of these shift reassignments. (Id. at PageID 17.) Finally, Sanford claims that
Green “resist[ed]” Sanford’s “promot[ion] to Cook” and his work as a jailhouse lawyer. (Id. at

PageID 11.)
Prisoners such as Sanford have no Fourteenth Amendment property or liberty interest in a
prison job; and the loss of a prison job or the ability to participate in rehabilitative or educational
programs does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981)
(“. . . deprivations of this kind simply are not punishments. We would have to wrench the Eighth
Amendment from its language and history to hold that delay of these desirable aids to rehabilitation
[such as job and educational opportunities] violates the Constitution.”); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F.
App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Prisoners have no constitutional right to rehabilitation, education,
or jobs.”); Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1989) (no property or liberty interest in
prison employment); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir. 1987) (“It is well established that
no prisoner has a constitutional right to a particular job or to any job.”). For these reasons,
Sanford’s allegations regarding the conditions and scheduling of his job fail to state colorable
claims. He had no constitutional right to on-the-job kitchen assistance, a certain number of job
hours, accommodation of his preferred shift times, or prison job promotion.

One further point warrants mention with respect to Sanford’s claims regarding his job
conditions. The Sixth Circuit has not directly addressed whether hazardous prison working
conditions may state a plausible claim under the Eighth Amendment. However, “other circuits
have held that the Eighth Amendment is implicated when prisoners are forced to perform physical
labor which is ‘beyond their strength, endangers their lives, or causes undue pain.’” Rayburn v.
Blue, 154 F. Supp. 3d 523, 532 (W.D. Ky. 2015) (quoting Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219 (5th
Cir. 1983)); see Middlebrook v. Tennessee, No. 07-2373, 2008 WL 2002521, at *11 (W.D. Tenn.
May 6, 2008) (citing Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006)); Bibbs v.
Armontrout, 943 F.2d 26, 27 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that “the intentional placing of prisoners in

dangerous surroundings or the manifestation of deliberate indifference to their safety violates the
Eighth Amendment”). Sanford makes no such contentions here. While he alleges that Jackson’s
instructions regarding cooking eggs was dangerous, he does not explain that allegation and does
not claim that his safety or health was endangered or that the work caused him pain. Sanford’s
personal beliefs on food preparation safety do not amount to a claim of constitutional magnitude.
Additionally, his simultaneous arguments about numerous and lengthy shifts on the one hand, and
denial of shifts on another, are not only meritless but also logically inconsistent. For all of these
reasons, he fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
(6) Verbal abuse: Allegations of discord among Sanford and the Defendants are found
throughout the complaint. For example, Sanford contends Colby “began verbally abusing
[another] Inmate and Plaintiff” and “became . . . angr[y] and us[ed] profanity” when Plaintiff stated
that he was “not coming in [to work]” on June 13, 2019. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 17.) He also
contends Green “unjustifiably verbally abus[ed]” him. (Id. at PageID 12-13 (alleging “abusive,

combative and unprofessional conduct”).) Sanford states that Jackson was “verbally abusive . . .
and unprofessional” because of the lack of productivity by the breakfast shift. (Id. at PageID 14
(alleging the reprimands were unfounded because “one of the cooking vessels was not working”).)
However, harassment and verbal abuse, no matter how “shameful and utterly
unprofessional,” do not violate the Eighth Amendment. Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d
539, 545–46 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim where plaintiff’s
allegations included continuous insulting remarks by guard); see also Morrison v. Greenwald, No.
3:09-CV-009, 2010 WL 1253962, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2010) report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3-:09-CV-009, 2010 WL 1253958 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2010) (“The Constitution

