# Mattox v. Memphis Police Department

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · August 26, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439561

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 26, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439561

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that a complaint that is “based entirely upon past acts and not continuing conduct that, if stopped, would provide a remedy to [the plaintiff]” does not trigger the Ex parte Young exception
- noting that such policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
_________________________________________________________________

MICHAEL MATTOX, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) No. 19-2139-MSN-dkv
)
MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT )
AND/OR CITY OF MEMPHIS; )
HOLIDAY INN; )
MEMPHIS MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTION; )
ALLIANCE HEALTH SERVICES, )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
________________________________________________________________
On February 28, 2019, the plaintiff, Michael Mattox, filed a
pro se complaint against the Memphis Police Department (“MPD”), the
City Of Memphis, Holiday Inn, Memphis Mental Health Institution
(“MMHI”), and Alliance Health Services (“Alliance”) titled “Civil
Lawsuit.” (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On March 25, 2019, Mattox filed a
document titled “Objections, Complaint Name Change and New
Injunction.” (ECF No. 7.) This case has been referred to the
United States Magistrate Judge for management and for all pretrial
matters for determination and/or report and recommendation as
appropriate. (Admin. Order. 2013-05, Apr. 29, 2013.)
Accompanying the complaint was a motion seeking leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The information set forth
in the affidavit in support of the motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis satisfies Mattox’s burden of demonstrating that he
is unable to pay the civil filing fee. Accordingly, the motion to

proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that this case
be dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim. In addition,
to the extent that Mattox’s filing titled “Objections, Complaint
Name Change and New Injunction,” (ECF No. 7), is a motion, it is
denied.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Mattox’s three-page, type-written pro se complaint contains
very little factual information. He asserts that on February 21,
2019, he was “sitting in front of the outside window looking into
the Holiday Inn” when “several men approach[ed]” him. (Compl. p.1,
¶ 1; ECF No. 1.) After the men told Mattox he was not allowed to

be there, Mattox “chose to ignore them.” (Id.) Mattox alleges
that Holiday Inn called MPD to the scene and that an MPD officer
“handcuffed [Mattox] . . . and a group of officers wrestled [Mattox]
to the ground.” (Id.) Further, Mattox alleges that the MPD “joined
in the harassment of the civil people going a step further and
kidnapping and holding [Mattox] hostage” and “exchanging . . .
[Mattox] over to Alliance Health Service,” who “turned [Mattox]
over to MMHI . . . for long term kidnapping.” (Id.) Mattox also
asserts that MMHI held him hostage and wouldn’t release him until
“their ransom demands were met.” (Id.)
Finally, Mattox claims in conclusory fashion that he
“encountered” the following constitutional violations:
1. 1st constitutional amendment - freedom of speech; freedom
not to speak; right of the people to peacefully
assemble[];
2. 4th constitutional amendment – Search and seizure, the
right for protection in your property and paper etc.;
3. 5th constitutional amendment – due process;
4. 6th constitutional amendment – right to assistance
of counsel;
5. 13th constitutional amendment – slavery;
6. 14th constitutional amendment – due process;
7. 8th constitutional amendment – cruel & unusual
punishment;
8. Life, Liberty, & the pursuit of happiness[.]

(Id. at p. 2, ¶¶ 1-8.) Mattox attributes these constitutional
violations to the MPD, Holiday Inn, and Alliance because they
“turned [him] over to [MMHI]” and are therefore “all [] responsible
for [MMHI’s] actions,” including MMHI’s decision to “forc[e] shots
on [Mattox] without [his] permission and against [his] will.” (Id.
at p. 2.)
Mattox seeks compensatory damages in the amount of fifty-two
zillion dollars, breaking down his damages as follows: five zillion
dollars from each of the four defendants for kidnapping, being “held
hostage,” mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, and
physical pain and suffering, totaling twenty zillion dollars; seven
zillion dollars from each of the four defendants “for each of the
7 constitutional amendments violated,” totaling twenty-eight
zillion dollars; and punitive damages in the amount of one zillion
dollars per defendant, totaling four zillion dollars. (Id.)
Further, Mattox seeks injunctive relief in the form of a court order
requiring Holiday Inn, the MPD, Alliance, and MMHI provide him with

