# Sills v. Southern Baptist Convention

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · March 8, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439187

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 8, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439187

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying state alter ego law to state law claim brought under diversity jurisdiction

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL DAVID SILLS and MARY )
SILLS, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) NO. 3:23-cv-00478
v. )
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, et al., ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 73, 75, 77, 83,
86, 88, 91), which are fully briefed (Doc. Nos. 104, 108, 115, 105, 116, 110, 112, 111). For the
reasons discussed below, Lifeway and Eric Geiger’s motions to dismiss (Doc. No. 73, 91) will be
granted; the motions to dismiss filed by SolutionPoint International, Inc. and Guidepost Solutions,
LLC (Doc. No. 77) and Jennifer Lyell (Doc. No. 75) will be granted in part and denied in part; and
the remaining defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 83, 88, 86) will be denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
This case arises from purportedly defamatory statements about Plaintiffs Michael David
Sills (“Sills” or “Mr. Sills”) and Mary Sills (“Mrs. Sills”) (collected “the Sills”). According to the
complaint, Defendants conspired to create and succeeded in publishing a false narrative about the
Sills to improve their own appearances and reputations.

1 The facts set forth herein are summarized from the facts alleged in the complaint. (Doc. No. 1),
The Parties
Sills was a Southern Baptist missiologist, professor, and author in the Southern Baptist
Convention. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 14). Mr. and Mrs. Sills have been married for 45 years. (Id. ¶ 15).
Defendant Southern Baptist Convention is a non-profit corporation headquartered in
Nashville, Tennessee. (Id. ¶ 16). Defendant Dr. Ed Litton (“Litton”) was the President of the
Southern Baptist Convention for the 2021-2022 term. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 40 n.8). Defendant Bart Barber

(“Barber”) was also a president of the Southern Baptist Convention. (Id. at ¶ 18). Defendant
Executive Committee of the Southern Baptist Convention (“Executive Committee”) is a non-profit
corporation that serves as the fiduciary, fiscal, and executive entity of the Southern Baptist
Convention. (Id. at ¶ 19). Defendant Willie McLaurin (“McLaurin”) was the Interim
President/CEO of the Executive Committee. (Id. at ¶ 20). Defendant Rolland Slade (“Slade”) was
the Chairman of the Executive Committee. (Id. at ¶ 21).
Defendant The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary (“Seminary”) is a non-profit
corporation that trains, educates, and prepares ministers, churches, and denominational entities.
(Id. at ¶ 22). Defendant Dr. R. Albert Mohler (“Mohler”) is president of the Seminary. (Id. at ¶
23). Defendant Lifeway Christian Resources of the Southern Baptist Convention (“Lifeway”) is

non-profit corporation that supplies Christian resources and is a subsidiary of the Southern Baptist
Convention. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 35). Defendants Eric Geiger (“Geiger”) and Jennifer Lyell (“Lyell”)
were vice presidents of Lifeway. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26).
Defendant SolutionPoint International, Inc. d/b/a Guidepost Solutions (“SPI”) provides
global business intelligence, security, and compliance services. (Id. at ¶ 27). SPI owns Defendant
Guidepost Solutions LLC (“Guidepost”). (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28). Guidepost provides solutions to help with
risk mitigation, dispute resolution, problem solving, and protecting reputations. (Id.).
The Sills/Lyell Relationship
According to the complaint, Sills met Lyell when she was 26 years old. (Id. ¶ 6). Lyell
allegedly initiated and aggressively cultivated and maintained a personal, consensual, prurient, and
emotionally intimate relationship with Sills. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 14). According to the complaint, Sills did
not, at any time, sexually abuse, force himself upon, engage in sexual intercourse with, threaten or
use violence against Lyell. (Id. ¶¶ 2-5). Sills ended the relationship with Lyell, but Lyell allegedly

persisted in her pursuit of Sills and undertook efforts to reach him through his family. (Id. ¶ 8).
2018-2019
According to the complaint, Lyell, a seasoned writer and publishing executive, coordinated
an implemented an attack against Sills after he ended their “consensual adult relationship.” (Id. ¶
34). In the spring of 2018, Lyell told Mohler, Geiger, and the Executive Committee, about her
relationship with Sills. (Id. ¶ 35). Geiger initiated the disclosure and reporting by Lyell, and shortly
thereafter moved to California. (Id. at ¶ 36). According to the complaint, Sills, immediately and
without controversy, admitted to having an “inappropriate relationship” with Lyell and accepted
the Southern Baptist Convention’s requirement that he leave his position at the Seminary. (Id. ¶¶
9, 40).

Lyell subsequently received negative attention within the Southern Baptist Community,
which allegedly threatened her position as a vice president at Lifeway. (Id. ¶ 35). In this same
time period, Mohler was allegedly looking for, and found in Lyell’s story, an opportunity to restore
his own reputation in the Southern Baptist Convention, particularly on the subject of concealing
sexual abuse. (Id. ¶ 37). 2 According to the complaint, when Sills’ relationship with Lyell “was

2 In 2013, Mohler signed a public statement supporting a former leader of Sovereign Grace Ministries
after they allegedly covered up incident of child sex abuse. (Id. ¶ 37). In February 2019, to restore his
reputation in the Southern Baptist Convention, Mohler denied knowing that leaders of Sovereign Grace
Ministries had not participated in the independent investigation of the alleged abuse. (Id.).
discovered to be consensual,” there was an unanticipated public reaction to the “branding” of Sills
as a “pervert,” which the Southern Baptist Convention tried to control. (Id. ¶ 38).
The complaint alleges that, in March 2019, Lyell responded to “backlash” by
“rebrand[ing]” what she had first reported about her relationship with Sills. (Id.). Lyell allegedly
offered to write about her relationship with Sills for the public relations arm of the Executive
Committee. (Id.). According to the complaint, the Seminary and Mohler urged Lyell to write the

public relations piece, which was expected to demonstrate the Southern Baptist Convention’s
reformative efforts in addressing sexual abuse cases. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 39). At the time, Lyell was
allegedly the highest-ranking woman in the Southern Baptist Convention. (Id. ¶ 38). According to
the complaint, Lyell’s offer was meaningful for the Southern Baptist Convention and the Executive
Committee because they were experiencing extensive criticism for their alleged mishandling of
significant sexual abuse cases. (Id. ¶ 39).
The Southern Baptist Convention, Litton, Lifeway, Lyell, Geiger, the Executive
Committee, McLaurin, Slade, the Seminary, and Mohler allegedly understood the value of making
an example out of Sills. (Id. ¶ 40). These defendants were allegedly still under fire for mishandling
complaints of sexual abuse unrelated to the Sills and saw Sills as an easy target and an opportunity

