# Howes v. Bragg

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · May 2, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438643

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 2, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438643

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that when prison officials placed an inmate in “the area of the prison used to house mentally disturbed inmates” it “would likely have a strong deterrent effect” on the inmate’s protected activities”
- holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
AARON JAMES HOWES, )
#508524, )
)
Plaintiff, ) NO. 1:23-CV-00023
)
v. )
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
JAMIE BRAGG, et al., ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Aaron James Howes, a pre-trial detainee currently in the custody of the Hickman County
Jail in Centerville, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, against Jail Administrator Jamie
Bragg, Correctional Officer/Corporal f/n/u Warren, and Correctional Officer/Sergeant f/n/u
Sunder, alleging violations of Plaintiff’s civil and constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff
also submitted a letter dated April 20, 2023. (Doc. No. 8).
I.SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
A.PLRA Screening Standard
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838

F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
B. Section 1983 Standard

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color
of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . .
. .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that
he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that
the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527,
533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
C. Facts Alleged in the Complaint
Plaintiff is an adherent of the Muslim faith. On March 14, 2023, Plaintiff and inmate f/n/u
Wilkins requested permission to go to the jail library to pray “because that’s where the jail conducts
church.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Officer Sunder denied the request. Plaintiff and Wilkins filed a
grievance regarding the denial.
On March 15, 2023, Jail Administrator Bragg “pulled” Plaintiff and Wilkins into the
hallway and “demanded” that they tell him their religion. (Id.) When Plaintiff told Bragg that his
religion was Muslim, Bragg asked if Plaintiff knew which direction was east. Bragg then placed

Plaintiff and Wilkins in solitary confinement, stating “it was because of [their] religion, so [they]
could pray.” (Id.) Plaintiff and Wilkins remained in solitary confinement for “a few hours.” (Id. at
13).
As relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory damages and punitive damages. He also seeks
injunctive relief in the form of changes to jail policy regarding Muslim prayers.
D. Analysis
Plaintiff names Jail Administrator Jamie Bragg, Correctional Officer/Corporal f/n/u
Warren, and Correctional Officer/Sergeant f/n/u Sunder as Defendants to this action. (Doc. No. 1
at 2-3). Plaintiff brings claims against each Defendant in his official and individual capacities. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges claims under Section 1983 for violations of his rights under the First and Eighth
Amendments as well as claims under RLUIPA.
1. Preliminary matters
Before moving to Plaintiff’s claims, the Court addresses three preliminary matters.
While Plaintiff, as a non-attorney, may raise claims on his own behalf, he cannot bring
claims in federal court on behalf of others. See Covington v. Cadogan, No. 1:18-cv-511, 2019 WL
2949845, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2019) (citing Corn v. Sparkman, No. 95-5494, 1996 WL 185753,
at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996)). “A prisoner must allege a personal loss and seek to vindicate a
deprivation of his own constitutional rights.” Id. This is question of standing. A prisoner does not
have standing to bring a Section 1983 claim on behalf of other prisoners. See Barnett v. Luttrell,
414 F. App'x 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 276-77 (6th Cir.
2009)). In addition, a claim under RLUIPA is subject to the general rules of standing under Article
III of the United States Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (“Standing to assert a claim or
defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of

the Constitution.”). This means that a prisoner who is Muslim lacks standing to make “general
assertions on behalf of the entire Muslim inmate community at [a prison].” Pleasant-Bey v. Shelby
Cnty. Gov't, No. 2:17-cv-2502, 2019 WL 1601495, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 15, 2019) (quoting
Jacobs v. Strickland, No. 2:08-cv-680, 2009 WL 2476896, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 2009) (“The
Magistrate Judge . . . correctly concluded that [plaintiff] could not assert the claims of other Sunni
Muslims who were allegedly deprived of their rights under RLUIPA and the United States
Constitution.”)). Thus, although Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that inmate Wilkins was
similarly affected by Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims on Wilkins’s
behalf in this action. The claims addressed herein by the Court are those raised by Plaintiff seeking

to vindicate deprivations of Plaintiff’s own constitutional rights.
Next, although the complaint names Officer Warren as a Defendant to this action, Plaintiff
does not make any factual allegations regarding Warren. It is a basic pleading essential that a
plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations
to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage
claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must
allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted
constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v.
Northville Reg'l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Thus, where a person is named
as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even
under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App'x
762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with
any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or

responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL
1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against
each defendant) (citing Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)); Rodriguez
v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff's claims against
those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to
them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”). Because
Plaintiff’s allegations fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), any claims against Defendant Warren in his

individual or official capacity must be dismissed.
Third, after filing his complaint, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Court in which he
expresses concern that a certain jail official has opened Plaintiff’s legal mail outside of Plaintiff’s
presence. (Doc. No. 8). Plaintiff may wish to seek permission to amend his complaint to allege a
federal claim based on this incident. The Court expresses no opinion as to the timeliness and/or
viability of such claim.
2. First Amendment free exercise claims
The complaint alleges that Defendants Sunder and Bragg violated Plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion. “The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion.” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Penn., __ U.S.
__, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1876 (2021). It is settled that prisoners have a First Amendment right to
practice their religious beliefs, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984), and prisoners must
be provided “reasonable opportunities” to practice their religion. Id.

“Under [Section] 1983, ‘[a] prisoner alleging that the actions of prison officials violate his
religious beliefs must show that the belief or practice asserted is religious in the person's own
scheme of things and is sincerely held.’” Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App'x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001)). “Only after a prison inmate
shows a sincere belief that his religion requires the practice at issue does the court move on to
determining whether the prison's actions restricting the practice are valid.” Id. (citing Boles v. Neet,
486 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the first requirement in a section 1983 First
Amendment free-exercise claim is for the plaintiff to show that the prison's action “substantially
burdened his sincerely-held religious beliefs”); Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274-75 (2d

Cir.2006) (“The prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially
burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.”)).
Here, although the complaint does not explicitly state, the Court will assume for purposes
of the required PLRA screening that Plaintiff’s religious beliefs are sincere.
The complaint alleges that, on one occasion, Officer Sunder prohibited Plaintiff from
praying in the jail’s library where religious services are held. However, the complaint does not
allege that Officer Sunder denied Plaintiff the ability to attend a religious service that was
underway in the jail’s library on that day or any other day. Nor does the complaint allege that
Officer Sunder denied Plaintiff the ability to exercise his Muslim religion by praying on that day
or any other day in his cell or in another location within the jail. Because the complaint fails to
allege that Officer Sunder burdened or restricted Plaintiff’s practice of his religion in any way, the
Court finds that the complaint fails to state a First Amendment free exercise claim under Section
1983 against Officer Sunder in his individual capacity upon which relief can be granted. See Davis
v. Hamilton County Jail, No. 1:16-CV-00486, 2017 WL 6566208, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 22, 2017)

(finding that “nothing in the complaint allows the Court to plausibly infer that any Defendant
restricted Plaintiff’s ability to practice his religion. While Defendant Byrd’s statements may have
made Plaintiff uncomfortable, nothing in the complaint suggests that these statements burdened or
restricted Plaintiff’s practice of his religion in any way.”).
The complaint alleges that Defendant Bragg placed Plaintiff in solitary confinement
because Plaintiff identified himself as Muslim and requested to exercise a tenet of his Muslim
faith, prayer. These allegations could could be reasonably construed as “substantially burden[ing]
[Plaintiff’s] sincerely-held religious beliefs.” Barhite, 377 F. App'x 508, 510 (citing Boles, 486
F.3d 1177, 1182 and Salahuddin, 467 F.3d 263, 274-75). Thus, the Court finds that the complaint

states a colorable First Amendment free exercise claim under Section 1983 against Defendant
Bragg in his individual capacity.
The complaint also names Sunder and Bragg as Defendants in their official capacities.
When a defendant is sued in his or her official capacity as an employee of the government, the
lawsuit is directed against “the entity for which the officer is an agent.” Pusey v. City of
Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993). Here, the complaint alleges that Sunder and Bragg
are employees of Hickman County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). Thus, a claim of governmental
liability requires a showing that the alleged misconduct is the result of a policy, statement,
regulation, decision, or custom promulgated by Hickman County or its agent. Monell Dep’t of
Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). In short, for Hickman County to be liable Plaintiff
under Section 1983, there must be a direct causal link between an official policy or custom and the
alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385
(1989); Burgess v. Fisher, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978)); Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 393 (6th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff can make a showing
of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal
official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision-making authority
ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4)
the existence of a custom or tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Burgess, 735
F.3d at 478.
Here, the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability
against Hickman County under Section 1983. The complaint does not identify or describe any of
the county’s policies, procedures, practices, or customs relating to the incidents at issue; the

