# Long v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · December 22, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438405

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** December 22, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438405

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding it clearly established that “[p]olice officers cannot, in good faith, rely on a judicial determination of probable cause when that determination was premised on an officer’s own material misrepresentations to the court”
- noting that whether an officer has probable cause to make an arrest depends on the elements of the charge as defined by state law
- recognizing that “the statutory definition of harassment ‘does not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose’” (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 315(a)(3)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JONATHAN D. LONG, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:22-cv-00267
) Judge Aleta A. Trauger
CITY OF CLARKSVILLE, )
TENNESSEE and JOSHUA LAJOIE, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM
Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 37), filed by
defendants City of Clarksville, Tennessee (“City”) and Joshua LaJoie. For the reasons set forth
herein, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The claims against the City and those
asserted against LaJoie in his official capacity, which are redundant of the claims against the City,
will be dismissed with prejudice. The motion will be denied, insofar as it seeks dismissal of the
claims against LaJoie in his individual capacity.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Defendant Joshua LaJoie is a police officer employed by the Clarksville Police Department
(“CPD”), which is an agency operated and maintained by the City. (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 7–8.) LaJoie
is sued in both his individual capacity and his official capacity. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff Jonathan Long
is an adult resident of the City.
On January 11, 2021, Julie Long, plaintiff Jonathan Long’s then-wife, obtained an ex parte
Order of Protection (“OOP”) against Jonathan Long, as a result of which he was not allowed
visitation with his minor children. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.) Julie Long filed for divorce on January 25, 2021.
(Id. ¶ 10.) The plaintiff believed that his children were at risk of danger while in Julie Long’s sole
custody, due to her history of mental health issues and alcohol abuse. (Id. ¶ 12.)
On February 17, 2021, the plaintiff’s divorce attorney, Nathan Hunt, entered into a contract
with Covert Results, LLC (“Covert”), a licensed investigation agency, for the purpose of gathering

information relevant to the plaintiff’s pending divorce and child custody proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 13,
15.) The contract, which is attached as an exhibit to the Amended Complaint, states that it is by
and between Covert and “Nathan Hunt on behalf of Jonathan Long” as the “client.” (Doc. No. 33-
1, at 1.) The contract was signed by a Covert representative and by Hunt for the “client.” (Id. at 6.)
The stated goals of the investigation were to “[c]onduct comprehensive search [and] gather
information for pending divorce suit.” (Id. at 1.) Hunt advised Covert on what the issues were and
what type of information was needed, but neither Hunt nor the plaintiff instructed Covert’s
investigators as to how to do their jobs (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 17, 18.) The plaintiff left the state to stay
with family in North Carolina while Covert conducted its investigation. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Bo Rice, the investigator designated by Covert to perform the investigation, installed two

surveillance video cameras in government utility rights of way—one across the street from Julie
Long’s house and one that was apparently trained on the home of Simone Ledbetter, a friend of
Julie Long’s. (Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 66, 87–88.) As part of his investigation, Rice also placed a vehicle
tracking device on a vehicle owned by Jonathan Long but driven by Julie Long. (Id. ¶ 98.) Any
information obtained by Covert in conducting its investigation and, specifically, related to the
placement of the video cameras was relevant to the pending divorce and child custody proceedings
and was communicated to the plaintiff only through his attorney. (Id. ¶ 21.) The plaintiff never
received information directly from Covert, and he did not receive “real-time” information or
“regular updates” about his wife’s activities from either Covert or his attorney. (Id. ¶¶ 21–23.)
On March 25, 2021, Nathan Hunt filed a “Motion to Remove Children from Order of
Protection and for Pendente Lite Visitation” in the plaintiff’s pending divorce case. (Id. ¶ 32; see
also Doc. No. 33-3.) This motion relied on information relayed directly to Hunt by Rice that was
obtained from his investigation, including specific dates and times between March 7 and March