to improve the Southern Baptist Convention’s appearance and reputation by adopting the narrative
publicly advanced by Lyell. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 41).
2021
In an interview on June 6, 2021, Lyell made a series of statements about the Sills, including
that Sills began sexually abusing her on a mission trip in 2004 and that it continued and escalated
for more than a decade. (Id. ¶ 43). Lyell stated that she verbally and physically resisted Sills in the
initial encounter and throughout all subsequent encounters. (Id.). She stated that her relationship
with Sills was always forced, never consensual, and that she always resisted. (Id. ¶ 42). Lyell
further stated that Sills had threatened her, possibly broke into her home, and tracked her phone.
(Id.). Lyell described the police waiting for Sills, called Sills a cult leader, and reported that Sills
had a gun and threatened to destroy her. (Id.). Lyell attributed bruises on her arms to Sills and
claimed a church official told her: “I’ve never had someone who’s been beaten show up and ask
for church discipline like what are you trying.” (Id.). Lyell further stated she:
could very easily picture some 24-year-old Trinidadian young
woman who would come up to him after hearing him preach being
spiritually moved by something he said thanking him and then
knowing him as I did being able to equally imagine how he would
turn that into access to force himself upon her I wondered who
would be there to help that Trinidadian young woman when he flew
off to the next place

(Id. ¶ 44). The Sills allege the foregoing statements are false and malicious. (Id. ¶¶ 42-44). Lyell
also stated that Southern Baptist Convention leaders handled her case well, which the Sills allege
was a public relations strategy in a concerted effort amongst Defendants to improve the public
image of the Southern Baptist Convention at the expense of Sills. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46). The Sills allege
the Southern Baptist Convention could control the response to Lyell’s claim of abuse in
coordination with Lyell, such that it would improve its tarnished reputation and Lyell would be
paid a confidential amount of money. (Id.).
The Southern Baptist Convention, Litton, Lifeway, Lyell, Geiger, the Executive
Committee, McLaurin, Slade, the Seminary, and Mohler allegedly coordinated and decided to
retain an investigator. (Id. ¶ 47). At the 2021 Southern Baptist Convention Annual Meeting in
Anaheim, California, various fractions of the Southern Baptist Convention observed that the
Executive Committee was overseeing the hiring of an investigator, namely Guidepost, to
investigate itself. (Id. ¶ 48). Observers noted that such an arrangement provided the Executive
Committee with control over the investigation’s outcome. (Id.). A motion was made and approved
to transfer oversight from the Executive Committee investigating itself to a new committee with
members handpicked by Litton, who was president of the Southern Baptist Convention at the time.
(Id. ¶¶ 49, 40 n.8). Litton chose his seven-member committee to purportedly oversee the sex abuse
investigation concerning the Executive Committee. (Id. ¶ 49). The Committee of Cooperation was
also formed and served as the exclusive go-between amongst the Executive Committee, the seven-
member “task force,” and Guidepost. (Id.). The Committee of Cooperation was composed of five
Executive Committee members, including Litton. (Id.).

In September 2021, Defendants hired SPI and Guidepost to investigate the Southern Baptist
Convention’s sexual abuse crisis, with particular focus on and disproportionate page space
dedicated to Lyell’s statements against Sills. (Id. ¶ 50). The Sills were not interviewed by SPI or
Guidepost, nor were they contacted by the police or an investigator. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 53).
2022
On February 22, 2022, in anticipation of Guidepost’s report (the “Report”), the Executive
Committee, McLaurin, and Slade published the following public statement:
A statement from SBC Executive Committee Chairman Rolland
Slade on a resolution being reached with Jennifer Lyell

February 22, 2022

The SBC Executive Committee acknowledges its failure to
adequately listen, protect, and care for Jenniffer Lyell when she
came forward to share her story of abuse by a seminary professor.
Baptist Press failed to accurately report the sexual abuse Jennifer
Lyell reported to two SBC entities and local Southern Baptist
churches.

The SBC Executive Committee acknowledges its failures to Ms.
Lyell, including the unintentional harm created by its failure to
report Ms. Lyell’s allegations of nonconsensual sexual abuse were
investigated and unequivocally corroborated by the SBC entities
with authority over Ms. Lyell and her abuser.
The SBC Executive Committee apologizes for all the hurt it has
caused, is grateful for Ms. Lyell’s perseverance and engagement,
and prays for her complete healing from the trauma she has endured.

(Id. ¶¶ 52-54). At the same time, the Southern Baptist Convention, Executive Committee,
McLaurin, and Slade paid Lyell an undisclosed amount, purportedly in lieu of Lyell filing a
defamation and libel suit. (Id. ¶ 52). Defendants also “tweeted” their foregoing statement with the
added commentary:
The @SBCExecComm acknowledges its failures to Ms. Lyell,
including the unintentional harm created by its failure to report her
allegations of nonconsensual sexual abuse were investigated and
unequivocally corroborated by the SBC entities with authority over
her and her abuser.

(Id. ¶ 54). Lyell responded to the tweet as follows:
Beyond grateful for this [emoji omitted]. Although I knew it was a
possibility, I’m in shock that almost 4 years after @albertmohler
investigated & corroborated what I reported as nonconsensual
abuse, it is finally public that there was never any ambiguity. Thank
you @SBCExecComm.

(Id. ¶ 55). The Sills allege Defendants’ suggestion of unequivocal corroboration was untrue and
reinforced the unchecked false narrative that had been repeatedly reported since 2021. (Id. ¶ 56).
On May 22, 2022, SPI and Guidepost published the Report, stating in part:
[Lyell] told Dr. Mohler and her boss at Lifeway that any sexual
contact she has with Professor Sills had been nonconsensual and
involved violence, threats of violence against her and others, and
coercion. Dr. Mohler clearly understood not only the nature of Ms.
Lyell’s disclosure but expressly stated that he believed Ms. Lyell
and stated that that it was his opinion that she had been abused by
Professor Sills.