does not protect inmates (or anyone else) from gross insults by public officials, including prison
guards. Furthermore, Plaintiff suffered no injury from the insult.”). Even a guard’s verbal threat
of assault does not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights. Miller v. Wertanen, 109 F. App’x 64,
65 (6th Cir. 2004). Just as the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Wilson, 501
U.S. at 298, it does not mandate polite prison guards or officials. “Derogatory or abusive language
and conduct do not give rise to a claim under § 1983.” Meadows v. Gibson, 855 F. Supp. 223, 225
(W.D. Tenn. 1994) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). Accordingly, Sanford’s
allegations of verbal insults do not state a claim under § 1983.
(7) Denial and/or withholding of prison job pay: Sanford claims that Green and Medina
wrongfully deprived him of pay for his prison job. First, he states that Green, who was “in charge
of Inmate pay for the HCCF kitchen,” shorted his monthly “state-draw,” his pay, over several
months by at least 108 hours. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 11, 18-19.) Second, Sanford states Medina
had agreed in writing to “accommodate and pay [him] when he needed access to the law library as

long as he had a pass.” (Id. at PageID 18.) However, Medina subsequently “den[ied] Plaintiff pay
for leaving work for the law library.” (Id. (also alleging that Colby, Green, Jackson, and Armour
“annull[ed]” the agreement Medina had signed).)
“As the Constitution and federal law do not create a property right for inmates in a job,
they likewise do not create a property right to wages for work performed by inmates.” Miller v.
Campbell, 108 F. Supp. 2d 960, 967 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted). “Rather prison
administrators may assign inmates jobs and wages at their discretion. Plaintiff thus has no property
or liberty interest in either a paying job in prison or in receiving payment at any particular rate or
schedule.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied wages for a

prison job does not amount to an allegation of the deprivation of a liberty interest. . . . As plaintiff
has no property right in wages from a prison job, he has no claim for lost wages.” Chapman v.
Shelby Cnty., No. 05-2767, 2006 WL 1646089, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 14, 2006) (internal citations
omitted). See also Countryman v. Nevada, No. 10-00107-LRH (RAM), 2011 WL 3472539, at *4
(D. Nev. June 27, 2011) (“The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude
includes an exception for those duly convicted of a crime.” (citing Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d
1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985))). Given these governing principles, Sanford fails to state a claim for
relief with respect to alleged denial or withholding of his prison kitchen job pay.
(8) Failure to correct HCCF staff: Plaintiff contends that Medina never “corrected the . .
. abusive and unprofessional conduct of Defendants Armour, Colby, Green, and Jackson.” (ECF
No. 1 at PageID 18.) He bases this on the Defendants’ supposed “annul[ment]” of Medina’s
agreement to pay Sanford for kitchen work whenever he had a library pass; their reassignment of
Sanford’s work shifts; and their denial of kitchen assistance to Sanford. (Id.)

Under § 1983, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see
also Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Thus, “a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983
plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized,
approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending
subordinates.

Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421 (citation omitted). A supervisory official who is aware of the
unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates but fails to act generally cannot be held liable in his
individual capacity. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Gregory v. City of
Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999);
Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, a failure
to take corrective action in response to an inmate grievance or complaint does not supply the
necessary personal involvement for § 1983 liability. See Simpson v. Overton, 79 F. App’x 117,
120 (6th Cir. 2003); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Ruling against a
prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the [constitutional]
violation.”).
Sanford alleges that Medina “allow[ed] his staff to harass Plaintiff for leaving work” to go
to the law library even though Sanford continued to request that he be “return[ed] to his morning
shift for everyone’s convenience.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 18.) But this contention does not
demonstrate the requisite personal involvement by Medina in a deprivation of any constitutional
right. Rather, Sanford alleges, at most, Medina’s failure to act. This does not set forth a

supervisory liability claim under § 1983. See Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421; Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575-
76; Gregory, 444 F.3d at 751; Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300; Lillard, 76 F.3d at 727-28; Simpson, 79 F.
App’x at 120. It is well-settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior is only a basis for liability
under § 1983 if there are allegations and proof of personal complicity. Monell v. New York City
Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). That is not the case here. For these reasons,
Sanford fails to state a claim for relief as to supervisory liability.
(9) Grievance process: Sanford alleges several deficiencies in HCCF’s grievance process.
First, he states that his “good faith grievance” against Green’s “abusive and unprofessional
behavior” was dismissed. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 14.) Second, in response to the grievance he