23, 2021 when Julie Long had left the plaintiff’s and her minor children home alone for extended
periods of time. (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 33–34.) The plaintiff was not aware of “the specific dates and
times” until he received a copy of the motion from his attorney. (Id. ¶ 35.)
Meanwhile, however, on March 17, 2021, Simone Ledbetter found one of the video
cameras and took it to the CPD, where she spoke with Officer LaJoie and filed a report.1 (Doc.
No. 33 ¶¶ 24, 27–28.) LaJoie went to Ledbetter’s residence the next day to take photographs of the
location where the camera had been found. (Id. ¶ 29.) While there, he spoke with Ledbetter and
Julie Long, who was also there and from whom he learned about the OOP in place against Jonathan
Long. (Id. ¶¶ 29–30.) LaJoie “added Jonathan D. Long as a suspect.” (Id. ¶ 30.)
On March 29, 2021, Ledbetter emailed to LaJoie a copy of the motion Hunt had filed in

the Long divorce case, highlighting the section including the dates and times the Longs’ minor
children were left unattended. (Id. ¶ 36.)
LaJoie called the plaintiff on March 31, 2021. (Id. ¶ 37.)2 LaJoie told the plaintiff that he
was investigating a “possible violation” of the OOP and noted that the question of whether it had
been violated was a “gray area.” (Id. ¶ 38.) LaJoie asked the plaintiff how the dates in the motion
were obtained. (Id. ¶ 40.) Jonathan Long told LaJoie that his attorney had hired a private

1 The Amended Complaint does not explain this, but LaJoie’s Case Summary states that
Ledbetter told him she was going through a divorce and believed that her husband might have
“placed the camera in the yard to monitor her while he was out of state.” (Doc. No. 33-4, at 1.)
2 The plaintiff has manually filed an audio recording of this telephone call.
investigator to obtain information relevant to the divorce and specifically for the purpose of
obtaining additional child visitation for Jonathan Long. (Id. ¶ 42.) He told LaJoie that he was out
of state to avoid potential legal issues during the investigation and that the private investigator
gave information to his attorney, Hunt. (Id. ¶ 43–44.) He emailed LaJoie a copy of the Covert

contract. (Id. ¶ 59.)
The crux of the plaintiff’s allegations is that LaJoie “intentionally misrepresented the
information provided by Mr. Long in this telephone call in the case summary and incident report
created by Defendant LaJoie” “as part of his investigation.” (Id. ¶¶ 46, 99–100.) The allegedly
false representations in LaJoie’s Case Summary include statements that Jonathan Long told him
that (1) the private investigator provided the details supplied in the motion filed by Hunt to “his
attorney and himself” (id. ¶ 49); (2) Jonathan Long received “regular updates” regarding Julie
Long and her whereabouts (id. ¶ 51); and (3) he received “updates of the investigation through his
attorney” (id. ¶ 53). The plaintiff also alleges that the Case Summary falsely states that the private
investigator contract was “between” Covert, Hunt, and Jonathan Long. (Id. ¶¶ 55–57.) According

to the plaintiff, LaJoie knew that statement was false, because Jonathan Long told LaJoie that his
attorney had hired a private investigator and LaJoie was in possession of a copy of the contract
with Covert, which states that it is “with Nathan Hunt, Mr. Long’s attorney” and was signed by
Hunt, not Jonathan Long. (Id. ¶¶ 58–61.)
The plaintiff also complains that LaJoie “omitted from his reports” that he went to Simone
Ledbetter’s residence on March 17, 20201 and “omitted information regarding the conversation
he had with Julie Long.” (Id. ¶ 31.)
LaJoie went to Julie Long’s residence on April 1, 2021 and searched for another video
camera, which he found across the street from her house in a utility right of way. (Id. ¶¶ 63–64,
66.) LaJoie told Julie Long and Ledbetter, who was also present, that the video camera belonged
to a private investigator hired by Jonathan Long’s attorney and that “it was legit.” (Id. ¶¶ 68–71.)
The plaintiff complains that LaJoie falsely stated in his report that he “noticed” a camera when he
actually “intentionally and actively searched” for the camera. (Id. ¶ 65.) He also complains that