Rather than publishing Ms. Lyell’s corroborated account as BP staff
had originally drafted it, the account was changed to read as if Ms.
Lyell was consensually involved with her alleged abuser. The article
as published reported that Ms. Lyell alleged that she had a ‘morally
inappropriate relationship’ with her former seminary professor,
making it appear that she engaged in a consensual sexual
relationship with him.
…any sexual contact she had with her abuser was nonconsensual
and involved violence, threats of violence against her and others,
and coercion.

(Id. ¶¶ 57, 58, 60). The Report included a photo of Sills and labeled him as an abuser. (Id. ¶ 63).
Very few of the individuals listed as abusers had a photo entry, primarily accompanying the listing
for individuals lawfully convicted of heinous crimes. (Id.). The Report allegedly published
statements that were not true and unsubstantiated. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 61, 62).
On the same day the Report was published, May 22, 2022, Mohler stated:
From the beginning we were prepared and determined to assist the
investigators in any way possible and to support their work. What
happened to Jennifer [Lyell] was sexual abuse, unquestionably.

(Id. ¶ 59). On June 14, 2022, Lyell stated she “told the truth through this entire ordeal” and that:
I first contacted the Louisville Police Department, through their Sex
Victims Unit, in May 2018, after I had disclosed to the seminary. I
told Ms. Basham what I had told Baptist Press in 2019, that I had
gotten their voicemail, so hung up initially, but then later called back
and left a message. However, I never received a return call from the
unit.

the Guidepost report is equally clear that while their conjecture was
not rooted in any material information provided to them, all the
material provided to the SBC’s news reporting agency on the matter
was from individuals in positions of denominational and
professional authority over the matter who had been directly
involved in questioning both me and the professor.

Guidepost did not need to interview the professor’s pastor or my
former boss to assert in the report that those individuals had
corroborated the abuse allegations to the EC because the EC’s own
records – and public statements – reveal it.

(Id. at ¶¶ 65-70). The Sills allege the foregoing was not accurate and intended to mislead. (Id.).
On July 7, 2022, Barber published the following statements:
Jennifer Lyell’s claims have been investigated and corroborated.
They have been investigated by people close to the situation who
have first-hand knowledge of the people and context involved.
Those people, including people I know at SBTS with whom I have
spoken directly, have said that they believe Jennifer and that what
she has said about the abuse she experienced is true.

Her claims have been investigated by @GuidepostGlobal, and
whatever you think of their political positions or positions on social
issues of the day, they are experts in this subject matter:
investigation of sexual abuse claims. That is what they do.

(Id. at ¶ 72). On July 8, 2022, the Seminary and Mohler published the following statement:
In 2018, Jennifer Lyell came to me with an accusation of sexual
abuse by David Sills. We followed appropriate processes and the
accusation of abuse was confirmed, as we indicated publicly and
have subsequently confirmed. Statements directly made by Sills in
the course of our confrontation clearly confirmed the allegations of
abuse.

(Id. at ¶ 71). The Sills allege this statement falsely accuses Sills of criminal conduct, while at the
same time denying him due process. (Id.). The Sills further allege these statements made in early
July 2022 by the Southern Baptist Convention, Barber, the Seminary, and Mohler were an effort
to add authenticity and legitimacy to the Report that leveled unsubstantiated accusations and
conclusions against Sills. (Id. at ¶ 73). The Sills allege Defendants’ May, June, and July 2022
statements were false and a continuation of a yearslong campaign to attack the honesty of the Sills,
(id. at ¶¶ 74, 76), that that the Report published in May 2022 intensified the controversy
surrounding the allegations and investigation, while also resurrecting and placing back into
circulation Defendants’ malicious statements made against the Sills. (Id. at ¶¶ 75, 77).
2023
On May 11, 2023, the Sills filed this action against the Southern Baptist Convention, the
Executive Committee, the Seminary, Lifeway, Litton, Lyell, Geiger, Barber, McLaurin, Rolland
Slade, Mohler, SPI, and Guidepost for defamation, conspiracy, negligence, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy
exceeding $75,000.00. (See Doc. No. 1).
In July 2023, Geiger, SPI, Barber, and Litton filed the pending motions to dismiss the Sills’
claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Additionally, Lifeway, Lyell, Guidepost, the Seminary, Mohler, the Executive
Committee, McLaurin, Slade, Barber, Litton, and the Southern Baptist Convention move to

dismiss the Sills’ claims against them under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state claim.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The district court has discretion in how to
resolve such a motion. Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2020).
“If it decides that the motion can be ruled on before trial, the court may determine the motion on
the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.” Id. (quoting Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat. Ass'n,
875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal

jurisdiction. Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 615 (6th Cir. 2005). The court's choice in
how to resolve a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction affects the plaintiff's burden.
Malone, 965 F.3d at 505. When the district court rules based on written submissions alone, as in
the present case, the plaintiff need only make out a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction
exists, which can be done through the complaint. Id. at 504-05. “The court must view the pleadings
and affidavits in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and not weigh the controverting assertions
of the party seeking dismissal.” Ingram Barge Co., LLC v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 3 F.4th 275, 278
(6th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
“A federal court sitting in diversity may not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant unless
courts of the forum state would be authorized to do so by state law—and any such exercise of
jurisdiction must be compatible with the due process requirements of the United States
Constitution.” Malone, 965 F.3d at 502. “Due process requires that an out-of-state defendant have

‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state sufficient to comport with ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’” Blessing v. Chandrasekhar, 988 F.3d 889, 904 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Tennessee’s long-arm statute “extends
its jurisdiction to due process's limits, so due process is all [the court] must address.” Parker v.
Winwood, 938 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 2019).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must
take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the
Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts its allegations as
true, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d

471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, dismissal is appropriate only if “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Guzman v. U.S. Dep't of Children’s Servs., 679 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2012).
While the Court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss “rests primarily upon the
allegations of the complaint, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the
case, and exhibits attached to the complaint [ ] also may be taken into account.” Barany-Snyder v.
Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The Court

may also consider “exhibits attached to the defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are
referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Rondigo, L.L.C. v.
Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680–81 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Personal Jurisdiction
The Court will first address whether it has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Geiger,
Litton, Barber, and SPI. As noted above, because the Court resolves these defendants’ motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without a hearing or jurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs
bear the low burden of making out a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists, which
can be done through the complaint. Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 504-05