filed about Jackson for “abusive and unprofessional treatment,” Medina simply “stated he was
tired of hearing about the abusive and unprofessional conduct of his staff.” (Id.) Third, Medina,
who handles food service-related grievances, wrongfully dismissed the four grievances that
Sanford filed concerning retaliatory kitchen discipline and shift reassignments. (Id. at PageID 18.)
Fourth, he complains that he is prohibited from filing a grievance with SCCF about the 108-hour
shortfall in his HCCF work-pay because he already has a shortfall grievance pending with HCCF.
(Id. at PageID 19.)
Prisoners do not possess a constitutional right to a prison grievance procedure. See Young
v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2002); LaFlame v. Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep't,
3 F. App’x 346, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff’s allegation that jail staff ignored
the grievances he filed did not state a § 1983 claim“ because there is no inherent constitutional
right to an effective prison grievance procedure.”). Even if a grievance system was constitutionally
guaranteed, Sanford has not shown how any particular Defendant’s conduct with respect to the
internal grievance process directly affected his “ability to bring his claim before any court.” See

Coleman v. Governor of Michigan, No. 09-1139, 413 F. App’x 866, 874-875 (6th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
(10) Violations of TDOC policy and Tennessee Code: Sanford alleges that the Defendants
violated several TDOC policies and sections of the Tennessee Code. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 38.)
Specifically, he alleges violations of TDOC Policies 305.03(V), regarding interaction between
inmates and TDOC employees;1 305.03(VI)(A), which governs workplace conduct by TDOC
employees,2 and 305.03(VI)(C), addressing conversational conduct between inmates and TDOC
employees.3 Sanford contends the Defendants also violated Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-3-603

1 “Interaction between employees and offenders shall be of a professional nature only.
All offenders shall be treated equally in a non-discriminatory manner.” TDOC Administrative
Policy & Procedure 305.03(V).
2 “Employees shall conduct themselves in a professional manner when interacting with
offenders. When staff of the opposite gender enters an inmate housing unit, he/she shall
announce his/her presence. Each Warden/Superintendent shall ensure that this language is
provided in the applicable post order governing inmate housing, living quarters, etc.” TDOC
Policy & Procedure 305.03(VI)(A).
3 “Conversation with offenders shall be respectful and limited to what is necessary as part
of the employee’s duties. Inmate questions which cannot be answered shall be referred to the
immediate supervisor. Offenders shall be addressed by name, rather than TDOC numbers.”
TDOC Administrative Policy & Procedure 305.03(VI)(C).
(governing TDOC Commissioner’s duties),4 § 4-3-606 (governing TDOC powers and duties),5 and
§ 39-16-402 (proscribing official misconduct by public servants).6 Finally, he contends the
Defendants violated TDOC Policy 502.06(V), concerning the provision of a safe and humane
environment for inmates.7
An inmate’s allegation that prison officials failed to follow TDOC administrative policies

does not, in and of itself, rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d
577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007). After Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), it is even clearer
that mandatory language in prison regulations does not create a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause. See Rienholtz v. Campbell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 721, 729-30 (W.D. Tenn.), aff’d,
198 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-71 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations. Lewellen v.