“all camera footage with audio from circa 9:20 am on 2-21-2019.”
(Id.)
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) Screening
Pursuant to Local Rule 4.1(b)(2), service will not issue in a
pro se case where the pro se plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis until the complaint has been screened
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The clerk is authorized to issue
summonses to pro se litigants only after that review is complete
and an order of the court issues. This report and recommendation
will constitute the court’s screening of Mattox’s complaint.
The court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints

and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
B. Standard of Review for Failure to State a Claim
In assessing whether Mattox’s complaint states a claim on which
relief may be granted, the standards under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied. See Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). To survive Rule 12(b)(6)
following Iqbal and Twombly, a complaint must “‘contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods.,
577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
The court “construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff” and “accepts all factual allegations as true” to
determine whether they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.
HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2012).
However, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be
liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th
Cir. 2011)(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir.
2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Further, the courts are
not required to act as counsel for a pro se litigant; nor are they
required to sort through the pleadings to create a claim on behalf

of the plaintiff. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)
(“[D]istrict judges have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x
608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)(“[A] court cannot create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.”(internal quotation
marks omitted)). Requiring the court “to ferret out the strongest
cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants . . . would transform
the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a
particular party.” Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510
(6th Cir. 2011). “While courts are properly charged with protecting
the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not
encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should

pursue.” Id.
C. Mattox’s Constitutional Claims
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead
that he or she suffered (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution or federal statutes that is (2) committed by a person
acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 150 (1970). The court construes Mattox’s “Civil Lawsuit”
as a complaint against the MPD, the City of Memphis, Holiday Inn,
MMHI, and Alliance pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
1. Mattox’s Claims Against the City of Memphis and the MPD
In his complaint, Mattox alleges claims against the City of

Memphis and the MPD for damages and injunctive relief. In Monell,
the Supreme Court held that (1) municipal liability must be
predicated upon the existence of some policy, procedure, or custom
resulting in constitutional harm to the plaintiff, and (2) a
“municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); see
also, Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)(“Proof
of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient
to impose liability under Monell.”). A governmental entity is
liable under § 1983 if an “officially executed policy, or the

toleration of a custom within [it] leads to, causes, or results in
the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.” Doe v.
Claiborne Cty., Tenn. By & Through Claiborne Cty. Bd. of Educ., 103
F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996)(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). The policy or custom
“must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order
to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.”
Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)(quoting
Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). Accordingly, for
Mattox “to demonstrate municipal liability, he must (1) identify
the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the

municipality, and (3) show that his injury was caused by the
execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815
(6th Cir. 2003); see also, Searcy v. Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th
Cir. 1994)(noting that such policy or custom “must be ‘the moving
force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the
liability of a government body under § 1983”)(quoting Polk Co. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981))).
In the instant case, Mattox has failed to allege that the City
of Memphis acted pursuant to a policy, procedure, or custom in
causing his alleged constitutional harm. In his complaint, Mattox
asserts a single incident: that he was “kidnap[ed] and held hostage”
when he was taken to MMHI. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) This assertion,

however, fails to identify any municipal policy or custom of the
City of Memphis that deprived him of his constitutional rights, and
Mattox therefore fails to state a claim for which relief may be
granted against the City of Memphis.
It is well-established in the Sixth Circuit that a police
department is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. See
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)(“[T]he Police
Department is not an entity which may be sued.”). Police
departments can properly be characterized as “sub-units of the
municipalities they serve.” Sargent v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t,
150 Fed. App’x 470, 475 (6th Cir. 2005). “[F]ederal district courts
in Tennessee have frequently and uniformly held that police

departments and sheriff’s departments are not proper parties to a
§ 1983 suit.” Mathes v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty.,
2010 WL 3341889, at *2 (M.D. Tenn., Aug. 25, 2010).
The MPD is a sub-unit of the City of Memphis, and, therefore,
the MPD is not a separate legal entity which may be sued under §
1983. Sargent, 150 Fed. App’x at 475 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, the
MPD is immune from Mattox’s lawsuit.
2. Mattox’s Claims Against Holiday Inn
Additionally, Mattox named Holiday Inn as a party to his “Civil
Lawsuit,” alleging that “Holiday Inn is responsible because they
call[ed] MPD.” (Compl. ¶ 1, p.1; ECF No. 1.) “[A] plaintiff
generally cannot sue a private company or individual for violations
of his constitutional rights.” Shannon v. URS Energy & Const.,