(6th Cir. 2020).
1. Geiger
Geiger is a former senior vice president of Lifeway who presently lives and works in
California. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 26). Through his pending motion, Geiger argues there is no basis for the
exercise of general, specific, or co-conspirator personal jurisdiction over him because he is not

domiciled in Tennessee, does not have continuous and systematic contacts with Tennessee,
Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise from any of his contacts with Tennessee, traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice would be offended by exercising personal jurisdiction over him, and
the complaint fails to state a claim for civil conspiracy against him with the required specificity.
(Doc. No. 92 at 6-16). In their response, the Sills argue jurisdiction over Geiger is appropriate
because of his alleged involvement in 2018 with the initial reporting of the Sills/Lyell relationship
that was part of a chain of events that led to the claim. The Sills also argue their conspiracy claim

is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Geiger. (Doc. No. 104 at 20 (citing First Cmty.
Bank, N.A. v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 489 S.W.3d 369, 394 (Tenn. 2015)).
a. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
“Specific jurisdiction turns on the affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy.” Parker v. Winwood, 938 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 2019). For a nonresident defendant

to be subject to specific personal jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit requires:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege
of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum
state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's
activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences
caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection
with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant reasonable.
Peters Broad. Eng'g, Inc. v. 24 Cap., LLC, 40 F.4th 432, 441 (6th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).
Here, according to the allegations in the complaint, Geiger was a Tennessee resident
employed as a senior vice president of Lifeway in the spring of 2018 when Lyell disclosed her
affair with Sills to Geiger and other defendants. (See Doc. No. 1 ¶ 35). Shortly after Lyell’s
disclosure, Geiger moved to California for a new job. (Id. ¶ 36). The complaint does not allege
Geiger had any contacts with Tennessee following his 2018 move to California. Thus, Geiger’s
only alleged contacts with Tennessee occurred in 2018 – at least three years before the alleged
conduct of other defendants that serves as the basis for the claims at issue. Even viewing the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the Sills and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor,
the Sills have failed to meet their low burden of pleading a prima facie basis for specific personal
jurisdiction over Geiger.

b. Co-Conspirator Jurisdiction
“Under this theory, an out-of-state defendant involved in a conspiracy who lacks sufficient
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state may nevertheless be subject to jurisdiction because of a
co-conspirator's contacts with the forum.” First Cmty. Bank, 489 S.W.3d at 394. Geiger argues the
Court should not exercise personal jurisdiction over him based upon the Sills’ alleged civil
conspiracy because the complaint fails to allege facts showing his participation in the alleged
conspiracy. (See Doc. No. 92 at 14-15 (citing Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 38, 40, 47, 60-62)). In their response,

plaintiffs contend the complaint alleges Geiger became a member of the conspiracy by contributing
to and/or approving the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements about Mr. Sills. (See
Doc. No. 104 at 21 (citing “generally” Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 32-97)).
Here, the complaint alleges that Lyell reported her relationship with Sills in the spring of
2018 and “soon thereafter” Geiger moved to California. (Doc. No. 1. ¶¶ 35-36). The complaint
also alleges the genesis of the alleged conspiracy to be in March 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39). While the
Sills list Geiger among many defendants who purportedly began a series of events that predate the

conduct that serves as the basis of the claims at issue, the Sills do not allege facts showing how
Geiger personally remained involved after his move to California. Accordingly, the Court is left
with only conclusory and vague references to Geiger’s purported involvement after May 2018.
In sum, based on the allegations in the complaint,3 the Sills have failed to carry their burden
establishing that this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Geiger would be consistent with due
process and does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Johnson v.
Griffin, 85 F.4th 429 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court will grant
Geiger’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

2. Barber and Litton
Barber and Litton argue the complaint contains only threadbare allegations of their conduct
to support exercising personal jurisdiction over either of them. The Court agrees that the complaint
fails to assert facts sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction over Barber or Litton.4 As
for specific personal jurisdiction, the complaint alleges that Barber and Litton engaged in conduct
in 2021 and 2022 that gives rise to the claims at issue, including that:

 Litton served as president of the Southern Baptist Convention in 2021 and 2022 (Doc. No.
1 ¶¶ 17, 40 n.8);
 The Southern Baptist Convention is headquartered in Nashville (Id. ¶ 16);
 Barber served as the president of the Southern Baptist Convention (Id. ¶ 18);
 Litton and other defendants sought to make an example of Sills (id. ¶ 40) and improve the

image of the Southern Baptist Convention (Id. ¶ 46);
 Litton selected a committee to oversee a sex abuse investigation in July 2021 (Id. ¶ 49);

3 Because the Court finds the Sills have failed to meet their initial burden of pleading a prima facie
basis for specific personal jurisdiction and for conspiracy-based jurisdiction over Geiger, the Court does
not reach or rely on Geiger’s declaration filed in support of his jurisdictional challenge.

4 General jurisdiction exists when the defendant's affiliations with the forum state are so continuous
and systematic as to render the defendant essentially at home there. See Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd., 79 F.4th
651, 660 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011)). Here, the Sills do not argue any of Defendants’ contacts with Tennessee are “continuous and
systematic” to warrant the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over them. (See Doc. No. 104 at 13-21).
 Litton directed and approved the narrative against Sills (Id. ¶ 49);
 Litton was involved in publishing allegedly defamatory statements in May 2022 (Id. ¶ 60);
 Litton is one of the defendants who relied upon “unchecked information” and acted in
concert with Guidepost to publish defamatory statements in May 2022 (Id. ¶ 62);
 Barber tweeted about the accusations against Sills in July 2022 (Id. ¶ 72); and

 Defendants, including Barber and Litton, conspired to defame Sills (Id. ¶ 95)
The complaint sets forth sufficient facts, accepted as true, that Barber and Litton purposely
availed themselves of the privilege of acting in this forum, their actions give rise to the causes of
action, and the acts or consequences of those acts have a substantial connection with the forum
such that exercising specific personal jurisdiction over them would not violate due process or be
contrary to notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, Barber and Litton will not be

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
3. SPI
Plaintiffs do not argue the Court has general jurisdiction over SPI or that SPI has sufficient
contacts with Tennessee for specific personal jurisdiction. Instead, the Sills argue exercising
jurisdiction over SPI would not violate due process because SPI is structurally and operationally

indistinguishable from Guidepost for purposes of jurisdictional review. 5 The Sixth Circuit has
“endorsed the use of the alter-ego theory to exercise personal jurisdiction.” Est. of Thomson ex rel.
Est. of Rakestraw v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008). In applying
the alter-ego theory of personal jurisdiction in a diversity action, the Court must look to Tennessee