LaJoie omitted from his reports the involvement of the individual on whose property the second
camera was located, the handling of the camera by various people, and the fact that the “integrity
and chain of command of the camera” was “breached.” (Id. ¶¶ 84, 85–86.)
On April 2, 2021, LaJoie spoke with Bo Rice, who confirmed that both cameras were his
and that he had placed them in the locations where they were found. (Id. ¶ 88.) Rice told LaJoie
that he did not update Jonathan Long directly but that he updated Long’s attorney. (Id. ¶ 89.) In
his Case Summary and associated April 2, 2021 Incident Report, LaJoie falsely stated that Rice
told him that he updated Jonathan Long “on the findings of the investigation.” (Id. ¶ 94–95; Doc.
No. 33-4, at 2; No. 33-5, at 4.)
Based on LaJoie’s investigative materials, a Montgomery County Grand Jury returned an

indictment charging Jonathan Long with aggravated stalking, a felony, in violation of Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-315; electronic tracking of a motor vehicle, a misdemeanor, in violation of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-606; and violating an order of protection, a misdemeanor, in violation of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-113. (Doc. No. 33 ¶ 101.) According to the plaintiff, the Grand Jury’s probable
cause finding was based in part on the Case Summary and April 2, 2021 Incident Report created
by LaJoie during his investigation and which contained “false statements [and] omissions.” (Id. ¶
102.)
LaJoie arrested Jonathan Long on April 16, 2021 based on the “falsely secured” indictment.
(Id. ¶ 104.) LaJoie took the plaintiff into custody for booking, and Jonathan Long spent six to eight
hours in the Montgomery County Jail before bonding out. (Id. ¶¶ 105. 111.)
The OOP was dismissed by agreed order on June 21, 2021. (Id. ¶ 112.) The criminal
charges against Jonathan Long were dismissed by motion of the State on December 16, 2021. (Id.
¶ 117.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff filed his original Complaint on April 14, 2022, in response to which the
defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. The plaintiff thereafter sought and was granted leave to
amend his pleading to address deficiencies identified in the first Motion to Dismiss. The Amended
Complaint, filed on July 11, 2022, states claims based on the above-referenced factual allegations
against LaJoie in both his individual capacity and official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts
I and II); against LaJoie, in his individual capacity, under state law for false arrest/false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts III,
IV, and V); and against the City, under § 1983, for inadequate training, supervision, or discipline
of the officers of the CPD (Count III).
The defendants thereafter filed their Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and

supporting Memorandum, invoking Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc.
Nos. 37, 40.) The plaintiff filed his Response in opposition to the defendants’ motion (Doc. No.
42), and the defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. No. 45).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
will “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d
471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2002). “Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The court must determine only whether “the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims,” not whether the plaintiff can ultimately

prove the facts alleged. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (quoting Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
The complaint’s allegations, however, “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. To establish the “facial plausibility” required to
“unlock the doors of discovery,” the plaintiff cannot rely on “legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” but, instead, the plaintiff must plead “factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). “[O]nly a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
According to the Supreme Court, “plausibility” occupies that wide space between “possibility”

and “probability.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If a reasonable court can draw the necessary inference
from the factual material stated in the complaint, the plausibility standard has been satisfied.
Generally, if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
At the same time, however, it has long been the rule that a court may consider, not only the
complaint and exhibits attached to it, but also exhibits attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss,
“so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.”
Brent v. Wayne Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 694 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
A court may also consider public records without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule
56 motion. Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Claims Against the City
The defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a
claim under § 1983 against the City.
The Amended Complaint purports to state a claim against the City based on “municipal

and supervisory liability.” (Doc. No. 33, at 17.) In support of such a claim, it first states that the
plaintiff needs to take discovery of the City’s policy and procedure manuals to “determine
inadequate policies and instructions provided to officers which can rise to the level of deliberate
indifference”; to determine whether the City has “a deficient internal affairs/disciplinary procedure
which would be the cause of Defendant LaJoie not being afraid to lie under oath”; to examine
LaJoie’s disciplinary file to determine whether the City has ignored prior complaints or poor
evaluations of LaJoie; and to find out whether some “supervisor” aided LaJoie or “approved the
false information.” (Doc. No. 33 ¶ 153(a)–(d).) The Amended Complaint also asserts that the City
“lacked safeguards to prevent officers from going to the grand jury to indict citizens who have not