complaint does not identify any particular shortcomings in training or supervision or how those
shortcomings caused the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights; and it does not identify any other
previous instances of similar violations that would have put the county on notice of a problem. See
Okolo v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 892 F. Supp.2d 931, 944 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); Hutchison v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 685 F. Supp.2d 747, 751 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Johnson v. Metro. Gov’t
of Nashville, No. 3:10-cv-0589, 2010 WL 3619790, at *2-3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 13,
2010). Consequently, the Court finds that the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to
state a claim for municipal liability against the Hickman County. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims
against Defendant Sunder and Bragg in their official capacities (which are actually claims against
Hickman County, Tennessee) therefore must be dismissed.
3. First Amendment retaliation claims
The complaint alleges that Jail Administrator Braggs placed Plaintiff in solitary
confinement because Plaintiff requested to pray in the jail’s library and identified his religion as

Muslim. A prisoner's claim that prison officials have retaliated against him for engaging in
protected conduct is grounded in the First Amendment. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388
(6th Cir. 1999). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation within the context of Section 1983, a
plaintiff must prove that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken
against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that
conduct; and (3) the defendant’s conduct was substantially motivated at least in part by retaliation
for the plaintiff’s protected speech and conduct. Id. at 394-99. Plaintiff has the burden of proof on
all three elements. Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003).
Although the complaint does not explicitly set forth a retaliation claim, the Court finds that

it is appropriate under the record presented to consider a retaliation claim against Defendant
Braggs. In Hill, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a First Amendment
retaliation claim on initial review, emphasizing that the essential elements of such a claim are not
overly difficult to establish, “especially in light of the ‘indulgent treatment’ that ‘[c]ourts are
instructed to give . . . to the ‘inartfully pleaded’ allegations of pro se prison litigants.” Hill, 630
F.3d at 471 (quoting Pasley v. Conerly, 345 F. App’x 981, 986 (6th Cir. 2009)). The Court of
Appeals indicated that, where the facts alleged in a prisoner’s complaint are sufficient to support
these elements, the claim should go forward even if the inmate “fails to explicitly state” that he is
making a First Amendment retaliation claim or does not “make an effective argument for that
claim in his . . . complaint.” Id. (citing Pasley, 345 F. App’x at 986). Thus, the Court considers
whether the pro se complaint alleges a non-frivolous retaliation claim under Section 1983 against
Defendant Braggs.
Here, Plaintiff’s efforts to exercise his Muslim faith “are activities protected by the
Constitution.” Lumbard v. Lillywhite, 815 F. App’x 826, 834 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Noble v.

Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Second, placement in solitary confinement “would likely have a strong deterrent effect” on
a prisoner’s protected activity. Id. at 835 (finding that prisoner-plaintiff’s allegation that he was
placed in the “drunk tank,” a “filthy, chaotic, and overcrowded” space as a result of engaging in
protected activities, plaintiff’s allegation rose above a de minimis deprivation” and met the third
element of a retaliation claim under Section 1983); see also Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398-99
(holding that when prison officials placed an inmate in “the area of the prison used to house
mentally disturbed inmates” it “would likely have a strong deterrent effect” on the inmate’s
protected activities”).

Finally, the complaint specifically alleges that Defendant Bragg placed Plaintiff in solitary
confinement directly after asking Plaintiff which religion he practiced and that Defendant Bragg
stated that he placed Plaintiff in solitary confinement “because of [his] religion, so [he] could
pray.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5). See Hill, 630 F.3d at 475-76 (retaliatory motive can be supported by
circumstantial evidence including “the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals or the
temporal proximity between the prisoner’s protected conduct and the official’s adverse action”)
(citing Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 525-26, (6th Cir. 2010)). In addition, although
he was not required to do so at this state of the proceedings, Plaintiff attached to his complaint a
witness statement in which inmate Joseph S. Gibbs states, under penalty of perjury, that he
overheard Defendant Bragg “laughing about an incident that had just taken place” and stating “I’m
going to take Howes and Wilkins and put them in the hole so they can practice whatever fucking
religion they want.” (Doc. No. 1 at 14). The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that
the punitive actions taken by Bragg were motivated by Plaintiff’s stated desire to engage in Muslim
prayer. Compare Lumbard, 815 F. App’x at 835 (finding that prisoner-plaintiff had sufficiently