5 The Sills also argue the Court has co-conspirator jurisdiction over SPI; however, for the same
reasons the complaint fails to state a claim for civil conspiracy against Guidepost, see Section III, H., infra,
the co-conspirator personal jurisdiction theory as to SPI fails.
law. See id.; see, e.g., Se. Tex. Inns, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 462 F.3d 666, 672 (6th Cir.
2006) (applying state alter ego law to state law claim brought under diversity jurisdiction).
Tennessee law presumes parent and subsidiary corporations are separate and distinct legal

entities. Gordon v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 635, 651 (Tenn. 2009). Under Tennessee
law, “[a]n alter ego ... relationship is typified by” one “corporation's control of [another]
corporation's internal affairs or daily operations.” Wells ex rel. Baker v. State, 435 S.W.3d 734, 756
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Gordon, 300 S.W.3d at 652). While the Sills allege SPI owns
Guidepost (see Doc. No. 1 ¶ 27), they do not allege a disregard of corporate formalities, that SPI
and Guidepost commingle funds, that SPI was acting through Guidepost in anyway, or that SPI’s
control over Guidepost caused their injuries. The complaint also does not contain allegations
suggesting that an inequitable result would follow if SPI were not held liable for Guidepost’s
alleged wrongdoing. Accordingly, the complaint does not allege facts to establish a prima facie
basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over SPI based on alter-ego personal jurisdiction.

Because the Sills’ reliance on an alter-ego theory of jurisdiction is unavailing, the Court will grant
SPI’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
B. Choice of Law
The Executive Committee, McLaurin, Slade, Southern Baptist Convention, Barber, Litton,
and Guidepost argue Mississippi law applies because the Sills are domiciled in Mississippi.6 The

other defendants appear to concede that Tennessee law governs and rely on it in their motions. In
their response, the Sills argue Tennessee law applies because Tennessee has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties.

6 No party articulated how application of Mississippi law alters the Rule 12 analysis.
The instant matter was brought to this Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the law of the forum state, including the
forum's choice-of-law rules. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tex., 571
U.S. 49 (2013). In tort cases, Tennessee abides by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
see Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992); Wahl v. General Elec. Co., 786 F.3d
491, 494 (6th Cir. 2015), which provides that “the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect

to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state, which with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principals stated in
[Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws] § 6.” Hataway, 830 S.W.2d at 59 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court must apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship
to the occurrences and parties. In a libel action, the location of the reputational harm to the plaintiff
typically provides the applicable law. See Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 137
(6th Cir. 1996). Here, the complaint does not specify whether the plaintiffs’ reputational harm was
primarily experienced in a specific geographical location. Conversely, the Southern Baptist
Convention – a central figure in the Sills’ claims – is located in Tennessee, as is the Executive
Committee. Guidepost contracted with the Southern Baptist Convention to conduct an

investigation into, among other things, the actions of the Executive Committee, and multiple
defendants are located in Tennessee. Given these facts and the lack of a clear choice-of-law based
on reputational harm to the Sills, Tennessee has the most significant relationship to the occurrences
and the parties.
C. Affirmative Defenses

A plaintiff typically does not have to anticipate or negate an affirmative defense to survive
a motion to dismiss. Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012). However, an
affirmative defense can be the basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if “the plaintiff's own
allegations show that a defense exists that legally defeats the claim for relief.” Est. of Barney v.
PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 714 F.3d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Through their pending
motions, the Southern Baptist Convention, Barber, Litton, the Seminary, Mohler, Guidepost, Lyell,
the Executive Committee, McLaurin, and Slade seek dismissal of the Sills’ claims based on the
affirmative defense of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.7 Lyell, the Executive Committee,

McLaurin, and Slade also argue the Sills’ defamation claims against them are time-barred.
Accordingly, the Court must review the allegations in the complaint to determine if either of the
foregoing affirmative defenses clearly apply.
1. Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine
Rooted in the First Amendment, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine cautions against

courts weighing into internal church matters that involve “questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law [that are decided by] church judicatories.” Ogle v. Hocker, 279
Fed. Appx. 391, 395 (6th Cir. 2008). A companion doctrine involving the review by courts of
employment decisions is referred to as the “ministerial exception,” which is also based on First
Amendment concerns. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565
U.S. 171 (2012); see also Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir.
2015). The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine looks to whether the lawsuit would require the court
to consider disputes involving “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical
government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of

7 While Defendants argue the ecclesiastical doctrine deprives this Court of subject matter
jurisdiction, courts have been clear that this doctrine constitutes an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional
bar. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 202 n.4 (2012);
Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2015). Defendants cite no law to
the contrary.
them.” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U. S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714
(1976).
While some of the defendants rely on Ogle v. Church of God, 153 F. App'x 371 (6th Cir.
2005) and In re Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2021), neither are applicable in the present
case because Ogle involved requested judicial review of church disciplinary proceedings and
Lubbock concerned defamation claims resulting from an application of Canon law.

On the other hand, Defendants largely ignore the case of Ogle v. Hocker, which is more
applicable to the claims alleged by Hunt. In Hocker, a church bishop sued a fellow pastor for
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress for statements made in sermons and
elsewhere. In analyzing the applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the Hocker court
asked “[w]hether a secular court may hear a tort suit despite the church autonomy doctrine turns
on the availability of secular standards and the ability of a court to resolve the controversy without
reference to religious doctrine.” 279 Fed. Appx. at 395. The Hocker court went on to point out
that “the relevant question … is whether the court would interfere with any matter of church
doctrine or practice by ruling on this case.” Id. at 396. The Hocker court declined to invoke the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine when: (1) the majority of the purportedly defamatory statements

occurred “outside of the religious practice context,” and (2) no party identified “any doctrinal
issues that will be involved.” Id. In contrast, in an earlier suit filed by Bishop Ogle – Ogle v. Church
of God, cited supra – challenging internal church disciplinary proceedings against him, the Sixth
Circuit applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine because “all of defendants' actions of which
Ogle complains were part of church disciplinary proceedings which were initiated precisely
because Ogle's actions violated the Church of God Minutes of the General Assembly.” Ogle, 153
F. App'x at 376.
Here, the complaint does not seek judicial review of a “theological controversy, church
discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the
standard of morals required of them.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714. Rather, according to the
complaint, the Southern Baptist Convention hired a third party to investigate how its Executive
Committee handled matters involving sexual abuse. The fact that a church body was involved in
the decision to hire Guidepost and that the resulting investigation and report involved a church

entity does not prevent the court from resolving the claims asserted without reference to religious
doctrine. Because it is not clear from the allegations that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars
this Court from presiding over the claims asserted, Defendants’ motions to dismiss will not be
granted on ecclesiastical abstention grounds.
2. Statute of Limitations