Inc., No. 3:14-CV-01292, 2015 WL 1640133, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 9,
2015)(citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50,
119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999)). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
however, an individual may “bring a federal lawsuit against any
person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual
of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or
federal laws.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff may not sue a purely private
party under § 1983. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 567
(6th Cir. 1999).
Mattox’s complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Holiday Inn for which relief can be granted. In the

instant case, Mattox named Holiday Inn as a defendant in his “Civil
Lawsuit,” (Compl., ECF No. 1), which the court has construed as a
complaint pursuant to § 1983. Mattox does not allege that Holiday
Inn acted under color of state law when its employees called the
MPD. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 567 (6th Cir.
1999). Thus, because Holiday Inn is a private party, Mattox cannot
bring a § 1983 claim against this defendant. It is therefore
recommended that the court dismiss Mattox’s claims against Holiday
Inn.
3. Mattox’s Claims Against MMHI and Alliance
Mattox has also named MMHI and Alliance as defendants in his
complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Because MMHI is an agency of the
State of Tennessee,1 “[a] suit against MMHI is actually a suit

against the State of Tennessee.” Ward v. Shelby Cty., No. 05-cv-

1 MMHI is one of Tennessee’s Regional Mental Health Institutes,
which are managed and funded by the Tennessee Department of Mental
Health and Substance Abuse Services. See Tennessee Department of
Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, Department Offices,
https://www.tn.gov/behavioral-health/who-we-are/who-we-
are/department-offices.html (last visited August 19, 2019).
2205, 2006 WL 8435001, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 7, 2006)(citing
Pennhurst State Schl. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100
(1984)). Because there is a sufficiently close nexus between MMHI’s
and the Alliance’s conduct in this case,2 Alliance’s actions
constitute state action under section 1983. The Eleventh Amendment

bars suits against state agencies and suits in which the state
itself is named as a defendant because “a state is not a person
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at *3 (citing Will v.
Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)); see also Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).

2 “A private party’s actions constitute state action under
section 1983 where those actions may be fairly attributable to the
state.” Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir.
2003)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the
symbiotic or nexus test, a private party’s actions constitute state
action under § 1983 if “there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the government and the private party’s conduct so that the conduct
may be fairly attributed to the state itself.” Id. at 834
(citations omitted). “[T]he Sixth Circuit has made clear that the
ties between the private party and the State must be substantial.”
Jackim v. City of Brooklyn, No. 1:05 CV 1678, 2007 WL 893868, at
*24 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Jackim v. Sam’s E.,
Inc., 378 F. App’x 556 (6th Cir. 2010)(citing Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960
F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992)). Alliance is a not-for-profit
organization that provides comprehensive behavioral healthcare to
residents in Shelby County and receives funding from the Tennessee
Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services. See
Alliance Healthcare Services, http://www.alliance-hs.org/our-
mission (last visited August 19, 2019).
In his complaint, Mattox asserts that that Alliance processed
his case and “turned [him] over to MMHI” and that MMHI subsequently
held him hostage and wouldn’t release him until “their ransom
demands were met.” (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) Mattox requests
injunctive relief in the form of a court order requiring Alliance

and MMHI provide him with “all camera footage with audio from circa
9:20 am on 2-21-2019.” (Id. at p. 2). A plaintiff may overcome a
state’s sovereign immunity and seek prospective injunctive relief
if the state has consented to suit, if Congress has properly
abrogated the state’s immunity, or if the exception outlined in Ex
parte Young3 applies. See Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d
806, 817 (6th Cir. 2000).
Tennessee has not waived its sovereign immunity, Tenn. Stat.
Ann. § 20-13-102(a), and Congress has not passed any legislation
that “unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate [Tennessee’s]
immunity” in this type of action, Kovacevich, 224 F.3d at 817
(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Seminole Tribe of

Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)). Further, the Ex parte

3 Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a federal court can issue
prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his or
her official capacity to prevent future federal constitutional or
federal statutory violations. 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Frew
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004)(stating that the Eleventh
Amendment permits suits against state officials for prospective
injunctive relief in order to “ensure the enforcement of federal
law”).
Young exception does not apply in this case because Mattox named
Alliance and MMHI as the defendants in his complaint, and therefore
failed to properly assert a claim against a state official in his
or her official capacity. 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Idaho v.
Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997)(“The Tribe’s

suit, accordingly, is barred by Idaho’s Eleventh Amendment immunity
unless it falls within the exception this Court has recognized for
certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
state officers in their individual capacities.”).
Even if Mattox had properly asserted a claim against a state
official, his complaint does not trigger the application of the Ex
parte Young doctrine. “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex
parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need
only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks
relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Verizon Maryland,
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645

(2002)(quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 296); see
also Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 776 (6th Cir. 2003)(noting
that a complaint that is “based entirely upon past acts and not
continuing conduct that, if stopped, would provide a remedy to [the
plaintiff]” does not trigger the Ex parte Young exception).
Mattox’s request is essentially a discovery request, as he is asking
for camera footage from the date of the alleged constitutional
violation. This relief would not provide him with a prospective
remedy that would prevent the continuation of conduct that he
alleges violates his rights under the Constitution or federal law.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Mattox’s claim for injunctive
relief against Alliance and MMHI be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.
Mattox has also requested relief in the form of compensatory
and punitive damages. (Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No 1.) “[A] federal
court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief . . . and may
not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds
from the state treasury.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677
(1974)(internal citations omitted). “Absent a clear abrogation of
immunity by congressional action or an express state waiver of that
immunity, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits for damages
against a state in federal court.” Hixon v. Tennessee, No. 14-cv-

1087, 2015 WL 1486362, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2015); see also
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Pennhurst, 465
U.S. at 98-100; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979). Under
Tenn. Stat. Ann. § 20-13-102(a), Tennessee has not waived its
sovereign immunity and Mattox has not asserted that either Alliance
or MMHI violated a federal statute that abrogates Tennessee’s
immunity in this action. Therefore, it is recommended that the
court dismiss Mattox’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for seeking monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
D. Mattox’s “Objections, Complaint Name Change and New
Injunction”
On March 25, 2019, Mattox filed a document titled “Objections,
Complaint Name Change and New Injunction.” (Pl.’s Filing, ECF No.
7.) Mattox requests that the court add the United States as a party
to this suit and add an additional claim for injunctive relief “to
make [Mattox] . . . president of the united states [sic].” (Pl.’s
Filing ¶¶ 2-3, ECF No. 7.) The court construes this request as a
motion for leave to amend the complaint.4

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that leave to amend a pleading “shall be freely given when justice
so requires,” however, a court has some discretion in allowing
amendments. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also
Troxel Manuf. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 489 F.2d 968, 970-71 (6th
Cir. 1942). “A motion for leave to amend may be denied for futility

4 Additionally, Mattox requests that his filing “serve as . .
. [his] objections to the magistrate judges [sic] report and
recommendation for sua sponte dismissal.” (Pl.’s Filing ¶ 1, ECF
No. 7.) To date, however, the court has not filed a report and
recommendation in this case. Mattox cannot preemptively file
objections to a report and recommendation he merely anticipates the
court will file.
‘if the court concludes that the pleading as amended could not
withstand a motion to dismiss.’” Midkiff v. Adams Cnty. Reg’l Water
Dist., 409 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2005)(quoting Martin v.
Associated Truck Lines, Inc., 801 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1986)).
The dispositive question is whether a plaintiff’s proposed amended

complaint contains “‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Williams
v. City of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945, 949 (6th Cir. 2014)(quoting
D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Mattox’s attempted amendments to his complaint are futile.
Mattox did not attach an amended complaint to his motion and fails
in the body of his motion to allege any actions by the United States
that would subject the United States to liability. (See Pl.’s
Filing, ECF No. 7.) Further, the court does not have the ability
to grant Mattox’s absurd and frivolous request that he be instated
as the President of the United States of America.
Accordingly, to the extent that the document titled

“Objections, Complaint Name Change and New Injunction” is a motion,
it is denied.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that Mattox’s
complaint be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for seeking monetary relief
from defendant who are immune from such relief.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of August, 2019.
_s/ Diane K. Vescovo________
DIANE K. VESCOVO
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
report and recommended disposition, a party may serve and file
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A
party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Failure to file objections within fourteen (14) days may constitute
a waiver of objections, exceptions, and further appeal.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439561. Public record. Not legal advice.