4 “The commissioner is the executive officer of the department of correction and has the
immediate charge of the management and government of the institutions of the department, and
the commissioner shall devote the commissioner’s entire time and attention to the duties of the
commissioner's position.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-603(a).
5 “The department of correction shall exercise all the rights, powers and duties described
in chapter 6 of this title and otherwise vested by law in the department, the commissioner, and
the commissioner’s officers, assistants and employees.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-606.
6 “(a) A public servant commits an offense who, with intent to obtain a benefit or to harm
another, intentionally or knowingly: (1) Commits an act relating to the public servant’s office or
employment that constitutes an unauthorized exercise of official power; (2) Commits an act
under color of office or employment that exceeds the public servant’s official power . . . [or] (4)
Violates a law relating to the public servant’s office or employment. (b) [A] public servant
commits an act under color of office or employment who acts or purports to act in an official
capacity or takes advantage of the actual or purported capacity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-402.
7 “It is the policy of the TDOC to provide a safe, humane, and appropriately secure
environment, free from threat of sexual abuse and sexual harassment for all inmates, by
maintaining a program of prevention, detection, response, investigation, and tracking of all
alleged and substantiated sexual assaults and sexual harassment.” TDOC Policy & Procedure
305.03(VI)(C).
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 34 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Unless a
deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right has occurred, § 1983 provides no
redress even if the plaintiff’s common law rights have been violated and even if the remedies
available under state law are inadequate.”). See also Storm v. Swiger, No. 4:07 CV 2387, 2007
WL 3171491, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2007) (the violation of a prison regulation is not actionable

under § 1983) (citing Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1993), overruled in part on
other grounds by Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995)).
Accordingly, Sanford does not have a constitutional right to demand the Defendants’
comply with any particular TDOC policy. See Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). And a plain reading of the
complaint shows that Sanford’s demand for relief under Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 4-3-603,
4-3-606, and 39-16-402 also warrants dismissal. Sanford does not allege any facts suggesting that
either the TDOC Commissioner or the TDOC as an entity refuted the obligations under §§ 4-3-
603 and 4-3-606. Moreover, a private citizen cannot bring criminal charges against another person

via a civil lawsuit. While a citizen may make a complaint regarding suspected criminal conduct
to the proper authorities, the choice to bring criminal charges pursuant to Tennessee law is left to
the discretion of the appropriate District Attorney General. Sanford thus fails to state a claim for
relief based on violations of TDOC policies and the Tennessee Code.
(11) Transfer to a different prison: Sanford suggests that he was wrongfully transferred
from the HCCF to the SCCF on July 23, 2019, which allegedly interfered with the resolution of
his grievance about the shortage in his pay at the HCCF. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 18-19.)
An inmate does not have a protected right to be assigned to a particular prison. Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes,
427 U.S. 236 (1976); Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484-87. Claims challenging placement procedures have
no constitutional merit. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Williams v. Bezy, 97 F.
App’x 573, 574 (6th Cir. 2004). This Court does not have the authority to supervise or alter
housing assignment of inmates, such as Sanford seeks. He thus does not state a claim for relief
with regard to his transfer to the SCCF.

(12) Injunctive relief: To the extent that Sanford’s request to “be free from all retaliatory
acts, incidents, and treatments,” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 39), can be construed as a claim for
injunctive relief, it is without basis. Because he is no longer at the HCCF, his request for injunctive
relief against the Defendants is moot. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010)
(claim for declaratory or injunctive relief is rendered moot by the plaintiff’s transfer to a different
prison facility); Moore v. Curtis, 68 F. App’x 561, 562 (6th Cir. 2003) (claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against prison and prison staff moot when inmate transferred to another facility);
Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
Opportunity to amend the complaint: The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may

allow a prisoner to amend his complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA.
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4,
5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered,
some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be
afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Curley v. Perry,
246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal
of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and
does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court concludes that Sanford
should be given the opportunity to amend his complaint.
Conclusion: The Court DISMISSES Sanford’s complaint for failure to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave
to amend, however, is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within twenty-one days after
the date of this order, on or before August 20, 2020.
Sanford is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original complaint and

must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the complaint must
allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any
exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached
to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in
the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify
each defendant sued in that count. If Sanford fails to file an amended complaint within the time
specified, the Court will dismiss the case with prejudice in its entirety, assess a strike pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439971. Public record. Not legal advice.