committed a crime.” (Id. ¶ 154.) Acknowledging the absence of actual evidence that the City has
adopted inadequate policies or procedures, the Amended Complaint states, “pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(b)(3), it is believed that” the allegations regarding inadequate policies and procedures
“will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery.” (Doc. No. 33 ¶ 153.)
The Amended Complaint also asserts in a wholly conclusory fashion that the City “failed
to provide adequate training, supervision and discipline” “in regards to false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution”; that the City was “aware of training issues with
Defendant LaJoie”; and that it was “deliberately indifferent to the known consequences of its
failure to adequately train, supervise and discipline” CPD police officers “in regards to false arrest,
false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.” (Id. ¶¶ 156–58.)
For a municipality to be liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that, “through its
deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Alman v.

Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
404 (1997)). A plaintiff may do this by showing that the municipality had a “policy or custom”
that caused the violation of his rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
There are four methods of showing the municipality had such a policy or custom: the plaintiff may
prove “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official
with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of
inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence
of federal rights violations.” Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)).
This standard must also be applied in conjunction with the pleading standard outlined

above. Under Twombly, a complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. That is, “a plaintiff’s obligation [under Rule 8] to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is not enough to avoid dismissal. Id. at 555 (citations
omitted). Even though a complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the plaintiff effectively admits in the Amended Complaint that he has no evidence of
the existence of unconstitutional or inadequate municipal policies or procedures. Instead, the
plaintiff believes that discovery will reveal the existence of such unconstitutional or inadequate
policies. “The mere fact that someone believes something to be true,” however, “does not create a

plausible inference that it is true.” In re Darvocet Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 931 (6th Cir.
2014) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551). In addition, as the Sixth Circuit has recognized, under
Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]he plaintiff may not use the discovery process to obtain these facts [to
support his claims] after filing suit.” New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d
1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, if the complaint does not satisfy Rule 8 from the outset, the
plaintiff “is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686.
Similarly, while the Amended Complaint asserts that the City was “aware of training issues
with Defendant LaJoie” and was “deliberately indifferent to the known consequences of its failure
to adequately train” (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 157, 158), the pleading does not contain actual facts to support
these conclusory assertions. The “inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983

liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1988). To
show such deliberate indifference, the plaintiff generally must allege “prior instances of
unconstitutional conduct” showing that the City “ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on
notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Plinton v.
Cty. of Summit, 540 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2008). Alternatively, he may show “a single violation
of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees
to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.” Id. (quoting
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
In this case, the plaintiff has alleged no facts showing deliberate indifference to the known
or obvious deficiencies in training. Instead, the Amended Complaint, insofar as it is directed to the
City, contains nothing more than the “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements” and “legal conclusion[s] couched as a factual

allegation[s]” that the Supreme Court has held “do not suffice” to state a claim for which relief
may be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The § 1983 claims against the City are not supported by actual facts and will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.3 The official-capacity claims against
LaJoie, which the plaintiff concedes are redundant of the claims against the City, will likewise be
dismissed. Because the plaintiff confirms in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss that the state
law claims are asserted against LaJoie in his individual capacity only, the dismissal of the § 1983
claims against the City will result in the dismissal of all claims against the City.
B. The Section 1983 Claims Against LaJoie
1. Absolute Immunity
Defendant LaJoie4 argues, first, that he has absolute immunity from liability for any claims

arising from his grand jury testimony or preparatory activities leading up to that testimony, under