Lyell, the Executive Committee, McLaurin, and Slade argue the Sills’ defamation claims
against them are time-barred. Dismissal on timeliness grounds – an affirmative defense – is
appropriate “if the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred.”
Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted).
But “it is the defendant's burden to show that the statute of limitations has run.” Id. Here, the
complaint states that the allegedly defamatory statements were made within a year of the filing of
this action, thus it is not clear from the complaint that the limitations defense defeats the
defamation claims. As such, these defendants have not met their burden of showing that Mr. Sills’
defamation claim is time-barred. See id.
However, Lyell also asserts that none of the post May 11, 2022 statements were about Mrs.

Sills. The Court agrees; the post-May 11, 2022 allegedly defamatory statements described in the
complaint are void of any mention or reference to Mrs. Sills, so, to the extent the Sills assert a
defamation claim against Lyell for statements made prior to May 11, 2022 about Mrs. Sills, that
claim will be dismissed as time-barred.

D. Group Pleading
1. Lifeway
Lifeway argues that the complaint simply includes it among references to “Defendants”
without setting forth specific acts of Lifeway that are actionable or sufficient facts to provide it

with fair notice of the grounds of the claims against it. Rhodes v. R & L Carriers, Inc., 491 F. App'x
579, 582 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In their
response, the Sills argue that Lyell and Geiger were Lifeway executives “at various times relevant
to the issues in this case.” The Sills further argue Lyell and Geiger’s conduct may be imputed to
Lifeway under respondeat superior. Yet, the Sills allege that Geiger left Lifeway for a pastor
position in 2018 – three years before the acts that serve as the basis for the claims – so his actions
post 2018 cannot be fairly attributed to Lifeway under a respondeat superior theory.

As for Lyell, the complaint alleges that she worked for Lifeway and reported the alleged
abuse to Lifeway executives in spring 2018. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 25, 35). It also alleges Lyell was a
senior executive with Lifeway (see id. ¶ 25), but does not specify when. Otherwise, Lifeway is
only mentioned among a list of defendants, but no specific allegations explain what actions of
Lifeway give rise to the Sills’ claims. Given that the Sills rely solely on the doctrine of respondeat
superior based on the actions of Lyell, the Court considers whether the complaint alleges facts
sufficient to apply that doctrine. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 840
S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
Here, the Sills allege that Lyell was employed by Lifeway, but fail to allege that she was
on Lifeway’s business or acting within the scope of her employment when she allegedly defamed
the Sills in 2022, conspired with others, acted negligently or intentionally inflicted intentional
emotional distress on the Sills. The Sills also point to allegations that specifically name Lifeway
(see Doc. No. 104 at 22 (citing Doc. No. 1 ¶ 47)), but the paragraph cited simply includes Lifeway
among other defendants without specifying what acts Lifeway engaged in giving rise to the claims.

Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are too sparse and do not have sufficient context or support
to “plausibly suggest entitlement to relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009), from
Lifeway under a theory of respondeat superior that fails to rise “above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Without pleading facts to support the elements of respondeat superior
against Lifeway, Plaintiffs have not adequately placed Lifeway on notice of the grounds upon
which the claims against it rests. Rhodes, 491 F. App'x at 582. Given this ruling, the Court does
not need to address Lifeway’s arguments as to specific claims or the statute of limitations.

2. The Southern Baptist Convention, Barber, and Litton
These defendants argue that the Sills impermissibly group “Defendants” together without
specifying what individual actions of these defendants give rise to the Sills’ claims.8 Plaintiffs
respond that the Southern Baptist Convention is mentioned over 80 times in the complaint with
specific allegations concerning the Southern Baptist Convention. After reviewing the complaint,

the Court agrees and will not dismiss the Southern Baptist Convention based on its “group
pleadings” argument.

8 These defendants did not defend this argument for dismissal in their reply. (See Doc. No. 112).
As for Litton, the Sills allege that he, as president of the Southern Baptist Convention,
acted in concert with the other defendants to publish defamatory information and, the report that
serves as the basis for some of the claims. (Doc. No. 104 at 24 (citing Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 60, 61, 62)).
Given his leadership role with the Southern Baptist Convention and accepting the Sills factual
allegations as true, the Court finds that the Sills have alleged sufficient facts to overcome Litton’s
“group pleading” argument.

Turning to Barber, the complaint alleges that he “tweeted” defamatory information in July
2022 (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 72) and served as the Southern Baptist Convention’s president during the
relevant time period and thus was involved in the Guidepost investigation and report. This is
sufficient to overcome Barber’s “group pleading” argument.

3. Executive Committee, McLaurin, and Slade
These defendants argue that the complaint impermissibly alleges claims against all the
defendants without specifying what each of these defendants did; the Executive Committee argues
this is particularly true as to itself. The Sills respond by pointing out that the Executive Committee
requested that Guidepost conduct the investigation at issue, had control over the outcome of the
investigation, its members worked with Guidepost, McLaurin and Slade issued an apology to
Lyell, and the Executive Committee entered into the Guidepost contract on behalf of the Southern
Baptist Convention. (See Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 60, 64). The Court finds that the Sills

have alleged specific actions against the Executive Committee to avoid dismissal on the grounds
that impermissible “group pleading” occurred.
As for McLaurin, the Sills allege that he served as the Interim President/CEO of the
Executive Committee (id. ¶ 20), understood the value of making an example out of Sills (id. ¶ 40),
played a role in hiring Guidepost (id. ¶ 47), issued a statement that refuted that the Lyell/Sills
relationship was consensual (id. ¶ 53), and acted in concert with Guidepost to publish the report in
May 2022 (id. ¶ 62). The Court finds that the Sills have alleged specific actions against McLaurin
to survive his motion to dismiss on “group pleading” grounds.