alleged that prison officials’ adverse action was caused by plaintiff’s protected activities when
plaintiff alleged that an officer told him plaintiff was being moved to a holding cell because of his
mother’s calls and, in a conversation with plaintiff’s counsel, the officer insinuated that she was
going to move plaintiff out of the holding cell but threatened to reconsider after receiving a
complaint from plaintiff’s counsel) to Oliver v. Gray, No. 2:19-cv-619, 2020 WL 5972920, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2020) (finding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment where
plaintiff alleged that defendant placed plaintiff in segregation “for trying to protect his interest to
exercise his Islamic faith” but plaintiff’s statement contained no details about the alleged protected
First Amendment activity he was engaged in or any allegations about causation that would explain

how or why defendant’s conduct was motivated by plaintiff’s practice of his faith). The Court
therefore finds that the complaint states a non-frivolous First Amendment retaliation claim against
Bragg in his individual capacity under Section 1983. This claim will proceed.
For the same reasons that Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise official capacity claims
against Defendants Sunder and Bragg fail, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation official capacity
claim against Bragg fails. That claim will be dismissed.
4. Eighth Amendment claims
Next, the complaint alleges that Defendant Bragg violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment when Bragg placed Plaintiff in solitary confinement for “a few
hours” for stating that he is a Muslim and asking to pray in the jail library.
It is well-settled that “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Pfeiffer v. Butler Cty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 1:10CV672, 2012
WL 1203557, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2012) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994)). And the Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates from “cruel and unusual
punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which includes “extreme deprivations” that deny “the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981)). “But the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees like [plaintiff].” Greene
v. Crawford Cty., Mich., 22 F.4th 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Graham ex rel. Est. of Graham
v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 382 n.3 (6th Cir. 2004)). State pretrial detainees are instead

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1; Greene, 22 F.4th at 605; Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on
other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 n.9 (2007).
The Due Process Clause “provides similar if not greater protections than the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause” of the Eighth Amendment. Spencer, 449 F.3d at 727 (citing Cty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1998) and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
To state a claim under either Fourteenth Amendment in this context, a plaintiff must allege (among
other things) that an objectively “sufficiently serious” deprivation has occurred, “resulting in a
denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’” Francis v. Altiere, 491 F. App'x
539, 541 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); Spencer, 449 F.3d at 728.
Confinement in segregation “is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably
anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-73
(1983). Thus, it is considered atypical and significant only in “extreme circumstances.” Joseph v.

Curtin, 410 Fed. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010). Generally, courts will consider the nature and
duration of a stay in segregation to determine whether it imposes an “atypical and significant
hardship.” Harden–Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2008). Conditions of confinement
claims “are highly fact-specific, but one guiding principle is that the length of exposure to the
conditions is often paramount.” Lamb v. Howe, 677 F. App'x 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2017). Further,
“[e]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson,
503 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added). “Allegations about temporary inconveniences, e.g., being deprived
of a lower bunk, subjected to a flooded cell, or deprived of a working toilet, do not demonstrate
that the conditions fell beneath the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities as measured by

a contemporary standard of decency.” Pena v. Brown, No. 2:20-cv-250, 2021 WL 4350124, at *5
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2021) (collecting cases).
With regard to the nature of Plaintiff’s stay in solitary confinement, there are no allegations
in the complaint concerning the conditions Plaintiff faced. Plaintiff does not claim that he was
denied adequate food, clothing, shelter, recreation, or medical care while in solitary confinement.
Neither has he alleged any injury or harm as a result of the alleged conditions of his solitary
confinement. With regard to the duration of Plaintiff’s confinement in solitary confinement, the
complaint alleges that Plaintiff was there for “a few hours.” (Doc .No. 1 at 13).
Although the Court does not condone Defendant Bragg’s alleged action, the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s described stay in solitary confinement for a few hours, without more, did not
constitute “an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87; see Williams v. Wilkinson, 51 Fed. App’x 553, 557
(6th Cir. 2002) (where, as punishment for the drug test that prison authorities allege plaintiff failed,

plaintiff received a suspended fifteen-day sentence in disciplinary segregation, he lost a promised
reduction in his security classification, was denied a furlough, and had to participate in a substance
abuse program that interfered with his ability to earn money at his prison employment, court held
that none of these punitive measures qualifies as a “significant and atypical hardship.”); Brunello
v. Limbalm, No. 3:19-cv-P571-DJH, 2019 WL 4060869, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 28, 2019) (finding
that plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, who was placed in solitary confinement, then in “super max,” and
then on lockdown, and denied certain privileges for approximately 32 days even though he did not
commit a disciplinary infraction did not state a due process claim for the loss of privileges and
confinement to segregation). There, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment

claim against Bragg in his individual capacity fails to state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief
can be granted, and the claim will be dismissed.
There are no allegations in the complaint supporting an official capacity claim against
Bragg under the Eighth Amendment. Any such claim will be dismissed.
5. RLUIPA claims
The complaint also alleges claims under RLUIPA against Defendants Bragg and Sunder.
RLUIPA “provide[s] very broad protection for religious liberty.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356
(2015). RLUIPA “prohibits state and local governments from placing ‘a substantial burden’ on the
‘religious exercise’ of any inmate unless they establish that the burden furthers a ‘compelling
governmental interest’ and does so in the ‘least restrictive’ way.” Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d
554, 559 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2)). RLUIPA defines “ ‘religious
exercise’ capaciously to include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief.’” Holt, 574 U.S. at 358 (quoting § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). Congress
specified that RLUIPA “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to

the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” § 2000cc-3(g).
Courts have recognized that, in the prison context, RLUIPA provides greater protections than the
First Amendment. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 296 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Lovelace v. Lee,
472 F.3d 174, 199–200 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Analysis under RLUIPA is a “three-act play.” Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455,
458 (6th Cir. 2019). First, “the inmate must demonstrate that he seeks to exercise religion out of a
‘sincerely held religious belief.’” Id. (quoting Holt, 574 U.S. at 361). So long as the practice is
traceable to a sincerely held religious belief, see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13
(2005), it does not matter whether the inmates’ preferred exercise is “central” to his faith, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-5(7)(A). Second, the inmate “must show that the government substantially burdened that
religious exercise.” Cavin, 927 F.3d at 458. While the phrase “substantial burden” is not defined
in RLUIPA, courts have concluded that a burden is substantial where it forces an individual to
choose between the tenets of his religion and foregoing governmental benefits or places
“substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Living
Water Church of God v. Charter Township of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 733-34 (6th Cir. Dec.
10, 2007) (citations omitted); see also Marshall v. Frank, No. x, 2007 WL 1556872, at *5 (W.D.
Wis. May 24, 2007). A burden is less than “substantial” where it imposes merely an
“inconvenience on religious exercise,” see, e.g., Konikov v. Orange County, Florida, 410 F.3d
1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005), or does not “pressure the individual to violate his or her religious
beliefs.” Living Water Church of God v. Charter Township of Meridian, 258 F. App’x at 734.
Upon satisfaction of these two steps, the burden then shifts to the government for the third act: it
“must meet the daunting compelling-interest and least-restrictive-means test.” Id.
Here, even if for purposes of the required PLRA screening the Court assumes that Plaintiff

seeks to pray out of a “sincerely held religious belief,” the complaint fails to allege that Officer
Sunder “substantially burdened” Plaintiff’s religious exercise. While the complaint alleges that
Officer Sunder denied Plaintiff’s request to pray in the jail library, the complaint does not allege
that Officer Sunder actually impeded Plaintiff’s ability to exercise his Muslim religion. And
importantly, the complaint does not allege that communal worship (such as that which Plaintiff
may have been seeking if, in fact, communal worship was occurring in the jail library at the time
Plaintiff requested access) is an important tenet of Plaintiff’s religion.1 See, e.g., Fox v.
Washington, 949 F.3d 270, 279-80 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding that prisoner-plaintiffs met their burden
under step two of RLUIPA by alleging that lack of communal worship creates substantial pressure

to violate plaintiffs’ religious beliefs) (citing Cavin, 927 F.3d 455, where prison officials prevented
Wiccan inmate from observing holiday called Esbats with other Wiccan inmates which caused
plaintiff hardship, as he believed that “Esbat services have ‘more energy’ ‘when you have a
collective of Wiccans together.’”); see also Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d 1076, 1083 (6th Cir. 2019)
(“Denying a Muslim inmate the opportunity to partake in Eid would substantially burden his free
exercise rights, so Maye has alleged a deprivation of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause.”);
Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1989) (similarly finding a substantial burden for
denying Jewish prisoners’ participation in Passover Seder). As such, the Court does not reach the

1 Further, the complaint does not allege that communal worship of any kind was occurring in the jail library on the
date Plaintiff requested to pray in the library.
third step of the RLUIPA analysis with respect to Defendant Sunder. Thus, Plaintiff’s individual-
capacity claim RLUIPA claim against Defendant Sunder fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, and the claim will be dismissed.
With respect to Defendant Bragg, the complaint alleges that he placed Plaintiff in solitary
confinement because of Plaintiff’s statement of Muslim faith and request to exercise his religion.