3 The plaintiff’s invocation of Rule 11 is unavailing. For one thing, the case to which the
plaintiff cites, Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 546 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2008), does not make any
reference to Twombly, and it predates Iqbal. In addition, the plaintiffs in Brown argued that the
district court should have afforded them discovery to “flesh out the details” of their fraud
allegations before dismissing their RICO claims under Rule 9. The court took note of that argument
but did not reach the question of whether Rule 11(b)(3) “may relax Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement,” because it found that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded a pattern of racketeering
activity for purposes of their RICO claim, even without consideration of the dismissed allegations.
Brown, 546 F.3d at 349 n.4. The plaintiff here has not asserted any fraud claims, and Rule 8, rather
than Rule 9, is at issue.
4 Having determined that the claims against the City must be dismissed, the court will refer
to LaJoie, in the singular, as the “defendant” for the remainder of this opinion.
Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (2012). He is correct as to Rehberg’s holding. See id. at 369 (“[A]
grand jury witness has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness’ testimony.
. . . [T]his rule may not be circumvented by claiming that a grand jury witness conspired to present
false testimony or by using evidence of the witness’ testimony to support any other § 1983 claim

concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution.”). The plaintiff here, however, does not
bring a claim based on LaJoie’s grand jury testimony or preparation for his grand jury testimony.
The plaintiff, in fact, disclaims any knowledge as to whether LaJoie even testified before the grand
jury. (See Doc. No. 42, at 2–3.) The court, therefore, rejects the defendants’ assertion that LaJoie
is entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 under Rehberg.
2. Section 1983 Claims
A false arrest claim requires, among other elements, that “the arresting officer lacked
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” Voyticky v. Vill. of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir.
2005). A federal malicious prosecution claim similarly requires, among other elements, that the
defendant officer “helped start a prosecution against [the plaintiff] without probable cause.” Howse
v. Hodous, 953 F.3d 402, 408 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 209 L. Ed. 2d 252 (Mar. 8, 2021). The

“decisive Fourth Amendment question” for both of Long’s § 1983 claims against LaJoie is whether
LaJoie had probable cause to believe that Long had committed the crimes charged in the indictment
and for which he was arrested and detained. Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 2020).
As a general rule, a grand jury indictment establishes probable cause. See Barnes v. Wright,
449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t has long been settled that the finding of an indictment, fair
upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of
probable cause.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). There are, of course, exceptions
to this general rule. Notably, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that a plaintiff may “overcome the
presumption of probable cause created by [the] indictment,” where he shows that
1) a law-enforcement officer, in the course of setting a prosecution in motion, either
knowingly or recklessly makes false statements (such as in affidavits or
investigative reports) or falsifies or fabricates evidence; (2) the false statements and
evidence, together with any concomitant misleading omissions, are material to the
ultimate prosecution of the plaintiff; and (3) the false statements, evidence, and
omissions do not consist solely of grand-jury testimony or preparation for that
testimony . . . .
King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 587 (6th Cir. 2017).
In this case, for purposes of his motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims on this basis, LaJoie
does not contest that the Amended Complaint adequately alleges that LaJoie set in motion the
prosecution of Jonathan Long. As set forth above, it is clear that the allegedly false statements—
which are contained in LaJoie’s Case Summary and Incident Report—do not consist solely of his
grand jury testimony or preparation for such testimony. The defendant argues here that the
plaintiff’s claims should nonetheless be dismissed, because the allegedly false statements either
were not false or were not material to the grand jury’s findings and, likewise, that the alleged
omissions emphasized in the Amended Complaint were not material to the charges against the
plaintiff. (Doc. No. 40, at 9–19.) Although the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss enumerates and
discusses each of the allegedly false statements highlighted in the Amended Complaint in order to
refute or attempt to refute whether they were actually false5 or material, the Motion to Dismiss
does not actually touch upon the elements of the charged offenses, for purposes of showing