Finally, as for Slade, the complaint identifies him as the chairman of the Executive
Committee (id. ¶ 21), alleges that he understood the importance of making an example out of Sills
(id. ¶ 40), participated in hiring Guidepost (id. ¶ 47), issued a statement that refuted that the
Lyell/Sills relationship was consensual (id. ¶ 53), and facilitated the publication of the Guidepost
report (id. ¶ 60). The Court finds that the Sills have alleged specific actions against Slade to avoid
dismissal on grounds of impermissible “group pleading” occurred.

E. Defamation
To state a claim for defamation under Tennessee law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a party
published a statement; (2) with knowledge that the statement was false and defaming to the other;
or (3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain
the truth of the statement. Brown v. Christian Bros. Univ., 428 S.W.3d 38, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).

1. Lyell
Lyell first argues that any actionable defamatory statements included in the Guidepost
report are covered by the “common interest” privilege and the “public interest” privilege. As the
Sills point out in their response, the applicability of the defense of “common interest” or “public
interest” privileges turn on specific factors and facts. Such a defense is not a sufficient basis for
dismissal of the defamation claim against Lyell because: (1) the Sills have alleged facts to state a
defamation claim against her; and (2) it is not clear from the face of the complaint that this defense
bars that claim. See Est. of Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 714 F.3d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 2013).
Lyell also seeks to inject into the record an interview, then argue for dismissal based on her
characterization of the interview. The Court considers only the complaint and even if it considered
the interview, it cannot draw inferences in Lyell’s favor, which she invites the Court to do.
Accordingly, the Court will not grant Lyell’s motion on this basis.

2. Guidepost
Guidepost denies the Sills’ allegation that it “published” the report to the Southern Baptist
Convention and argues its “sending” the report to the Southern Baptist Convention was covered
by the “common interest privilege.” As noted in Lyell’s similar argument, the applicability of a
privilege as a defense turns on factors and facts outside of the pleadings and for which the Court
would be required to draw inferences in favor of Guidepost; the Court declines to do so. See supra.
Guidepost next argues that Sills is a public figure, thus the actual malice standard applies

and the complaint is void of allegations that guidepost showed actual malice toward him in the
publication of the report. Here, the complaint does not include sufficient factual allegations for the
Court to conclude that Sills was a public figure. See Thomas M. Cooley L. Sch. v. Kurzon Strauss,
LLP, 759 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 2014); Santoni v. Mueller, No. 3:20-CV-00975, 2022 WL 97049,
at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2022). As for the remainder of Guidepost’s arguments, they turn on
Guidepost’s denial of liability and rely on construing information and records outside of the record
of this case at this juncture; the Court will confine its analysis to the Complaint and its Exhibit.
Accordingly, the Court will not grant Guidepost’s motion on this basis.

3. The Southern Baptist Convention, Barber, and Litton
The Southern Baptist Convention, Barber, and Litton argue the complaint fails to include
any factual allegations to support the claim that they published defamatory statements. Even a
cursory review of the complaint shows the Sills allege the Southern Baptist Convention published
defamatory statements (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 60, 62, 63). As for Barber, the complaint alleges that he
published statements in July 2022 concerning Lyell’s claims against Sills. (Id. ¶ 72). The Sills
allege that Litton directed and approved the narrative against Sills. (Id. ¶ 49). Thus, the Sills have
stated a defamation claim against Barber, Litton, and the Southern Baptist Convention.

4. Executive Committee, McLaurin, and Slade
These defendants argue the February 2022 statement by Slade wasn’t defamatory.
Acceptance of this argument as grounds for dismissal would require the Court to construe the
allegations against the non-movant, which the Court cannot do. The complaint alleges the
Executive Committee published a statement in February 2022 that was a precursor to and
consistent with the allegedly defamatory statements made in May-July 2022; McLaurin was the
Interim President/CEO of the Executive Committee and acted in concert with others to publish

defamatory statements; Slade served as Chairman of the Executive Committee, which was
experiencing criticism before the defamatory statements, and understood the need to address
controversy, all of which resulted in the hiring of Guidepost and the resulting investigative report.
(See Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 54, 60-63, 20, 49). Taking all those allegations as true, the Sills have stated a
defamation claim against the Executive Committee, McLaurin, and Slade.

F. Conspiracy
To state a claim for civil conspiracy under Tennessee law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a
common design between two or more persons; (2) to accomplish by concerted action an unlawful
purpose, or a lawful purpose by unlawful means; (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy;
and (4) injury to person or property resulting in attendant damage. See Pagliara v. Moses, 605
S.W.3d 619, 627 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020). A claim for civil conspiracy must have an underlying
predicate tort committed in the course of the conspiracy. See id.
1. Lyell
Lyell argues that conspiracy claims should be pleaded with “some level of specificity” and
cites state and federal cases in support of that argument. The Sills respond that they pled facts
sufficient to state the elements of a civil conspiracy claim and cites numerous specific allegations
in the complaint. The Court agrees Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a factual basis for the
conspiracy claim against Lyell. Moreover, Lyell’s arguments ask the Court to draw inferences from

the factual allegations in her favor, which the Court cannot do at this stage. Accordingly, the Court
will not grant Lyell’s motion on this basis.
2. The Seminary and Mohler
The Seminary and Mohler argue that the complaint fails to allege facts to state a civil
conspiracy claim against them because “there is no plausible allegation” to support the existence

of a conspiracy “beyond the allegation that the Seminary [and Mohler] simply supported Lyell
when she revealed Sills’s sexual abuse.” (Doc. No. 84 at 7). While the Seminary and Mohler
characterize the investigation in a manner favorable to them, the Court cannot do the same at this
stage.
The complaint alleges that the Seminary and Mohler urged Lyell to write a “public relations
piece” at a time when the Southern Baptist Convention and Mohler were struggling with
circumstances arising from other scandals. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 37, 38). The complaint further alleges
the Seminary and Mohler saw an opportunity to improve the reputation of the Southern Baptist
Convention which resulted in what became the Guidepost investigation report (Id. ¶ 40). Further,
the report, as it related to Sills, allegedly relied primarily on Mohler’s statements, Mohler and the

Seminary published the report, and Mohler made a statement concerning the purported abuse of
Lyell soon after the publication of the report. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 59, 60). Given these allegations, the Court
finds the Sills have adequately alleged a claim for civil conspiracy against these defendants.