For purposes of the required PLRA screening, the Court finds that the alleged burden placed on
Plaintiff—knowing that Bragg has punished Plaintiff once already and exhibited a hostility toward
Plaintiff’s religion—could be viewed as “substantial” in that it places “substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Living Water Church of God, 258 F.
App’x 729, 733-34. Further, the complaint may be reasonably construed to imply that Bragg’s
actions are not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. The
Court therefore finds that Plaintiff states a colorable claim for violation of RLUIPA against Bragg
in his individual capacity.
The Court notes, however, that RLUIPA does not permit money damages against state

prison officials, even when the lawsuit targets the defendants in their individual capacities. Haight
v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 569 (6th Cir. 2014). As a result, Plaintiff may not recover damages
under RLUIPA from Defendant Bragg in his individual capacity.
With respect to Plaintiff’s official capacity claims under RLUIPA against Defendants
Sunder and Bragg, there are no allegations in the complaint supporting such claims. Those claims
will be dismissed. In any event, RLUIPA does not permit damages claim against prison officials
in their official capacities either. Resch v. Rink, No. 2:21-cv-227, 2022 WL 794849, at *8 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 16, 2022).
II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. No. 7). As grounds for his motion,
Plaintiff states that he is indigent and therefore unable to retain a private attorney; his imprisonment
will limit his ability to litigate; and counsel would better enable Plaintiff to present evidence and
cross examine witnesses at trial. (Id. at 1). However, an indigent plaintiff in a civil action, unlike

a defendant in a criminal action, has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel; rather,
the appointment of counsel in such cases is a privilege “justified only in exceptional
circumstances.” Miles v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-2218, 2020 WL 6121438, at *4 (6th Cir.
Aug. 20, 2020) (citing Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 2003); Lavado v. Keohane,
992 F.2d 601, 606-07 (6th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiff’s indigence alone, therefore, is not an exceptional
circumstance. Nor, at this time, do the circumstances presented necessitate appointment of counsel;
Plaintiff has filed an organized, fourteen-page complaint in which he sets forth the issues in this
case in an understandable manner. Thus, the appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time.
See Miles, 2020 WL 6121438, at *4. Accordingly, the Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 7)

will denied, but without prejudice to renewal by Plaintiff in the future if he can better explain why
exceptional circumstances justify the appointment of counsel.
III. CONCLUSION
Having conducted the screening required by the PRLA, the Court finds that any claims
against Defendant Warren in his individual or official capacity must be dismissed.
The complaint fails to state a First Amendment free exercise claim upon which relief can
be granted under Section 1983 against Officer Sunder in his individual capacity. Likewise,
Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claims under Section 1983 claims against Defendant
Sunder and Bragg in their official capacities (which are actually claims against Hickman County,
Tennessee) must be dismissed. However, the complaint states a colorable First Amendment free
exercise claim under Section 1983 against Defendant Bragg in his individual capacity. That claim
will proceed.
Next, the complaint states a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim under Section
1983 against Bragg in his individual capacity. That claim will proceed. Plaintiff's First
Amendment retaliation claim against Bragg in his official capacity, however, fails, and that claim
will be dismissed.
Further, Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against Bragg
in his individual capacity fails to state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted, and
that claim will be dismissed. There are no allegations in the complaint supporting an official
capacity claim against Bragg under the Eighth Amendment. Any such claim will be dismissed.
Finally, Plaintiffs individual-capacity RLUIPA claim against Defendant Sunder fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the claim will be dismissed. However, Plaintiff
states a colorable claim for violation of RLUIPA against Bragg in his individual capacity.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff may not recover damages under RLUIPA from Defendant Bragg in his
individual capacity. With respect to Plaintiff's official capacity claims under RLUIPA against
Defendants Sunder and Bragg, there are no allegations in the complaint supporting such claims.
Those claims will be dismissed.
Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 7) will be denied without
prejudice.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
a — L. CAMPBELIGR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438643. Public record. Not legal advice.