5 Some of the allegedly false statements were clearly neither false nor material, such as
LaJoie’s representation that the contract with Covert was between Covert and Hunt and Jonathan
Long. In fact, as set forth above, it is clear from the face of the contract that Hunt, the lawyer,
signed the contract “on behalf of” Jonathan Long. In other words, the contract indicates that Hunt
entered it as Long’s agent, for purposes of binding Long. See Corp. Flight Mgmt., Inc. v. Tal
Aviation, S.A., No. M2018-01492-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 4052493, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
28, 2019) (“Agency is a relationship between a principal and an agent in which the principal gives
the agent authority to act on the principal’s behalf, subject to the principal’s control, and the agent
consents to do so.” (citing Savage v. Cty. of Memphis, 464 S.W.3d 326, 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
whether the allegedly false statements were material to those charges.6 That omission significantly
undermines LaJoie’s argument that the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were not
material. See, e.g., Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that whether an
officer has probable cause to make an arrest depends on the elements of the charge as defined by
state law).7

Notably, “stalking” is defined as a “willful course of conduct involving repeated or
continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that actually causes the
victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-315(a)(4) (emphasis added). Although a “course of conduct” includes “acts in which
the defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or
means, . . . monitors, observes, [or] surveils . . . a person,” id. § 39-17-315(a)(1) (emphasis added),
the term “harassment” is expressly defined to exclude from its scope “constitutionally protected
activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.” Id. § 39-17-315(a)(3). In other words, that a

defendant is engaged in constitutionally protected conduct or conduct that serves a legitimate
purpose is not merely an affirmative defense; such conduct falls instead outside the scope of the

6 Although under Tennessee law “each count of a multiple-count indictment is a separate
indictment,” State v. Welch, 586 S.W.3d 399, 402 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), neither party distinguishes among the charges in the indictment for
purposes of their probable cause arguments.
7 The defendants reference the stalking statute in their Reply, and they also argue for the
first time in their Reply that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for false arrest, because
the plaintiff does not allege that he was arrested without appropriate process. (See Doc. No. 45, at
2 (citing Cross v. Metro. Gov’t, No. 3-12-1109, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175356, *14 (M.D. Tenn.
2014)).) Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are generally deemed waived, as the
opposing party has no real opportunity to contest them. Accord Palazzo v. Harvey, 380 F. Supp.
3d 723, 730 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (Crenshaw, C.J.) (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d
546, 553 (6th Cir. 2008)).
definition of stalking. See Purifoy v. Mafa, 556 S.W.3d 170, 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017)
(recognizing that “the statutory definition of harassment ‘does not include constitutionally
protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose’” (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
315(a)(3)).

Thus, although surveillance by a third party private investigator could still be attributed to
the defendant who hired the investigator, such surveillance is not illegal if it is for a legitimate
purpose—such as the preparation of a motion in a child custody proceeding showing that one’s
spouse is leaving the couple’s minor children unattended for substantial periods of time. Although
LaJoie included in his Case Summary Jonathan Long’s statement to him that his attorney had hired
a private investigator “as part of an effort for Mr. Long to have the protection order . . . amended
to allow unsupervised visits [with] his daughters” (Doc. No. 33-4, at 1), he did not reference the
information included in the motion filed by Hunt, even though he was in possession of a copy of
the motion. Moreover, LaJoie stated in his investigatory materials that the plaintiff was speaking
directly with the private investigator and receiving regular updates from the private investigator

regarding his wife’s activities. At this juncture, the court finds that the plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to support an inference that LaJoie’s misrepresentations regarding the plaintiff’s direct
contacts with the investigator and the degree to which he received updates about the investigation
were material to the grand jury’s finding that the surveillance was not—or at least not entirely—
conducted for a legitimate purpose and, therefore, that there was probable cause for the aggravated
stalking charge and alleged violation of the OOP.
In sum, the court finds that the plaintiff has adequately alleged facts to rebut the inference
of probable cause created by the indictment and to support his § 1983 claims: that LaJoie
knowingly or recklessly made false statements regarding Jonathan Long’s direct contacts with the
private investigator; that the false statements combined with the omission of the evidence that the
investigation was for a legitimate purpose were material to the ultimate prosecution of the plaintiff;
and that the false statements did not consist solely of grand-jury testimony or preparation for that
testimony. King, 852 F.3d at 587.