3. Guidepost
Guidepost argues Plaintiffs’ claim for civil conspiracy against it fails because the complaint
fails to allege facts to show that it had the intent to cause them harm. In response, the Sills argue
the complaint alleges that Guidepost’s “sham investigation” and the false statements in exchange
for payment are sufficient to plead intent by Guidepost to participate in and common design to
harm them. The allegation of a “sham investigation” and publication of the report may support the
Sills’ claims for defamation and negligence, but the complaint must allege some factual basis for
the conspiracy claim. Under Tennessee law, each co-conspirator “must have the intent to
accomplish th[e] common purpose, and each must know of the other’s intent.” First Cmty. Bank,

N.A. v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 489 S.W.3d 369, 396 (Tenn. 2015). However, it is “not essential
that each conspirator have knowledge of the details of the conspiracy.” Brown v. Birman Managed
Care, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tenn. 2001) (citation omitted). While actionable civil conspiracy
does not require uniformity of knowledge among all co-conspirators, it does require that each
conspirator intend to accomplish the common purpose.
Here, the Sills allege the Executive Committee hired Guidepost to conduct an investigation
of the Southern Baptist Convention’s “sexual abuse crisis” in September 2021 (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 50);
the Sills also allege Guidepost, acting in concert with the Southern Baptist Convention, published
an “unsubstantiated” allegation against Sills. (Id. ¶ 60). What’s missing, however, is any allegation
that in conducting the investigation and publishing its report that Guidepost intended to defame

Sills to distract from the Southern Baptist Convention’s sex abuse scandal – the purported goal and
purpose of the conspiracy. (Id. ¶ 95). There are not even allegations from which a reasonable
inference of Guidepost’s intent to defame Sills for this purpose can be drawn. Accordingly,
Guidepost’s motion to dismiss will be granted as to the Sills’ conspiracy claim against it.

4. Southern Baptist Convention, Litton, and Barber
The Southern Baptist Convention, Litton, and Barber argue that the conspiracy claim
against them must be dismissed because it is derivative of the defamation claim. Because the Court
has found that the Sills have stated defamation claims against these defendants, see supra, and the
complaint alleges that they acted in concert with others to harm the Sills. Accordingly, dismissal
of the Sills’ civil conspiracy claim against these defendants would be inappropriate.

5. Executive Committee, McLaurin, and Slade
These defendants argue the conspiracy claim must be dismissed because the Sills have not
plausibly alleged an underlying tort. Having found that the Sills’ tort claims survive, the Court will
not dismiss on that basis. McLaurin also argues dismissal is appropriate because the complaint
does not allege that he engaged in an overt act. (Doc. No. 87 at 22). As noted by the Sills in their
response, the complaint alleges McLaurin issued a statement characterizing the Baptist Press’
reporting as inaccurate, meaning, the reportedly consensual affair was now not consensual, and
the relationship between Lyell and Sills was deemed abusive and forced. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 53).

Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss the Sills’ civil conspiracy claim against these defendants.
G. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant's conduct was (1) intentional or reckless, (2) so outrageous
that it is not tolerated by civilized society, and (3) resulted in serious mental injury to the plaintiff.

Lemon v. Williamson Cnty. Sch., 618 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tenn. 2021). Guidepost, the Executive
Committee, McLaurin, and Slade argue the complaint does not allege facts showing outrageous or
malicious conduct by them against Sills. (Doc. No. 78 at 24-25; Doc. No. 87 at 20). The Sills
respond that, under Ogle v. Hocker, a reasonable jury could potentially find that Guidepost’s
conduct was “extreme and outrageous” by participating in a process that labeled Sills as a “violent
sex abuser.” The Court agrees and, construing all facts in favor of the Sills, finds that they have
stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The Southern Baptist Convention, Barber, and Litton argue the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim should be dismissed because it is derivative of the defamation claim.
(Doc. No. 89 at 17-18). This argument fails because the Court is not dismissing the Sills’
defamation claim against these defendants. See supra.
H. Negligence

A claim for negligence under Tennessee law requires: (1) a duty of care owed by defendant
to plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that amounts to a breach of that duty;
(3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause. Cotten v. Wilson, 576
S.W.3d 626, 637 (Tenn. 2019). Guidepost, the Southern Baptist Convention, Barber, Litton, the
Executive Committee, McLaurin, and Slade argue this claim must be dismissed because the
complaint fails to allege they owed a duty of care to the Sills. (Doc. No. 78 at 23; Doc. No. 87 at
20-21; Doc. No. 89 at 17). The Sills argue Tennessee courts balance “the foreseeability and gravity
of the potential harm against the feasibility and availability of alternatives that would have
prevented the harm.” (Doc. No. 104 at 33 (citing In re AME Church Emp. Ret. Fund Litig., 2023
WL 2562784, at *32 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2023)). The Sills also argue that when determining a

duty to a third party, Tennessee law requires a balancing of several factors. (Id. (citing Biscan v.
Brown, 160 S.W.3d 462, 479 (Tenn. 2005)). The gravamen of the Sills’ negligence claim is that
these defendants owed them a duty of care and breached that duty in the manner in which the
investigation and report were performed and published, respectively. At this stage, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the Sills, the Court finds the complaints states a claim for
negligence against these defendants.

I. Mrs. Sills’ Claims
The Seminary, Mohler, the Executive Committee, McLaurin, and Slade generally challenge
the claims asserted by Mrs. Sills on the grounds that the complaint is void of any allegations that
they defamed, conspired against, were negligent towards, or intentionally inflicted emotional
distress against her. The Sills point to the Seminary and Mohler’s allegedly wrongful acts against
the Sills and argue these defendants perpetuated Lyell’s assertion that Mrs. Sills enabled the affair.
While the complaint is admittedly thin on factual allegations concerning Mrs. Sills, when taking
the allegations as true and giving her all reasonable inferences, Mrs. Sills has stated a claim.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Geiger and SPI’s motions (Doc. No. 91, 77) will be granted for
lack of personal jurisdiction, Lifeway’s motion (Doc. No. 73) will be granted for failure to state
claim, Guidepost’s motion (Doc. No. 77) will be granted only as to the conspiracy claim; Lyell’s
motion (Doc. No. 75) will be granted only as to the defamation claim against her for statements
about Mrs. Sills. The remaining defendants’ motions (Doc. No. 83, 88, 86) will be denied.

An appropriate Order shall enter. Lh = CLA; ip
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

32

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10439187. Public record. Not legal advice.