3. Qualified Immunity
That conclusion does not entirely resolve LaJoie’s motion, as he also argues in the
alternative that he is entitled to qualified immunity, because the Amended Complaint fails to plead
facts demonstrating that he violated Long’s clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.
(Doc. No. 40, at 19.)
A defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity is a “threshold question to be resolved at
the earliest possible point.” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted). That point is “usually summary judgment and not dismissal under Rule 12,” id., but it is
nonetheless well established that the defense of qualified immunity can properly be asserted in a
Rule 12 motion. See, e.g., Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 240 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“Although a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) invites an inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the

complaint, not an analysis of potential defenses to the claims set forth therein, dismissal
nevertheless is appropriate when the defendant is entitled to a meritorious affirmative defense such
as qualified immunity.”).
“The qualified-immunity doctrine shields government officials performing discretionary
functions from civil liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights.” Quigley v.
Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In considering a qualified
immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage, the Sixth Circuit applies a “two-tiered inquiry.”
Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Martin v. City of Broadview
Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013)). “The first step is to determine [whether] the facts
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Id. If the plaintiff has shown a violation of
a constitutional right, then “[t]he second [step] is to ask if the right at issue was ‘clearly established’
when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated
it.” Id. “Both inquiries must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor for the claim to proceed.” Id. at

429. Under “longstanding principle,” “‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high
level of generality.’” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73 (2017) ) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 742 (2011)). Rather, “the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the
case.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). At the same time, the Sixth
Circuit has warned that granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified
immunity may be inappropriate when the “clearly established” inquiry turns on “case-specific
details that must be fleshed out in discovery.” Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 765 (6th Cir. 2021).
As set forth above, the court has found that the plaintiff has adequately alleged facts
showing that he was indicted, arrested, and prosecuted without probable cause. Moreover, it was
clearly established at the time that an arrest that was not supported by probable cause violates the

Fourth Amendment. See Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 875 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he right
to be free from arrest without probable cause is a quintessential example[] of [a] clearly established
constitutional right.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Stahl v. Coshocton Cty.,
754 F. App’x 335 (6th Cir. 2018) (“It is a well-settled principle of constitutional jurisprudence that
an arrest without probable cause constitutes an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”). Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that individuals have a clearly
established Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution by a defendant who
has ‘made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff’ by, for example,
‘knowingly or recklessly’ making false statements that are material to the prosecution either in
reports or in affidavits filed to secure warrants.” King, 852 F.3d at 582–83(6th Cir. 2017); see also
Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 758 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding it clearly established that
“[p]olice officers cannot, in good faith, rely on a judicial determination of probable cause when
that determination was premised on an officer’s own material misrepresentations to the court”).

The plaintiff alleges that LaJoie knowingly made false statements in his Case Summary
and Incident Report and that these false statements were material to the grand jury’s finding of
probable cause and, thus, to the plaintiff’s prosecution. LaJoie argues in only the most cursory
fashion that he is entitled to summary judgment. (See Doc. No. 40, at 19 (“Officer LaJoie
respectfully requests dismissal of the claims against him based on qualified immunity, considering
that the Amended Complaint fails to plead facts demonstrating that he violated any clearly
established Constitutional or statutory right of the Plaintiff.”); Doc. No. 45, at 6 (“Further,
considering that the Amended Complaint fails to adequately plead any Constitutional violation,
Officer LaJoie reiterates that he has qualified immunity.”).) The court finds at this stage in the
proceedings that there is a material factual dispute as to whether LaJoie knowingly made false

statements in his investigative materials that were material to the prosecution of Jonathan Long.
Based on the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint, LaJoie is not entitled, at this stage, to
qualified immunity.
4. State Law Claims
The defendants’ Motion to Dismiss does not address the state law claims against LaJoie.
Because the court will deny the motion, insofar as it is directed to the federal claims over which
the court has original jurisdiction, the court will continue to exercise jurisdiction over the
supplemental state law claims.
19

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the court will grant in part and deny in part the defendants’
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. All claims against the City of Clarksville and the
official-capacity claims against LaJoie will be dismissed, but the motion will be denied, insofar as
it seeks dismissal of the claims against Officer LaJoie in his individual capacity.
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438405. Public record. Not legal advice.